

TABLE OF CONTENTS

<u>Foreword</u>	7
<u>The Germans and their fractured relationship to their own history</u> ..	15
My entry into politics	19
My role on July 20, 1944 in Berlin.....	24
The events in the Bendlerblock.....	40
<u>Stauffenberg's assassination attempt in the Führer's headquarters</u> ..	59
The assassin Colonel Claus Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg . .	67
Other planned Attentate	84
<u>July 20 in Paris</u>	96
The invasion battle in France	
- Sabotage on the invasion front by the "Foreign Armies West"	
section of the Army High Command.....	112
- No timely alerting of the troops.....	119
- The different assessment of the weather situation	127
- Betrayal and sabotage during the invasion.....	132
- Was the invasion battle really unwinnable?.....	136
- The end of Stülpnagel, Kluge and Rommel.....	140
Were the conspirators really the role models that one legend tries to portray them as today?.....	159
Who was to blame for the downfall of the 6th Army in Stalingrad? . . .	172
<u>The momentous betrayal by Dr. Richard Sorge</u>	188
The betrayal under the chief of defense Admiral Canaris	195

The military betrayal of attack dates	211
<u>The treason of the conspirators in the Foreign Office.....</u>	<u>230</u>
Espionage under the cloak of resistance	242
The "Red Orchestra" and the resistance	246
German technical development far ahead of the Western powers	264
The betrayal of the Peenemünde Research Institute.....	269
Betrayal and sabotage in the development of the German atomic bomb	281
Concluding remarks	302
Plan of the briefing in the guest barracks at the Führer's headquarters in Rastenburg "Wolfsschanze" on July 20, 1944 ..	312
Appendix	
- Annex 1 Secret Reich matter	
I. Order to the Wehrmacht commander -of Berlin.....	313
- Annex 2 Secret Reich matter	
II. Order to the Wehrmacht site commander of Berlin	313
- Enclosure 3 Secret Reich matter Order to Pz. troop school.....	315
- Annex 4 Secret Reich matter	
To the commander of the Pz. troop school	315
- Annex 5 Standing Orders No. 1	316
- Annex 6 Standing Orders No. 2	316
- Annex 7 Standing Orders No. 3	317
- Annex 8 Standing Orders No. 4	317
- Annex 9 Standing Orders No. 5	319
- Appendix 10 Table of deaths of the conspirators of July 20, 1944	320
- Annex 11 Witness statement of Baron Vansittart	325
Index of names.....	326
List of sources.....	335

FOREWORD

The seeds are sown! The spirits that our leaders have been calling out since the end of the war by justifying and glorifying the July 20th resistance will not be shaken off.

The system changers, chaotic people, terrorists, anti-militarists and Marxists have long since begun their march through the institutions and are resisting our state as a matter of course, but the politicians in charge have nothing to oppose them other than raving about the "most liberal constitutional state" in our history. They know how to protect themselves with police and border guards, but are unable to protect our women, old people and children from the mob and terror of the streets.

In his speech honoring the resistance on July 20, 1981, Federal President Professor Carstens objected to "deriving the right to fight against our state today from the citizen's right to resist" and emphasized that he was living in an unprecedented liberal order.

Well, our freedom-loving citizens, who are also in need of security, are certainly happy to do without an order in which short-sighted politicians are incapable of governing the people according to a grand law that is useful in itself, and for decades have allowed managers in the mass media who are alien to the people to educate our young generation to be irresponsible towards their parents and the state and, moreover, to have the audacity to burden our people with eternal stigma because they overwhelmingly declared their support for the Nazi state in the Third Reich, which was an unjust state.

Since 1945, our traitors and saboteurs of the resistance have been living off this insane demonization of the Nazi state together with the traitors of internal and external emigration, who were sent by the victorious powers as submissive executors of their will into the highest positions, into the parliaments and into the licensed key positions of the press, radio and television, in order to tackle the diabolical work of re-education, i.e. demoralization, of our people with the greatest success. An opinion poll carried out last year revealed that 65 percent of our 18 to 28-year-old men and women consider Volkstum and Vaterland to be outdated, outmoded concepts, a terrifying picture of a generation that has already grown into responsibility for the nation as a whole. Only the demonization of the Nazi state gives our traitors the opportunity to numb their guilty conscience and justify their serious crimes, although the first President of the Federal Court of Justice in Karlsruhe, Hermann Weinkauff, decisively rejected the distorted image of the "Nazi state of injustice" in his expert opinion of 1956, adding that the "order of the state and social structure" at that time was accepted as legally binding by the "overwhelming majority of the people of the state".

No constitutional lawyer from abroad - unless he is a German-hater - would think of describing the state of the Third Reich as an unjust state, which not only concluded the naval treaty with England in 1935, but also the Reich Concordat with the Vatican on July 12, 1933, which remains valid to this day. In today's world, more nations are ruled authoritarian or dictatorially than democratically, and no serious politician would think of denying an authoritarian state the right to protect its internal and external existence through criminal provisions against high treason and national treason.

Accordingly, all resisters who are guilty of treason, sabotage of their country's war effort, mutiny or subversion of military power before and during the war are to be sentenced to death by summary courts.

Wehrmacht and the People's Court according to valid law.

In order to properly assess the resistance, which has been so egregiously burdened by hundreds of cases of treason, our governments should finally the view of the former

Austrian Federal Chancellor Dr. Alfons Gorbach, who was imprisoned in a concentration camp for six years and declared on Viennese television that he considered the murder of tyrants to be justified, but that he firmly rejected establishing contact with the enemy while the people and the state were at war. He also rejected the idea of trying to change domestic political conditions with the help of the enemy. Treason and sabotage must be ruled out as murder of fighting comrades for a decent person. This statement addresses the fundamental distinction between treason and treachery. High treason, that is, resistance without the help of a foreign power, can be justified and need not be a dishonorable offense; resistance with the help of a foreign power is treason and therefore a serious crime for which it never, under any under any circumstances, a This principle, which cannot be shaken by anything, applies even more so when a nation and state are at war, regardless of the form of government in which the nation is governed. is governed, in a monarchy, in a parliamentary democracy or in an authoritarian leader state In war, high treason is also treason and, for the soldier, mutiny, which is sentenced by summary courts.

This uniquely valid assessment of treason, which is punished with the highest penalties in all other cultural nations, was thrown overboard in our state after 1945. We know the consequences that could not fail to occur, because whoever betrays the old duty also betrays the new. The conspirator Dr. Otto John, who betrayed our research institute for the V-weapon, Peenemünde, to the enemy during the war, defected to East Berlin as the first protector of the West German state, then returned home via Moscow and was surprised to be relieved of his post and imprisoned.

After being pardoned by Federal President Heuss, the Hohenzollern Prince Louis Ferdinand, who called Otto John his friend, made a serious effort to have him reinstated.

to rehabilitate them. It's horrible what was possible in our country after the end of the war.

If the Adenauer government was indeed forced in 1952 to accept Article 3 of the Transition Treaty concluded with the victorious Western powers, according to which our traitors could not be prosecuted for their crimes, it should at least have clearly distanced itself from them when the first staffs and units of the Bundeswehr were set up in 1955/56. Instead, it allowed the first Federal Minister of Defense, Theodor Blank, to appoint the left-leaning Count Baudissin with the

"Innere Führung", who invented the term "citizen in uniform" and introduced the 20 July tradition of the Bundeswehr, according to which traitors to the country, saboteurs, mutineers and draft-dodgers of the resistance have been presented to our young soldiers as shining examples ever since. But how, for example, can former Colonel General Beck, who was charged with the most serious treason and continued sabotage, be the role model in the Sonthofen army barracks that bear his name?

This 20th of July tradition of the Bundeswehr will break down one day, because the historical truth cannot be kept away from its barracks in the long run.

It would be unthinkable that governments of other cultures would defend or even honor opponents who have been guilty of treason. This was only possible with our poor, unfortunate people, who allowed themselves to be re-educated by foreign elements into a permanent state of life-threatening mental illness because, as so often in their long history, they lacked a leadership elite of strong character that could have saved them from this. Where were our resisters, who have been talking for decades about being "the better Germany"? It is not known that they raised their voices against the demoralization of our people and its youth.

Compare the judgments of our sick brains about the resistance with the view of the Scottish clergyman Peter H. Nicoll, who in his book "England's War against Germany" (p. 501), published in 1963, explains: "On the other hand, for Germany it means a

It was a tremendous challenge to realize that while it was literally fighting for its existence to the last breath, numerous subversive forces were at work to destroy it from within. One can understand the extreme severity with which these subversive forces were dealt with. Nor can anyone doubt that they would have fared just as badly in England if we had had to deal with them under similar extreme conditions." Characteristic of the mental state of our leaders, who, with their responsible ministries, are responsible for the demoralization of our young generation and have tolerated the shameful re-education by the mass media and in schools for decades, is the speech given by Federal President Professor Carstens on television and radio on 3 September 1979 on the occasion of the beginning of the war 40 years ago. After commemorating not only those who died in the war but also the victims of tyranny - as had become customary after the lost war - he said: "We also bow our heads to the men and women of the resistance who risked their lives in an attempt to eliminate tyranny. But it would seem dishonest to me if I did not also speak of a divide in opinion that runs through our people. Some, especially among the younger generation, are not prepared to accord honorable thought and action to those who fought and suffered on the front lines and died by the millions. They lack the experience of the inner conflict in which the German soldiers found themselves at that time. Most of them believed they were fighting for their homeland and yet knew or suspected that they were simultaneously keeping alive a system of injustice whose contempt for humanity had nothing in common with the Germany they were fighting for. They were fighting for. .. We confess ourselves to human dignity and human rights. That is the most convincing response to the unjust state of National Socialism."

That most of our soldiers of the war knew or suspected the idea that they should use their efforts to keep an unjust system alive is absolutely wrong for the young and adult generation of the Third Reich. Our young people were not aware of tyranny.

Soldiers, who had been brought up by the intact parental home, the school, the Hitler-

The young people, the Reich Labor Service and the Wehrmacht were just as unaware of what had happened to the German youth as the older generation, who had grown together with the young into a unique national and fateful community. They faithfully followed their oath of allegiance to the 936 fallen field marshals, generals and admirals, who knew full well that the enemy powers were waging their war of annihilation against the entire German people and their Reich and not just against the Hitler regime, as the unsuspecting creatures of the resistance imagined in their delusion. The resister and former President of the Bundestag Eugen Gerstenmaier confirmed this aberration of the conspirators by writing in an article in the "Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung" on March 21, 1975: "What we in the German resistance did not really want to understand during the war, we learned in retrospect: that this war was ultimately not waged against Hitler, but against Germany."

For the sake of the inner peace of our people, we should work on future national days of mourning finally only honor the fallen of the war and not together with them also the dead of the

July 20 and the alleged tyranny One would thus avoid the deep insult to the bereaved of our fallen comrades who cannot be associated with the resistance or any violent regime.

As a front-line soldier and officer, the author of this work, Major General Otto Ernst Remer, who on July 20, 1944, nipped the attempted coup by the conspiracy in the bud in Berlin on the orders of his supreme warlord Adolf Hitler, naturally felt an urgent need to comment on fundamental questions concerning the resistance in order to make a very significant contribution to the presentation of historical truth. Furthermore, he is not only particularly authorized to report on the events in Berlin and the assassination attempt on Hitler, but also, as a front-line soldier from the beginning to the end of the war, to report on the terrible acts of betrayal and sabotage committed by the resistance from his point of view and on behalf of all those involved.

to judge loyal front-line soldiers of the war and to denounce them in an appropriate manner.

At the beginning of the war, the author was the company commander of an infantry unit.

He then became battalion and regimental commander of the elite "Großdeutschland" unit, taking part in the Polish, French, Balkan and Russian campaigns at various focal points, during which he was awarded the Iron Cross 2nd and 1st Class, the German Cross in Gold, the Knight's Cross and finally the Knight's Cross with the Knight's Leaves in recognition of successful troop leadership and personal bravery. With 48 registered close combat battles, he earned the silver close combat medal and was awarded the gold wounded badge after eight wounds. Convincingly and unsparingly, the author assesses in the soldier's unmistakable language the heinous betrayal of the home and stage warriors of the conspiracy with which they stabbed the front fighting under the heaviest losses in the back, and conveys an idea of the catastrophic consequences that could not have been avoided by a successful assassination attempt on Hider, especially on the Eastern Front. Committed to the millions of fallen comrades, he settles accounts with the betrayal of the Reich and the traitors within the Wehrmacht

Despite the most disgusting agitation against the German Wehrmacht, it is still regarded today by friend and foe as the most decent, fair and respectful towards the enemy on the battlefield and towards the civilian population in the territories it occupies

From May to August 1944, the author Otto Ernst Remer led the "Großdeutschland" guard regiment in Berlin and then, on Hitler's orders, the Führer's escort brigade in the "Wolf's Lair" headquarters because, according to an agent report, there were fears that two larger parachute combat units from the west would attack the Führer's headquarters. In his capacity as combat commander of the headquarters, he - directly subordinate to the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, Hider - from September to early December

In 1944, the PanzerFührer-Begleit-Brigade was the only Wehrmacht unit consisting of "Großdeutschland" units, an anti-aircraft regiment "Hermann Göring" with 12.5 cm Flak and parts of the Leibstandarte SS "Adolf Hitler" consisted of. With this brigade, he took part in the Battle of the Bulge as a colonel.

participated. For this mission, Hitler personally promoted him to major general in the Reich Chancellery on January 30, 1945. He then led his unit, which had since been upgraded to an armoured division, as the "fire department of the Eastern Front" in the battle in Pomerania, destroying a Russian armored corps near Lauban and later over 400 armoured vehicles near Jägemdorf-Troppau. When the battle for Berlin was already raging, he was still in retreat battles together with parts of the Waffen-SS division "Frunderberg" on the ridge of the Erzgebirge to cover Army Group Schörner.

The author was the commander of the Führer-Begleit-Division and of the SS-Division

"Frunderberg" to the tattered front divisions with many volunteers from all European countries who saved the rest of Europe from being flooded by Bolshevism in the May days of 1945.

I would like to thank the author for speaking out again in this publication, despite the trial he was thought to have been put on in Braunschweig in 1952 for allegedly insulting the resistance fighters, after he had already reported on his role on July 20, 1944 in a publication in 1950. In particular, he wants to address the younger generation in order to show them that the young men in the Third Reich were not clueless fools, but knew, just like their fathers, what they owed to the community of fate of their people, even as soldiers, when the war was forced upon them, in which they had to fight for their right to live and for their future in freedom. The author, Major General Otto Ernst Remer, can be sure that readers in Germany and beyond, where German compatriots loyal to the people live, will receive his new work as a harrowing, but also forward-looking document of a disastrous era of our severely tested people.

KARL BALZER

Bad Heilbrunn, November 1981

THE GERMANS AND THEIR FRACTURED
RELATIONSHIP TO THEIR OWN HISTORY

The system of re-education after 1945 turned the Germans into a newly reddened people. This mental state of West German society made them incapable of recognizing themselves and taking decisive defensive measures against the re-evaluation of the order of life being pursued by the left.

In the book "Die deutsche Neurose - über die beschädigte Identität der Deutschen" published by the Carl-Friedrich-von-Siemens-Stiftung, eight academics and a journalist analyze the mental illness of our people. They say: "The Germans of today, whatever their generation, live in a special, abnormal situation. This is determined by the era of the world wars and their interpretation. The abnormality of the situation seems difficult to bear and suggests defense mechanisms. One is to keep the abnormal normal. Another is to banish certain events from memory.

If such attempts fail, neurotic conflicts arise. A people is only capable of acting when it is able to tell its history and identify with it and through it. The Germans today are unable to carry out this necessary process, or only with great difficulty. This threat to their identity has condensed into a mental mirror image of a neuroticized people. Professor Hepp says: "A people that celebrates its own defeat as a victory and identifies with the victor as a defeated nation would undoubtedly be ripe for a madhouse of nations, if such a thing existed." The German people have changed their ego through brainwashing.

se I it The winners have the latest findings of the

Social psychology is used to systematically analyze the people of the defeated. "to recultivate". The question arises as to whether the Germans are still themselves or a completely different people because they used to inhabit the same territory and are still identified with it today through legal fictions. The possibility of ethnic alienation is a given. An ethnomorphism has taken hold among political leaders: the denial of language, customs, tradition, history and culture. Can we still recognize ourselves, at least in part? Is it not considered at best cranky, at worst nationalistic, to pay attention to ethnic identity in this country? Do we have to look and listen for a long time to recognize the alarming increase in the weight of the foreign? Don't some Germans want to appear as anything but German? Is this all real change or just acting?

Hepp says: "Just look back at the German people of the last 80 years in films or photographs! You really don't have to be gifted with a special physiographic 'eye' to recognize a typological change that has changed more than the *idola fori et theatri*. An anthropologist may wonder whether we are really still dealing with one and the same race.

The German people seem to have changed. Or are these people just an acting troupe with an enormous capacity for roles?" Hepp uses the example of an octogenarian to illustrate the changing times, the changing plays. In the course of his life to date, this octogenarian has been a citizen of the German Empire, the Weimar Republic, the Third Reich and, depending on where he lives, the Federal Republic of Germany, the "GDR" or the Austrian Republic. In a span of just 50 years, he has therefore experienced four different political constitutions, "each of which has seen itself as the contrary or at least contradictory opposite of the previous one

If this hypothetical German had identified with each of these different regimes, one could easily imagine," says Hepp, "that on August 4, 1914, he would have presented the Kaiser with his

ovations, on 9. No-

vember 1918 would have cheered Scheidemann, applauded Goebbels on February 18, 1943 and still paid homage to Kennedy or Brezhnev in his old age." According to Hepp, a Central European moralist educated in traditional ethnic ideas would not hesitate,

"to describe such a *cross-country* subject as a characterless opportunist .

While such artful portrayal of four different roles may only characterize a few, there is no doubt that a considerable number of Germans still alive have managed to be just as unfaithful to the spirit of the new age after the caesura of 1945 as they were to the old spirit before it. If yesterday they had not used all their energy of mind and will to abolish and overcome parliamentary democracy, no one would be surprised that today they are militantly democratic. If yesterday they had presented themselves as pro-national militarists, no one would be surprised that today they want to present themselves as the most peaceful and civil people on earth. And if they had not burned anti-national writings yesterday, it would not be worth mentioning that they are suppressing national books today."

This juxtaposition is somewhat misleading. Nevertheless, most people only repeat what politicians tell them. The obvious change of opinion among the people is very succinctly attributed to the change of elite. Especially from the two world wars is a "contraselection effect" was assumed. A negative selection had taken place in which the "wolves" were inferior to the "foxes".

Since the electorate - and not just the German electorate - has no character of its own, it is only given the opportunity to make itself heard with a

to "identify" the "elite". But according to Hepp, the winners have their "elite", that of the "foxes", into all German positions of power after 1945 and what was left of the "lions", i.e. a potential counter-elite, was removed from the political establishment through skillful manipulation.

femgehalten. This

The process was all the easier because the loss of the war had decimated the better part of the German population. The historian Otto Seeck is quoted in his judgment of the consequences of the Roman civil wars: "Those who had been bold enough to expose themselves politically had perished almost without exception, only the cowards remained alive, and from their brood the new generations emerged." This may be an exaggeration. For it was not only cowards who remained, as it is well known that efficiency also asserts itself in battle. Confessions of guilt and declarations of atonement are now part of the disgusting post-war ritual and will certainly survive the turn of the millennium. Former members of the brown party are free to set the standard for others. The co-author of the book writes: "Those who make public confessions of guilt speak far less of themselves. They prefer to gather a large number of penitents and fellow sinners around them without being asked, for whom they themselves then speak as already absolved representatives." Mr. Groß, editor of "Kapital", sees brilliant achievements in this sector and names Albert Speer as representative of others, who has made a name for himself as a permanent actor of penitential behaviour, quite apart from the fact that he, of all people, as a convicted person, is one of the few who declare the Nuremberg judiciary to be lawful. "It would not be unimaginative to think of him as an honorary Israelite citizen or as the author of designs for the reconstruction of Solomon's Temple."

The not infrequently cramped effort to come to terms with the past may indeed be the main component of this German neurosis, to which scholarly attention is being turned in this way for the first time. In the meantime, however, there are, thank goodness, a number of publications that breathe competence and commitment in equal measure. The following chapters are intended to make a modest contribution to this.

MY ENTRY INTO POLITICS

I was a soldier and served my country with conviction and dedication. In peace it was a joy, in war a sacrificial duty. As an active officer, I was on the front line from the beginning of the Second World War and did my best to win the war. For me, especially during the war, concepts such as resistance, conspiracy, sabotage and even treason against the front, which was fighting to preserve our freedom, were unthinkable and reprehensible. My front activities were only interrupted for four months at a time when I was appointed commander of the "Greater Germany" guard regiment in Berlin and then as combat commander of the Führer's headquarters in the "Wolf's Lair" in Rastenburg.

Fate confronted me for the first time on July 20, 1944, surprisingly and unintentionally, with the problem of resistance, conspiracy and betrayal, which was unimaginable for me at the time. Thirty-seven years have passed since then. Then as now, my views have changed little. Five years after the war, when "denazification" still dominated the political field, I wrote an introduction to the reasons for my entry into politics after the war in my brochure "My role on July 20, 1944", which was published 80,000 times.

In June 1949, German men gathered in Godesberg on the Rhine to protest for the first time after the collapse of the German Reich against its division into a western and an eastern "satellite state" and the piecemeal surrender of original German territories. Until the establishment of the West German Federal Republic and the immediately following the establishment of the German Democratic Republic in the Soviet occupation zone, the German Reich had neither actually nor legally ceased to exist, as has been clearly established by numerous domestic and foreign experts.

For it was not the German Reich, represented by the last all-German head of state, Grand Admiral Dönitz, but merely the High Command of the German Armed Forces as a purely military agency.

- This cannot be emphasized often enough - signed the surrender document on May 8, 1945

It was only the willingness of German post-war politicians to give in to the Allies' wishes for a permanent break-up of German unity by establishing a separate state in West Germany or Central Germany that practically sacrificed the idea of the Reich, which has survived from the oldest periods of German history to the present day, for the momentary success of a sham sovereignty, which was practically tantamount to a renewal of the old Napoleonic Rhine Confederation policy. Future generations will no doubt see in this process a disastrous German participation in a long-lasting division of the empire.

No amount of intrusive propaganda will be able to disguise the true course of events before the incorruptible judgment seat of history and absolve those responsible of their disastrous failure. It was only through German consent to this state division that the respective victorious group was given the opportunity to expand its occupation zone into a deployment and interest area, thus eliminating the only possible starting point for a genuine all-German policy for an unforeseeable period of time. A newly founded party saw itself at the time as the first genuine German opposition to the division of Germany and, within the framework of the Socialist Reichspartei, wanted to achieve the preservation of freedom and the chance of survival of an armed neutral Germany as a precursor to a pan-European confederation of states.

Those who had once gathered in Godesberg were determined to counter this foreseeable development, which was becoming clearer by the day.

The aim was to protest to the German nation and the world against the division of Germany and Europe, and thus the division into two separate fortress areas, and at the same time to make the voice of the genuine German-European opposition heard in the forthcoming election to the first Bundestag. In contrast to our political struggle at that time, today's peace demonstrations are only a

weak replacement that comes far too late.

After a thorough review of the situation, it was agreed in Godesberg to make a direct appeal to the voters to call on them to nominate and elect independent candidates, after the military governments had until then stubbornly refused to allow any political groups other than the so-called licensed parties. This was our post-war resistance to a disastrous policy of pandering to foreign interests that is becoming increasingly evident today.

Although I was invited to this conference, I initially avoided taking part in the discussion. It was only when I was asked to sign a joint declaration that I made my position known in the following words: "This appeal is formulated in such a way, that it every conscious German, thus also would have to sign it. I realize that my signature will be a beacon for thousands of German soldiers who know me as a front commander. But I also know that, as a result of my decision as commander of the 'Großdeutschland' guard regiment in Berlin on July 20, 1944, part of the German officer corps will be forced from the outset into opposition to a good and necessary cause if I take a visible part in it. However, in order to rule out any possibility of a division of opinion on an issue that is vital for the continued existence of the Reich, I will only sign this appeal on condition that a former opponent of the National Socialist regime, insofar as he honestly believes he is serving the interests of the German nation and the Reich, is prepared to co-sign with me." I made this declaration at the time in the knowledge that in this fateful question for the Reich, my position on the former regime would have to take a back seat. Unfortunately, no surviving participant of July 20, 1944 was willing to put his name to the appeal. Apparently their hatred was directed only at Adolf Hitler's regime, but not at the policy of violence pursued by foreign forces who, after 1945, endeavored to destroy the remnants of the Reich and the substance of the nation with the help of German henchmen, according to the Morgenthau plan, without

only one word of protest would have been audible from the ranks of the former "resisters".

This carelessness, despite all the other self-congratulation, and the continuing attacks against my political position, sometimes in the foulest form, especially from the ranks of the former resistance fighters, have decisively changed my view of the real motives of this inner-German "resistance", which rose up against its own leadership in the midst of a terrible struggle between nations - not to continue the struggle all the more resolutely, but to end it under any condition, no matter how pitiful

Nevertheless, I would have continued to remain silent about the events of July 20, 1944, if I had not been constantly insulted as a murderer, a bloodhound and, more recently, as a traitor to my comrades by an "opinionated" press, which I could not accept in the interests of my subordinates at the time. Since the collapse of 1945, such lies and falsifications about the recent German past have been spread by all interested parties - and there are all too many of them - that it is now high time for the truth to break through.

I had not yet returned from Godesberg when, as if on a secret cue, the entire licensed press descended on me to slander and suspect me in every way. All too soon I sensed that the intention was not to target me alone, but an army of millions of decent German soldiers who, true to their oaths, had turned their backs on the conspirators of July 20, 1944, preferring to direct their will to resist against the external enemy of the Reich and the German nation to the bitter end. Only now did I decide to come out of my reserve. If one allows treacherous resistance fighters to be glorified as heroes on the one hand, and dutiful soldiers and workers to be insulted as criminals and fools on the other, one is guilty of desecrating the memory of countless dead who fell true to their oath.

So it is not my fault that the treatment of the question of the

It would have been better for the German future if it could have been conducted *sine ira et studio*. However, this was obviously of little interest to those who were interested in the permanent suppression and fragmentation of the German people. Now that the debate has got underway in this way as a result of the excessive glorification of the failed assassination attempt and the continuing disparagement of German soldiers loyal to the cause, especially by commentators who are alien to the people, it may now be conducted with unreserved openness. However, the overwhelming majority of our soldiers, who fought in accordance with their oath of allegiance, strongly resent being "excused" as a *bona fide* herd of sheep. If the martyr gloriola of the assassins and other traitorous resisters should fade in this debate, the blame certainly does not lie with me.

However, I would not dare to speak out on such a sensitive issue if I were not still convinced today of the necessity of my intervention on July 20, 1944, and even determined to act in the same way again in a similar situation; for like the oath, honor is indivisible. But the marrow of honor is loyalty.

MY ROLE ON JULY 20, 1944 IN BERLIN

My appointment to the guard regiment "Großdeutschland" in Berlin was actually for my recovery - as a kind of first furlough - after my many wounds and in recognition of my high bravery awards up to the Oak Leaves of the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross and the silver close combat clasp with forty-eight days of close combat. I was later wounded again. I only served in the guard regiment for a total of four months because I felt the urge to return to my comrades.

My task as commander of the "Greater Germany" guard regiment, which I took over at the end of May 1944, consisted of purely representative duties as well as securing the Reich government and the Reich capital. Since over a million foreign workers were employed in Berlin and the surrounding area, the possibility of an outbreak of internal unrest had to be reckoned with.

Around noon on July 20, 1944, the severely wounded First Lieutenant Dr. Hans Hagen had finished his cultural and historical lecture to the officers and non-commissioned officers of my regiment. He was only economically assigned to my regiment and was by no means a Nazi commanding officer, as was often reported. I alone was the commanding officer at the political and military level.

Afterwards, I invited Hagen to lunch in my official apartment in the Rathenow barracks together with my adjutant, Lieutenant Siebert. The latter had lost an eye at the front, was a pastor of the Confessing Church and used to go to church every Sunday in the garrison church with my express permission, even though I had left the church myself. At

us

personal freedom prevailed. I also didn't mind that he was an SA man and a party member during the time of the struggle, but then left both organizations in protest after defamatory statements by his district leader regarding Christi's origins, without having to accept any disadvantages as a result.

That was all possible back then without consequences. Before I appointed him adjutant because of his personality, he even confided to me that he had broken into the Gestapo while still an SA man in uniform in order to secure incriminating papers from his colleagues in the Confessing Church. For me at the time, these voluntary revelations were just one more reason to regard this man's grit as a basis for a trustworthy position as adjutant. It was the same in the Third Reich, which is so demonized today. In the officer corps and also in my unit, there was no stubborn narrow-mindedness or even terror of opinion, as is practiced today with the help of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution against nationalist people. I also never heard that Pastor Siebert later felt himself to be a resistance fighter or claimed to be one. Characteristic of our open-mindedness was a conversation after the meal between the famous cultural historian Hagen and the pastoral Siebert about the "Heliand", in which the discussion centered on the extent to which the introduction of Christianity at the time made use of tried and tested Germanic ways of life in order to make the new, alien doctrine appear comprehensible to the people. Christ was the duke, and his disciples were the followers. As this conversation between the two squabblers was beginning to bore me, I put a reconciliation bottle of wine on the table and went for a swim in the nearby post stadium to get fit for the next deployment to the front.

In the early afternoon of 20 July 1944, my regiment, like all the troops of the reserve army, was alerted by the cue "Valkyrie". This cue was intended for the mobilization of the reserve army in the event of internal unrest. While my regiment's preparatory measures started automatically, I was called up from the Schwimm-

bad Then, as ordered, I went in my car to my superior office, the Berlin city commandant's office opposite the "Ewige Wache". In contrast to other subordinate troop commanders waiting in the anteroom, I was the only one who was immediately allowed to see the site commander, Lieutenant General von Hase, and was briefed by him on the situation and mission as follows:

"The Führer had a fatal accident! Internal unrest has broken out. The army assumes executive power! The guard regiment is ordered to hermetically seal off the government district - shown in detail on the map - so that no one, neither a general nor a minister, can pass through the cordon! To support them in cordoning off the trams and subway railroads, they are to be assisted by Obersdeutnant Wolters!"

I noticed that a younger general staff officer, Major Hayessen, was assisting me in giving this order, while the older first general staff officer I knew earlier stood idle and conspicuously nervous.

I was naturally very shocked by the direction I had been given, as the death of Hider also meant that my chances of a happy end to the war were beginning to dwindle. I immediately asked: "Is the Führer really dead? Was he killed in an accident or was there an assassination attempt? Where have internal disturbances broken out? I didn't notice anything out of the ordinary on my trip through Berlin. Why does the executive power pass to the army and not to the Wehrmacht? Who is the Führer's successor? According to Hider's will, the successor should automatically be Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring! Are there any orders or orders from him?"

As I received neither exhaustive information nor clear answers to my questions and the situation therefore remained unclear to me, a certain mistrust was aroused in me from the very first hour. I then tried to take a cursory look at the documents lying on the table in front of me, above all to discover a responsible signature. I was denied this by the fact that Major Hayessen ostentatiously took away the written instructions and put them in a

folder. On the way back to my regiment, I was dominated by the thought: "Hider is dead, now there's no head, they'll probably try various personalities, the to succeed him." I was thinking of possible diadoch fights.

In any case, I resolved not to allow myself to be abused under any circumstances in my capacity as commander of the only active elite force in Berlin, especially as my regiment consisted only of selected and proven front-line soldiers with high bravery awards. The Knight's Cross was part of the officers' uniform. I also remembered the situation in 1918, which led to the Berlin Guards being accused of having contributed to the success of the revolution through their hesitation. Under no circumstances did I want to expose myself to such an accusation before history.

When I returned to my troop, I immediately called an officers' meeting and announced the situation and mission. The supposed death of Adolf Hitler had a shocking effect on all the officers and the troops. Never in my life, not even after the reunion, have I experienced such dejection. Contrary to all current accounts, this is the pure truth, which I can vouch for. At this meeting I left no doubt that many things seemed unclear and mysterious to me and that I was not willing to allow myself and my troop to be abused in any way. I expressly demanded unconditional trust and absolute obedience from each of my officers, as I was accustomed to in critical situations at the front. This somewhat unusual demand was triggered by the fact that during the meeting a general I didn't know - probably Lieutenant General Olbricht - from the High Command of the Reserve Army requested a company from my unit for a special mission, which I expressly refused on the phone, saying that I had received a clearly defined mission and that it didn't seem advisable to me to disperse my unit.

After the meeting, I received two reports that worried me further. Firstly, Lieutenant Dr. Hagen, who was present and was a member of my staff, told me that he had been injured during his trip to the

barracks, I saw Field Marshal von Brauchitsch in full uniform driving through the streets of Berlin in a car. This circumstance was striking, as Brauchitsch was retired and his appearance in uniform was exceptionally unusual.

net seemed strange in the given situation. As it turned out later, it could not have been Brauchitsch. It was probably one of the co-conspirators.

Secondly, Obersdeutnant Wolters, who had been assigned to me by the commandant's office as liaison officer, assured me that I should not believe that he had been assigned to monitor me as an informer. Such a statement, unsolicited and without any reason, was not only unusual and annoying, but must have aroused my suspicion that he was somehow playing with hidden cards. As it turned out later, my speech to the officers had given him second thoughts and he had simply gone home to avoid responsibility; an impossible course of action for an active officer.

The doubt as to whether the city commander's description of the situation corresponded to the real facts, especially since another version was that Hider had been killed by the SS, prompted me to decide to find out about the situation myself and to call all available offices. This way of thinking and acting is anything but the cadaverous obedience that is so much criticized today and that is often attributed to the army of the Third Reich.

Among other things, I decided to send Lieutenant Dr. Hagen, who had previously worked in the Ministry of Propaganda, to the Reich Defense Commissioner of Berlin, whom I assumed would be informed not only about the military but also about the political situation. The Reich Defence Commissioner for Berlin and at the same time Gauleiter of Berlin was the Propaganda Minister Dr. Joseph Goebbels and as such also the protector of the "Greater Germany" division, which had been set up in Berlin from all of the Reich's national associations.

About an hour and a half after the "Valkyrie" command was triggered

my regiment was ready for war and moved into the designated cordoned-off areas as ordered. The routinely deployed guards, such as at the memorial and in the Bendlerblock, the headquarters of the commander of the Reserve Army and the General Armaments Office, remained at their posts.

the post. At about 4.15 p.m. I received a message from the officer on duty, Lieutenant Arends, the guard in the Bendlerblock, that he had received orders to block all entrances. The order had been given by Colonel Mertz von Quirnheim, who was unknown to him. He had also received instructions from General Olbricht to open fire on any approaching SS units.

After personally checking the deployment of my regiment on the spot, I went back to the town commander of Hase at around 5.00 p.m. to report completion. On this occasion I was asked to set up my command post in the commandant's office opposite the memorial. In the Rathenow barracks, I had a reporting head set up under the leadership of Lieutenant Gees, who was in telephone contact with me. On this occasion, v. Hase gave me the additional task of cordoning off the block of houses north of the Anhalter Bahnhof station shown on the map.

When I wanted to carry out this assignment on the spot, I discovered that the Reich Security Main Office was housed in the building complex in question. The ambiguity, not to say camouflage, of this insincere assignment only served to increase my suspicion. Why wasn't I given the clear order to keep an eye on the Reich Security Service? Of course I would have carried out this order too

On my third visit to General von Hase, I therefore asked him openly: "Why, General, do I get such unclearly worded orders, why am I not told to pay special attention to the Reich Security Main Office?" von Hase was very nervous and agitated and did not answer my question at all. If you ask me today why such a young officer like me could take such liberties with a general, you might consider that we young

commanders felt that we were powder-steamer gray and successful front-line leaders and that respect for indispensable home warriors was not overly important.

In this context, I would like to draw on my long experience at the front: Just as in the First World War the events at the front were very much shaped by the experienced shock troop leaders on a company commander basis, in the Second World War it was the young commanders who had grown up at the front who formed a close-knit fighting community with their troops, who were not only able to fight, but also wanted to, especially as they believed in a possible victory.

In General v. Hase's office I gathered from a conversation between the general and his first general staff officer that Goebbels still had to be arrested and that I was to carry out this task. As I was uncomfortable about carrying out this assignment in view of the contact I had initiated with Goebbels, I intervened in the conversation and said to General v. Hase: "General, I consider myself to be extremely unsuitable for this task! You know that as a long-time member of the "Greater Germany" division, whose stripes I wear, I consider this task to be less than cavalier. You are probably aware that Dr. Goebbels, in his capacity as Berlin Gauleiter, is also the protector of the "Greater Germany" division. I paid Goebbels my inaugural visit as the new commander of the guard regiment only fourteen days ago and for this reason I consider it inappropriate to entrust me, of all people, with the arrest of my protector." It is likely that v. Hase understood my arguments or, for other reasons, gave the army patrol service the order to arrest Reich Minister Dr. Goebbels.

At around 5.30 p.m., Lieutenant Dr. Hagen Goebbels had finally arrived in his Hermann-Göring-Straße 20, next to the Brandenburg Gate, after he had previously tried in vain to reach the Propaganda Ministry. The minister had no idea of the threatening situation he was in. It was only when Hagen pointed to the vehicles of the Guard Regiment, which had just passed, to emphasize his report on the situation.

ments, Goebbels was startled: "That's impossible, what are we going to do?" Whereupon Hagen suggested: "It would be best if you asked my commander to come here." "Can we also rely on your commander?" was Goebbels' brief counter-question. Hagen: "My head for my commander!"

Immediately after leaving the city commander's office, I finally received the long-awaited guidance in the corridor as a result of my contact with Goebbels.

Hagen had driven back to the barracks, briefed Lieutenant Gees there and then driven to my new command post in the command post, which was now heavily guarded. In order not to expose himself to any danger, he did not enter the building, but informed my adjutant and the orderly officer, Lieutenant Buck, of the situation with the request to inform me immediately, which read: "Completely new situation! It's probably a military coup! More details not yet known! The Reich Defense Commissioner has asked you to come to him as soon as possible! If you have not appeared before him in twenty minutes, he must assume that you are being held back by force. He will then be forced to alert the Waffen SS. In order to avoid a civil war, he has ordered the Leibstandarte to stand by for the time being"

When I received this information a little later from my adjutant, I decided to go and see v. Hase again. You can see the confidence I still had in the lieutenant general at that time from the fact that I had Lieutenant Buck repeat to v. Hase the information Goebbels had just given him in my presence. I did not want to appear to be an intriguer and, as an experienced front-line officer, I played my cards absolutely straight. My subsequent request, this

request of the Reich Defense Commissioner in order to bring about a clarification of the situation that was in everyone's interest, was brusquely rejected by v. Hase After leaving the commandant's office, which I was able to do without hindrance, I and my adjutant, First Lieutenant Siebert - now a pastor in Nuremberg

I thought about what I had to do now. My key position in this difficult and obscure situation, which I had not caused, became increasingly clear to me. I felt that my head was now also at stake. After assessing the situation as accurately as I could at the moment, I came to the decision to go to Goebbels despite the orders to the contrary. My reasons were as follows:

Firstly, I did not want my freedom of action to be taken away under any circumstances, as I was used to at the front. Here, too, it was often only a small step between receiving a high military decoration and a court martial resulting in death.

Secondly, I still felt bound by my oath, because so far the report of the Führer's death had been at least doubtful, so I had to act as my oath of allegiance dictated.

Thirdly, I had had to make responsible decisions at the front, countless times on my own, the correctness of which was confirmed by the awarding of high honors. Many a situation could only be mastered through decisive action. I felt at one with my comrades at the front, who would not have understood if I had laid my hands in my lap for lack of civil courage. I could not allow things to develop in a way that could have been disastrous through my own fault. I thought of 1918.

Fourthly, I found myself in a predicament, as Goebbels was planning to alert the Waffen SS, so that a fratricidal battle between two units that had proven themselves at the front was to be expected under certain circumstances. As commander of the only active elite troop in Berlin, I was responsible for the lives of the soldiers entrusted to me. It was not my place to use them for a completely unresolved matter.

But I was also suspicious of Goebbels, because I still believed that the Führer was dead and thought a battle for his succession was possible. It was far from my mind to allow myself and my troops to be dragged into such a battle of diadochi. As Goebbels' role was not clear to me, I took Lieutenant Buck and a platoon of soldiers with me on my visit to him, who were instructed to get me out one way or another if, after a quarter of an hour of Goebbels' time, I was not to be dragged into such a battle.

bels would not have left his apartment.

I then forced my way into the minister's office with my pistol cocked, where I was urgently expected, and asked him to brief me on the situation. Goebbels then asked me to tell him what I knew. I complied with this request, but kept quiet about his arrest as intended by v. Hase, as I was doubtful as to what role he himself was playing. Asked what I intended to do, I told him that I would stick to my military orders and was determined to carry them out. Even if the Führer was no longer alive, I felt bound by my oath and could only act as my conscience as an officer dictated. Goebbels looked at me in astonishment and said:

"Why? The Führer is alive! I spoke to him on the phone. The assassination attempt failed! You've been taken in by a mystification." This information came as a complete surprise to me. When I heard that the Führer was alive, a stone fell from my heart. But I remained suspicious. So I asked Goebbels for his word of honor that his message was true and that he himself stood unconditionally behind the Führer. Goebbels hesitated at first, as this request did not seem entirely understandable to him. Only when I repeatedly asked him that I needed his word of honor as a responsible officer in order to see clearly did he give it to me.

My wish to be put through to headquarters by telephone coincided with his intention. Within a minute, the connection to the Wolf's Lair in Rastenburg in East Prussia was established and, to my great surprise, Adolf Hitler himself was on the line. Goebbels briefly informed the Führer and then handed me the receiver. Adolf Hitler said something like: "Major Remer, can you hear me, do you recognize my voice, do you understand me?" I answered in the affirmative, but was still unsure. It flashed through my mind that perhaps someone could imitate the Führer's voice. I had known the Führer's voice personally since I had been awarded the Oak Leaves of the Knight's Cross the year before, when I had had the opportunity to talk to him very openly for an hour or so about the worries and hardships of the front, but it was the rest of the phone call that convinced me,

that I was actually speaking directly to him in person. He continued: "So, as you can see for yourself, I am alive. The assassination attempt failed, Providence did not intend it. A small clique of ambitious, disloyal and treacherous officers wanted to kill me. But now we have the saboteurs of the front. We will make short work of this treacherous plague, using brute force if necessary.

You, Major Remer, receive from me at this moment all powers for Berlin and are personally responsible to me and no one else to immediately restore the peace and security of the Reich capital. You will be personally subordinate to me for this purpose until Reichsführer Himmler arrives there and releases you from your responsibility."

The Führer's words were very calm, firm and convincing. I could breathe a sigh of relief, because all my doubts had been dispelled by this conversation. For me, the oath I had taken as a soldier to the Führer was still binding and the guiding principle for my actions. My only concern now was to clear up misunderstandings and avoid unnecessary bloodshed by acting quickly and resolutely. Goebbels asked me to tell him the content of the conversation and asked me what I intended to do now. He made the downstairs rooms of his house available to me, where I set up my command post. It was now 6.30 pm. The first report on the Großdeutscher Rundfunk about the explosives attack at headquarters came a quarter of an hour later.

Through my stay at the Berlin city commandant's office, I was largely familiar with the orders for the troops approaching Berlin. In order to inform the commanders of these troops about the actual situation, I sent orderly officers to meet them in all directions. This was completely successful. The word "for or against the Führer" worked wonders. I would like to state unequivocally that all the commanders who, like me, were outraged by the incidents, placed themselves unconditionally under my command, even though I was junior to them in rank. So it turned out that the oath of allegiance was also binding for all of them. There was only

temporary difficulties where personal orientation was not immediately possible.

Due to the prevailing insecurity and misunderstandings - it was believed that the guard regiment had mutinied because of the completed cordon - other troop units were almost deployed against my regiment in two places. On Fehrbelliner Platz, a tank brigade had formed on the orders of the conspirators.

However, Colonel General Guderian issued a radio order to break them out of the ranks of the conspirators. This troop then began reconnaissance on its own initiative and came to the erroneous conclusion that the "Greater Germany" guard regiment was on the side of the conspirators and had arrested Reich Minister Goebbels. Some of the brigade's tanks sensed this, and blood would almost have been shed had it not been for my personal intervention to clear up this error. The same situation occurred in front of the Bendlerblock, the office of the Commander-in-Chief of the Reserve Army, when an armored infantry company wanted to relieve my appointed guard. Thanks to the energetic intervention of some of my regiment's officers, misunderstandings were cleared up at the last moment and an exchange of fire between German soldiers was avoided. Here, too, the question "for or against Hider" brought the clear decision. I had sent my company commander, Captain Schlee, to the Bendlerblock to clarify the situation. I had no idea at the time that the head of the conspiracy was sitting there. Schlee had orders to withdraw our guard because I wanted to avoid possible bloodshed. On this occasion, Schlee was ordered to General Olbricht. However, he secured himself and ordered the guard to take him out by force if he did not return. He was actually detained in the general's anteroom by Colonel Mertz v. Quirnheim with instructions not to leave the room. But when Mertz went into Olbricht's office, Schlee also left the room.

When he returned to our station, Leut-

nant Arends reported a strange occurrence. He had heard screams from the upper floors and then a typewriter and a telephone had been thrown through the window into the courtyard. Schlee immediately turned around and advanced to the scene of the crime with a task force to investigate this strange incident. He soon discovered the room from which the noise was coming. It was locked, but not guarded, and the key was in the lock from outside. It was General v. Kortzfleisch, Commanding General of the Berlin military district, who had thrown the objects through the window. The general had gone to the

He had been ordered to the Bendlerblock after a reception at the Bendlerblock, where he consistently refused to cooperate with the conspirators. He was arrested and imprisoned, but not guarded. Now he was free and gave us the first clues about the head of the conspiracy.

At 7.30 p.m. our guard was withdrawn in accordance with orders. Olbricht had to fill the guard with his own officers. The leader of this guard was Lieutenant Colonel Fritz v. d. Lancken. As he was leaving, Schlee learned from a captain at the intelligence center in the building that Major Remer had been charged by the Führer with suppressing the putsch. They had been able to overhear my conversation with the Führer and realized that the telexes to be issued were orders from putschists. As a result, they were systematically delayed and in some cases did not arrive at all.

Truly a masterfully prepared coup without followers! There were also telexes and telephone calls from the Führer's headquarters, which clearly showed the real situation.

The late afternoon of July 20th was filled with countless individual orders. Among other things, I had the "Großdeutschland" replacement brigade from Cottbus called up to the outskirts of Berlin as an intervention reserve. The conspirators had previously given them a different mission. The one-armed commander, Colonel Schulte-Neuhaus, whom I knew from the front and who had proven himself extremely well, reported to my command post. I introduced him to Goebbels

I drew my own troops closer together around the Reich Chancellery complex and created a strong reserve in the garden of Goebbels' ministerial apartment. Goebbels asked me to give a speech to my soldiers assembled there, which I did. The outrage at the treasonous events was so great that they would have torn any conspirator apart if he had shown himself.

I then had the city commandant's office cordoned off, as I had gained the impression that some questionable people were staying there. I was also told that after my refusal the army patrol was to arrest Goebbels. I waited in vain. As I heard later, no troop had declared itself ready for this undertaking, so that v. Hase would have had to do it alone. The city commander himself had gone to the deputy general commando at this time to discuss further measures with the general appointed by the conspirators. They had negotiated there for two hours and had not come to a decision, a typical behavior of non-front conspirators.

After his reported return to the commandant's office, I telephoned General v. Hase and asked him to visit me at my command post in the Goebbels Wing to clarify the situation. At first he refused my request and demanded that I come to the commandant's office as his subordinate. Only when I pointed out to him that I was personally and directly charged by the Führer with restoring peace and order, that he was therefore subordinate to me and would be taken by me if he did not come voluntarily, did he appear. At this point I still had the impression that v. Hase, who had previously been my guest in the mess hall on several occasions, had often expressed his solidarity with the fighting front and had never failed to shout "Sieg Heil" to the beloved Führer, just as I had initially been deceived and had no knowledge of the true situation. I therefore apologized to him for my unusual action. When he arrived, Hase was kindness personified and even expressed his appreciation for my independent decision and my actions in seeking out Goebbels, as this was the only way I could have done so.

much misfortune was prevented.

He also played ignorant to Goebbels and pretended that he had no idea what was going on. He was asked to make himself available for further inquiries. A room was made available to him. When v. Hase left Dr. Goebbels' office, an embarrassing incident occurred that made my face flush with shame. In this extremely tense situation, Hase emphasized that he had been occupied by the strenuous work all day and had not yet eaten anything. Goebbels immediately offered to have some sandwiches prepared for him and asked if he would like a glass of Moselle or Rhine wine. When Hase had left the office, Goebbels said disdainfully

dear. "My name is Hase. I don't know anything! But that's how our revolutionary coup generals are. They ask to be given food and drink in such a delicate situation, they want to talk to their mother on the phone. In such a situation, I would rather bite my tongue off than make such unworthy requests."

Just two events may shed light on how little this putsch was thought through and prepared. Some of my conversations and orders went through the same intelligence center of the Bendlerblock, the headquarters of the conspirators' headquarters, from which the conspirators' orders went out all over the world. So it could happen that it was at the discretion of the responsible intelligence officers to let important orders go out only hesitantly or not at all, or to interrupt my telephone conversations, which never happened. Even a request from the Reichsrundfunk radio station was forwarded to me to inquire about the situation. In this way, I was able to order that under all circumstances only those broadcasts that were originally planned in the program were allowed to go out. So this important means of communication was also canceled. What had happened at the Masurenallee broadcasting center? Major Jacob had been ordered to occupy the broadcasting center. Surprisingly, he had neither an order to interfere with the broadcasting operations nor to shut them down. He therefore tried by telephone, the occupation the

Bendlerblock and ask for further orders. He stuck to this intention. Because he did not get a connection, as was the case with many other departments. For a front-line soldier, a telephone connection failure was a normal occurrence. The only way to establish a connection was by radio or by sending a dispatcher on foot or a motorcycle dispatcher. He also had a teleprinter at his disposal. But he did nothing of the sort. General Stauffenberg had probably not thought of providing a signalman when he was planning the putsch, such little things were deliberately overlooked!

Rudolf-Günther Wagner, who was to read out the proclamations, said: "I had known for years that I had been chosen as the speaker for the proclamation on Day X. I waited in feverish anticipation, as arranged. As agreed, I waited in feverish suspense for the lieutenant to give me the proclamations to be read out.

I was supposed to deliver the declamations. Unfortunately in vain, until I heard the failure of the assassination attempt from Goebbels' loudspeakers." As is well known, General Lindemann could not be found with the original manuscript of the appeal. Beck was unwilling to step into the breach and instructed Gisevius to perform this function. However, he first had to hastily draft a draft, during which Stauffenberg, Olbricht, Hoepner, Yorck, Schwerin and Schulenburg called out a few key words to him . . . for this mishap was also the responsibility of the

"Managing director" of the Stauffenberg resistance. However, in order to maintain broadcasting operations, a reliable and extensive team of specialists was required. However, they were ordered to the city commandant's office and waited there idly until they were arrested in the course of the counter-action. Hans Kasper, who witnessed Aktion Jacob, says: "July 20th fell around this time. There is something tragic about describing it from the perspective of a radio editor. Tragic, because little things made it clear how little chance this uprising had."

In the meantime I had also received a report from Captain Schlee about the events in the Bendlerblock. I knew nothing of the internal affairs, nor that the Commander-in-Chief of the Reserve Army, Colonel General Fromm, had been eliminated and from the conspirators

had been arrested. After our guard had left, Schlee was now ordered to surround and blockade the Bendlerblock with his company without entering it. At 7 p.m. I thought I had the situation in Berlin under control. The hectic began to subside.

THE EVENTS IN THE BENDLERBLOCK

Meanwhile, in the Bendlerblock, the headquarters of the High Command of the Home Army, the conspirators were tense and nervous, while the uninitiated were calmly going about their daily business. The helplessness of the conspirators is remarkable and no credit to general staff work. The assassination attempt at the headquarters near Rastenburg had been triggered by Count v. Stauffenberg - I will come back to this in the next chapter - at 12.42 pm. But only at

At 4 p.m. the Count informed his co-conspirators of the allegedly successful assassination attempt after he had arrived by plane at the Rangsdorf airfield in Berlin, an incomprehensible omission on the part of the conspirators.

The principle of conducting reconnaissance in critical situations, which was a matter of course for every front-line soldier, was grossly disregarded. Since in reality there was no enemy, such reconnaissance could consist of nothing more than obtaining certainty about the situation by telex or telephone. But apart from active conspiracy, action was not the decisive characteristic of the home conspirators sitting in the stage.

The uninitiated commander-in-chief of the replacement army, Colonel General Fromm, dined with relish at the Adlon Hotel in Berlin and only returned to his office at 4 p.m. unsuspectingly. His adjutant, the severely wounded cavalry captain Ludwig Bertram - who had lost a leg - had been placed at his disposal by the "Greater Germany" division. He was present throughout the critical hours as an incorruptible eyewitness, so that I was able to obtain my information from the first source.

The first advance measures for the coup d'état were only taken after Stauffenberg's call from Rangsdorf airfield. It took him about forty-five minutes to drive to the Bendlerblock, so he was only able to arrive there shortly before 5 pm. First, the city commander of Berlin received an alarm order by telephone to trigger all "Wallküre" measures. These were prepared in case of internal unrest. At the same time, General v. Hase was ordered to the Bendlerblock to receive further orders (see Appendix 1 and 2). Colonel Gorn, commander of the Pz. troop school in Krampnitz-Groß Glienicke, received a similar advance order by telephone (see Appendix 3). These orders were issued by Colonel Mertz v. Quirnheim. Major Ulrich v. Oertzen was also sent to the military district command, to the aforementioned General v. Kortzfleisch, to urge him to come to Bendlerstrasse. Kortzfleisch was clueless. The only one who acted consistently was Lieutenant General v. Hase, who immediately passed on the alarm orders. After being personally briefed by General Olbricht, he was assigned the retired Major Hayessen as liaison officer, whom I met at the commandant's office at around 4.30 p.m. when I reported there as commander of the guard regiment; v. Hase was undoubtedly a co-conspirator and confidant. In addition, the infantry school and the non-commissioned officers' school in Potsdam were alerted by Lieutenant Colonel Robert Bemardis

It was significant that it was only after all these measures had been initiated that General Olbricht sought out his commander-in-chief, Colonel-General Fromm, who had returned from lunch, and reported to him untruthfully that the Fellgiebel intelligence office had reported Hitler's death from the Führer's headquarters. In Olbricht's presence, Fromm immediately ordered a flash call to be made to headquarters and demanded to see Field Marshal Keitel. To Olbricht's surprise, who was firmly convinced of Hitler's death based on the information Stauffenberg had received from Rangsdorf, he was able to gather from the immediately established conversation that this was by no means the case. Fromm asked Keitel what was going on at headquarters, the strangest rumors were circulating in Berlin. Keitel replied angrily: "What

should be going on? Plier is everything at its best

Order." Fromm then became more specific: "I have just been informed that the Führer has been assassinated." Keitel replied: "That's all nonsense. An assassination attempt did indeed take place, but fortunately it failed. The Führer is alive and unharmed. Where is your Chief of Staff, Count Stauffenberg?" Fromm replied truthfully: "Colonel Stauffenberg has not returned to me."

This meant that Fromm no longer needed to raise the alarm, so Olbricht had to leave him without having achieved anything. The conspirators had not anticipated this reaction, which was bound to have serious consequences for the course of events. In addition, further ghostly scenes took place behind Fromm's back during this time. Colonels General Beck and Hoepner - both off duty - appeared in civilian clothes. They brought their uniforms with them in their suitcases. Beck was to take on the role of Reichsverweser, i.e. head of state, while Hoepner was intended to assume supreme command of the home army. In addition, such illustrious gentlemen as the District President of Potsdam, Gottfried Graf v. Bismarck-Schönhausen, and the co-sworn SA-Obergruppenführer and Police President of Berlin, Wolf Heinrich Graf v. Helldorf, appeared. The government councillor Dr. Hans- Bernd Gisevius, Peter Graf Yorck v. Wartenburg, Captain Ulrich Wilhelm Graf v. Schwerin-Schwanefeld, Lieutenant Colonel Fritz v. d. Lancken, whom we have already met as a sentry in the previous chapter, Berthold Count Stauffenberg, who had spent the night before with his brother Claus, First Lieutenant Ewald Heinrich v. Kleist-Schmenzin, Captain Hans Fritzsche, Captain Friedrich Karl Klausing, Major Freiherr Ludwig v. Leonrod, Lieutenant Kurt Freiherr v. Hammerstein-Equord, Major i. G. Harnack. These were all representatives of the class that could not get over the fact that Hitler did not have the little word "von" in his name and was therefore not befitting his rank. They were joined by the consistorial councillor Eugen Gerstenmaier, whose activity extended according to statements source researchers essentially essentially on the to buttering sandwiches during the long nights.

Before Stauffenberg reached the Bendlerblock, General Olbricht ordered

All military district commands received the following order by telex at about 4:30 p.m. in the name of the new Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht, Field Marshal v. Witzleben, who was not yet present: I. The Führer Adolf Hitler is dead

Taking advantage of this situation, an unscrupulous clique of party leaders from outside the front tried to stab the struggling front in the back and seize power for their own selfish ends. (What they did themselves, they blamed on the party leaders. The author.)

II. In this hour of greatest danger, the Reich Government has declared a state of military emergency in order to maintain law and order, and at the same time has transferred executive power to me along with supreme command of the Wehrmacht.

III I hereby order:

1. I transfer the executive power - with the right of delegation to the territorial commanders - in the home area to the commander of the replacement army with simultaneous appointment as commander-in-chief in the home war zone

In the occupied western territories to the Commander-in-Chief West (Commander-in-Chief of Army Group D), in Italy to the Commander-in-Chief Southwest (Commander-in-Chief of Army Group C), in the southeastern area to the Commander-in-Chief Southeast (Commander-in-Chief of Army Group F), in the occupied eastern territories to the commanders-in-chief of Army Groups South Ukraine, North Ukraine, Center, North and the commander-in-chief of Ostland, for their respective areas of command in Denmark and Norway to the Wehrmacht commanders.

2. The holders of executive power are subordinate:

a) All departments and units of the Wehrmacht including the Waffen-SS, the RAD and the OT.

b) All public authorities of the Reich, the federal states and the municipalities, in particular the entire regulatory, security and administrative police.

c) All officials and branches of the NSDAP and of their

affiliated associations.

d) The transport and utility companies.

3. The entire Waffen-SS is to be integrated into the army with immediate effect.

4. The holders of executive power are responsible for maintaining order and public safety. In particular, they must ensure

a) The security of the messaging system

b) The elimination of the SD.

Any resistance to military enforcement must be ruthlessly broken.

5. In this hour of greatest danger to the Fatherland, the unity of the armed forces and the maintenance of full discipline is the highest imperative. I therefore make it the duty of all commanders of the army, the navy and the air force to support the holders of executive power in the execution of their difficult task with all means at their disposal and to ensure that their instructions are followed by the subordinate services.

The German soldier is faced with a historic task. It will depend on his energy and attitude whether Germany is saved. The same applies to all territorial commanders, the high commands of the Wehrmacht units and the command authorities of the army, navy and air force directly subordinate to the high commands.

The Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces signed v. Witzleben
General Field Marshal

Here, too, one recognizes the initiation of the coup d'état under false premises and the knowledge that no relief whatsoever was to be expected from such a coup with regard to the continued existence of the Reich. The unconditional surrender to all Allies from the West and the East was certain.

internal civil war, the consequences of which would have been impossible to predict for the future. The result would have been unparalleled chaos and the Russians would probably be sitting on the Rhine today.

When Stauffenberg finally arrived at the Bendlerblock shortly before 5 p.m., the rumor of Hider's survival had already spread. Stauffenberg's first appearance before Beck, Olbricht and the police chief Count Helldorf, as well as the district president of Potsdam, Count v. Bismarck-Schönhausen, and Gisevius, was therefore devoted to clarifying the question of Hider's possible survival. Above all, Beck made a point of having Keitel's claim of Hider's survival corrected in the presence of Helldorf. "Keitel is lying," was Stauffenberg's reply.

"I saw the bomb explode with my own eyes. It was a detonation like a fifteen-centimeter grenade that no one could have survived." Another disastrous false report that was to cost the lives of many of Stauffenberg's comrades. At the front, such a report with such catastrophic consequences would have resulted in a court martial with a death sentence by firing squad.

Beck cut short Stauffenberg's further detailed descriptions. "For me, Hider is dead. That is the basis of my actions now. If Hider is indeed alive, we must act all the more quickly and decisively and bring our action in Berlin to a conclusion before reports to the contrary come from headquarters." With what uncertain feelings might Count Bismarck or Count Helldorf have felt at such a state of affairs? Bismarck or Count Helldorf have left the command center of the Bendlerblock, what doubts about the success of their intended coup d'état may have tormented them? Gisevius was more robust there. He constantly pushed for action, everything went far too slowly for him. His words: "Stauffenberg, we must have a few corpses; Goebbels and Gestapo-Müller are still alive."

No decisions had yet been demanded of Fromm, the head of the house, so shortly after 5 p.m. General Olbricht and Stauffenberg went to Fromm again. This was probably done after the telexes had been sent, without the knowledge and

Fromm's approval and thus amounted to outright mutiny against his own employer. "I myself saw Hitler being carried out of the barracks dead," were Stauffenberg's words when Fromm, on the basis of Keitel's message, claimed the opposite. Disregarding any

Out of disrespect for his superior Fromm, Stauffenberg then shouted: "Keitel is lying as usual." Olbricht then explained briefly and succinctly: "In view of Hider's certain death, we have issued the planned alarm orders in the event of internal unrest." Fromm was speechless: "That's mutiny. Who did this?"

It is again indicative of the spirit of the conspirators that Olbricht himself did not take responsibility and initially put forward his chief of staff, Colonel Mertz v. Quirnheim. He was summoned immediately at Fromm's request. After he had confirmed that the orders had been issued, Fromm declared him under arrest and demanded that the gentlemen present stop all orders immediately. Mertz refused. Stauffenberg then intervened: "Colonel General, I detonated the bomb myself during the meeting with Hider in his immediate vicinity. There was an explosion as if a fifteen-centimetre grenade had hit. No one in the room could have survived it." Fromm was genuinely horrified and shouted angrily at Stauffenberg: "The assassination attempt has failed. The only chance you have left is to shoot yourself." When Stauffenberg rejected this suggestion out of hand, Olbricht threw himself into the middle and implored his general-in-chief to join in, as this was the last chance to save the beleaguered fatherland. From these words Fromm had to conclude that Olbricht was also involved in the coup d'état. When this was confirmed, Fromm jumped up angrily and wanted to arrest all three gentlemen.

Now Olbricht excitedly turned the tables and explained his

When Fromm then tried to pounce on Stauffenberg indignantly, the storming lieutenants v. Kleist and Haeften threatened their commander-in-chief with a pistol and locked him in his room. The telephone lines were destroyed, and Maj.

Ludwig Freiherr v. Leonrod took over the guarding. During the whole time, the severely war-damaged Rittmeister Bertram voluntarily remained with his employer and shared his fate as a comrade.

Bertram later told me that Fromm was so shocked by this wild mutiny and betrayal that he could no longer defend himself and remained completely inactive, which later earned him the accusation of cowardice in addition to a lack of supervision. His mutinous camera operators were to blame for the fact that he was also sentenced to death by firing squad. He died tragically with the words: "Long live the Führer Adolf Hitler and my German fatherland" before the volley rang out. The cavalry captain was later able to slip away. At midnight I was still listening to the details of this incredible event. Shortly after this event, the SS leader Dr. Pfiffraeder, commissioned by Himmler, arrived to arrest Stauffenberg after missing him at the airfield in Rangsdorf. He and his two detectives unsuspectingly fell into a trap in the Bendlerblock and were arrested and detained by Colonel Fritz Jäger and First Lieutenant v. Kleist. From then on, the conspirators became more cautious and took security measures. The corridors were controlled by co-conspirators, with Captain Fritzsche in charge. Outside, First Lieutenant Helmut Cords tried to regroup the existing guard of the guard regiment on his own authority, but he did not succeed because my people refused to take any orders from strangers. orders from strangers. Contrary to usual practice, only visitors with orange-colored passes were allowed to pass.

These circumstances, which were reported to me a little later, led me to suspect for the first time, as I have already said, that the head of the conspiracy must be in the Bendlerblock. Neither our guard nor I knew anything about what was going on inside the building. As already mentioned, the next mishap for the conspirators occurred when General Körtzfleisch, who had been ordered there, appeared. He was handed over to the inactive colonel general

Hoepner. However, he strictly refused the orders given by Hoepner, as he knew that Hider had let him go prematurely. He demanded to speak to his superior Fromm, but was refused. Beck's and Olbricht's attempts to change his mind were also fruitless and only increased his anger. He rightly called the conspirators "traitors".

The internal difficulties continued. Similar to Kortzfleisch, the generals Kunze, as head of training, and Specht, as inspector, who had been ordered in for the operational purposes, also refused to take part.

The young leaders denied any involvement in the coup and rejected it as despicable treason. This is what the solidarity of today's unjustly praised resisters really looked like. I am not exaggerating when I say that not even a minority of five percent identified with these illusionists. That is the historical truth that will survive a manipulated falsification of the facts.

To make matters worse, the first news of the failed assassination attempt was broadcast at around 6.45 p.m. on Großdeutscher Rundfunk. "An explosive attack was carried out on the Führer today: Lieutenant General Schmudt, Colonel Brandt's staff Berger. Lighter injuries were sustained by: Colonel General Jodl, Generals Korten, Buhle, Bodenschatz, Heusinger, Scherff, Admirals Voss, v. Puttkammer, Captain Assmann and Lieutenant Colonel Borgmann. The Führer himself suffered no injuries apart from minor burns and bruises. He immediately resumed his work and - as planned - received the Duce (Mussolini) for a lengthy discussion. Shortly after the attack, the Reichsmarschall arrived at the Führer."

At this time, the traitor of Peenemünde, Dr. Otto John, celebrated the successful assassination attempt with his brother Hans and Klaus Bonhoeffer, and they drank to Hitler's death.

Meanwhile, Stauffenberg was almost constantly on the phone, trying to save what could no longer be saved by repeatedly emphasizing that the Führer was dead and that the radio reports were

Lies. Although he knew that Fromm had refused to cooperate, as a supposed man of honor he did not hesitate to issue the following telex at 6 p.m. in his name:

KR - HOKW 02155 July 20, 1944 6 p.m. To W Kdo 1-12,17, 18, 20, 21, W Kdo. Gen. Gouv., Bohemia-Moravia. Secret!

I. On the basis of the authorization granted to me by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, I am transferring the executive power in the military districts to the Deputy Commander-in-Chief Generals and Military District Commanders. With the executive

Presentation of the Oak Leaves of the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross to Major Otto Ernst Remer by Adolf Hitler in 1943 at the Führer's headquarters "Wolf's Lair". The Knight's Cross was awarded on May 27, 1943, and the Oak Leaves on November 12, 1943.

Remer, his 1st General Staff Officer Lieutenant Colonel Reidel (later General of the Bundeswehr) and the Ordnance Officer Captain Wimmer at the divisional command post during the defensive battle near Jägerndorf-Troppau in March 1945.

Major General Remer, commander of the Panzer-Führer-Begleitdivision, and Major General Maeder, commander of the Panzer-Führer-Grenadierdivision, during the Battle of Lauban in March 1945.

Minister Dr. Josef Goebbels with the guard regiment in Berlin after the suppression of the putsch. On the right: Colonel Otto Ernst Remer. On the left: Lieutenant Dr. Hans W Hagen.

Wolf Hitler visited survivors in the military hospitals shortly after the attack in Sedlcien; hier in conversation with
Lmteradimral v. l'utt- amer.

Claus Schenk Graf v. Stauffenberg, who placed the English bomb in the consultation room of the Führer's headquarters on July 20 and drove away hastily after the explosion without having convinced himself of the actual effect (above).

the powers of the Reich Defense Commissars are transferred to the military district commanders.

II. The following immediate measures must be taken:

a) News systems:

The most important buildings and installations of the post military network (including radio installations) are to be secured in a planned military manner. The forces deployed for this purpose must be sufficiently strong to prevent unauthorized interference and violent destruction. Important communications equipment must be manned by officers. In particular are be secured:

Amplifier offices, transit exchanges of the army radio network as well as large radio stations (radio transmitters), telephone and telegraph offices, as far as important telephone lines pass through, amplifiers and battery rooms. The telecommunications network of the Reichsbahn is to be protected in agreement with the transportation departments. The radio network is to be created from own resources.

b) Arrests:

The following are to be removed from office without delay and taken into specially secured detention: all Gauleiters, Reich governors, ministers, chief presidents, police presidents, Gestapo chiefs and heads of SS offices, heads of propaganda offices and district leaders. I command exceptions.

c) Concentration camp:

The concentration camps are to be occupied with haste, the camp commanders arrested and barracked. The political prisoners are to be informed that they must refrain from all demonstrations and individual actions until their release.

d) Waffen-SS:

If there are doubts about the obedience of leaders of the Waffen SS units or if they appear unsuitable, they are to be taken into protective custody and replaced by army officers.

Waffen SS units whose unrestricted subordination is doubtful are to be ruthlessly disarmed. At the same time, energetic intervention with superior forces is necessary to avoid more bloodshed.

e) Police:

The Gestapo and SD offices are to be staffed. Otherwise, the order police are to be deployed to a large extent to relieve the Wehrmacht. Orders are issued by the Chief of Police through the police command channels,

f) Navy and Air Force:

Liaison must be established with the commanders of the navy and the air force. Joint action must be ensured.

III. For the handling of all political questions arising from the military state of emergency, I am appointing a political commissioner to each military district commander. Until further notice, this officer will assume the duties of the Chief of Administration. He advises the military district commander on all political issues.

IV The Home Command Staff is the office of the Supreme Commander in the homeland war zone responsible for all matters of executive power. It sends a liaison officer (VOOKH) to the military district commanders for mutual information on the situation and intentions.

V Acts of arbitrariness and revenge must not be tolerated in the exercise of executive power. The population must become aware of the distance to the arbitrary methods of the previous rulers.

The commander-in-chief of the homeland war
zone no. 32160/45 geh.

signed. Fromm Colonel

General

Colonel Count Stauffenberg

The intended insinuation or, in the event of refusal, the disarmament of SS units alone speaks of the unrealistic nature of these illusionists. This would undoubtedly have led to total civil war. With such a development, we would only have shown the Allies, who were rubbing their hands in glee, a shameful self-destruction. An undeniable stab-in-the-back dogma would have burdened German history for a long time to come.

While Stauffenberg was almost overrunning to put the well-prepared general staff plans into action, he and his co-conspirators increasingly realized that the calculation was without

the host had been made. Above all, neither the army nor the troops thought to trust them or even believe that they would succeed. A typical example was the attempt by Colonel Fritz Jäger to find a troop commando to arrest the Minister of Propaganda and at the same time Reich Defense Commissioner Goebbels. As I reported earlier, I had refused this order from General v. Hase - albeit diplomatically. So now Jäger went to the commandant's office to give this order the necessary emphasis. But the designated shock troops of the army patrol as well as the Landesschützen and the fireworks school rejected this request and simply dispersed, so that the conspirator Colonel Jäger had to return to the Bendlerblock without having achieved anything and report his failure. After the platoon of the guard regiment routinely deployed in the Bendlerblock had left, the conspirators waited in vain for the troop units ordered there. Although the commander of the armored troop school, Colonel Gläserner, appeared as required by the order, he categorically refused to carry out the tasks assigned to him. He even managed to inform his advancing troops of the betrayal, which had already been done by liaison officers from the guard regiment. Colonel Gläserner was then arrested by Colonel Mertz v. Quirnheim and detained in the Bendlerblock

Stauffenberg's above-mentioned order to seize the radio and news media, an important prerequisite for the success of the coup, also failed across the board. But not a single company was found that was prepared to stand up for the conspirators. So it was nothing like the cadaver obedience so reviled today. The whole coup d'état grew more and more into a theoretical plan game without an executing troop, proof that the fighting front was very different from

had distanced himself from these treacherous coup plans. This is the unambiguous truth, which stands in stark contrast to today's propaganda and brainwashing that seeks to ascribe a heroic or idealistic background to July 20, 1944. Anyone who claims otherwise is denying the historical truth.

There were the same difficulties in the intelligence center of the Bendlerblock. Here it was Lieutenant Röhrig, who was on duty, who became suspicious and suspicious of the content of the telexes sent out and also of the contradictory texts and telephone conversations. He immediately informed his superior, Colonel Köllner, and a number of other off-duty intelligence officers, who only hesitantly and reluctantly passed on the telexes sent by Major Harnack, Captain Klausning and Lieutenant Haeften, or even prevented them from being passed on. When this came to light, the excuse was "overload". Here, too, there was not the slightest hint of a vigorous investigation or examination on the part of the conspirators from outside the front. The following incident is typical of the situation. When the radio announced the failure of the assassination attempt, Colonel General Beck asked Dr. Gisevius to immediately draft a counter-statement for the radio. This did not come to anything, as Gisevius very soon left the scene of the crime and spoke at police headquarters with Count Helldorf and the head of the Reich Criminal Police Office, Artur Nebe, both of whom were later executed as co-conspirators, about how the Reichsführer Himmler could be eliminated when he appeared in Berlin. However, this was no longer a serious issue for Helldorf and Nebe. They had already given up and were only talking about how to cover up or deny involvement in the putsch later on. A short time later, Dr. Gisevius had to go into hiding with friends in order to evade responsibility.

The role of General Lindemann, who was scheduled to read out the first prepared appeals of the new government, is also significant. He too had disappeared and with him the prepared concept for these speeches. How one can still heroize the 20th of July today under such circumstances is incomprehensible to me. It was the personalities involved themselves who

contribute to their miserable downfall through their failure all along the line.

After orders had also been issued in the name of Field Marshal v. Witzleben, he did not appear at the OKW in full uniform with his marshal's baton until 7.30 p.m. He had long since heard the news of the failed assassination attempt on the radio and, in the presence of Beck and Captain Ulrich Wille, carried out a thorough examination.

Heim Graf v. Schwerin-Schwanenfeld subjected Stauffenberg to scathing criticism. He accused Stauffenberg of a reckless false report and soberly stated that the whole plan should already be regarded as a failure. He curtly left his intended position as commander-in-chief of the Wehrmacht, drove home and waited there for his trial, for which he was partly responsible. The conspirators were now even more insecure and disoriented. The ongoing telephone calls all over the world, but especially to France, resulted almost exclusively in refusals and imprecations. The initial heroism visibly waned, parts of the conspiracy crumbled and, like Hammerstein, Klausen, Oppen, Fritzsche and Cords, were able to take refuge temporarily. They did not think of risking their lives in battle, but simply left their posts.

In the meantime, however, an energetic counter-action, a kind of self-cleansing, had begun within the Bendlerblock. After being supplied with weapons from the outside by a truck, at around 10.30 p.m. Lieutenant Colonels Herber, v. der Heyde, Pridun, Kuban and Major Fließbach appeared in the room of their superior Olbricht with submachine guns and hand grenades and demanded clarification and an account of his actions. Instead of providing the fighting troops with supplies, as was their duty, they said, they were engaged in senseless putsching. The evil word "stab in the back" was uttered against our fighting brothers. Without further ado, they forced Olbricht not to leave the room.

In this critical situation, Stauffenberg looked through the door and immediately recognized the situation. He slammed the door shut again, fled

through Colonel Mertz's antechamber into the corridor, closely followed by his adjutant Haeften. One of the officers immediately shot after Stauffenberg and wounded him slightly. He managed to escape into Beck and Hoepner's room. Olbricht and his son-in-law, Rittmeister Barnim v. Ramin, who was not involved, were disarmed and driven down the corridor after the fleeing Stauffenberg. He was then found in Beck and Hoepner's room together with Haeften. They were all disarmed and then demanded to speak to Fromm.

He appeared a little later together with Lieutenant Colonel Gehrke and his adjutant Captain Bechtel. Gehrke was my predecessor, from whom I had taken over the guard regiment. He set up one of the seven armored brigades that were to go to the front at the Fallingbommel training area. On that day he had gone to Berlin and, purely by chance, witnessed the deployment of the armored unit alerted by the conspirators at Fehrbelliner Platz, where he happened to meet one of my officers, who informed the commander of the situation. On this occasion, Gehrke immediately became actively involved and then visited me at my command post in Goebbels' house. He arrived just as Captain Schlee was giving me his first detailed report on the events in the Bendlerblock. As Gehrke was free and also knew Fromm, I asked him to go with Schlee to the Bendlerblock to see what was going on.

The result was Fromm's liberation. Fromm held his loaded pistol in his hand and called on the putschists to lay down their weapons. "Now let's turn the tables," were his words. The weapons were also laid down without resistance. Only Beck asked Fromm to refrain from making this demand of him, his old superior, as he himself was willing to draw the consequences from this unfortunate situation. He did so immediately, brought his pistol to his temple and pulled the trigger. The shot was not fatal, but only a grazing shot that caused Beck to slump. "Help the old man," were Fromm's instructions. He was then placed in an armchair, covered in blood, where he was able to take the second shot.

and was saved by a third shot from one of my soldiers.

Fromm gave the other leading putschists present some time to write farewell letters to their relatives. He then left the room, only to reappear a short time later. In the meantime, the Bendlerblock had been sealed off by the company and then stormed. After these events, Fromm reappeared with Gehrke and Schlee in front of the guarded ringleaders. Hoepner wordlessly handed over a letter, which Fromm put unread into an envelope. Fromm's words were something like: "Are you finished, gentlemen? The court martial has just convened under my direction. I have passed the death sentence over four officers: Colonel Mertz of the General Staff, Infantry General Olbricht, this colonel, whose name I no longer know, and this lieutenant" Fromm pointed to Stauffenberg and Haeften.

Lieutenant Schady of the guard regiment was ordered to carry out the execution immediately. It was shortly before midnight when the most active conspirators, standing in front of a pile of sand in the courtyard of the Bendlerblock, were shot in accordance with the law. All the condemned remained silent, only Stauffenberg shouted shrilly into the night: "Long live our holy Germany." A short time later, a telex was sent to all subordinate offices:

"Coup attempt bloodily crushed by irresponsible generals. All leaders shot. Orders from Field Marshal Gen.

v. Witzleben, Colonel General Hoepner, General Beck and General Olbricht are not to be obeyed. I have resumed command after being temporarily detained by force of arms. Fromm, Colonel General."

But Fromm was wrong here. His successor Himmler was already on his way to Berlin. I was still unaware of what was going on in the Bendlerblock at that time. I had enough to do in Berlin. It was only when I heard from one of my officers that executions were taking place in the courtyard of the Bendlerblock that I was startled. I was very shocked and outraged by this, as it had been my pride until then that the action I had led had been carried out without a single shooting.

bloodshed could be carried out. When I received this message, I was in Goebbels' office, where the Minister of Armaments, Speer, was staying at the time. I wanted to drive off immediately to prevent any further shootings. As my car was on the road at the moment, Speer offered to drive me to the scene in his sports car. I was surprised and amazed to hear Goebbels say this:

"This must be prevented at all costs!" This is where Goebbels, who was so confidently calm and circumspect in those hours, was wrong. In less than five minutes, Speer had driven me to the entrance of the Bendlerblock. I thanked him politely, as I had never been had ever had such a high-ranking driver. As soon as I entered the courtyard, I met Colonel General Fromm, who was visibly excited and shaken. Recognizing me, he addressed me: "At last a decent officer from 'Greater Germany'! What do you know about the situation?" I simply said: "Colonel General, I have been given all the powers by the Führer himself to restore peace and order in Berlin. So far, this has been done without a shot of powder. Unfortunately, things are different here. I have come here to prevent further shootings." Fromm looked at me in surprise and was visibly affected. I noticed a certain annoyance. I then told him that I alone would be responsible for everything here in Berlin until Himmler arrived, who was on his way to Berlin. My command post was in the official residence of Minister Goebbels, who certainly knew more than I did and knew the bigger picture. Fromm then drove to Goebbels. I saw him there after midnight talking to senior SS leaders. After Fromm had left the Bendlerblock, I ordered the strictest cordon and took care of restoring order myself. The subsequent arrests and the seizure of material about the conspiracy were carried out on the instructions and orders of Heinrich Himmler, Reichsführer of the SS, who had taken over Fromm's post. When I left the building, I met with the Mussolini liberator Skorzeny

together.

After returning to my command post, I met Himmler there. I dutifully reported my orders to him. At daybreak, my troops moved back to the barracks. I went to bed.

During the night I had listened to Hider's radio address on German radio:

"German comrades of the people!

I don't know how many times an attempt on my life has been planned and carried out. But when I speak to you today, it is for two reasons in particular:

Firstly, so that you can hear my voice and know that I myself am unharmed and healthy.

Secondly, so that you can learn more about a crime that is unparalleled in German history

A very small clique of ambitious, unscrupulous and at the same time criminal, stupid officers have forged a plot to eliminate me and at the same time to wipe out the staff of the German Wehrmacht leadership with me.

The bomb, which was planted by Colonel Graf v. Stauffenberg, landed two meters from my right side. It seriously injured a number of my dear colleagues, one of whom died. I myself am completely unharmed apart from very minor abrasions, bruises or burns. I see it as a confirmation of my providential mission to continue pursuing my life's goal as I have done so far. For I may solemnly confess before the whole nation that since the day I entered Wilhelmstrasse I have had only one thought, to do my duty to the best of my knowledge and conscience, and that since I realized that the war was inevitable and could no longer be postponed, I have known only worry and work and have lived countless days and nights for my people.

At a time when the German armies are engaged in the most difficult struggle, as in Italy, a very small group has now also emerged in Germany, which believed that it could strike back with a dagger, as it did in 1918. This time, however

The claim of these usurpers that I am no longer alive is now being refuted as I speak to you, my dear people. The circle which these usurpers represent is a very small one. It has nothing to do with the German armed forces and above all with the German army. It is a very small coterie of criminal elements who are now being ruthlessly exterminated

I therefore command at this moment,

1. that no civil authority has to take any order from an authority which these usurpers arrogate to themselves.
2. that no military body, no leader of a troop, no soldier has to obey any order of these usurpers, that, on the contrary, everyone is obliged to obey the transmitter or the giver of such an order.

either to be arrested immediately or, in the event of resistance, to be put down immediately. In order to establish order once and for all, I have appointed Reich Minister Himmler as commander of the Home Army. I have appointed Colonel General Guderian to the General Staff to replace the General Staff officer who is currently absent due to illness, and have appointed a second proven leader of the Eastern Front as his assistant. In all other departments of the Reich nothing will change. I am convinced that, with the departure of this very small clique of traitors and conspirators, we will finally create the atmosphere at home that the fighters on the front need. For it is impossible for hundreds of thousands and millions of good men to give their last, while at home a very small clique of ambitious creatures is constantly trying to thwart this attitude

This time we will settle accounts in the way we are used to as National Socialists. I am convinced that every decent officer, every brave soldier will realize this in this hour.

What fate would have befallen Germany if the attack had succeeded today, few people can perhaps imagine. I myself do not thank Providence and my Creator for having preserved me - my life is nothing but worry and

is only work for my people - but I thank him only because he gave me the opportunity to continue this care and to continue my work as well as I can justify it to my conscience.

It is the duty of every German, no matter who he may be, to confront these elements ruthlessly, either to arrest them immediately or, if they offer any resistance, to put them down without further ado. The orders have been given to all troops. They will be carried out blindly in accordance with the obedience known to the German army

May I once again greet you in particular, my old comrades in arms, with joy that I was once again granted the opportunity to escape a fate that was not terrible for me, but would have brought horror to the German people.

I also see this as a sign from Providence that I must continue my work and will therefore continue it."

STAUFFENBERG'S

ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT AT

THE FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS

On July 20, 1944 at 6:00 a.m., Colonel Grafv. Stauffenberg drives from his apartment in Wannsee to the airfield in Rangsdorf. He is carrying a kilo bomb of English origin in his briefcase. On the way, he picks up his adjutant, First Lieutenant Werner v. Haeften, who also had the same bomb with him. With a heavy heart, General Wagner, Quartermaster General, had provided a plane for the flight from Rangsdorf to Rastenburg and back, because he knew what a burden he was taking on. The co-conspirator Major General Stieff was waiting at the airfield with his adjutant Roel. At 10.15 a.m. they reach the Rastenburg airfield and, after an eighteen-kilometer drive in a bucket truck, the headquarters. Stauffenberg wants to report to the commander, Colonel Streve. As he is not available, Stauffenberg and Haeften are invited to breakfast in the casino by the adjutant, Rittmeister v. Möllendorf. The latter remembers that Stauffenberg guarded his briefcase like the apple of his eye and always carried it with him. At headquarters, only the following knew about the planned assassination attempt

Stieff and the General of the Intelligence Corps Erich Fellgiebel.

After an interim meeting with General Buhle, Stauffenberg tells Field Marshal Keitel what he wants to report to the Führer in detail at the briefing. To his horror, he learns from Keitel that the briefing has been brought forward to 12.30 p.m. in view of Mussolini's visit. This disrupted the dates that had been agreed with the Bendlerblock for 1.30 pm. Nevertheless, Stauffenberg sticks to his plan.

After the meeting, which begins punctually at 12.30 p.m., Stauffenberg asks for a room where he can freshen up. Keitel's adjutant, Lieutenant Colonel v. Freyend, obligingly offers him his room. Here, with v. Haeften's help, Stauffenberg hurriedly changes his shirt and breaks the glass capsule of the bomb with a pair of flat-nose pliers. The acid released as a result tears the wire connected to the firing pin, which is then freed and hurtles into the detonator. The bomb had such a thin wire that it was bound to explode after just over ten minutes from the time the glass capsule was broken.

When Stauffenberg stepped out again, John v. Freyend offered to carry his bag in view of his severe war damage, but he refused. Keitel, Buhle and other officers were already waiting outside the concrete-covered wooden barracks for the meeting to begin. Hider's air force adjutant v. Below asked the gentlemen to enter. It was only at this moment that Stauffenberg asked v. Freyend to take his folder and reserve a seat for him near Hitler. Freyend did so and placed the folder about three meters away from Feder on the chair intended for Stauffenberg. Stauffenberg remained in the anteroom and informed Constable Adam, who was manning the telephone in the map room, that he was still waiting for an urgent call from Berlin. He should therefore be called out. In reality, it had been agreed with the General of the Intelligence Troops, Fellgiebel, to have this call made, which was also done by the intelligence officer, Lieutenant Colonel Sander, who informed Stauffenberg that he would return to Berlin after the meeting.

to come to Fellgiebel.

A little later, Stauffenberg entered the storeroom. The meeting had already begun. Stauffenberg gave a brief military salute. His greeting was seriously returned by Hider. General Heusinger reported on the situation on the eastern front. After the Romanian front had been touched upon, he spoke about the tense situation in the central section. Heusinger pointed out that the reserves had been used up and that fresh troops were needed from the General Government and the homeland, about which Stauffenberg was to give a talk. Time was pressing. The bomb was ticking. It was bound to explode at any moment, which would have meant Stauffenberg's certain death. But self-sacrifice was not on his agenda.

program. Contrary to the honorable custom of atoning for the reprehensible oath by sacrificing himself in order to create the conditions for the coup d'état to succeed, he considered himself indispensable. It was Hider himself who saved him by ordering: "No, not now, Stauffenberg can speak later at the end of the meeting." Stauffenberg was saved. Whispering, he asked Keitel if he could make a phone call. Keitel nodded. He asked Colonel Brandt to look after the folder. He would be right back.

So Stauffenberg left the room almost unobserved and hurried to the intelligence bunker where Haeften was waiting for him. The meeting continued without him. Shortly before leaving the room, Stauffenberg had moved his briefcase from his chair to the map table. This now covered the spread-out map when Hitler once again mentioned the southern section. General Schmundt therefore took it off the table and placed it to the right of the massive oak base of the map table, so that a certain protective wall was created between Hitler and the bomb.

At exactly 12.45 p.m. there was a huge bang, like a fifteen-centimeter grenade exploding. Stauffenberg had not met with Fellgiebel, who, according to the plan, was to disable all communications to and from headquarters by blowing them up in his key position after the assassination. Instead, Stauffenberg sat with his adjutant in the car that had been launched, for example

two hundred meters away in front of Fellgiebel's bunker. He reportedly saw flames, smoke and shredded bodies flying out of the house of cards, including his own comrades, whom he was willing to sacrifice in cold blood while sparing himself. The deadly silence after the explosion was followed by shouts and screams.

Without contacting Fellgiebel as agreed, Stauffenberg sped off headlong. The first obstacle was the guard of restricted area 1, who had also been startled by the explosion. But Stauffenberg took the lieutenant on guard by surprise by briefly jumping out of the car, simply picking up the telephone in the guardhouse and confidently pretending to have permission to pass. This bluff succeeded, and just two minutes after the assassination attempt, Stauffenberg was able to drive through the gate. The second outward journey

The next obstacle was the southern guardhouse of the headquarters. Here he was stopped by Sergeant Kolbe, who was on guard duty and also refused him passage because of the explosion he had overheard. Stauffenberg then called Rittmeister v. Möllendorf, with whom he had had breakfast a few hours earlier. General Fromm was waiting for him urgently, he had to get to the airfield immediately. He hung up the phone again and then said to the sergeant: "You heard me, I can pass." But the sergeant did not allow himself to be irritated and called the adjutant of the headquarters commander to make sure. Only when he cleared the passage did the sergeant let him go.

I am so well informed about the events because two months later I was appointed combat commander of all seven headquarters by the Führer himself and had to deal with the failures on July 20. The commander of the Wolf's Lair near Rastenburg - one of Hitler's headquarters -, Colonel Streve, was placed under my command, as was Rattenhuber's SS security group. Rittmeister v. Möllendorf and the lieutenant of the guard of Sperrkreis 1 were later severely reproached. They only saved their heads because responsible superiors stood up for them. Rittmeister v. Möllendorf was later known as

He fell as the battalion commander of my Führerbegleitbrigade at Bastogne during the Battle of the Bulge as a proven and exemplary brave officer. I keep him in special memory.

It is not true that before July 20, visitors to the headquarters had to lay down their weapons when visiting the Führer. This order only came later and only applied to people you didn't know. I myself always carried my pistol, even when talking to the Führer. I was prepared to lose my head if, despite everything, something should happen.

In any case, it was perfectly possible for Stauffenberg to shoot Hitler and then execute himself. But he preferred to let others die and unhesitatingly dragged countless co-conspirators into his misfortune. Certainly not a role model for future generations of soldiers. For this reason, I didn't think it was appropriate to call for a post-war visit to Berlin to take a look at the memorial plaque in the courtyard of the Bendlerblock.

Stauffenberg and Haeften arrived at the airfield in Rastenburg at 3.15 pm. The same plane took off a few minutes later. The flight took two and a half hours. Stauffenberg was in high spirits. He believed in a successful assassination attempt and hoped that all Valkyrie measures had already been initiated during his flight, after Fellgiebel, as agreed, was to give the starting signal for the planned blowing up of the communications bunker.

But what had actually happened or been omitted? What mistakes had been made by those involved? First of all, the prerequisite for the success of the coup, namely the death of Hitler as the decisive oath bearer to whom everyone was committed, had not been fulfilled. He stood alive, albeit injured, in front of the barracks. Stauffenberg could have seen this for himself if he had waited a minute longer. He would still have had the opportunity to shoot the Führer himself. He could have taken advantage of the general confusion. The Führer's eardrums had burst, his right arm was so bruised that he could still

his hair was scorched and his skin had small splinters, burns and abrasions. But for Stauffenberg, the assassination attempt turned out to be the murder of his innocent comrades. The stenographer Dr. Berger was torn apart by the bomb, Colonel General Korten, General Schmudt and Colonel Brandt were so badly injured that they subsequently died. Why didn't Stauffenberg draw his pistol? Just to save his precious life, which he lost hours later? That would have been courageous and exemplary. But as it was, he dragged hundreds of comrades to their doom and became more or less co-responsible for what happened later in Plötzensee.

General Fellgiebel, a key figure in the operation, saw Hitler, supported by Keitel and an orderly, emerge from the rubble. His horror made him not only forget his task of blowing up the Führer's headquarters intelligence center, but also step in front of his Führer with his pistol strapped on, not to shoot him, no, to be the first to congratulate him on his miraculous salvation by providence.

to congratulate him. Even now, he could have saved many of his comrades who were later executed if he had acted in accordance with the task he had voluntarily undertaken. His life was forfeit in any case But these home warriors had no guts or sense of responsibility. To offer them today to the hard-pressed Bundeswehr as role models must seem like an imposition to a knowing and thinking soldier, or his virtues must be so puny that he is useless and superfluous as a soldier If the latter is the case, I am in favor of abolishing the Bundeswehr. One does not defend systems such as empires, republics, authoritarian regimes or liberal democracies, but one's homeland and fatherland, which should embody the values for which it is worth giving one's life. Forms of government are only shells, never the content and yardstick for selfless devotion. This also applies to the soldier's oath. Being allowed to keep or break it at will leads to immorality. Whoever breaks his oath is dead! To discuss this controversially is to call one's fatherland into question. Valuable hours went to waste for the conspirators and were

thus wasted. The oath bearer had not been removed, and thus the oath taken to the head of state, the Führer, remained binding for every honorable soldier. This meant that the most important prerequisite for the success of the coup was not fulfilled from the outset.

After the explosion, Stauffenberg did not take the time to check the success of the assassination attempt and consult with Fellgiebel, even though he was standing in front of his bunker. He lost his nerve and wanted to get himself to safety first. He thought he was so indispensable and felt he had to do everything himself. His first contact after landing in Rangsdorf, when he made the first phone call to his office, is telling. Not only his false report about Hitler's death is documented, but also his message on the phone: "This is General Stauffenberg, everything has gone according to plan. I will report as soon as I arrive in three quarters of an hour." He spoke to Colonel Mertz v. Quirnheim and was very surprised to hear that the putsch had not been triggered due to a lack of news.

It did not occur to him that he was not entirely innocent of this. Witness to this conversation was Lieutenant Colonel Stepp, who was on duty at the airfield and knew nothing of an intended coup d'état. He was only surprised that Stauffenberg was wearing the colonel's epaulettes but was reporting as a general. "May I congratulate you on your promotion," he asked. "Yes, as of today I am a general," was Stauffenberg's reply! As a soldier at the front, you really have to wonder that an officer can find the time and thought to promote himself after such an act and with such responsibility. Yet streets and barracks are named after him today

It should be noted that two days earlier, Dr. John, arriving in Berlin from Madrid, had informed the conspirators in the Bendler Block that the Allies would continue to insist on unconditional surrender, even to the Soviets, if Hitler was eliminated. Stauffenberg was therefore aware that he could not expect any relief from our enemies either.

At this point, it was already known at headquarters that Stauffenberg was the bomber. His companion v. Haeften had provided incontrovertible proof of this, for on the journey from headquarters to the airfield he had made the mistake of dismantling the second bomb he had brought with him and throwing it carelessly into the ditch, so that a little later, when Stauffenberg himself was drawn into suspicion by Hider, the attentive driver, who had noticed an object being thrown away, was able to find this defused bomb.

But Stauffenberg had no idea of any of this, nor that, on Himmler's orders, SS-Obersturmführer Piffraeder was on his way to Rangsdorf airfield to arrest him. Stauffenberg had to travel in a car borrowed from the airport because they had forgotten to send their own car. The two cars must have crossed paths in Berlin without spotting each other.

In the headquarters itself, after the initial shock, people initially thought it was a direct hit by an aerial bomb. Then construction workers from the Todt organization were suspected of having recently erected this unfortified house of cards, which was only encased in concrete. Only Hitler brusquely rejected this accusation, saying: "A German worker will never raise his hand against me. Such an outrage can only spring from the morbid mind of a decadent aristocrat." Himmler had arrived about half an hour after the assassination attempt. He immediately had the scene of the crime investigated. A check of the list of participants revealed that Stauffenberg was missing. It was then quickly discovered that he had left the map room shortly before the explosion without his cap and briefcase. A check of the barriers revealed that Stauffenberg had left the Wolfsschanze and taken off to Rangsdorf by plane. The driver of the car stated that several objects had been thrown out of the car during the journey. A search revealed the discovery of a nine hundred and seventy gram lump of explosives with two detonators and an English chemical-mechanical detonating pin.

The suspicions against Stauffenberg grew stronger when the "house of cards" was found. At first it was assumed that he had flown to the Russians, until the departure of the Heinkel plane used by Stauffenberg to Berlin-Rangsdorf was reported from the Rastenburg airfield.

While all these investigations were in progress and Stauffenberg was on his way to Berlin, Hider had changed his clothes, received the announced Duce as planned and personally showed him the shattered camp barracks. Internally, Hider had ordered that nothing about the events should be leaked to the outside world. Hider also considered this assassination to be one of the many events directed against him personally, but in no way thought of a well-prepared coup d'état that was to be initiated with this murder. He spoke only of divine providence, which had once again held a protective hand over him. He only saw this as a sign to continue the work he had begun until victory.

Stauffenberg left the Rangsdorf airfield in a borrowed car at 4.05 pm and did not arrive at his office in the Bendlerblock until 4.45 pm. In other words, a whole four hours were wasted, which meant that the failure of this coup was already pre-programmed.

THE ATTENTION

COLONEL CLAUS SCHENK GRAF VON STAUFFENBERG

Stauffenberg had joined the Rider Regiment 17 of the Reichswehr in Bamberg in 1926 as an ensign. After attending the infantry school in Dresden and the cavalry school in Hanover, he returned to his old regiment as a midshipman at the end of 1929. As a young lieutenant, he took part in an infantry gunner course in Döberitz the following year and became platoon leader of his regiment's mine launcher squadron in Bamberg from March 1931. After coming to power, he became a cavalry officer at the Hanover Cavalry School. He was promoted to cavalry captain on January 1, 1937. In the fall of 1937, he was commanded to the war academy, from which he graduated on 24.6.1938 with

successfully. He became Ib (supply) with the 1st Light Division in Wuppertal, which was led by the later conspirator Hoepner. In this capacity, he took part in the peaceful invasion of the Sudetenland for two weeks. In the same capacity as a supply officer, he was also involved in the Polish campaign. During the French campaign, he was appointed to the organizational department of the General Staff. His previous fourteen-year service career did not show any unusual features. It is striking that he was never an independent troop leader, such as a company commander or later a battalion or regimental commander, and thus did not know the hard and sacrificial fighting at the front. After his promotion to lieutenant colonel on January 1, 1943, he was appointed Ia of a division of the Afrika Korps in February of the same year, when it was already in a hopeless situation in the Tunis area. On April 7, 1943, he was seriously wounded by enemy aircraft and thus escaped imminent capture. He had lost his left eye. According to Professor Sauerbruch, the bullet was still lodged in the back of his head and was not operated on due to Stauffenberg's condition. He had also lost his right arm and the index and ring fingers were missing from his left hand. After his wound had healed, he was transferred to the AHA (General Army Office) on October 1, 1943. His immediate superior was Lieutenant General Olbricht, one of the most active resistance fighters. On July 1, 1944, Stauffenberg was transferred to the Chief of Staff of the BdE (Commander of the Reserve Army), Colonel General Fromm, and simultaneously promoted to colonel.

There is no question that Stauffenberg, like many other of his colleagues, approved of Hitler's assumption of power for national reasons and also as a young officer in the futureless Reichswehr. He also welcomed the restoration of sovereign rights in the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland, the introduction of universal conscription and was enthusiastic about the historic success of Austria's reunification with the German Reich. Neither the annexation of the German Sudetenland, the annexation by the Slovaks and Czechs caused later establishment of a

independent Slovakia and the creation of the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia revealed a serious opposition to the regime in Stauffenberg, nor did the Polish campaign and the subsequent Western campaign trigger any critical remarks or attitudes. He, too, was caught up in the general frenzy of enthusiasm. If, in this context, his well-meaning authors merely report "that the aristocrat Stauffenberg was less able to make friends with the plebeian component of the National Socialist revolution and always rejected it", this is of course no indication of any serious opposition to the Third Reich. If, as Christian Müller does in his biography of Stauffenberg, there is talk of a "flare-up of the spirit of resistance" and a "disastrous development" in connection with the Röhm revolt, then Stauffenberg, like the majority of officers at the time, must have been more concerned that the SA might succeed in asserting a genuine competitive claim against the Wehrmacht.

A historical review of these events will certainly have to establish that this so-called Röhmputsch was essentially an invention of the army, intended to force Hitler to bring about a decision in favor of the army. I will never forget, in contrast to today's narrative, the rejoicing that prevailed among the reactionary officers belonging to the later resistance when Hitler decided in his own way in favor of the military. The same circles had also wished for the elimination of the Waffen SS as a rival organization, but despite all their efforts, they were not given the opportunity to do so. Hitler's intervention, enforced by the Wehrmacht, broke the back of the SA, which had grown up during the fighting and had proven itself at the time. We younger officers regretted that very much. It was clear to us that a large part of militant young Germany had gathered in the SA, and that without the Sturmabteilungen it would not have been possible for Hitler to seize power. For many of these young fighters, most of them unemployed, had themselves given in to the reigning terror on the streets.

In the streets and in the assemblies, they made considerable sacrifices and contributed significantly to the success of the revolution.

This selfless SA no longer had a task after the takeover. As we know today, these young fighters did not grow into the sinecure of the state or the NSDAP. Despite their merits, they stood outside. But such a young, proven fighting organization could not be allowed to lie fallow. It had to be given an appropriate task. It would certainly have been better if the majority of these young fighting men had found a new field of activity within the Wehrmacht. But this was precisely what the conservative aristocratic Reichswehr leadership knew how to prevent. Hider became their victim in this respect. Stauffenberg was certainly one of these people at the time, not because he was against Hider, but because he did not want to see the independence of the Wehrmacht as a state within a state endangered by foreign influences.

At the time, these circles were not bothered by the fact that some SA leaders were put up against the wall as part of this revolutionary event; however, they were shocked that General v.

Sneak peek

and the author of the sensational Papen speech, the lawyer Edgar J. Jung, were victims of this event; after all, they belonged to their untouchable circles. However, the fact that Jung and his backers had planned to overthrow him from above with the help of Hindenburg due to the existing and fueled tensions between the SA and the Wehrmacht was deliberately concealed. A possible civil war was only averted by Hitler's energetic intervention

There is no evidence of any real resistance to Hider and National Socialism in Stauffenberg's life up to the end of 1942. He undoubtedly had contact with the so-called "Kreisau Circle". Some of his friends were there, such as the under-utilized gentlemen Oberregierungsrat Yorck v. Wartenburg, Helmut Graf v. Moltke, Legationsrat Adam v. Trott zu Solz, Dr. Carlo Mierendorf, Professor Adolf Reichwein, Dr. Julius Leber, Dr. Horst v. Einsiedel, Dr. Dietrich v. Trotha, Jesuit priest Alfred Delp,

Consistorial Councillor Eugen Gerstenmaier and other to regular "coffee party" came together. It were As a "non-politician", Stauffenberg, for whom this circle was too conservative, was met with mistrust with his half-baked ideas, especially as he did not reveal his true political intentions at the time. with these meetings to hide sought to hide. Stauffenberg is generally said to have had a pronounced sense of prestige Some of his comrades report of exaggerated ambition and suspect that his brain injury may have caused a pathological change in consciousness. His "consuming thirst for action" had so far come up short. He had never the exciting minutes of a front-line fighter before the attack, or the renunciative fight for every meter of ground during the defense. He had to do his job at his desk and had to accept how others achieved success and fame in active service. This must have been all the more difficult for him to bear if his author Peter Hoffmann is right in his statement: "From his earliest youth, Stauffenberg had the feeling of destiny to something extraordinary." He felt himself to be a brilliant descendant of Gneiseau and felt that he had the tools to "succeed Moltke or Schlieffen". Gerhard Ritter speaks of "a piece of demonic will to power". But for all his ambition, his career to date offered little prospect of this. In particular, after his serious wounding and thus his physical disability, he had to come to the inevitable realization that fate left little chance for his promising dreams of the future.

He had not become a troop commander and probably could not become one. The position offered to him as head of the AHA and later with the BdE, which made him an office officer, albeit certainly in an influential position, certainly did not meet his high expectations. At the age of thirty-five, he must also have had rather pessimistic hopes regarding his continued use as a professional officer after the end of the war, especially as in his position he was able to better understand the military situation.

Germany as desperate. What was to become of him, who had neither found the opportunity to prove himself as a higher-ranking troop leader nor to have any high war decoration? Both would certainly have been benchmarks for possible further service after the war. Added to this was his physical disability, which made early retirement seem likely. All in all, this record shows little prospect of fulfilling lofty dreams.

He therefore had to gratefully accept the position offered to him as head of the General Army Office, which was headed by Lieutenant General Olbricht. He took up this position at the beginning of October 1943 as Lieutenant Colonel (retired). Here he was confronted for the first time with one of the most active resistance fighters. It was also Olbricht who recruited him and brought him into direct contact with Goerdeler, but above all with Beck, v. Witzleben and his former division commander Hoepner.

There was another reason why Stauffenberg was recruited. The position of the previous "managing director" of the resistance had become vacant. Major General Oster, head of the organization department of the Abwehr, had resigned. He was sent into retirement when incriminating papers belonging to his colleague, Reichsgerichtsrat Hans v.

Dohnanyi, who was also a conspirator, had been found, which led to his arrest and later execution. This case marked the beginning of the end of the German Abwehr under Canaris. From the point of view of the resisters, he was all the more irresponsible as Dohnanyi wasted foreign currency for personal purposes in addition to the conspiracy carried out for Oster and, on top of that, had forty thousand Reichsmarks paid out for the purchase of a villa from the Jauch und Hübner company as an alleged loan in Switzerland.

I don't know how you can speak of role models here when sworn enemies seriously endanger their supposedly idealistic goals by committing criminal offenses. In any case, they were not very

honorable events was the reason why Olbricht had to look for a new managing director. He considered Stauffenberg suitable for this task, and he accepted, recognizing this as an opportunity to make a name for himself and write his name in the book of history.

Thus, in addition to his full-time duties as Chief of Staff with Olbricht and later, from July 1, 1944, as Chief of Staff with the BdE (Colonel General Fromm), Stauffenberg was also given the difficult, responsible task of becoming the driving force behind a coup d'état. This double function alone was an almost impossible gigantic task and responsibility for a man who was severely war-damaged and also brain-injured. Even here, the principle of all general staff work was violated, namely to focus soberly and with concentration on one goal in the interest of success. But that was not all

He himself grossly violated his general staff duties by allowing his messianic calling and his thirst for action to lead him to further accumulation of offices as a politician, as general manager of the coup d'état and as an assassin. No one, neither Olbricht nor other high-ranking front-ranking officials, fell into his arms and forced him to limit his areas of responsibility. The seeds of the failure of the coup d'état on July 20, 1944 already lay here, namely in the excessiveness and not in the limitation to what was feasible.

cannot be a commander and an assistant commander at the same time. You can't want to do everything yourself.

The art of leadership lies in assigning tasks to responsible personalities. This was not a coup d'état as we know it from South American history, but a coup d'état of truly gigantic proportions in the midst of a war in which half the world was involved in order to bring Hitler and the German Reich to their knees. This coup d'état was to be triggered by an assassination attempt and bring the Reich a negotiated peace, although there were no prerequisites for this. A unique event in the history of

German history. Colonel General Guderian's verdict: "Never before in the Prussian-German Empire has a head of state been ended by assassination, and because it did not succeed, July 20th will be an eternal stain on our history."

Everyone, including Stauffenberg, was aware that the coup could only succeed if Hitler was removed as head of state and commander-in-chief of the Wehrmacht. After Stauffenberg had failed to find a suitable assassin, he decided to do it himself. This was all the more astonishing because Stauffenberg was not only a devout Catholic, even if he was not a regular churchgoer, but also because he was going against the opinion of many leading front men that this dirty work could not be expected of a high official of a state. Such arguments had also led to Stauffenberg's rejection of Colonel Meichssner's recruitment. In response to Meichssner's counter-attack as to why he did not do it himself, Stauffenberg is said to have replied: "I am not the kind of man who wants to turn others into assassins without being prepared to do so myself. But unfortunately I can't get close to the guy."

This was Stauffenberg's decision. When he became Chief of Staff at the BdE on July 1, 1944, he had access to the Führer. From this moment on, he was faced with a new situation. As a sober-minded Generalstabler, he had to ask himself whether his task as chief of staff of the resistance was compatible with the role of an assassin. could be agreed. The assassination attempt alone required the whole man. Only the most careful preparation, thinking through and planning down to the last detail, including possible mishaps and overcoming them, were the prerequisites for success. Add to this the mental and physical strain and the responsibility for oneself and the lives of others, and it seems completely incomprehensible to me that there was no clear and necessary separation of duties.

does not speak for the qualifications of a general staff officer. Stauffenberg must have sensed this. For there is no other explanation for his hesitation and uncertainty.

On July 6, on the Obersalzberg near Berchtesgaden, he twice fails to put his decision into action during meetings with Hider. The same thing happened again on July 11 and then again on the 15th of the same month, when Stauffenberg's promise to kill Hider this time had already triggered the Valkyrie measures in Berlin, without the planned assassination being carried out. Stauffenberg always had the bomb with him on all these occasions. This fact alone refutes the later theory of close surveillance of visitors to the headquarters. As already mentioned, the execution of an assassination attempt against the German head of state not only required a man who was determined to do anything, capable and willing to sacrifice himself, but also careful, detailed planning and preparation by a general staff. Here, too, there was a lack of specialist knowledge, the necessary study of the opportunities available and the intensive training preparations of an amateur. The consequences were horrific and led to reckless sacrifices of comrades and family members involved and not involved. People complain about them today, but not about the perpetrators of such suffering.

Why did Stauffenberg use the same English explosives with the acid detonator, which had already proved to be ineffective in the hands of Schlabrendorff and von Gersdorff? This alone is clear evidence that the planners were not experts, but dilettantes who did not even consider it necessary to seek appropriate advice and training. For this reason alone, Stauffenberg must be denied the ability of an assassin.

As an expert, one can only marvel at the fact that Stauffenberg compares the explosion with the detonation of a fifteen-centimeter grenade. As is well known, an explosive is not encased and therefore only acts through air pressure within a very limited radius of action. When a fifteen-centimeter grenade explodes

but hundreds of shrapnel fragments from fifty kilograms of iron become lethally effective within a radius of fifteen meters. Explosives that have not been dampened lose their lethal effect after just one meter. For this reason alone, it is incomprehensible and reckless that Stauffenberg only used one kilogram of explosives instead of the two kilograms he had carried and was advised to use. Here, too, Stauffenberg lost his nerve and was not a sober-minded general. The often cited excuse that there was no room for this amount in his briefcase is incorrect. He could have easily accommodated four kilograms of explosives; the dimensions for one kilogram were only nine/eight/thirty-two centimeters, according to other reports five/fourteen/twenty centimeters. The whole thing could easily have been placed in a file folder and cleverly camouflaged.

In any case, it was criminal recklessness that both Stauffenberg and his superiors had not taken into account the possibility that he might be discovered and not return to Berlin during the superficial preparation of this assassination attempt. Weighing up all these errors of judgment, it is difficult to speak of the cool and balanced actions and deliberations of a general colonel. Rather, the picture that emerges is one of great nervousness, disorientation and lack of concentration, or even, due to his brain injury, of mental constriction, which bears no relation to the responsibility and sense of duty of a key figure in a coup of truly world-historical significance. This uncertainty and indecision was already evident on July 15, when Stauffenberg did not stand by his word, although he knew that the Valkyrie measures had already been triggered, and instead of acting he made a telephone call. Even here, Stauffen-

berg for recklessly endangering his comrades and the entire company. His behavior was not excusable, but deserving of punishment.

Even the choice of means was questionable and dishonorable. A man who has undertaken to play an important political and military role after such an assassination cannot anonymously detonate a bomb and then sneak away. This contradicts any sense of honor of an officer. The question simply arises, why did Stauffenberg not use a pistol to get rid of the oath bearer, if necessary at the sacrifice of his own life? Many authors have tried to prove that Stauffenberg was unable to do so because of his disability. I consider this to be a contrived, benevolent excuse. As tests have shown, it is perfectly possible to use a pistol with the safety off with the appropriate training, even if you are missing two fingers. He was able to carry his injured hand in a sling in which a concealed and unlocked pistol was inconspicuously at hand. In this way, he would not have become the murderer of innocent comrades and would not have recklessly risked the lives of his co-conspirators, because the coup would only have been triggered if the assassination attempt had been successful. But such considerations would have been necessary beforehand. But that would have required a man who had already "smelled powder" and had to limit himself exclusively to the planning and execution of the assassination. Stauffenberg, however, wanted to do everything alone and therefore achieved nothing.

The plan was to blow up the headquarters intelligence center after a successful assassination. What happened? Stauffenberg left the Wolf's Lair in the belief that he had killed Hitler. Fellgiebel, however, did not blow up the intelligence bunker as agreed, as Hitler had survived, and failed to pour clear wine for his co-conspirators in Berlin. This mishap was also a result of Stauffenberg's inadequate advance planning. Why had he not planned with the help of the

The conspiratorial intelligence officers set up their own independent telephone, radio and telex connection between Berlin and the main

have quarters prepared? The Steindorf estate, owned by Count Heinrich von Lehndorf, was located in the immediate vicinity of the headquarters. He was a member of the resistance and was executed in connection with the events of July 20th. This estate was ideal for creating an independent communication link without attracting attention. From here, Stauffenberg or co-conspirators commissioned by him could have informed the Bendlerblock without having to accept the loss of time caused by Stauffenberg's flight to Berlin. This was undoubtedly a fatal omission in general staff planning. The same applies to the planning in Berlin. The coup could only have succeeded if it had been triggered suddenly and in a concentrated manner. This required a prepared meeting room for the key leaders. This had to be near the Bendlerblock. It was only possible to take energetic, unified action after all the relevant leadership bodies had assembled, especially as this was a revolt from above. Goerdeler was unavailable, v. Witzleben had traveled to Zossen by mistake and only appeared seven hours after the assassination attempt. Lindemann, who was to read Beck's appeal on the radio, was not there, so that Gisevius first had to be instructed to write a new draft, which was then no longer read out. The radio station was manned by the troops, i.e. by non-experts, but the experts assigned to it sat idly in the commandant's office until they were arrested because the telephone connections did not work and there were no bikers available. Even the Reichsverweser Beck only appeared half an hour after the Valkyrie measures had been triggered.

When the resistance literature speaks of the fact that the preparatory The fact that it was Stauffenberg who first gave "color and a face" to the events of the coup, and that Count v. d. Schulenburg called them "classic", all these mishaps testify to the exact opposite. On July 15, the Valkyrie measures had already begun before the planned assassination attempt. This means that at the time of the elimination Hitler a provision had already been sufficiently strong

troop units. On July 20, however, nothing of the sort had happened, so they were

unable to act at the decisive moment. This can also be seen from the fact that the managers who were gradually arriving in the Bendlerblock stood idly by. They waited. They had not been given predetermined tasks and areas of responsibility. There were no appointment calendars or prepared telephone directories for measures to be taken. Some of the addresses of the required co-sworn officers, but also of those to be arrested, were out of date. General Hoepner did not want to take up his duties without a certificate of appointment. Strange rebels! Did Stauffenberg not know the mentality of his co-conspirators' superiors or did he not trust them to carry out a coup d'état? Was this the reason why he felt irreplaceable? Or did he feel that as a general he had not prepared the coup carefully enough, so that he believed that only his personal involvement could compensate for this weakness? The fact that he considered himself indispensable contradicts the upbringing of a general staff officer and is an expression of his pathological need for recognition.

There is evidence that Stauffenberg left the bunker without his cap and belt and waited for the detonation. Both had remained in the situation barrack during the excitement. He also left the headquarters in this outfit, "half naked", as they used to say at the time. To outsiders, this may seem a ridiculous trifle. In reality, however, this unusual picture must have caught the eye of every inspector at the station and made him suspicious. The driver must have noticed it too. Equally reckless was the throwing away of the second unused explosive from the car going to the airfield, which did not escape the driver's attention. He reported this incident so that the explosive device was found during an ordered search. This fatal mistake very quickly convicted Stauffenberg. Both incidents show the lack of advance planning. Haeften should have taken care of Stauffenberg's paddock and cap and taken both with him

have to. So here too, planning errors and thus negligent endangerment of such an important company.

It is also not clear why Stauffenberg waited for the detonation within the inner exclusion zone. That would only have been would have made sense if he had been able to attempt a second attack. In this context, the question must be seriously raised as to why no electric detonator was used, which also had the advantage of being able to determine the time of the explosion itself. It seems that little thought was given to this and no practical tests were undertaken. But if Stauffenberg considered himself indispensable as "manager" of the resistance, it is incomprehensible that he did not leave the headquarters immediately to avoid the danger of possible arrest. He was also able to wait for and hear the detonation outside the cordon. Here, too, confusion and not sober, considered action is recognizable.

I cannot recognize such behaviour as a foolhardy achievement. In the interest of success, it was important for a general staff officer to eliminate all risk by coolly weighing up the situation and avoiding all conceivable mishaps. Furthermore, it remains incomprehensible that Stauffenberg did not immediately contact General Olbricht in the Bendlerblock by telephone after his arrival at the airfield in Rastenburg and report the completed assassination attempt. Did he rely exclusively on Fellgiebel or was he interested in stalling the gentlemen in order to take everything into his own hands after his return? In any case, you can see here the disadvantages of accumulating offices and his intention to trust others with nothing, but himself with everything.

I simply cannot imagine that generals like Beck, v. Witzleben or Hoepner made the initiation and execution of the coup dependent on Stauffenberg's return. That would be a misjudgment of the intelligence of these men. Given the superficiality of the preparations for this undertaking, they had to reckon with the fact that Stauffenberg would return even after a

was arrested after the successful assassination attempt and was therefore unable to return to Berlin. For this reason alone, it was the duty of the general manager of the resistance to prepare and define all plans in detail so that everything could function without him. There can be no doubt that Olbricht was pulling all the strings in Berlin, as he had already started the Valkyrie measures before Stauffenberg's return. He was the person who commissioned the planning carried out by Stauffenberg.

and had certainly checked them and found them to be good, so that it must have been possible to carry out the plans without Stauffenberg. After arriving at the Bendlerblock, Stauffenberg must have been aware that he had lost more than four valuable hours due to his own miscalculations. His plans had already failed because the headquarters had not been eliminated. He must have realized this at the latest when he met Fromm. He did not understand, or did not want to understand, that Fromm's request to put a bullet through his head in view of the situation would have been an honorable solution that would have saved the lives of many of his co-conspirators. In any case, they would have been able to claim that they had acted in good faith as part of the Valkyrie measures. Rather, fate had offered him the opportunity to play the tragic hero. I consider it impossible that Stauffenberg had at that moment adopted the view later constructed by benevolent historians: "It no longer depends on the practical purpose, but on the fact that the German resistance movement has dared to make the decisive throw before the world and before history." With these words, General v. Tresckow, one of the most active conspirators, put an end to his life after the failure of the coup and in the certain knowledge of his imminent imprisonment between the German and the Russian lines. But Stauffenberg was not thinking of self-execution, he wanted to live, to write his success into the book of history and not leave it at an unheroic coup. But here it is a matter of history

to check objectively whether, in this hopeless situation that he himself had caused, he was not making the same mistake that he had presumed to make towards Hitler, regardless of the fact that he was dragging his co-conspirators down with him.

But if he was prepared to take this path against all reason, with almost no prospect of success, it must be clearly asked whether he was the right man for the job in terms of his leadership qualities. In this desperate situation, it could only be possible for him to concentrate all his available resources on the task at hand.

to act with superhuman energy and avoiding all mistakes. In this situation, he had to demonstrate maximum ingenuity and unshakeably confident leadership, just like in a battle in a cauldron. Did he do that? His excited running back and forth from one telephone set to the next, his erratic and hectic instructions and "saddle orders" do not yet reveal any leadership qualities. Initially, after all the failures, the important thing was to get the prepared orders out as quickly as possible. If this had been properly thought through, they could have been issued within half an hour by means of a so-called "conference call". The precondition for this, however, was that sufficient trained intelligence personnel were ordered in good time, which was not the case. However, the orders were inappropriately issued as FFR and gKdos, the highest level of secrecy, which practically meant that instead of reaching nineteen offices simultaneously, these instructions had to be copied nineteen times and sent out one after the other. As a result, the last telexes did not reach the recipients until 8.00 pm. The result was uncertainty and nervousness, which led to the various military districts calling each other and informing each other, not to mention the fact that clarification of the situation was also requested from the headquarters, which automatically led to a drop-off from the frontline troops.

Just how carelessly Stauffenberg had prepared the coup plans can be seen in the

The fact that not even a reliable and responsible intelligence officer was appointed from the ranks of the co-conspirators is also a clear indication of this. It is true that Stauffenberg had confidants and accomplices in a number of military circles, including some commanding generals who were quite approachable for him. But even there he failed, answering precise questions only superficially and making excuses under time pressure, referring to the written orders still to come. In some cases, he was unavailable for recalling commanding generals because he was supposedly conducting important meetings. Such unbelievable behavior towards leading representatives alone is inconceivable, and was likely to cause any kind of suspicion.

to destroy trust. So it was not surprising that even his initiated comrades only reacted to orders from the Wolf's Lair. What use were Stauffenberg's repeated affirmations "The Führer is dead, I was there myself" if Keitel had already given the opposite information. Even Stauffenberg's words, "You won't want to jump off" or "You're not going to want to give up, are you?" are not very suitable for spurring people on. They don't keep a wavering person in line and are not an expression of particular persuasiveness

Here you can see the false and inadequate \brbereitungen for the coup d'état, but also Stauffenberg's incompetence and megalomania. Since when have minor colonels in a non-subordinate function in an army ever been in a position to issue fundamental operational instructions to commanding generals or army commanders that were completely out of the ordinary? Colonel General Fromm was responsible for this. Even Beck, v. Witzleben and Hoepner, of whom everyone knew that they had left the army, were not qualified to do so. They essentially did not even try. Hoepner's lukewarm attitude when he was on the phone instead of Fromm himself and was called by General Schaal, the commander-in-chief of the Bohemia-Moravia military district, at 8.24 p.m. is telling. This was because, contrary to the clear instructions, he had contacted the deputy commander.

Reichsprotector Frank, did not arrest him and concluded an honor agreement with him. He wanted to have his independence confirmed. Hoepner gave him the freedom to cooperate with Frank. Peter Hoffmann writes in his book "Resistance, coup d'état, assassination": "Now Hoepner had so little to say about the unusual situation - there was nothing new - that Schaal decided to take the initiative himself." In other words, he dropped out. v. Witzleben had told v. Stauffenberg off like a schoolboy for his false report and went home. This meant that the military leader was out. Competence problems blocked any meaningful work Stauffenberg, left alone, believed he could desperately save what could still be saved through pointless telephone conversations. In one of his last conversations with his cousin

v. Hofacker

In Paris, he had to admit his surrender: "The henchmen are already making noise outside in the corridor. It's over."

But Stauffenberg had also played *va banque* as a politician. He pretended to want to save Germany in its greatest need. However, numerous conspiratorial contacts with our opponents had clearly revealed that they insisted on unconditional surrender to both the Soviets and the Western Allies. There could be no question of a hoped-for cease-fire against the West in order to build a stable eastern front. Stauffenberg and his co-conspirators did not want to understand that our opponents in the war were not so much concerned with the destruction of National Socialism, which was seen as a purely internal German political matter. The hope of achieving more tolerable conditions with a capitulation was also unrealistic and not justified by anything.

Then, as now, the later victors were concerned with pure power politics. The only difference is that at that time the Western Allies, like the Soviets, wanted to smash the core of the European center of power, Prussia-Germany, with its alleged militarism and its leading aristocratic class, once and for all. This was more or less the political leadership, which, in order to achieve its

head, had come together in the resistance. After the capitulation, there was less talk of the destruction of National Socialism than of Prussian Junkertum, militarism, indeed Prussia in general. The unique historical event, the dissolution of Prussia by the Allied Control Council in 1947 in violation of international law, clearly demonstrates the main objective of the victors. Today, in view of the changed world situation, the Americans and British would certainly be glad if they had not made this historic mistake. Stauffenberg, however, did not want to understand that the Prussian-German aristocratic class, which played a leading role in the military revolt of July 20, 1944, had already dug their own grave at that time, which the victors had intended for them anyway after the defeat.

FURTHER PLANNED ASSASSINATIONS

It is surprising that the successful assassination attempt on November 9, 1939 in Munich's Hofbräuhaussaal, carried out by the loner Johann Georg Elsner, is never mentioned in the literature of the resistance. As is well known, Hitler gathered his old comrades-in-arms there every year to commemorate the 1923 putsch in Munich. Everything was carefully prepared, almost by an unpredestined person with a general staff. The explosion took place punctually, as planned and intended. Only Hitler had unexpectedly left the event minutes before the explosion. In contrast to the assassination attempt by Count von Stauffenberg, do we find this act so unworthy of mention only because he did not belong to their circles and was only a small, insignificant craftsman who had to leave because of alimony payments? Is this a case of double standards? Does this assassination attempt carried out by a simple man like Elsner contradict the thesis, which was artificially built up after the war, that it was a decidedly elite group that rose up against Hitler in a political and moral sense? Elsner had no political ambitions whatsoever. He only wanted to get rid of the hated Hitler.

According to the latest findings, however, he has English backers

who financed his crime. After the war, the Jewish member of the English House of Commons, Strauss, confessed to aiding and abetting him. But an assassination seems to me to have little to do with morality, regardless of who plans and carries it out. There is no doubt that an assassination attempt on a head of state has a political background. In politics, however, the ethos of power has always prevailed, which can be expressed with moralizing words.

but has little to do with morality Even a democracy is not immune to this. Assassination remains assassination, just as murder is still murder. But to judge and evaluate assassins from different points of view, depending on which circles and social classes they come from or whether they are an amoral little man like Elsner or a highly moral military man or politician, is not valid. Assassins are judged by their achievements. But if this is taken as the basis for evaluating assassinations, then the unknown Elsner stands alone at the top.

He alone scouted the place and time of the attack He alone found ways and means to obtain the necessary explosives. He thought through all the possibilities and obstacles. He made all the preparations himself in a methodical, almost classic general staff manner. He designed and installed the double time fuses himself so that there was no chance of a mishap. The installation of the detonator package with the mechanical time fuse took four weeks. He carried out the work at night, always in danger of being discovered. The planning and execution of the attack were flawless. All the assassins who were not heard of until after the war and who did great things without being able to show even one success could have learned from him.

According to his own statements, after the Polish campaign, the Legation Councillor Erich Kordt offered to eliminate Hider by means of a bomb attack in order to prevent the Western campaign in the interests of peace. To this end, he approached the first "managing director" of the resistance, the then Abwehr Colonel Oster, with the request,

to get him the explosives he needed. As a Legation Councillor, he had access to Hider's antechamber in the Reich Chancellery. Oster had promised to get him the bomb.

What is also striking here and makes the plan appear less credible is merely the subsequent announcement of the intention to commit such an act, without giving the eager reader any concrete information about the manner and practical implementation. For here, too, the perpetrator had to expect a self-sacrifice, which he apparently wanted to have done. But here, too, the question arises how who asked the legitimate question why he did not prefer the safe and risk-free pistol shot

If Kordt had really had the opportunity to get to Hider and the will to act, the pistol attack would inevitably have been the solution after Oster had declared himself unable to obtain explosives without signing his name. Just as this excuse disqualifies Oster as a resistance fighter, Kordt behaves just as contemptuously after his failure when he dismisses his resistance comrade Oster "by shaking my hand with the words, this handshake, as it eventually turned out, was the only thing he effectively delivered". Kordt should have kept quiet after the war rather than making himself important. He would certainly have done the resistance a better service. This also applies to the dead Oster, who as a senior counterintelligence officer was not in a position to procure explosives, which were certainly part of his sabotage equipment, quite apart from the fact that he could have obtained them inconspicuously from any friendly troop leader.

Also after the war, two officers who knew each other well from their work within an army group staff made a name for themselves by almost sensationally trying to enter themselves in the book of assassination stories as assassins against Hitler. These were the then retired colonel and later major general Freiherr v. Gersdorff and the retired first lieutenant v. Schlabrendorff, who both served with Army Group Center on the Eastern Front under Field Marshal v. Kluge

were on duty. Both were under the influence of the main conspirator, Lieutenant General v. Tresckow, who was Chief of Staff. In their efforts to gain credibility, both gentlemen helped each other. Unfortunately, after the Second World War there was no officers' court of honor before which all officers would have had to answer, as was the case after the defeat of Prussia by Napoleon. This was impossible during the occupation, and later undesirable under both partial governments in East and West, as the representation of German interests was not required and would not have been accepted by the victors.

Schlabrendorff made a name for himself very early on after the collapse with his brochure "Officers against Plitier", when there was a need for a

It was still impossible for the average consumer to publish anything. When he published the first edition, he obviously lacked a sense of proportion with regard to the emerging political developments. Appropriate restraint and cautious modesty were not his forte. His hastiness can be recognized simply by the fact that in his second edition all the names of the Communists and members of the Red Orchestra are missing from his roll of honour, which he had previously listed on an equal footing with the victims of July 20th. But this was no longer appropriate due to political developments in West Germany.

In order to leave no doubt as to Schlabrendorff's credibility, his editor v. Gaevernitz writes, he had already recorded his client's statements in the summer of 1945 in order to "keep his memories unclouded before they were blurred by new impressions". I believe that the events of an attempted assassination attempt on the head of the Reich should be so firmly etched in the memory in view of such an extraordinary event that there is no need to record it in the minutes. On

On March 15, 1943, Hitler paid a visit to the front of Army Group Centre, only to return to his headquarters near Rastenburg on the same day. General v. Tresckow claims to have been waiting for such an opportunity beforehand,

to arrest Hider with a supposedly reliable force. I also consider this to be an old wives' tale. As far as the reliability assumed for such a mission is concerned, this may well have been true for some conspirator officers, but never for a troop. Frivolous faith was certainly the inspiration here. In any case, this troop was not available at the time, so Schlabrendorff decided to become an assassin himself. He was not an expert in the field of explosives, but claimed to have familiarized himself sufficiently with the ample means and possibilities available. Mind you, he was an ordnance officer and not a trained pioneer.

This also makes it understandable that he and his friends came to the completely incorrect conclusion that English explosives were better than German explosives, as the latter could only be detonated by means of a fuse.

could be used. Apparently, these experts had not yet heard of a mechanical or electric time fuse. Schlabrendorff, like Stauffenberg, later opted for the mechanical-chemical time fuse, which, depending on the choice, shreds a thin wire within ten minutes or hours and causes the firing pin, which is tensioned by a steel spring, to strike a primer, which in turn explodes the detonator and thus the explosive with a jet flame. In order to set this mechanism in motion, the acid capsule must first be crushed, which protrudes like a kind of bottle neck from the so-called clam. A clam weighs about five hundred grams. Schlabrendorff speaks of two explosive devices used, v. Gersdorff of four limpet mines, which were shaped into two bottles. One clam measures about fifteen/seven/four centimeters, two therefore fifteen/seven/eight centimeters. At first it was said that it had been identified as a cognac bottle, later as a cointre bottle. According to v. Gersdorff (vier Haftminen), it must therefore have been two bottles measuring fifteen centimeters high, fourteen centimeters wide and eight centimeters deep, i.e. dimensions that could almost be disguised as two Cointreauf bottles.

These dimensions play a role with regard to the credibility of the assassins without witnesses. During the meal, General v. Tresckow is said to have asked Obersdeutnant i. G. Brandt, one of Hitler's companions, to take a package containing two bottles of cognac as a gift for Major General Helmuth Stieff, head of the organizational department in the OKH. Brandt promised to do so without realizing that his life was being put at risk by so-called comrades. When they then set off for the airfield, Schlabrendorff claims to have hurriedly prepared the package described above, inserting a detonator into the opening provided above, but without arming the two or four limpet mines by crushing the acid capsule. He had chosen a detonator with a running time of half an hour. Only shortly before taking off from the airfield did he claim to have crushed the acid capsule with a key. In no statement does he mention the safety pin, which also had to be pulled out if the limpet mines were to work.

Due to this human error, of course, nothing happened, and the driver's plane landed in Rastenburg two hours later as planned. But, horror of horrors, what happened to the cognac, or explosive package? So Schlabrendorff has to call Brandt and ask him not to hand it over, as he wants to come and deal with it himself. The question arises in my mind: didn't they have a reliable friend at headquarters who was prepared to do this? How is it possible that a minor ordinance officer can travel to headquarters so easily and be admitted there? Just as mysterious is Schlabrendorff's description of the defusing of the explosives in a sleeping car compartment, of course without witnesses! During the war, it was not possible for me, as an essentially higher rank, to obtain a sleeping car compartment. Why didn't he take out the detonator as soon as he received the package? Was he so foolhardy as to walk to the station with it, and was he so reckless as to endanger others on the train? All of these unprovable accounts give me the greatest doubts as to whether the will be intensified, if one the wi-

takes a close look at the contradictory technical details

At one point Schlabrendorff mentions that when he checked the firing mechanism he found that the firing pin had snapped forward but the primer had not ignited. However, this would be a truly unique case. Accordingly, he would also have had to have pulled out the safety pin, about which the expert Schlabrendorff has remained silent to this day. Schlabrendorff is interested in being interested in it, with a view to prove to his co-conspirators that there had been no human error on his part. Did he do that and to whom? Can he also prove, if the firing pin had in fact been fired, whether he did not later do so himself in order not to embarrass himself? In Nuremberg on June 30, 1948, Schlabrendorff testified in the trial against the Foreign Office and the High Command of the Wehrmacht: "I opened the explosives package and found that the detonator had initially worked, but that the detonator capsule on the edge of the detonator had not exploded." In this case, it was not the primer but the detonator that did not work. Years later, its author Hoffmann described it as follows: "The primer was burnt, the detonator of it outside blackened on the outside!" In the television discussion on April 21, 1975, it was again said that the detonator had failed. It would be good if Mr. v. Schlabrendorff would make a convincing statement in the interest of credibility.

In contrast to the careful preparation of the assassin Elsner, who double-checked everything, Schlabrendorff cannot be spared the reproach that he acted recklessly and thus already proved his human failure. In his report he speaks of the detonator, the firing pin and the primer. This means that he only fitted one detonator instead of four to the four limpet mines he used. Was this just recklessness or did he not understand his business? Until all these questions are clarified, I cannot believe in this assassination attempt and must assume that he constructed something after the war to draw attention to himself.

My assessment of Gersdorff's company is not much different. I first heard about this story, which he told himself, while in captivity and which was also taken up as such by a number of other comrades. He was also summoned to Nuremberg. There he testified as a witness in the OKW trial on April 14, 1948: "Since the ignition time of the chemical time fuse was about fifteen minutes, it was not possible to carry out the assassination." He did not say a word about the detention mines, which he claimed to have been carrying in his right and left coat pockets, being triggered. He also gave the same version in his report of January 1, 1946 and later. Gersdorff had been appointed to explain the captured Soviet weapons on display in the armory after the 1943 hero's memorial ceremony in Berlin, which Flider attended. Gersdorff wanted to use this favorable opportunity to blow himself up together with Hitler. According to his own statements, he wanted to make a heroic self-sacrifice. Even here, any sober-minded expert must have serious doubts about the choice of means.

If v. Gersdorff had already decided to sacrifice himself and did not want to experience the "aftermath", the easiest and surest way to success was the pistol grip. After the negative outcome of the attempted assassination on the plane eight days earlier, the unreliability of the Clam limpet mine with the acid detonator should have been a warning sign for Gersdorff. Moreover, he was unable to determine or recognize the exact time of the detonation. He allegedly carried a Clam with only five hundred grams in each coat pocket. He would only have been successful with these small quantities if he had embraced Hider at the moment of the explosion. But how was he going to determine the exact moment? If he had been walking immediately to the left of Hider and the clam in his left pocket had exploded, the same would not have happened as with the clam in his right pocket, which could have killed Hider. Vermudich would have been blown to pieces by v. Gersdorff, but not Hider. Even at a distance of less than

one meter, the blast wave would have been ineffective. This method can only be dismissed as gross nonsense. Both clams could only have exploded simultaneously if they had been connected by a fuse. But Gersdorff, who is not an expert, remains silent about this.

As we know, Hider was in a hurry and broke off the inspection after a short time. Baron v. Gersdorff had been ordered there by his chief of staff, v. Tresckow, in his capacity as defense officer of Army Group Center to inspect and explain the captured Russian weapons. It is striking that the near-assassin v. Schlabrendorff claims to have handed him the two limpet mines of the same type, which had previously failed, in his hotel early that morning. In contrast to his earlier accounts, v. Gersdorff reports in his book "Soldat im Untergang" on page 131 as follows: "... Since I had no idea how long he (Hider, the author) would speak and how long the orchestra would play afterwards, it was impossible for me to operate the detonators (i.e. both detonators of the clams, the author, which were in the right and left coat pockets) during the ceremony. I took a Pervitin, which Tresckow had given me as a precaution, and went to the entrance of the exhibition rooms during the concluding music recital. There I met Colonel General Model and the museum director. The three of us lined up at the entrance... However, it was quite a while before Hitler appeared... Hitler was appointed by Himmler,

Keitel, Dönitz, Schmundt and two or three ordinance officers. At the door, Hitler suddenly turned and said: 'Field Marshal v. Bock, as the former commander-in-chief of Army Group Center, I ask you to join me. Bock acknowledged with a somewhat exaggerated bow and entered the room together with his accompanying officer, Major of the Reserve Hans Carl Graf v. Hardenberg- Neuardenberg. I used this moment, when everyone's attention was focused on Hider, Bock and Hardenberg, to set off the detonator of the 'Clam' clip mine in my left coat pocket. I had the other 'Clam' in my right coat pocket. But I had already raised my right arm in the 'German salute' like my two neighbors. Hider only greeted Model with

Handshake. Then the tour began, with me pressing close to Hider's left side. When I wanted to explain various exhibits, Hider obviously didn't listen at all. Even when I drew his attention to a Napoleonic eagle that German pioneers had found in the riverbed while building a bridge over the Berezina, I received no reply. Instead, Hider walked - or rather, ran - the shortest way in the direction of the silky exit.... At the exit on the arsenal side, next to the memorial, Hider said goodbye to Model and me with the usual right-angled raising of his right forearm. Hider had not spoken a word during the short walk through the exhibition and had hardly looked at anything." I don't suppose that Hider instinctively felt threatened by an assassination attempt this time and therefore broke off the tour. But Gersdorff would have been conspicuous in his tailor-made military coat if he had been carrying four-centimeter-thick clams in his side pockets. Nor do I remember the German Wehrmacht using the German salute as early as 1943. This was only ordered after July 20, 1944. But it could be that the cap was taken off inside the building and therefore had to be saluted with the German salute. In any case, the cap was then carried in the left hand and was not free to crush the acid capsule. I therefore consider Gersdorff's portrayal is unrealistic and a fictitious narrative. I would have preferred to remain silent in his place. Nor does the choice of a time fuse indicate any particular degree of intelligence on the part of a general staff officer. In any case, the use of a push or pull detonator, or perhaps an electric detonator with a pocket battery, would have been more appropriate, not to mention the use of the pistol. Only with such detonators would he have been able to determine the timing of the explosions and count on a modest success.

But why did Gersdorff deviate from his first version, namely from Schmudt's alleged statement that Hider had little time available to view the exhibition, which

was it for this reason that he refrained from igniting the device? Was he accused of pomposity? He also has an unconvincing explanation for this. 'He only denied setting off the detonator untruthfully because he did not want to be charged with killing his friends accompanying Hitler, such as Szymonsky and Hardenberg, in order to eliminate the spoiler? It would be extremely important with regard to the clarification of such a historically significant fact if Gersdorff were to comment in detail on all the doubts that have been raised and raised. This would be essential with regard to his credibility.

This also included a credible explanation of the conclusion of the assassination attempt, which had again failed. Hider had taken his leave, but Gersdorff stood there alone with his primed limpet mine, in danger of being torn apart at any moment. He had a simple excuse for this too. He raced to the first available toilet, threw everything in there and simply left, without knowing what happened next. What did he throw in there? The detonated clam or both or just the triggered detonator? Not even the detonator could be flushed away. Nobody heard a bang or noticed any damage to the toilets. If Mr. v. Gersdorff does not want to take all these mysteries to his grave unsolved and be suspected of showing off, it is high time to clear up all these unexplained facts. His witness Schlabrendorff is not the man to provide comradely assistance.

Another assassination attempt against Hider needs to be mentioned because it was planned in a particularly hideous and despicable manner. The author was Major General Stieff, who also had the English explosives handed over to Stauffenberg by First Lieutenants Bernhard v. Klamroth and Albrecht v. Hagen, who revealed both names during his interrogation and thus handed them over to the executioner. Hider planned to have the new uniforms and equipment intended for the Russian campaign demonstrated to him. Stieff immediately recognized an opportunity for an explosives attack. Initially, the young Captain Axel von dem Busche had agreed to take part during the

Hider, Göring and Himmler with a bomb in their coat pocket to blow themselves and all the participants up, including the unsuspecting soldiers. But nothing came of it, as the arrival of the demonstration objects was delayed. Von dem Busche then dropped out as he was called back to the front and was seriously wounded a few days later. Then, on February 11, 1944, this conspiracy was to be repeated. Instead of von dem Busche, Stauffenberg had now recruited First Lieutenant Ewald Heinrich v. Kleist-Schmenzin. This event also had to be canceled because Himmler was unable to attend.

After all, the demonstration of the new combat uniform of the assault units with backpacks, assault rifles and hand grenades had been prepared for July 7, 1944 near Schloss Kleßheim. Four days earlier, Generals Stieff, Wagner, Fellgiebel and Lindemann had met with Stauffenberg at the 'Berchtesgadener Hof' to discuss all the details of the assassination attempt. Three front-proven non-commissioned officer ranks with high decorations and golden melee clasps had been expressly selected in order to give them the honor of being allowed to meet their Führer himself in recognition of the bravery they had demonstrated. As v. Kleist-Schmenzin was not available, the explosives were now to be placed in the assault packs of the unsuspecting NCOs. It is hard to imagine greater perfidy and brutality, devised by stage and office officers who had never smelled gunpowder.

had. The fact that these gentlemen were later executed can only be seen today as compensatory justice.

Hermann Giesler, one of Hitler's outstanding architects, writes in "Another Hider" on page 445: "After the demonstration of his own weapons, Adolf Hider canceled the demonstration of the new combat equipment because he had run out of time and had a scheduled appointment. We drove back to the Berghof. During the demonstration, however, I noticed a small general who stood out from the rest of the military staff, looking important and excited. 'Who is this

Little one there?" I asked the SS adjutant. "That's Major General Stieff," was the answer.

The fact that traitors planned to place the bomb in the knapsacks of three front-line soldiers who were to be presented to the Führer for the inspection of a new uniform caused true horror among the entire population as well as in Wehrmacht circles, especially among the enlisted men and non-commissioned officers."

You can't shed a tear for such atrocities.

JULY 20 IN PARIS

In the following descriptions of the many outrageous crimes of betrayal and sabotage committed by the resistance, I have relied primarily on the documentary works "Der 20. Juli und der Landesverrat" (July 20th and Treason) published by K W Schütz KG in 1967, 1974 and 1978, "Sabotage against Germany" and "Conspiracy against Germany" by the author Karl Balzer, which are so well documented that they could not be contested by any side.

The conspiracy had not succeeded in any of the military districts in the Reich territory. Not even in Prague and Vienna In Vienna, the higher SS and party leaders were probably summoned to the General Command, but there was only a partial arrest, which was reversed by a telephone conversation with Keitel.

Things were different in Paris, however. The invasion had begun on July 6, 1944. On July 17, Field Marshal Rommel was seriously wounded. On the same day, the Soviets launched their offensive on the southern front. July 18 Caen and St L  had fallen. The decision on victory or defeat had to be made in France. It was clear to everyone with insight that the invasion battle would be decided in the course of the year at the latest. Only a clear German defensive success and thus a victory for German weapons in the west could free up sufficient forces for the decisive battle in the east. It was therefore important for us Germans to decide this battle at the right time with concentrated superior forces and with the indispensable will to win at the landing site determined by the enemy.

It was not for nothing that Hitler had appointed the experienced and cunning "desert fox", Field Marshal Rommel, as commander-in-chief of the army.

Top right: Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, head of the Abwehr, who sabotaged the German war effort from day one and whose office became a center of resistance and conspiracy.

Bottom left: Major General Hans Oster, head of Department Z in the German Abwehr, did not shy away from revealing attack dates of the German Wehrmacht to the country's enemies.

The Swiss defence major Dr. Max Waibel (top left) and the former Swiss defence major Hans Hausamann, through whose cover the Soviets also received Swiss information from Germany (bottom left). The Swiss commander-in-chief during the war, General Henri Guisan (in uniform), to his left Federal Councillor Minger, both of whom broke Switzerland's neutrality (top right). Otto Pünter, who led the Pakko intelligence group, which also supplied the Soviets with intelligence from Germany (bottom right).

Group B to France and tasked him with preparing the defense against such an Allied landing operation. It was Rommel who coined the term "rigid forward defense". In other words, the enemy was to be so decisively defeated as soon as he landed that he would have no opportunity to form larger bridgeheads, while the Supreme Commander West, Field Marshal v. Rundstedt, believed that he could destroy the landed enemy operationally in the depths of space. But what was the situation at the turn of the year with regard to the preparations for such a decisive battle and the confidence in victory of a decisive part of the Fleeerführer commissioned for this battle? One can only shudder at their conviction in view of the declared will of our opponents to demand unconditional surrender and the destruction of the Reich and Western Europe, as the outcome of the war proved to history. Here in France, defeatist illusionists were at work who thought the war was lost even before the invasion and sought armistice negotiations. Their illogicality lay in the fact that, on the one hand, they recognized the necessity of an entrenched front as an indispensable prerequisite for successful negotiations, but on the other hand, they only half-heartedly pursued the necessary defensive readiness, in that a large part of their willpower was taken up by pushing ahead with plans for an overthrow. After all, Rommel's illusion also consisted of being able to split up the unconditional surrender to the West and the Soviets. The conspirators' fever for overthrow and armistice naturally had to considerably weaken the spirit of the fighting troops. Here the resistance generals, who otherwise prided themselves on their precision, made a temporal error. 1944 was not 1947, when the Cold War began and friends became enemies.

The military commander in Paris was the conspirator General v. Stülpnagel, who had always been a political foreign body within the Third Reich. Paris was far away from the action and also offered additional amenities compared to the difficult

The Eastern Front also felt much more undisturbed and unobserved far away from headquarters and Berlin. It was therefore far less difficult here to

With the help of a scheming "mafia" in key positions, he was able to build up a widespread circle of conspirators relatively unobserved. Good family connections did the rest.

Thus, the commission of the capable General Unruh - at that time "Heldenklau" ("Hero's Steal") - which was supposed to comb the homeland and stage for soldiers fit for front-line service, the resister Lieutenant Fritz v. der Schulenburg was inconspicuously smuggled in. This was all the less noticeable because, as the former deputy police president of Lower Silesia, he was still a dear party comrade of the NSDAP. Equipped with such a spotless vest, it could not have been difficult to look around for politically close friends on the orders of Beck, Goerdeler and Stauffenberg as early as 1943 during visits to the highest military command posts and to arrange a personnel policy suitable for the resistance among friends with similar views.

Stülpnagel himself felt obliged to his old superior Beck and was friends with him. His staff included one of the most active conspirators, Lieutenant Colonel Dr. Caesar v. Hofacker, who had very close contacts with the Berlin conspirator group and was also a cousin of v. Stauffenberg. He was also well acquainted with Infantry General v. Falkenhausen, Wehrmacht commander in Belgium, who in turn belonged to the long-standing resistance circle with Stülpnagel.

But v. Stülpnagel was not a front commander and had no combat units. The commander-in-chief v. Rundstedt was an old, experienced Prussian field marshal who felt obliged to fulfill his difficult military leadership duties. He was not the type to allow himself to be used as a conspirator. He took note of some of the negative talk coming from his surroundings, but without ever committing himself or becoming actively politically active. Participation in coup plans or even instigating an assassination attempt on the Führer of the Reich, to whom he was loyal

were undoubtedly not his profession.

But from the point of view of the resistance, who could be the man who, because of his proven name and rousing personality, was chosen as the eye-catcher for a coup d'état that was incomprehensible to the troops?

had to be? Only a man like Rommel, who was so highly publicized by the mass media of the Third Reich, seemed suitable for the job - even according to the conspirators. But his fellow field marshals regarded him as an upstart and had not forgotten that his career had begun at the start of the war as leader of Flider's escort commando. Moreover, his comrades at the highest level had become accustomed to denying him the ability to be a field commander. Perhaps there was also a certain amount of envy involved. He was generally regarded as an extremely brave and resourceful divisional commander and perhaps the commanding general of a corps, but never as a predestined commander at the highest level. His pessimism in difficult situations had not escaped Hitler's notice. Nevertheless, the resistance needed him as a symbolic figure for the troops and the homeland

A certain estrangement had arisen in his relationship with his formerly beloved Führer because Rommel, after abandoning the North African theater of war, was of the opinion that Italy had to be evacuated more or less in one go in order to save forces. In contrast to this view, Hitler was of the opinion that this would leave Italy to the Allies as an aircraft mother ship with only short approach routes towards the Reich and the urgently needed oil fields of Romania.

Rommel was undoubtedly of eminent importance to Hitler as well as to the conspirators. However, as it was assumed that Rommel was not their equal in the eyes of the conspirators and was considered unreliable, it was cleverly understood that Lieutenant General Dr. Hans Speidel was assigned to him as an active co-conspirator as Chief of Staff of the army group he led.

Speidel's aim was to convince his commander-in-chief to join the resistance. In his book "Invasion 1944" (page 81), he reports in detail on his efforts as follows: "The subject of the first meetings with the commander-in-chief included the thoughts of the former mayor of Leipzig, Dr. Goerdeler, which were conveyed to the chief of the general staff - namely Speidel - by the mayor Dr. Strö- lin for Rommel on April 14 in Freudenstadt.

were. At the end of 1943, Goerdeler had asked Strölin to contact Field Marshal Rommel. The aim was to convince him that Hitler and his regime had to be eliminated in order to save Germany and Europe. The Lord Mayor of Stuttgart, whom Rommel had long held in high esteem as an energetic and insightful man, had referred to his first meeting with Rommel in February 1943. In this meeting, the possibilities for changing the regime and ending the war had been discussed.

Briefings from the military side, including from retired Colonel General Beck and the Quartermaster General, General of Artillery Wagner, completed the picture. The judgments agreed that ways and means to end the war should be found without delay, before the inevitable catastrophe cut off any possibility of negotiation."

That all sounds very nice, but at that time there were no options for negotiation, only unconditional surrender! On May 15, 1944, Speidel arranged a meeting with Colonel Kossmann, v. Stülpnagel's chief of staff, in a country house near Mareil-Marly for Rommel and v. Stülpnagel to discuss the end of the war in the West and the overthrow of the National Socialist regime.

There was constant and special contact between the conspirators of the Bendler Block in Berlin and their auxiliary organs in Zossen, the headquarters of the OKH, and the headquarters in Paris with the men around Stülpnagel. For example, as in Berlin, Paris had already been alerted on July 15, when Fromm and Stauffenberg had flown to Rastenburg together. Here Stauffenberg had already, without his knowledge

Fromms had the bomb with him. The assassination attempt only failed to materialize because Himmler had not appeared and Hider had broken off the meeting prematurely . Olbricht had already

"Valkyrie" measures were initiated in Berlin, which were later passed off as a test alarm and thus disguised. Fromm should already have had doubts and suspicions after his return, because this alarm was also triggered without his knowledge

v. Stülpnagel had already gone that far after the fall of Stalingrad, that he had his confidant Dr. Hans Buwert, who had been commissioned by the Foreign Office to manage the French publishing house of the Hachette Group, establish contacts via Madrid and Lisbon in order to discuss possible negotiations with the enemy. This high-handedness, which had nothing whatsoever to do with his official duties, was undoubtedly treason. This case alone does not support the thesis that the July 20 people were not traitors to the country. Here, too, v. Hofacker had a hand in it. He was introduced to Buwert by Count Helldorf and Count Dohna.

These contacts only became known through later Russian revelations. According to these revelations, Churchill is said to have been sympathetic to the offer to evacuate France and continue the fight against the Soviet Union, but Roosevelt rejected such fears in the strongest possible terms.

It must have been downright shocking that they went one step further and negotiated with the French "Resistance", in one case even involving a French colonel of de Gaulle, in order to achieve a certain cooperation with them after a successful coup d'état.

While the German soldier had to make daily sacrifices in battle with the French resistance, his leaders held conspiratorial talks with their murderers. Such behavior during the war can only be described as the most reprehensible subversion of military strength.

Here you can already recognize the destructive attitude of these conspirators, who

can only be explained if one is prepared to accept the loss of the war from the outset. But if you want to pursue serious armistice negotiations that should lead to an acceptable peace, this presupposes a strong position, a holding of the front, i.e. a clear defensive success, but never a voluntary evacuation or an opening of the gate to the Reich. But anyone who has toyed with such thoughts is, in my eyes, nothing other than a traitor and therefore a criminal.

So what happened in detail on July 20, 1944 in Paris and France? Far earlier than in Berlin and elsewhere, General

At around 3 p.m., Blumentritt, as the responsible Chief of Staff of the Commander-in-Chief West (at that time Field Marshal v. Kluge, Rundstedt had already been relieved), received the grave news that Hitler was dead. Significantly, the bearer of this message was Colonel Eberhard Ludwig Finckh, the Chief Quartermaster of the Commander-in-Chief West, a subordinate of Blumentritt. When asked where this report came from, Finckh named Lieutenant General v. Stülpnagel. This official channel alone must have seemed strange and attracted attention. It should be noted that Finckh was a confidant of Stauffenberg and had visited him six weeks before taking up his new post in France. In truth, Finckh had already received a phone call that morning from Chief Quartermaster Wagner in Zossen that "the exercise had begun". This cue had been agreed between Beck, Stauffenberg and Finckh if the planned assassination was to be carried out. Hofacker had received the same information from Berlin. So it happened that Finckh, as agreed, called Hofacker after receiving this message and received confirmation from him

Just as the keyword "Valkyrie" triggered precisely defined measures in the Reich, the word "Valkyrie" also triggered measures in France. "Exercise" orders to carry out the coup d'état. In accordance with orders, Finckh had sent his report triggering the coup to the command center of Field Marshal v. Kluge in St Germain.

However, this headquarters was only occupied by Blumentritt, as the commander-in-chief himself was using Rommel's command post in La Roche-Guyon after he had been seriously wounded. Blumentritt, as a confidant but not involved in the conspiracy, immediately called v. Kluge, but found that he was not there and was on a front trip. With Speidel present, he arranged a meeting with his commander-in-chief without divulging any of his information. The journey took about an hour and a half. He arrived in La Roche-Guyon at the same time as the field marshal who had returned from his trip to the front. It was about 5.30 pm.

First v. Kluge received a message saying that an assassination attempt on the Führer had failed. At the same time, however, he received two phone calls from the Reich, without the speaker giving his name: The Führer was dead, now he had to make a decision. While Kluge was still on the phone, an anonymous telex was read to him from his command post in St. Germain stating that Hitler was not dead. According to Blumentritt's later report, both men racked their brains over the contradictory reports. Just like Fromm in Berlin, v. Kluge got in touch with the Führer's headquarters in East Prussia. He asked for General Warlimont, the representative of Colonel General Jodl, but was unable to reach him as he had a meeting with Keitel. Finally he reached the head of the organization department, Major General Stieff. He had no idea that he was talking to one of the main conspirators and was only surprised when he was asked whether Hitler was dead and was asked the strange counter-question: "Where did you get the news that the Führer is dead? The Führer is perfectly well and in good spirits." As Blumentritt then recalls, v. Kluge is said to have told him: "If it had been successful, the first measure would have been to stop the V-1 fire on England, and the second step would have been to contact the Allied commanders-in-chief." If this statement Kluge's of

Blumentritt has been truthfully reproduced, this means nothing other than that Kluge must have known about the planned coup d'état.

After these briefings, Blumentritt was instructed to ask Stülpnagel and the commander of the air force in the West, Field Marshal Sperrle, to a meeting. All that remains to be said is that nothing was done by the highest command authorities in France that would have been in the interests of the coup d'état.

In Paris, however, things were different. There, v. Kluge acted independently and without consulting him General v. Stülpnagel had his orderly officer, Lieutenant Baumgart, summon all the men required for the operation by telephone, as provided for in the plan. As they appeared, they immediately received their orders and went into action. The commander of Paris, Lieutenant General v. Boineburg-Lengsfeld, and his deputy Major General Brehme, who, piquantly enough, still wore the Blood Order of 1923, were important here. They immediately alerted the Number One Security Regiment under

Lieutenant Colonel v. Kraewel, who had the order to arrest the Paris SD and top SS leaders along with all members of the German security service. Stülpnagel justified this measure by claiming that an assassination attempt had been made on the Führer and that a Gestapo putsch had taken place in Berlin. This action was well prepared. An exact sketch plan of all the SS and SD quarters was available. Just as in Berlin, nobody suspected anything about the background.

The operation was carried out smoothly, and by midnight one thousand two hundred SS men were in custody. They were overpowered without resistance and locked up in the Wehrmacht prison in Fresne and in the casemates of the old Fort de l'Est. The only reason why everything went so smoothly was because the officers and the troops believed the Gestapo's alleged coup attempt against Hitler. Among those arrested were the highest SS and police leader in France, SS-Gruppenführer Oberg, and the highest SD leader in Paris, SS-Standartenführer Dr. Knochen, with their staffs.

convicts were to be executed. Officers like Trappe acted in good faith. No one was later called to account. It is equally clear, however, that no one would have carried out this action if they had not been deceived and lied to by the false report from the Stülpnagel office.

In contrast, the co-conspirators of Stülpnagel's office, the Chief of the General Staff Colonel von Linstow, the Chief of the Military Administration, Ministerial Director Dr. Michel, and Hofacker were executed shortly afterwards. The arrest of the SS leaders was otherwise meaningless, as some of the younger officers were able to escape. They immediately informed Oberführer Kurt Meyer of the Waffen-SS "Hiderjugend" division, who was deployed at the front and who in turn immediately informed Sepp Dietrich of the strange events in Paris. Thus, even a successful coup in Paris would have been short-lived.

General von Stülpnagel was the driving force. He was one of the few main conspirators who did full justice to the tasks they had taken on. This is also clear from the conversation he had with Colonel General Beck in Berlin at around 6 p.m., which has been passed down to us

"Stülpnagel," said Beck, "you now know about the latest events." Yes ! Of course," said Stülpnagel. "Then I have to ask," said Beck, "whether you will join me?" Stülpnagel: "By all means. I've already ordered the entire SD to be arrested. It won't be long before the SS leaders responsible are in jail. The troops here, like their leaders, are reliable." Beck: "Whatever may come, the die is cast; there is only one way forward." Stülpnagel:

"I stand up for that." Then came the crucial question from Beck:

"What will Kluge do?" Stülpnagel: "I can't answer that question with any certainty. It will be best if you talk to him yourself."

A short time later, Stülpnagel received a telephone order to report to Kluge's command post at 8 p.m. together with his chief of staff for a meeting.

Kluge was also attacked by Beck. After Beck briefly described the situation

in Berlin and in the Reich on the basis of the measures taken, he asked Kluge: "Give the signal for general apostasy by openly joining the Berlin action." However, as the radio report about the failure of the assassination attempt had been broadcast in the meantime, Kluge asked: "What is the real situation at headquarters?" Beck replied: "In the end, it doesn't matter if we are determined to act. Kluge, I'm asking you quite clearly: do you approve of the action here and are you subordinate to me?" The conversation could not have been more dramatic. Kluge evaded the question and referred once again to the radio report. For him as a soldier and Commander-in-Chief West, clarification of the situation was essential. Beck then became even more insistent in his desperation: "Kluge, lest there be any doubt, I remind you of our last conversations and agreements and ask: Are you clearly subordinating yourself to me?" Kluge, who remembered very well and already had enough experience with conspirators as a result of his contact with his former chief of staff in the middle section of the Eastern Front, replied: "I must first consult with my gentlemen here, as the situation stands. I'll call you again in half an hour."

Since it was clear to him that Hider was alive, he saw no reason to call him back. But at the meeting, which began at 8 p.m., Stülpnagel was of the opinion that the confidant v. Kluge was now also determined to act after the planned conversation with Berlin. But he was soon proved wrong. After v. Hofacker had begun the conversation by describing all the details of the existing connections between Beck, Stauffenberg and Stülpnagel, Kluge broke off the conversation in disappointment: "Well, gentlemen, the assassination attempt has failed. Everything is over." Agitated, Stülpnagel replied: "Mr. Field Marshal, I thought you were in on the plan. Something has to be done." Kluge: "Nothing more can happen. The Führer is still alive."

A world collapsed for Stülpnagel. He rose to breathe fresh air on the balcony and was completely apathetic on his return. Into this atmosphere came Field Marshal Sperrle, who was only

and also declined an invitation to dinner. He probably felt that the situation gave him no reason to do so. He also probably didn't want to be drawn into any discussion, possibly as a witness. He drove off again.

The dinner that followed was silent, even spooky. In the documentary film "Walküre" by Dr. Prigge, this is particularly evident. During the meal, Stülpnagel asked Field Marshal Kluge for a private conversation. The two gentlemen left the room with Blumentritt as a witness, expressly requested to do so by Kluge. Only now did Stülpnagel report the security measures he had initiated in Paris.

Kluge was visibly shocked: "Jesus, what have you done?" Stülpnagel: "I gave the order to arrest the entire SS in Paris." Kluge: "But you couldn't do that without my orders." Stülpnagel: "I tried to reach you by phone in the afternoon, but you weren't at your headquarters, so I proceeded at my own discretion." Kluge: "Fine, but on your own responsibility." Kluge then prompted Blumentritt to ask Stülpnagel's chief of staff whether measures had actually been taken to arrest the SS. When Colonel von Linstow confirmed that "nothing could stop them", Blumentritt turned to him.

Kluge to Stülpnagel: "Listen, the best thing you can do is for them to put on civilian clothes and go into hiding." He then instructed Stülpnagel to release all the arrested SS men immediately. This was an unusual reaction and could only have been the result of Kluge's guilty conscience. According to the laws of war, he should have arrested Stülpnagel.

Stülpnagel, however, did not go into hiding. After his return to St. Germain, Blumentritt found one of Keitel's telexes in which all orders received from Berlin were revoked. His first visit was to the naval staff. There he found all those responsible, took note of the telex received from Witzleben and heard that Admiral Krancke in the OKW had accidentally spoken to Grand Admiral Dönitz by telephone, who had revoked all orders from Berlin for

declared invalid. His next visit, long after midnight, took him to the headquarters of the security police. He found that all those arrested had already been released. When he asked about Gmppenführer Oberg, he was told that he was on friendly terms with Stülpnagel and in an advanced mood. He went there immediately and was astonished to find that Stülpnagel and his former prisoners were actually sitting together cheerfully. An incredible occurrence when you consider that

v. Stülpnagel was the first to have his party partners, who were drinking with him, earmarked for execution.

The historian Wilhelm von Schramm writes about this: "However, these SS leaders probably knew one thing just as little as General Blumentritt or the present Abetz (ambassador in Paris) when they decided that some incriminated persons would probably have been executed after a successful uprising. This must also be said here for the sake of truth and the completeness of our report: In the courtyard of the Ecole Militaire, the quarters of Guard Regiment No. 1, the sandbags were also set up at midnight, in front of which those SS leaders were to be shot on whom the intended summary court-martial might have pronounced the death sentence at dawn. This prepared bullet trap was hastily removed in the early hours of July 21 before the troops lined up"

We learn the true state of mind of Stülpnagel's office from the report of the lawyer Bargatzky, who belonged to Stülpnagel's staff: "While Hider's blood-dripping voice rang out over all the stations, promising terrible revenge, the Paris prison gates closed behind hundreds of SD men. Stülpnagel, two hours away by car, wrestled with Kluge for the execution (Stülpnagel no longer had the courage during the conversation with Kluge; the author). Baron v. Teuchert implored Linstow to maintain the arrest until Stülpnagel returned. Only the three of us agreed after a brief consultation: Paris must take over Berlin's inheritance. From the west, where the uprising had proceeded like clockwork, the Browns in the Reich had to take the last

receive a fatal blow (i.e. a stab in the back; the author). Stülpnagel would have to give the order to shoot the four top SS men, if necessary without a trial (i.e. murder; the author), and open the floodgates for Eisenhower's and Montgomery's invasion troops (i.e. mutiny, sabotage and treason; the author), so that they would stream to the Rhine together with the German units. We had already talked about this earlier, when we wanted to despair because the assassination attempt never came to fruition. General Speidel had won. He had inconspicuously deployed the SS divisions on the furthest wings of the invasion front." I will discuss Speidel's disastrous role in the next chapter. Only this much can be said in advance: it was not the will to win, but surrender and armistice negotiations that were his ideas, and unfortunately also those of Rommel. However, these could not be achieved without a break with Hitler. Speidel was certainly not one of those for whom General Blumentritt, on behalf of all general staff officers, sent a telegram of devotion to the Führer: "On the occasion of the unsuccessful attempt on your life, my Führer, I convey to you the congratulations and most respectful greetings of loyalty from the entire general staff of the Western Army."

On the subject of general staff officers, I would like to say the following: General Staff officers are necessary, and the General Staff is a helpful organ of the Trappe leadership. The general staff officers are supposed to relieve the Trappe and army commanders of their manual work, and they are supposed to provide tactical and strategic advice to the Trappe commander in charge and relieve him of the administrative and supply tasks, including these daily necessities.

The commander and the troop leaders at the front need this relief in order to maintain the necessary freedom of decision resulting from the constantly changing frontline situation and the will to win by using their entire personality in constant contact with the fighting troops. It is a bad thing when army and troop leaders are burdened with general staff officers who do not **p u t** themselves at the service of their very **o w n** task, who themselves lead or

and who, with their defeatism, only inhibit the will and drive of the troop leaders instead of supporting it. The responsibility for success and failure always lies with the troop leader, never with the general staff officer. He is an assistant leader. That is why, after the First World War, it was pointless to argue about whether the somewhat ponderous Hindenburg or the more mentally agile Ludendorff was the victor of Tannenberg. It was Hindenburg who had to make the decision for all the battle plans presented, but he was also responsible for them. Victory and defeat often lie close together.

In both cases, the troop commander is solely responsible and must take the blame in the event of a disaster, just as he is entitled to the laurels of victory. General staffs, however, who do not have the will to win, but instead make defeatism, political and military resistance or, even worse, the will to defeat the standard of their actions, are and remain saboteurs and criminals for a force that is committed to fighting for victory. I, for one, would have severely forbidden it if the first general staff officer of my division had had a negative influence on the education, spirit and attitude of my troops. I would have chased him away or court-martialed him in critical situations. General staff officers are trained auxiliary organs of a strong-willed troop command. Anyone who exceeds his authority here is unfit for his position and should be relieved. The mistake lay in the fact that auxiliary organs were allowed to assume leadership tasks that were not theirs. That is basically the tragedy and the failure of men like Kluge and Rommel, that they acted out of misunderstood comradeship and

as so-called "cavaliers" allowed peccadilloes to occur that were in fact crimes. In reality, this is where their guilt lies. We have always loathed mutinous troops. It is regarded as worthless. Leadership bodies that do such things or plan them conspiratorially are just as worthless and despicable. He has to fulfill the task assigned to him by the political leadership in a responsible manner. If he

If it is brought up differently, its task is called into question from the outset. One should then also have the courage to abolish it. In every army, concepts such as decency, loyalty, honor, reliability and comradeship are at the top of the list of ethical values. Anyone who consciously or unconsciously violates them is sinning and calling into question the value of every army.

With the exception of the traitors and saboteurs, who were mainly in the high staffs of the OKW and OKH as well as in the army groups, the general staff officers also fulfilled their entire duty for their people and fatherland in an exemplary manner during the Second World War, true to their oath of allegiance.

Certainly, after the events of July 20, 1944 in Paris and France, many more men would have "^{jumped} over the blade-if the ranks of the arrested SS had not had different moral principles than those represented by the resistance forces. Schramm writes about the attitude of the SS leaders released from prison: "There was this strange Higher SS and Police Leader of France, Obergruppenführer Oberg. He was not exactly popular in the command staff, nor was he popular in the command staff of the military commander. But during this time he put many of his opponents to shame. He may have been stubborn in other matters, but in this case he adhered to the unwritten laws of comradely decorum. It was certainly not pleasant for him that the SD had not played a very heroic role on the night of July 20, but it speaks for him that he refrained from any kind of revenge. Oberg certainly knew more about that night than he said. Surely he could have cooled his heels and spoiled things for some after he had seen through all the connections. But that was obviously not in his character.

Oberg had involved a man like Blumentritt from the very beginning and gave a confidant - whether half or fully in the picture is hard to say - the chance to stake out the investigation as he needed to." That very night, Field Marshal Kluge sent the following telex to Adolf Hitler: "The attempt on your life by nefarious murderous hands, my Führer, is

thanks to a kind providence. At the same time in the name of the
me as Commander-in-Chief West subordinate I
congratulate you and assure you, my Führer, of our unwavering
loyalty, whatever may come." Stülpnagel was ordered to report to
Berlin by telephone. He suspected his fate. During his journey, he
stopped at the old battlefields near Verdun to judge himself. That
failed. He shot himself in the eye and had to go to hospital seriously
injured. His second eye also had to be operated out. After a fourteen-
day stay in hospital, he was transferred to Berlin, expelled from the
army, sentenced to death by the People's Court and executed.

THE INVASION BATTLE IN FRANCE

Sabotage on the invasion front by the "Foreign Armies West" section of the Army High Command.

July 20th in Paris, like everywhere else in the Reich, had passed without bloodshed and civil war. The failed coup d'état, however, revealed the tip of an iceberg that not only showed the characteristics of internal resistance against a hated regime, i.e. high treason, but also treason with the help of the enemy. In France, the invasion battle continued with undiminished ferocity. I said at the beginning of the previous chapter that the success or failure of the invasion was decisive for Germany in the war. The following question must first be clarified: Was a successful defense against an invasion launched with a superior force still possible at all, taking into account the attrition of our forces on all fronts, or was that just an illusion? I would like to quote Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz from his book "10 Years and 20 Days", Munich 1958, on page 344:

"That the invasion did not necessarily have to succeed despite the enemy's air and sea domination, if the view of Rommel and the navy that the enemy had to be beaten on the coast when landing had been accepted as a unanimous opinion and the expansion of the defense, the deployment of the army units and a plan for the course of operations after the landing had been prepared accordingly, if the army had not committed itself to the assumption that the enemy would land in the Somme area,

if the air force and navy had done more for reconnaissance on the day before the invasion and on the night of its start, since an enemy landing had to be expected with increased probability during these days because of the tides; and finally,

if both the Western High Command and Hitler had immediately regarded the landing in Seine Bay as the main invasion." It is therefore clear that a successful defense was possible. But if this is the case, it is necessary to examine the reasons why the battle was lost and who was responsible for it. It would have been better not to boast about the resistance after the war and to cloak it in glory. It would be more useful for the future of Germany and Europe if efforts were made to objectively clarify the failure of many operations that ultimately led to the disastrous destruction of Europe and created the current uncertainty for our future.

It would make more sense not to always view history from the perspective of Hitler and "Nazi" Germany and to constantly throw sand in the eyes of us Europeans in order to blind us to the dangers that lie ahead. It is indisputable that the successful invasion was the beginning of the destruction of Europe and thus the birth of the Soviet world power; for without the commitment of strong German forces in the West, the Soviets would not be in the middle of Europe today.

In the last two paragraphs of his assessment of the situation, Dönitz already touches on the main problem. "Where was our reconnaissance against the enemy?" Just as the loss of the Battle of Stalingrad a year and a half earlier was due to a lack of reconnaissance by "Foreign Armies East" under the legendary General Gehlen, here it was "Foreign Armies West" under the leadership of Colonel i. G. Alexis Freiherr v. Roenne and his colleague Obersdeutnant Roger Michel who played a major role in the loss of the invasion battle. It is necessary to go into more detail here in order to understand the disastrous role of both traitors in Hitler and Jodl's misjudgment of the situation. The question here is why, after the

the initial Allied successes during the landing were not all available forces used to drive the Allies back into the sea?

Colonel Roenne was initially held in high esteem by Hitler, as he had repeatedly made very astute and accurate assessments of the situation. This was also the case before the Polish campaign, when Hitler had to decide to intervene militarily because of the attacks and murders of Germans. This study correctly stated that the Western powers England and France "would mobilize, but would not attack Germany during the advance into Poland". This was the reason for Hitler to solve the problem of Poland in a flash in order to reach peace negotiations with a long-term outcome. Roenne's second assessment of the enemy before the Western campaign was also correct. It stated "that if the German armored divisions were to cross the Meuse between Givet and Sedan and attack the enemy, the French army would collapse". These circumstances were expressly confirmed by Obersdeutnant Liß, the officer in charge at the time, to the American writer Anthony Cave Brown in an interview after the war

Roenne, who was Baltic German, was awarded the German Cross by the Führer for his outstanding assessments of the situation. He volunteered for the front before the Russian campaign, was deployed in the northern sector and hoped to regain his property in Latvia for his family. He was wounded and, after a long stay in hospital, rejoined the army division

"Foreign Armies West" and now became its chief. This was an important and influential position. All reconnaissance results about the Western powers landed on his desk. It is therefore not surprising that the resistance fighters and saboteurs tried everything to gain influence over these key positions. In addition, he held Canaris in high esteem and was friends with General Oster. He also knew Stauffenberg from the war academy. It is therefore understandable that he was automatically drawn into an atmosphere that was to have a very disastrous effect on him. It also proved

once again how dangerous and ominous such a defeatist environment with conspiratorial thoughts can distract from incorruptible work dedicated to victory.

At the end of 1943, Lieutenant-Colonel Roger Michel was placed under his command as head of Group England.

was in British service because his mother was English. It is significant that he was seen in an American uniform after his early release from captivity. Or was it Gehlen who recruited him? In any case, Michel declared that he belonged to the American intelligence service C.I.C.. According to his own statements, Gehlen also counted himself among the resistance. As such, did he also contribute to the loss of the war? Was this the reward and recognition of his services by the Allies? These are all questions that are perfectly justified in the case of our conspirators.

The aim here was to assess the enemy's forces and the number of large units to be expected for the invasion. Of course, it was not easy to obtain reliable information from agents deployed in England, especially since a strong defensive organization and corresponding disruption and camouflage measures had been taken on the English side. Nevertheless, Roenne's assessment of the enemy situation at the beginning of 1944 was correct, according to which he had conclusive evidence that the Allies would not strike the decisive blow in the Balkans that year, but in France. On February 2, a second report was issued, which read: "For 1944, the Allies are in any case planning an operation outside the Mediterranean which is to bring about the decision. This operation is to be carried out with all available forces from England and is being prepared under the cover name 'Overlock' - troop movements and distribution of the enemy forces clearly indicate that England will be the starting point of the operation."

This important information was only possible because the omnipresent German radio reconnaissance with the most modern defense techniques detected it. Despite the camouflage, a clear decrease in radio traffic from the Mediterranean in favor of the British Isles was identified. At the beginning of 1944, a shift in offensive forces was also reported, in particular the transfer of the American elite unit, the 82nd Airborne Division, from Italy to England, as well as the landing of new units from America. As an expert, Roenne knew very well that it was possible to fake radio traffic and thus create a desired enemy image for the enemy.

achieve can achieve. He knew even the allied company
"Mercury", which is used exclusively by

South East England was put on as a deceptive maneuver. All well and good so far.

Since the end of the French campaign, the German leadership had become suspicious of Canaris and his defense and therefore had all reports checked by the SD before they were presented to Hider. It was often the case that the Security Service reduced such reports by half of the stated units and thereby made the right decision. The dubious Lieutenant-Colonel Michel took advantage of this fact to play along with the obvious English confusion, namely to make the English forces look stronger than they were. He took advantage of the undoubted differences between the two intelligence services to convince his superior Roenne that his idea of simply doubling the reported enemy units was correct, as this number would always be reduced by fifty percent by the SD. He made this dangerous game palatable to Roenne by claiming that "Foreign Armies West" would become less and less credible if the SD's reduced figures were actually accepted, thus proving that the SD's intelligence sources were more reliable. It seems almost incomprehensible that a man as intelligent as Roenne would agree to this suggestion, which was perhaps fascinating at the time. He thus violated all the principles appropriate to such an important authority. The disastrous consequences were immediate. Be it for whatever reason, the next increased report was passed on to Hitler unabridged.

Headquarters assumed that between eighty-five and ninety Allied divisions had assembled in England, including seven airborne divisions. The reality was thirty-five divisions, including three airborne divisions. The first sin had to be followed by the second. When proof of this exaggerated report was demanded, information from press releases, other reports and from the footage of the English radio play "Mercury" was simply passed on as real reports. The OKW was deceived by this unbelievable manipulation, which had come about practically hand in hand with the Allies.

Instead of the agreed thirty-five
 divisions eighty-five
 divisions were marked on the OKW's situation map. This, however,
 was the underlying reason why Hitler and Jodl rightly expected an
 even larger and more decisive invasion after the Normandy invasion
 and were reluctant for a long time to expose the Channel coast
 elsewhere. This prevented the landed enemy
 in the Normandy with forces, which were available in
 sufficient numbers, could be driven back into the sea or destroyed.
 Eisenhower feared this again and again and kept it within the realm
 of possibility. Paul Carell writes on page 223 of "They're Coming":
 "Even Eisenhower was dominated by the worry that if the Germans
 brought their infantry from southern France - and they had the time
 to do so - there was no telling what would happen, without
 possibility to large-scale
 operational movements. Then the weather turns bad and
 disables the bombers, especially the Jabos. But that would take the
 decisive weapon on the Allied side out of the game. Outmaneuvered
 by General Winter! These were the gloomy thoughts of the Allied
 staff. The evil word of the 'solidification of the front' was going
 around." Anthony Cave Brown reports in
 "The Invisible Front" on page 467 with regard to Roenne's activities:
 "The Allies had thus found an unwilling ally. His overview of the
 Allied troop strength in England before the day of the landing
 corresponded in every respect with the deployment plan of
 'Quicksilver'. In May, the fictitious 'FUSAG', the so-called ghost
 army, became a reality for the Führer and the OKW in south-east
 England, and Roenne could do nothing to dispel this impression.
 Roenne had to pay for this intrigue (disgraceful treason would be the
 correct term, the author) with his life. But the man who had hatched
 the idea, Lieutenant-Colonel Roger Michel, got away with it. . .
 Roenne and Michel together helped to realize the

to complete the finely spun web with which the Allies sought to conceal the 'Neptune' operation, a web in which Hider also became entangled and which thwarted all his efforts to repel the invasion."

Paul Carell confirms this treacherous numbers game in "They are coming" on page 205. He quotes the Australian war correspondent Chester Wilmot: "At the fall of Cherbourg there were 25 British and American divisions in the beachhead. In the United Kingdom, 15 divisions were waiting to embark for Normandy and 6 were in training as reinforcement depots for the British Army on all fronts. However, German intelligence reported to its command: The enemy had deployed 27 to 31 divisions and a large number of army troops of all kinds in the beachhead. 67 large formations were still available in England, of which at least 57 could be deployed in a major operation.

The 42 non-existent divisions that German intelligence placed in Eisenhower's reserves were the result of British wartime cunning and German obtuseness. (Carell is mistaken here. It was Roenne and Michel's treachery, the author) It was easy for the Allied agents to sell the German agents a deployment strength that was exaggerated to the point of ridiculousness, as there were willing customers in the intelligence department of the OKH. These foisted divisions clouded the judgment of the German High Command and helped to distort its strategy. Cherbourg was the first fruit of this distorted strategy¹. It was not to remain the only one."

This shameful betrayal meant that the abundant reserves were not deployed, or not deployed in time, because the decisive main invasion was expected against the Pas de Calais. If, despite local German inferiority, the Allied breakthrough was not easy and had to be fought for with the greatest sacrifice of blood, this is entirely to the credit of the bravely fighting front troops, who were cheated of a possible victory by German traitors. That is also the reason why

July 20th has never found its way into the hearts of the German people and will do so even less in the future. For this betrayal cost the lives of hundreds of thousands of German sons in vain. It was a stab in the back of the German troops. History will confirm this more and more every day.

The manipulated misjudgment of the existing Allied forces was a decisive reason for our defeat in the invasion and for the subsequent loss of France, Belgium and Holland.

No timely alerting of the troops

The German western front had been waiting for the invasion for months. When it finally came, they were surprised and only partially prepared to defend themselves. Was this just recklessness or carelessness, or did sabotage and betrayal also play an important role here? It is now absolutely certain that the Western High Command, with Field Marshal von Rundstedt still in charge at the start of the invasion, knew the exact date of the attack.

It is well known that the Allied High Command had for some time set up the SOE, a secret organization for sabotage and intelligence gathering in France. These sabotage troops were actively planned to fight in the rear of the German front in the event of an invasion. They were to attack German command posts, blow up or mine bridges, roads and crossroads. In particular, the aim was to paralyze the railroad network with hundreds of explosions in order to impede German troop movements. This was a partisan struggle, which naturally called for corresponding countermeasures, which we should no longer be upset about today, as they were justified. Above all, the aim was to sabotage the telephone lines in order to paralyze the management options. These sabotage squads were well equipped and had sufficient weapons and

explosives, which came over the canal at night and were dropped in parachute containers. Despite all the subsequent sanitization, these partisan units were hardly a serious threat to the German troops. The victims were, as usual, the peaceful population, who consistently distanced themselves from the fight. For this reason, major counteractions by the German troops were relatively rare.

What was difficult for these partisan organizations was the unified leadership. For the invasion, however, the secret activation of this home organization was important. For this reason, the leadership in London had agreed with the heads of these units to listen to the French BBC broadcasts on the 1st, 2nd, 15th and 16th of each month and to listen for a specific code word. A verse of Paul Verlaine's poem was agreed, which reads as follows:

"Les sanglots longs des violons de l'automne blessent
mon coeur d'une langueur monotone."

When the first line of the above poem was read out between other messages, it meant that the invasion was imminent. When the second line was read out, it was clear that the invasion was coming in the next 48 hours. Naturally, after this information was announced, the French sabotage units began to listen intently to the BBC's radio reports. But they were not the only ones eagerly awaiting the announcement of the aforementioned lines, but also the German intelligence service. One of the confidants of this French organization worked in the German service and had revealed his secret. Among others, specialists from the

15th German Army under the command of Colonel General Salmuth at the Toutcoing headquarters - the army was deployed between the Seine and Meuse - intercepted the lines of the poem agreed for the start of the invasion and reported them. The historian Paul Carell later checked the war diary of the 15th Army and read the exact entries there. He writes in "They are coming" on page 17:

"The war diary of the 15th Army contains five entries on June 5, 1944. The first says that the intelligence unit intercepted the first part of Verlaine's verse 'Les sanglots longs des violons de l'automne' on June 1, 2 and 3. The second entry reports under the time 21.15: 'Second half of the saying blessent mon coeur d'une langueur monotone intercepted'.

The third, fourth and fifth entries at 9.30 p.m., 10 p.m. and 10.15 p.m. reveal the writer's dramatic excitement. They state that the sensational news, the big secret, was sent to the head of the 15th Army, the Commander-in-Chief West, to the General

command, the anti-aircraft division, the commanders in Belgium and France as well as Army Group B (i.e. Rommel-Speidel) and the OKW in Rastenburg. By 10:15 p.m. on June 5 at the latest, the OKW, Field Marshal Rundstedt, the naval group staff in Paris and Army Group Rommel knew that the invasion was imminent.

Not a shot had been fired yet. The bombers were just taking off from the English airfields and the transporters with the landing traps were taxiing to the runways. Pilots and paratroopers all believed in their secret. But their secret had already been revealed

But don't worry - it did no harm. A great effort had been wasted, the first victory given away by the German High Command. Colonel General Salmuth immediately put his 15th Army, which was not in the area of the coming events, on high alert. But nothing else happened - nothing at all. Army Group B (Rommel had gone home for his wife's birthday, Speidel was celebrating at his command post with invited guests) *did not* alert its 7th Army (it was hit by the entire invasion in full force) and hours later let it become the unsuspecting victim of the most powerful attack in the history of the war. The 84th Corps, against whose coastal divisions the first air and sea landings were directed, was taken by surprise. Neither the naval commander of Normandy, Admiral Hennecke, nor his most important coastal batteries and radar stations were alerted. Rommel was not immediately recalled from Herrlingen. His army group remained without its head for fourteen crucial hours, without the driving, all-dominant force. The chief of staff, Speidel, was left to his own devices

General Jodl at the Führer's headquarters can be conceded that he was of the opinion that Field Marshal von Rundstedt would sound the alarm. But he did not do so because he did not believe in the invasion. The standard American work on the history of the invasion quotes a word from his staff: 'General Eisenhower did not announce the invasion over the BBC broadcasts. The information was simply not believed. A line of poetry by Verlaine - laughable!

Why, however, the General Staff of Army Group B (responsible solely to Speidel, d.

author) was guided by this sovereign contempt for psychological warfare and did not alert his corps and divisions on his own initiative remains unexplained! Thus the victory of the German defense remained without fruit. The night from June 5 to 6 passed in routine work, carelessness and not infrequently in leisurely cheerfulness." It is known that Speidel was later demoted. This did not prevent Bonn from allowing him to become active in the Bundeswehr again. After all, he made it to Commander-in-Chief of the NATO Land Forces Europe Center. However, he has since retired from this position.

But the inexcusable omissions continued. Rommel was not called by Speidel during the night, but only the next morning, when the landing of the troops was in full swing. A report in the "Deutsche Wochenzeitung" from January 11, 1974 by retired Colonel Hans Oelze of the Sicherungs regiment on the Channel Island of Guernsey is indicative of the whole situation:

"On the evening of June 5, an aerial intelligence company, equipped with the best detection equipment available at the time from the 'Freya' and 'Würzburg' types, was stationed on the English Channel Island of Guernsey, conquered by the German Wehrmacht. At around 10.40 p.m., four-engined Lancaster bombers appear on their screens in regular formations and at equal intervals; behind each aircraft, another missile can be seen at the same distance, which can soon be identified as a cargo glider.

Of these, a total of 180 teams are located by this one air intelligence company... The company commander - responsibly - wants to be absolutely sure of his case before raising the alarm. He therefore asks the commander of a neighboring army security regiment to his observation post, who immediately confirms that this is not a figment of over-excited nerves

Determined, the colonel skipped all the relevant offices in his long official channels and immediately contacted the superior general command of his corps in St Lo (Norman coast).

verbindea He demands the chief of staff. He cannot be reached. He now wants to speak to the first general staff officer (Ia)a Absent. Plagued by distress, the colonel requests the commanding general in person . . .

Then he bursts his collar: one of the gentlemen is in Paris for a meeting with the army group, the other is at a birthday party and one is on vacation, the officer on duty, an orderly officer, tells him.

The colonel orders him, indeed implores him, to sound the air alarm immediately, because he is sure that a major landing operation will take place on the mainland in the next few minutes. The officer on duty promises to do his utmost . . .

About twenty minutes later, the general command reports back. The gentlemen of the staff wished the comrade on the island a good night and advised him not to see any ghosts and not to drive the horses wild . . .

Another twenty minutes later, the general command, namely the Ia, all excited, now on the line himself: 'You were right. Major airborne landings behind the entire front line alert!'"¹ Thus the defense against the Anglo-American invasion was delayed by at least thirty crucial minutes - and that was what mattered. The Lancers were able to drop their paratroopers without resistance to secure the landing sites and then land the cargo gliders completely undisturbed behind the front line."

It should be noted that the 15th Army between the Seine and the Meuse, which was not affected by the invasion, was alerted and fully prepared to defend itself, while where it mattered, i.e. in the section of the 7th Army with the main 84th Corps, the alarm failed to sound. Rommel was not there, although he was also aware of the Verlaine verses. With his reckless journey, he himself sabotaged his forward defense. He relied on a man for whom peace negotiations seemed more important than a defensive success, who spent valuable time on plans to overthrow the enemy and no longer believed in victory. This raises the historically important question of whether this is why he was commander-in-chief of the NATO land forces.

Europe Center because he had decisively helped his friends, the Allies, at the time.

It is time that the mystery of Speidel, why the 7th Army was not alerted by him in time, is clarified as a matter of priority. This can never be done by a court, but by a court of honor of former officers, as was once the custom after the wars of liberation. The clarification would therefore have to be taken seriously, as Speidel was arrested after July 20th. The reason was the accusation that he had deliberately not alerted the 7th Army so as not to unnecessarily impede the landing of the Allies and their immediate march through France into Reich territory. This can be read by Anthony Cave Brown on page 600 of "The Invisible Front". He added:

"Later rumors circulated that the Allies, mainly the Americans, had rewarded him with a NATO high command after the war." Up to now, historical events have always been brought to public attention in a less than attractive form by left-wing intellectuals such as Hochhut for the sake of coming to terms with the past in a corrosive sense. The Filbinger case was one of these examples in which even absolute inaccuracies could be proven. I believe that righteous Germans who have demonstrated their love for their fatherland should also have the same right to expose historical failures and treasonous crimes to the public. We will be able to judge whether there are still equal rights and equal duties in this supposedly liberal democracy.

Only recently, after much difficulty, my bookseller sent me a book by a foreigner, an American professor, that I had ordered long ago. It came with a yellow note: "At short notice, standard scientific works that have been on the market for many years have now been placed on the 'Index for Publications Harmful to Young Persons'. The 'Federal Review Board for Publications Harmful to Young Persons' in Bad Godesberg has ruled that these books 'do not serve science'." So today there is no free formation of opinion, and certainly no free expression of opinion, without German courts.

be "forced". The question is therefore whether today's ostracized "Book burnings in the Third Reich" by Goebbels were no more honest than the hidden and subterranean bans today. In any case, I will no longer remain silent. I have not done so in the past and do not intend to do so today. It is time to finally take a stand against the falsification of history and the perverse re-education methods in order to put a stop to the education of German youth in denial. Or is that

no longer possible today? Then it's no longer worth living in Germany.

According to historian David Irving, the diary of Vice-Admiral Ruge shows that Speidel attended the evening event at Rommel's headquarters on June 5 and went "to his bunk" at 1 a.m. to sleep for three hours. It is strange that on the eve of such a fateful day Speidel had invited his brother-in-law Dr. Horst and Rommel's friend Ernst Jünger to an evening party. In practice, this was a secret conspiracy meeting at which, according to Speidel, Jünger's draft for an armistice negotiation with the Allies was to be discussed. Allegedly, Rommel had commissioned Jünger to do this work. On the coast and in the hinterland, the unsuspecting soldiers had been given only a few hours to die, while Speidel's staff was pursuing a paralyzing policy of hasard that lacked any will to accept the challenges of this decisive battle.

As already mentioned, Speidel had been informed of the state of alert of the 15th Army. However, he did not sound the alarm. Colonel Staubwasser, the chief of intelligence under Speidel's command, testified that he had been informed of the alarm.

At 10 p.m., the intelligence general staff officer of the 15th Army reported the interception of the Verlaine cue and the subsequent alerting of the army by telephone. Staubwasser immediately reported this to Speidel. Allegedly, Speidel did not know the meaning of the cue. Either this is an outright lie

or an omission of a carelessly omitted orientation. He had Staubwasser inquire with Rundstedt at headquarters. Staubwasser later made the following statement during an interrogation: "During this telephone conversation, which I conducted personally, a staff officer on special assignment conveyed the order of the OB West to refrain from alerting all the dummies." The question arises, who was the staff officer on special assignment here? Anyone who is familiar with the customs of high staffs knows that such a procedure is impossible, because this is not just some trivial report and information, but a highly important procedure. I consider it completely out of the question that an experienced colonel, and a general staff officer at that, would accept such an instruction from an unknown person and allow himself to be fobbed off with it. The research of the American Brown in "The Invisible Front" on page 598 stands in complete contrast to this description of the facts: "Why did Commander-in-Chief West refrain from alerting the entire force, even though he knew the significance of the Verlainne lines? This remained one of the most impenetrable mysteries of the war. Colonel Bodo von Zimmermann from Rundstedt's staff later claimed that all troops in the West had been put on alert. He told the Americans who interrogated him after the war: 'On June 5, at 9:15 p.m., intelligence officer Meyer-Detring brought the alarming news that the enemy radio had broadcast several times a cue calling on the resistance movement throughout France to rise up immediately. The message was therefore taken very seriously. Rundstedt ordered that this message be passed on with a general warning to all units and offices in his command area. And then he added with regard to Zimmermann, and since his early release from Allied captivity depended to a certain extent on the truth of his statement, it may be regarded as a kind of testimony: 'Army Group B, to whom this report

was known, von Rundstedt received the order to order alert level II, the highest alert level, for their entire command area . . .' Shortly after midnight was this process according to Zimmermann - i.e. before any reports of a landing in France had been received. Accordingly, all German forces in the west, including the navy and air force, should have been on high alert when the first Allied paratroopers jumped off, but this was not the case." If Zimmermann was telling the truth with his statements, this means without doubt that Speidel's and Staubwasser's statements are incorrect. But that would mean that Speidel's staff had a very must have had a guilty conscience. Did this guilty conscience perhaps have something to do with the fact that he was no longer concerned with serious resistance to a landing, but rather with ending the fighting, practically surrendering?

The different assessment of the weather situation

The landing on the Channel coast depended on two main factors after the preparation and deployment of the forces intended for it had been completed: the tides and the weather. The fact that the Allies' preparations for a landing had been completed and that the tides in the days around June 6 had to be considered favorable for a landing in the early morning hours could not have escaped the attention of Commander-in-Chief West and the Army Group B concerned. This circumstance alone should have forced increased vigilance and defensive readiness. These facts also make it seem incomprehensible, indeed irresponsible, to a critic that Field Marshal Rommel thought it right to have to give a critical lecture to the Führer on this particular date, combining the pleasant, namely a birthday visit to his wife, with the useful.

wanted. But what about the forecast and assessment of the weather situation? There were incomprehensible differences here, especially with regard to the assessment of the weather situation.

Eisenhower had scheduled a conference of the high commands at Southwick House at 4:15 a.m. on the day before the invasion. There, in the presence of all members of this high command, he had Group Captain John Stagg, the chief meteorologist, report on the weather situation, which essentially read: "There have been no significant changes, and I believe I may interpret the insignificant ones optimistically." In his opinion, Tuesday, June 6, was suitable for a landing on the Normandy coast. He then forecast "mixed weather", but probably not so bad that it would

"could seriously jeopardize the important build-up phases of the operation". It was seen - after

Brown - the commander-in-chief Eisenhower literally felt a great weight lift from him and he said with a broad smile: "Well Stagg, if your prediction is correct, we'll celebrate when the time comes, I promise you that."

The decision was thus made, and shortly afterwards Washington and the troops earmarked for the invasion were alerted. The war did not take place, as the German saying goes, "because of bad weather in the Saale" Eisenhower was satisfied with a short intermittent high forecast by the meteorologists to take the risk of landing.

But how was the weather situation assessed on the German side and what conclusions were drawn? In any case, it was clear that a landing was possible in terms of tide, moon phase and general weather conditions. There is no doubt that the naval commander of Normandy, Rear Admiral Hennecke, was worried the day before the landing. A survey of the "weathermen" on June 5 revealed rough seas, poor visibility and winds of between five and six, with hardly any change in the weather situation to be expected in the short term. This situation did not rule out an invasion, but made it seem unlikely. However, the admiral was aware of the recent reports of strong movements on the

radar screens, which indicated large accumulations of ships on the south coast of England.

The weather forecast of Government Councillor Müller, the chief meteorologist in the Office of the Chief of Staff West, from the day before the invasion began, which the Polish historian Janusz Piekalkiewicz found while researching US Army loot files for his publication "Invasion of France 1944", is highly revealing. It shows perfectly that Müller, like chief meteorologist Stagg in Eisenhower's staff, after the first forecast of June 4, according to which the bad weather would last for several days, also predicted on the afternoon of June 5 that the weather was expected to improve during the night of June 6 and on that day.

At 5.30 p.m., following his first report at 5 a.m. on the same day, in which he had already predicted better weather for June 6, Müller described the weather in detail in his second forecast.

The prospects for an enemy operation in the night from June 5 to June 6, 1944 are as follows:

1. Luftwaffe: Departure from the English drop zone generally possible without significant difficulties, only locally somewhat impaired by heavier cloud cover. Air activity in the OB West area with strongly clearing clouds, also clearing in some areas, mostly possible without obstructions.

2. Marine: In the Hoofden and in the Channel fresh winds from southwest to west around force 3-5, in places light swell around 3-4, occasionally up to 5, also decreasing somewhat towards morning. In view of this weather forecast, the invasion had to be taken seriously. By the evening of June 5 at the latest, it had reached the staffs of the defensive front - naturally including Rommel's staff under the responsibility of the conspirator Speidel - and should at least have resulted in advance warning of all forces. But nothing of the sort happened, because the commanders and commanders of Rommel's Fleeresgruppe had long since left their command posts, as has already been reported. Rommel himself was forced to rely on the outdated forecast of bad weather.

leaving his staff quarters for Herrlingen on the morning of June 4 to celebrate his wife's birthday at home on June 6.

The weather situation was also discussed on June 5 in Le Mans, at the headquarters of the 7th Army, which was later attacked and was under Rommel's command. This question played a not insignificant role because Colonel General Dollmann had scheduled a planning game for June 6 in Rennes in Brittany, to which all commanders of the army down to down to the divisions with each

each with two regimental commanders. The weather forecast therefore also played a role in the conversation between Dollmann and his chief of staff, Major General Pemsel. According to Pemsel, it produced roughly the same forecast as described above, but was qualified by him with the remark "As far as you can rely on our weathermen can be relied on!" The

approach routes for for this commanders' meeting were up to almost 200 kilometers for many of the commanders. In order to keep the commanders' absence from the troops as short as possible, Pemsel sent telexes to his subordinate units that the commanders involved should only leave at dawn for the meeting scheduled for 10.00 a.m., as by then it would certainly be clear that the landing had taken place.

This order, however, clearly proves that the start of an invasion was by no means ruled out, i.e. that it was expected. It must seem all the more incomprehensible that this meeting was held so far away from the troops, at such a favorable time of the day, and that no heightened alert had been ordered. After all, this was not about any kind of combat action, but about the decisive battle for the victory or downfall of the Reich.

Ultimately, however, the participating commanders were more familiar with the sometimes difficult approach routes. For some time, bombing raids had been stepped up considerably. They had destroyed roads, so that detours had to be taken. In addition, driving in daylight was not particularly pleasant, as the increased

Jabo activity even endangered single vehicles. It could not have escaped the notice of those responsible that this conspicuous increase in air activity was an indication of preparations for the invasion. The 709th Division under Major General von Schlieben and the

Major General Falley's 91st Airborne Division had particularly difficult and long approach routes. The two commanders therefore decided independently of each other to set off at nightfall.

They said "that there was nothing to worry about in this miserable weather". At this time, Rommel was already in the intimate family circle in Herrlingen, making birthday preparations for his wife. General Mareks, as Commanding General of the 84th Corps, who had to bear the main burden of the landings in a few hours' time, was to lead the simulation ordered by the army and was still busy preparing this war game after midnight, when the enemy airborne troops were already taking off.

The first victim of this war game planned in Rennes was General Falley. He was traveling with his second general staff officer. As they both wanted to turn onto the road to Rennes near Picaudville at dawn, Falley noticed enemy aircraft squadrons roaring over him into the hinterland. As an experienced front-line soldier, he recognizes the situation in a flash and immediately turns back. For him, the planned war game is over and he immediately orders a return trip to his troops, who are now in dire need of him. He jumps out of the car with his general staff officer. He is able to fire two more shots from his pistol, then he is the first of his division to fall, far away from his beloved troops in the rear. The commander and his Ib are dead before they can even give an order to their troops. General Schlieben is also on his way to Rennes. Both divisions are without their commanders at the start of the invasion.

Army Group B is not alerted because the responsible Speidel is asleep, but the troops are surprised and alerted by the enemy. This is the historical truth, caused by those,

who betrayed their mission and their oath. Their concern was less about being ready to defend themselves and strengthening their will to defend themselves than about concentrating on plans for overthrow and future peace negotiations. It was cruel how the fighting troops were abandoned!

Speidel did not initiate anything decisive once the fighting got under way. Rommel's driving force, which used to dominate everything, his leadership skills in the midst of the action, his spontaneous orders from the saddle were not there. Fourteen precious hours were lost before Rommel returned to his headquarters. Further important hours were missed before he was able to determine the law of action again in the decisive section of the front through personal commitment. The first mishap had already occurred. The hard-pressed commander General Mareks had General Feuchtinger's 21st Panzer Division counterattack east of the Orne in the area of his 84th Corps. The 21st Panzer Division was subordinate to General Richter's 716th Infantry Division and had already received orders from him at 01.20 hours to attack the paratroopers that had landed with the nearest units. At 02:00, the order was extended to include the clearing of the entire area east of the

Orne. But the widely dispersed parts of his division were not assembled until 10.00 a.m., as Feuchtinger had allegedly waited in vain for the OKW to release his division.

This was nonsense, because he was in the immediate combat area and therefore had a duty to attack the enemy that had jumped off immediately. The armored advance only got underway eight hours after the landing, at least six hours too late. Nevertheless, it successfully led to the relief of the parts of the 716th Infantry Division still fighting in their bases on the coast. During this attack, the enemy dropped further parachutists into the area east of Caen and also into the area of the attacking 21st Armored Division. This alone shows how unpleasant the attack by this division was for the enemy. I know from my own experience what a good find for a deployed armored division a

is when enemy paratroopers jump in. Back then, in the Bastogne area, during the Battle of the Bulge, hardly anyone came to the ground alive in a similar situation. This made the local decision to break off the battle in order to clear rear areas all the more incomprehensible. This was certainly a fatal mistake and was bound to have serious consequences. It would be interesting to know who this local leader was

Betrayal and sabotage during the invasion

Everything mentioned so far are only examples of failures in the first hour. The real reasons for the failure of the defense against this invasion lie deeper and are of a political nature. In his book "Invasion 1944", Hans Speidel states very clearly on page 90 what his and Rommel's goals were, which were agreed between Rommel and Stülpnagel in the form of a mobilization calendar: "In the West, establishing the precondition for an armistice with Generals Eisenhower

and Montgomery without Hitler's participation! Field Marshal Rommel had planned for the negotiations: General of the Infantry Karl Heinrich Stülpnagel, General of the Armored Forces Freiherr Leo v. Schweppenburg, Lieutenant General Dr. Hans Speidel, Lieutenant General Graf Gerd v. Schwerin, Vice Admiral Friedrich Ruge, Lieutenant Colonel d.

R. Dr. Caesar v. Hofacker.

The following negotiating principles for an armistice were envisaged: Evacuation of the occupied western territories, return of the Western Army behind the Siegfried Line, handover of the administration of the occupied western territories to the Allies. Immediate cessation of the enemy's bombing campaign against the homeland The armistice - not a surrender - was to be followed by negotiations for a peace that would point the way to order and not chaos. Field Marshal Rommel expected the Allies to seize such an opportunity.

would give . . .

Appeal to the German people from all Western broadcasters, relentless information about the true military and political situation and its causes, further information about the crimes of Hitler's state leadership, informing the troops about the necessity of all measures to save them from catastrophe.

Home: Arrest of Adolf Hitler in order to bring him before a German court. Execution by the resistance forces in the army high command or by armored units to be brought in. Provisional takeover of government power in Germany by the resistance forces of all classes and estates under the leadership of Colonel General Beck, Lord Mayor Dr. Goerdeler and trade union leader Leuschner . . .

East: Continuation of the battle, for this purpose holding a shortened eastern front in the approximate line Danube mouth-Carpathians-Lemberg-Vistula-Memel, immediate evacuation of Courland and other strongholds.

Preparations were to be accelerated so that action could be taken before the invasion began. A firmly established western front was a prerequisite for any negotiations that might become necessary. It was therefore the constant concern of all."

If these concerns had actually existed, the

The above-mentioned omissions were not permitted. As for the unreality of a unilateral surrender, Colonel General Guderian says: "Any talks for negotiations with the enemy, either as a whole or with the East or West separately, had become pointless from the outset due to the demand for unconditional surrender, which was raised by all our opponents together."

How Rommel wanted to achieve his freedom of action is revealed to us as early as 1953 by Wilhelm v. Schramm in "Der 20. Juli in Paris". He reports that Rommel had been waiting for a visit from Hitler before the invasion, but he did not come, either because his health did not allow it or because he was suspicious and an inner voice had warned him. But when the invasion situation became critical and Rundstedt requested that a number of the most authoritative personalities of the headquarters be sent to the

When the Führer was supposed to come to the west to discuss the situation, Hider and Jodl appeared unexpectedly on June 17 with a small escort at the Margival bunker complex north of Soisson, where Rundstedt and Rommel had been ordered to go with their chiefs of staff. After discussing the situation, Rommel had said flatly that no one from the Führer's entourage had yet been seen at or behind the front.

It soon became clear that this was a good idea. For shortly before the return journey, Lieutenant General Schmundt, Hider's chief adjutant, suddenly turned to Speidel and told him to prepare a trip for Hider to La Roche-Guyon or another suitable place on June 19 and to order front commanders from the various departments and branches of the armed forces to go there. The Führer would then speak to them personally.

One can imagine the satisfaction with which Speidel heard this news and the fierce smile with which it was received by Rommel - according to v. Schramm. Once again the opportunity seemed to present itself, as the resistance forces had envisioned it from the beginning: not assassination, but arrest! The fact that Speidel called on Stülpnagel on the return journey via Paris and informed him of the meetings and of Hider's impending trip to the front may also indicate that they intended to seize the opportunity. It was a pre-alarm for the military commander. Incidentally, the necessary measures

The measures were taken immediately. It can be assumed that Hitler would have been Rommel's prisoner on June 19.

But Hitler did not come. He was taken up with other important meetings in Berchtesgaden. Schramm's theory that Hitler only left the Margival bunker camp prematurely because a stray V-1 had fallen near the camp is nonsensical. Incidentally, as I was later able to see for myself as combat commander of all headquarters, the Führer's safety was excellently provided for. That is why an arrest was not possible without further ado. At the very least, hundreds would have had to bite the dust first, especially those who were arrested. People like Stülpnagel, Speidel or Rommel would not have survived.

I would like to see the Trappe, who would have dared to shoot at Hitler, their leader, in such an event. Any attack justified by the wrong motives would have been met with a storm of ovation when Hitler appeared. I do not say this lightly. As the person responsible for the Führer's security, I know what I'm talking about. The longer the war lasted, the more desperate the situation became for Germany, the more German men rallied around him in a conspiratorial community of fate. That is the sober truth.

That Rommel succumbed more and more to the influence of the conspiracy is described elsewhere by von Schramm: "When Hofacker returned to Paris from a meeting with Rommel on the evening of July 9, he reported to his co-conspirators in joyful excitement: Rommel had been almost unstoppable, he wanted to strike right away."

"Hofacker asked me, according to the conspirator Freiherr v. Teuchert, to immediately procure a draft of a letter to the Allied headquarters. It was to inform them of the intention to cease hostilities on their own initiative, not to contain any conditions, only to ask for honorable treatment after the surrender, and also for secrecy until the possibility of execution had arisen. The letter was completed that very evening - excellently worded by Bargatzky."

Was the invasion battle really unwinnable?

After the leadership had failed to throw the enemy back into the sea by combining all forces with energetic counterattacks due to serious omissions, it was now necessary to prevent the breakthrough from the beachhead until sufficient combat units had been brought up for a counterattack. It was therefore a matter of taking back control of the action by bringing in and deploying the superior units that were available. Was this possible? What about the strength ratio? The enemy had initially established a stronghold between Orne and the area north of Ryes.

A bridgehead 25 kilometers wide and about 10 kilometers deep had been fought, a second one 15 kilometers wide and only 4 kilometers deep in the southeast corner of the Cotentin. Later, at the fall of Cherbourg, 25 American and British divisions were on the Fesdand, as mentioned earlier, and 15 more divisions were waiting in England to embark.

On the German side, there were 48 infantry divisions in France, 38 of which were deployed on the long coast, so ten were still available. There were only three infantry divisions deployed in the Brittany area.

On the day of the invasion of France, ten armored and mechanized divisions were ready for action. Of these units, four were initially under Rommel's command, namely the 2nd Panzer Division in the Amiens-Abbeville area, the 21st Panzer Division immediately behind the land front, the 116th Panzer Division east of Rouen, i.e. north of the Seine, and the 12th SS Panzer Division "Hiderjugend" near Caen.

Three further armored divisions were under the command of the OKW as an intervention reserve. These were the 1st SS Panzer Division "Adolf Hider", at the start of the invasion in Beverloo in Belgium. It was brought in. Furthermore, the Panzer Lehrdivision in the Le Mans-Orleans-Chatres area and the 17th SS Panzer Division around Saumur-Niort-Poitiers. Three further armored divisions were stationed in southern France: the 11th Panzer Division around Bordeaux, the 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich" around Montauban-Toulouse and the 9th Panzer Division around Avignon-Nimes-Arles. In addition

two SS armored divisions (the 9th and 10th) were brought in from the east.

Of the twelve armored divisions, only three were initially in combat, as were the three infantry divisions mentioned above. This meant that ten armored and ten infantry divisions were still available. If necessary, another thirty divisions could be called up from the unattacked coastal positions if a further landing was no longer to be expected. There is therefore no reason to claim that there were not enough troops in the west.

But this required a leadership that had the will to fight and the conviction to win. In addition, there were enough combat units at home that were demonstrably withheld from the front for political reasons.

But still, in the early days of the invasion, as a result of the ghost army invented by Roenne, a feared main invasion elsewhere haunted the minds of the top leadership. Did this have to be the case or were there not very early indications that this really was a haunting? Paul Carell reports in

"They are coming" on page 96: "When the evening report for June 6 was discussed at the 84th Corps, Major Hayn explained: 'That's three-quarters of all the parachute units identified in England. Add to that the US elite formations of the 1st and 4th Divisions. There's no way they're going to sacrifice their best attack troops over there for a sham maneuver. And here', he said to Lieutenant Kretschmer, the 03, 'read Major Wiegmann's report in the Caen area. According to the report, the 3rd British and 3rd Canadian divisions had already been identified around noon, and now we know that the 50th London and 7th Armored Divisions are also there. All that's missing is the 51st Highland and 1st Armored Divisions, and then we'll have Montgomery's entire 8th Army from North Africa on our tail. If that's not the invasion, what's it going to come with?

The question made sense and convinced the staff officers. The Ic of the 7th German Army, Obersdeutnant Vorwerk, agreed. 'I completely agree with you,' even the Ic at OB West, Obersdeutnant Meyer-Detring, concurred. But that was the end of it. Rundstedt himself, especially the OKW and Hitler remained skeptical."

You have to read it twice "but that was the end of it". Was there no one who, through objective analysis, was able to come to consistent conclusions and was prepared to act accordingly? But that was the historical task of Army Group B under the leadership of Rommel. It remains incomprehensible to me that it should not have been possible to prevail upon the top leadership with the demand to bring in all the necessary forces. Rommel would certainly have had the stature to do so if

he would not have been obsessed with plans for an armistice. Something else incredible had happened. Chance had allowed the American operational plans to fall into German hands. Already in the evening hours of June 6, soldiers of the 353rd Infantry Division had found a boat in the surf of the Vire estuary with the body of an American officer who had been killed in the fighting in the "Utah" sector of the American bridgehead. In a briefcase attached to his hand, the entire operational orders of the American VII Corps were found. That same evening, soldiers from the same division found the orders for the V Corps on the body of another American officer. Both Major General Pemsel, Chief of Staff of the 7th Army, and Rundstedt's staff interpreted these plans as the invasion par excellence. However, if such an assessment of the situation had already been made on June 8, which later proved to be correct, it is simply incomprehensible that the only correct consequence was not drawn from this, namely to bring in all available and expendable forces at an accelerated pace in order to destroy the enemy bridgeheads with concentrated, superior forces. At the very least, the breakout from the bridgehead could easily have been prevented and the Anglo-Americans left to stew in it. The failures and thus the responsibility weigh heavily. They cannot be excused and can only be explained by the fact that the will to win was no longer the starting point for all considerations, but rather the resistance plans of irresponsible military leaders on the invasion front.

Rommel and Speidel undeniably held back the two strong army divisions, the 116th and the 2nd Panzer Division! Their two commanders, Lieutenant General Graf Schwerin and Lieutenant General Freiherr v. Lüttwitz, were part of the German resistance. They were not to bleed to death like the SS units deployed. They were kept in reserve so that they could first arrest Hitler during his planned visit to the front and later intervene politically on July 20. The historian Irving reports that Speidel

in 1947 to the former German tank commander Leo Geyr v. Schweppenburg confessed that he had kept the 2nd and 116th Panzer Divisions out of the fighting in order to be able to use them in the conspiracy against Hitler. Guderian also criticized Rommel's withholding of the two divisions and expressed himself cautiously: "His refusal may have had a political reason." Baron Geyr v. Schweppenburg also confirmed this version in an Irish newspaper after the war

This restraint on the part of the two divisions in the face of the most difficult frontage was an outrageous betrayal of the hard-wrestling troops and the most reprehensible sabotage of the German war effort. Both divisions were in the immediate vicinity of the invasion front and were experienced and battle-hardened units with an outstanding tradition. They could be deployed on the second day of the invasion at the latest and hit the enemy in its most vulnerable moment of weakness in a devastating counterattack. However, it was better to wait for the arrival of the "LAH" SS division brought in from Belgium and the 9th and 10th SS divisions coming from the east. Contrary to all experience, these units were brought up by day and suffered considerable losses from the superior Allied air force as they approached. Also, as Guderian criticizes, the units were not deployed as a concentrated unit, but only fragmented and fragmented. It seems as if the intention was to use up these Waffen-SS units in the interests of the conspiracy and thus eliminate them for the planned political events.

The end of Stülpnagel, Kluge and Rommel

The soldier fighting dutifully at the front is dependent on supplies and support from the higher and highest command centers further behind him. If they do not do their utmost to provide the troops, who are fighting to the point of self-sacrifice, with the help and means to maintain their fighting strength, defeat is inevitable. Typical of the sickly spirit of a

Leadership also seems to me to be the following event: On July 28, in the absence of any help from the Army Group, the proven and brave SS Obergruppenführer Hausser, as commander-in-chief of the 7th Army, had announced his decision that he would break through to the southeast with his army. Kluge was horrified, as this would have meant the loss of contact with the west coast of the Cotentin Peninsula and thus the possibility for the Americans to break through to the south into the free French area.

In order to reverse this momentous decision, that same evening Field Marshal Kluge instructed General Freiherr v. Gersdorff to replace the proven General Pemsel as Chief of Staff of the 7th Army and to reverse the breakout attempt. Gersdorff was, as Kluge must have known very well, one of the main co-conspirators who wanted to blow up Hitler in the Berlin arsenal on Heroes' Memorial Day on March 21, 1943, sacrificing himself, as he later published. I don't think this man was the type who would have been prepared to do that. I still remember the prison camp in Treysa when I heard Gersdorff say among his comrades: "I don't understand the Americans, they don't treat us resisters any differently than the National Socialists." He didn't understand that the victors at the time had little sympathy for alleged co-victors. Understandably, they didn't want them because they could only diminish their glory. In any case, I couldn't complain about being treated worse, although I never denied my convictions even in captivity.

Gersdorff had been advised by the field marshal of the importance and urgency of his mission, as an emerging gap in the front line at the

front at Avranches could mean the loss of the war. Despite this urgency, the courageous conspirator Gersdorff was prevented by his co-conspirator Speidel from leaving immediately in order to reach the army during the night. His journey was not started until the next morning for fear that he might fall into the marquis' camp during the night,

too late, of course, to prevent the Americans from breaking through. Whenever quick action was needed, these gentlemen showed "good nerves", as Speidel used to recommend, and caused irreparable mishaps by waiting. Incidentally, Gersdorff was the man who, according to his own statements, had advised Kluge to enter into immediate negotiations with the Allies the previous evening. He had specifically suggested making radio contact with the American commander-in-chief, General Omar Bradley, or with the Englishman Montgomery. The basis of the negotiations was to be: cessation of all hostilities, planned withdrawal of all German forces on the Western Front behind the 1939 borders, guarantee for the elimination of the National Socialist regime. According to Gersdorff, Kluge is said to have replied: "If that goes wrong, then Field Marshal von Kluge will be the biggest pig in the history of the world." To Gersdorff's reply that "in history, great men have always faced the question of either being condemned or praised as saviors from the greatest adversity", Kluge is said to have replied: "Gersdorff, Field Marshal Kluge is not a great man."

If it is already surprising that Kluge listened to such a conversation at all without immediately court-martialing v. Gersdorff, the historian must be even more astonished that such a man should replace a righteous general like Pemsel and be entrusted with a mission that was supposedly so decisive for the war, v. Kluge, who now also represented Rommel after he was wounded, is indeed puzzling. This happened again a little later on August 12, when he was reported missing on a visit to the front. On the basis of a report from Keitel, Hider feared that Kluge was in contact with the enemy, as a radio message to this effect had been intercepted by a listening company. His suspicion was already too

This was caused by the fact that, after radio contact with the enemy, an exchange of American seriously wounded with captured German nurses had taken place. As Guderian confirmed

Flitler was distraught when Kluge was thought to have disappeared for almost a day.

Kluge's behavior remained unclear at first. The only thing that seems certain is that he did not make contact with the enemy, but to what extent he tried cannot be answered with absolute certainty. On June 25, 1945, an article appeared in "Time" magazine, which was probably written at the instigation of the American tank general Patton. It stated that Kluge had waited in vain for hours on the Avranches road for a meeting with officers of the 3rd American Army with whom he had an appointment. The reason given for the failure of this meeting was the desolate condition of the road, which was said to have been completely destroyed by Allied bombing raids. Allegedly, Kluge had already disappeared again when the American negotiators arrived. Kluge feared betrayal and returned to his staff quarters without his radio station. Cave Brown also reports in "The Invisible Front" on page 731: "This and other similar reports in the American press were confirmed by Dulles, who later wrote that Kluge had made 'a futile attempt to surrender to General Patton's army somewhere in the Falaise cauldron'."

After returning from the encirclement accompanied by First Lieutenant Tangermann around noon on August 16, Kluge found an order from Hider at the command post of Obergruppenführer Sepp Dietrich that he was to leave the encirclement immediately and conduct the operations from outside. After returning to his headquarters in La Roche-Guyon on August 17, he received a telex from the Führer's headquarters. "The Commander-in-Chief West and Commander-in-Chief of Army Group B General Field Marshal v. Kluge is transferred to the Führer Reserve At the same time Field Marshal Model is appointed Commander-in-Chief West and Commander-in-Chief B"

Like v. Rundstedt, who had previously been replaced, Kluge had also failed to fulfill the task assigned to him by the Führer.

20 July, he had, as previously as Commander-in-Chief Central on the Eastern Front, also tolerated here in France that general staff officers from outside the front, filled and contaminated by the spirit of resistance with treasonous intentions, were able to undermine the fighting spirit and stab the courageously fighting officers and soldiers in the back through omissions and sabotage. Torn between the Prussian duty he had been taught and the treacherous influence of his surroundings, burdened by the failure of the decisive battle of the invasion, he saw no promising way out and drew his conclusions. Similar to Stülpnagel, he did not withdraw as a co-conspirator, but as a confidant traitorous plans the suicide a justification. On his journey via Compiègne to the area west of Verdun, he took cyanide during a break. Beforehand, he had sent his accompanying officer, Lieutenant Tangermann, a letter to the Führer to the Führer, with the order, this to be passed on to the Führer via the Obergruppenführer Sepp Dietrich for security reasons. In view of his death, he therefore considered the SS Führer to be more reliable than his own comrades.

"My guide!

. . . I believe I can claim to have done everything in my power to master the situation. In my accompanying letter to Field Marshal Rommel's memorandum, which I sent to you, I already explained how the situation might develop. Both Rommel and I, but probably all commanders here in the West who had combat experience against the Anglo-Americans with their material superiority, foresaw the current development. We were not listened to. Our intentions were not based on pessimism, but simply on knowledge of the facts. I do not know whether General Field Marshal Model, who has proved himself in every respect, will still be able to master the situation. I sincerely hope so. But if it is not the case, and if your new, eagerly awaited weapons, especially those of the Luftwaffe, do not bring success, then, my Führer, resolve

They are determined to end the war. The German people have suffered such unspeakable

suffering that it is time to put an end to this horror. There must be ways and means to bring about the end and, above all, to prevent the Reich from falling into Bolshevik hell. The behavior of some officers who were taken prisoner in the East has always been a mystery to me. My Führer, I have always admired your greatness and your attitude in this gigantic struggle and your iron will, yourself yourself and National

Socialism. If fate is stronger than your will and your genius, it is the will of Providence. You have fought an honorable and great battle. History will bear you witness to this. Show yourself great enough now to put an end to the hopeless struggle, if necessary.

I part from you, my Führer, as one who, conscious of having done his duty to the utmost, was closer to you than you perhaps realized. Hail, my Führer!

August 18, 1944 v. Kluge, General Field Marshal"

Field Marshal v. Kluge also voluntarily gave up his life. Before he took this desperate step, he acknowledged his Prussian tradition as the head of the Reich and its commander-in-chief. One speaks what one intends to say to posterity and what one, as a personality, wishes to leave as a confession to the living generation. In any case, the field marshal made a point of retiring with dignity as a soldier who had not broken his oath, and expressed this once again in clear words. Time and again, people had tried to win him over to the resistance and wear him down. There is no doubt that this restricted and hindered his freedom of action and decision. Surely he could have achieved greater and more successful things if he had had the strength to separate himself from the forces of defeat.

defeatism and resistance. However, he obviously did not succeed in doing so and ultimately drove him to his death. What

The fact that his Prussian conscientiousness kept him from his actual task of winning the Battle of Normandy was perhaps his real fate, which broke him.

His accompanying officer, First Lieutenant Tangermann, denied attempting to establish contact with the enemy. Kluge's son-in-law Dr. Udo Esch, a military doctor in a Paris military hospital, made a completely contrary statement to the U.S. War Department on October 23, 1945, as only later became known. He considered his father-in-law to be an opponent of National Socialism. He knew of a meeting in Berlin in 1943 with Goerdeler and v. Tresckow, as well as of the maturing of the conspiracy on the western front. At Kluge's request, he claimed to have obtained seven ampoules of cyanide from a laboratory in Leipzig during his vacation, which were to serve the main conspirators in the event of failure. Above all, however, he claimed that after the failure of July 20, Kluge had considered surrendering to the Western Allies on his own responsibility if necessary. "He went to the front, but was unable to establish contact with the Allied commanders." /

Stülpnagel and, almost four weeks later, Field Marshal v. Kluge had judged themselves. Field Marshal Rommel had been seriously wounded three days before July 20 while on the front. Rommel experienced the climax of the Battle of Normandy as a convalescent at home. He had no influence whatsoever on political and military events from July 17th onwards; however, the investigations and interrogations of those involved, as well as the upcoming trials in connection with the plans of the

July 20 provided a clear picture of the widespread scope of the entire conspiracy. Records and documents found, but also unrestrained statements by some of the conspirators, Goerdeler at the head, revealed the treason that had been carried out and that was still planned in a heinous form that had previously not been thought possible. Through the

The investigation of the assassination not only unmasked and revealed the always pretended idealistic high treason, but also the disgusting treason against the country: ■ ■ > ^ ; : ■

In an interrogation report by Lieutenant Colonel Hofacker, Rommel was heavily incriminated by the fact that he had accused Goerdeler of treason.

that he could rely on him if the assassination attempt succeeded. According to Irving's interpretation in his "Spiegel" article of September 18, 1978, Rommel's fate was decided by the Wehrmacht's Court of Honor, which had to decide whether the incriminated Speidel should be expelled from the Wehrmacht. "In a way," says Irving, "not only Speidel but also Rommel was now standing before the court of honor. The judges, as it now turned out, were to decide who had to hang: Speidel or Rommel." Irving's version is based on a statement by General Kirchheim, who was a member of the court of honor chaired by Field Marshal Keitel, which he misunderstood. To clarify this misunderstanding, retired Major General Heinz G. Guderian, son of the well-known Colonel General Heinz Guderian, wrote in a letter to the editor of "Der Spiegel" on October 2, 1978: "The affidavit of Lieutenant General Kirchheim of September 16, 1947, which my father confirmed in an affidavit, is in my possession. Irving completely misinterpreted it. According to Kaltenbrunner (head of the Reich Security Main Office, the author), Rommel and Speidel were incriminated:

There was an awkward silence! The realization that not only Speidel, but also Rommel, and the latter in an even more serious way, was incriminated by the facts of the case, prevented us from asking any further questions, since an in-depth discussion could undoubtedly not ignore Rommel's guilt.

There was no decision to be made about Rommel and there never was. A fortiori there was no decision to be made as to 'who had to hang: Speidel or Rommel'. Irving's assertion that 'a condemnation

Speidel's Rommel would completely end his life' is nonsensical. It remained the fact, presented by Kaltenbrunner and confirmed by Keitel, that neither Rommel nor Speidel had reported their knowledge. After that there was only the possibility of saving Speidel's life and the hope that Hitler would continue to spare Rommel... Rommel's life could not be saved by expelling Speidel. One life was to be saved, Speidel's. That's what Kirchheim and my father did."

On October 7, 1944, three days after the meeting of the Court of Honor, Keitel called Rommel at home and asked him to come to Berlin on October 10 via his orderly officer. Rommel declined the trip on the grounds that he had an appointment with his specialist doctors on that day, who advised him not to travel for any length of time due to his state of health.

He then received a letter from Keitel, dictated by Hider, in which he advised Field Marshal Rommel to report to the Führer if he felt innocent, or to take the consequences as an officer. Otherwise, his arrest and thus his responsibility before the People's Court was unavoidable. This letter was delivered by Lieutenant General Burgdorf as the Führer's chief adjutant - previously this had been Schmudt, who had died as a result of the assassination attempt - and as head of the personnel office, accompanied by Lieutenant General Maisei. Rommel only asked briefly whether the Führer was also aware of Hofacker's statements. After this was answered in the affirmative, Rommel immediately decided to commit suicide. According to Maisei, Rommel read both letters very carefully and then said goodbye to his wife. He then drove off with both gentlemen in Burgdorf's official car. On the way, he wanted to shoot himself with a pistol. However, he was advised not to do so, as a gunshot wound would only lead to public speculation. Poison would be better, as it would be easier to fake a natural death as a result of his head injury. In any case, he was told, the Führer had promised a state funeral with full military honors in view of his popularity.

Rommel took the poison - cyanide - and used it to kill himself. Nobody in the nation had any idea of these events. He was given a memorable state funeral with full military honors. It was only after the end of the war that resistance fighters, who were not popular among broad sections of the population, felt it necessary to drag the background to his death into the public domain in order to enhance their own image with the glamorous name of Rommel.

But why did Rommel choose suicide? Perhaps his conscience told him at that hour that he had not done everything he could to repel the decisive invasion victoriously. I could imagine that he did not want to repay like with like in terms of the burden placed on him by his confidants. Perhaps he will have remembered that in the decisive phase of the battle he had refrained from deploying two army armored divisions that were intended for use after the overthrow, if necessary against his own comrades. Who knows what thoughts may have tormented Rommel at the hour of his death.

The suicide of Stülpnagel, v. Kluge and Rommel was the dramatic aftermath of the invasion battle, which was lost through deliberate sabotage and opened the way for the Allies to enter the Reich.

In his biography of Rommel, the English journalist David Irving attempted to absolve the field marshal of any collaboration with the resistance by making his chief of staff, Lieutenant General Speidel, and his co-conspirators solely responsible for the success of the invasion. This is not the reality. What I said in the chapter "July 20 in Paris" about the relationship between the responsible troop commander and his staff officer must of course also apply to Rommel and Speidel.

As commander-in-chief of Army Group B, Rommel was responsible for everything that happened before and during the invasion battle - ' :; :

He made his decisions independently without influence or "interference".

He naturally drew on the information provided by his staff officers to form his opinion, as well as on the teachings of other people, some of whom belonged to the resistance. His inner pride, coupled with his pronounced stubbornness and need for recognition, would not have allowed anything else. His strong tendency towards defeatism, which he displayed when he could no longer successfully storm forward with his unit, was already characteristic of him when he wanted to surrender to the British in the fall of 1942 after the disaster of El Alamein, as can be read in Irving, at a time when he did not yet know his Swabian compatriot Speidel.

"In mid-December (1942), Rommel" - according to Irving - "wrote secretly to his wife: 'If you could send me an English-German pocket dictionary by courier, I would be very grateful. I shall be able to make good use of it. (Irving, page 336.)

"Apparently Rommel considered defeat, even surrender to Montgomery, to be probable and perhaps even unavoidable, for on December 21 (1942) he asked his wife again in a secret letter: 'Have you sent the English dictionary yet?'" (Irving, page 356.)

"On June 13, 1944, when the invasion battle failed to retake the town of Carentan, he confessed in a letter to his wife that he had admitted defeat. 'You can imagine,' he wrote, 'how difficult the decisions ahead are, and you remember what I told you in November 1942. At that time he had hinted that he might have to offer the British an armistice.'" (Irving, page 521.)

"Rommel's former interpreter, Dr. Ernst Franz, visited Rommel on November 15, 1943, i.e. after the African campaign, to congratulate him on his 52nd birthday. During the conversation, Rommel confessed to him: 'It is difficult for me, dear Franz, to wish you all the best for the future, because the war is as good as lost and difficult times are ahead of us. According to reports I have received, the enemy is getting stronger every day in terms of men and modern equipment, while our propaganda about the miracle weapons has so far been nothing but bluff. Unfortunately, we are dealing with people at the top whose fanaticism is tantamount to madness! Franz was deeply affected by Rommel's

Pessimism." (Irving, page 433.) ,

Irving's report on page 534 f. speaks for Rommel's fatal defeatism and his resulting firm plan for a unilateral surrender to the Western Allies:

"On June 28, 1944, Rommel drove to Germany in a large Mercedes, as Hitler had ordered a briefing with all the commanders-in-chief and commanders from the West at the Berghof the next day On the country road to the border north of Paris, Rommel's car stops next to another car. Rundstedt clumsily gets out of the

vehicle. Major Eberhard Wolfram, who was accompanying Rommel, overheard fragments of the quiet conversation between the two field marshals. 'Mr. Rundstedt,' said Rommel, 'I agree with you that the war must be ended immediately, and I will make this clear to the Führer.¹ After a few more whispered words, Rommel gets back in the car and they drive on. The partition window is closed so that the driver cannot overhear.

The Field Marshal thinks aloud to himself and suddenly turns to Major Wolfram. 'Listen carefully,' he says, 'I will present this to the Führer tomorrow. I stand here and feel responsible to the German people; I have a deep responsibility, not only as a military leader, and this determines my actions. The political situation is clear: the whole world is against us. We have no chance of victory. Then there is the military situation: 'Despite everything, the enemy has gained a foothold in the west' Rommel continues to speak in this tone until they reach Ulm, where they part in the evening.

When I visited Wolfram (after the war, the author) in Bavaria, he told me what happened that night. 'I spent the night with my wife in a hotel in Ulm,' Wolfram said. 'There I spread out the Führer's map of the western situation on the bed and, after she had vowed silence, told her in detail about Rommel's and Rundstedt's thoughts. My wife exclaimed indignantly: 'That's mutiny! - A clear and correct assessment that left me slightly dumbfounded, was I have been since April from the defeatist 'breakfast mood' at Speidel's table in La

Roche-Guyon had been 'contaminated'." That's right: a German woman had to tell the clique around Rommel, who were committed to his plan to surrender to the Western Allies, regardless of whether they were actively involved in the July 20th conspiracy or not, in no uncertain terms what they were: Mutineers!

Rommel's statement to Major Wolfram that he felt responsible to the German people not only as a military leader was a presumption towards the Führer and Reich Chancellor Adolf Hitler, who alone bore political and military responsibility to the German people. Rommel was one of several field marshals who, like all members of the Wehrmacht, had to take the oath of allegiance.

They had to fulfill their military duty wherever they were ordered to do so by the Supreme Warlord. The highest ranks of the Wehrmacht in particular had to know that mutiny and defeatism had no place in the troops.

Irving reports on page 559 of his biography of Rommel: "Colonel Latt- mann, Rommel's artillery officer, described an incident which again reveals what Rommel's secret intentions were. On the way we had a breakdown; we had to stop. The field marshal took me aside and walked up and down with me while Captain Lang and the driver took care of the car. Then he asked me: 'Well, Latt- mann, what do you think about the end of the war?' I said: 'Herr Field Marshal, I realize that we can no longer win the war. But I hope that we still have enough strength to bring about a peace that is not too harsh: 'I will try, on the basis of my reputation with the Allies, to make a pact with the West against the will of Hider and on condition that they allow us to march together with them against Russia.

These are just a few of Irving's many reports on Rommel's mutiny and the destruction of the Wehrkraft as well as an expression of incredible illusion and fatal overconfidence. According to Irving (p. 559), it is clear from post-war documents "that in every meeting between Rommel and his troop commanders there were unrecorded, confidential allusions to Rommel's plans for an armistice . . ." The

Rommel's language was that of the conspirators, just as he shared their illusion of the possibility of a unilateral surrender to the Western Allies. He kept his distance from the group of conspirators around Speidel, while his relationship of trust with his chief of staff must have been as pronounced as Irving indicates on page 565 of his biography: "During my research, one particular puzzle caused me a headache: the absence of important long-distance conversations in Rommel's war diary. Speidel strongly advised me to be careful when analyzing the war diary. He remembered that Rommel used to say in the evenings: 'Well, Speidel, what are we going to lie about in the war diary tonight?'"

There is something complicit in this. Only close confidants who have nothing to hide from each other can talk to each other like this. Irving probably cannot understand that two die-hard Swabians could come together to form a conspiratorial community. He also finds (p. 435) two questions "strange" that Rommel addressed to the mayor of his hometown Herrlingen in the fall of 1942,

"which he still remembered ten years later". The first was:

"Are there many Prussians here? Don't take in so many Prussians!"

The second was: "What do you think of the war?" The mayor just gave Rommel a big look; he couldn't think of a harmless answer.

Perhaps there were too many Prussians among his divisional and regimental commanders in the African campaign, with whom he could be ruthless if they did not follow him unconditionally? Irving has no explanation for Rommel's animosity towards Prussia.

Irving describes how Rommel dealt with his commanders in Africa (p. 142 f): "In the meantime, Rommel's personnel file in Berlin was filling up with nasty letters and complaints from other officers. Many had been questioned confidentially by the general staff after their return, such as the good-natured General Streich, Kirchheim, Olbrich, Rommel's chief of staff Colonel Kreuzwendedich, von dem Borne, Major Köhn, commander of an armored division, and Count Schwerin . . . 'With the wear and tear here,' said Schwerin, 'in terms of generals and commanders, I can calculate pretty accurately when I

... "One colonel criticized Rommel's "capricious leadership" and "strange conclusions". Herff called Rommel's habit of wanting to try every officer who, in his opinion, had failed in the field, intolerable. "This custom had not previously existed in the German army. We are all appalled by this measure," wrote Herff Streich, calling this behavior "downright proletarian".

When the head of the OKH, Brauchitsch, asked him at Hitler's headquarters: Tell me, Streich, was it so hot down there that you couldn't get along?" replied the general: "Not at all, Field Marshal. But I would like to emphasize that there are an incredible number of intermediate stages between a brave and daring shock troop leader and a brilliant general.""

Although Irving, as a very zealous reporter, reports on many events that incriminate Rommel for defeatism and mutiny, he repeatedly tries to distance Rommel from the resistance, writing (p. 518 f.), for example: "Speidel informed Schwerin that the division would be set aside as a reserve for the planned putsch against Hider. In this way, while Rommel desperately sought reinforcements from the eastern front and southern France, Schwerin's 116th Panzer Division remained inactive until July 19. (The other panzer division earmarked for the putsch, the 2nd, could not be held back, however; on June 12, the OKH intervened and sent it to the Normandy front.)

There is little doubt" - Irving continues - "about the accuracy of this account. Historians should take the trouble to consider how far Rommel could have turned the battle in his favor if he had committed the 116th Panzer Division to Normandy at the outset. Regardless of Speidel's first written accounts, these facts are confirmed by Schwerin himself, by Geyr and by Lademann, as well as from other sources: They spoke about the secret reason for the division's reticence only with Speidel and never with Rommel."

How simple-minded of Irving to expect them all to talk to Rommel and Rommel to talk to everyone about this highly explosive secret

have to speak. Incidentally, he forgets that it is no coincidence that Rommel is called the "*Desert* Fox", who was a master of camouflage. Not even Vice-Admiral Ruge, who had been seconded to Rommel from the navy and was able to discuss political issues with the field marshal frequently and very confidentially, had, as he himself wrote, been let in on the secret by Rommel of sparing the two army armored divisions for the arrest of Hitler and securing the planned coup.

It is simply absurd to assume that Speidel would have held back the two army armored divisions from the defensive front behind Rommel's back, i.e. without his knowledge, for the purpose of conspiracy. Speidel would never have dared to do this and would contradict all the statements of the aforementioned

The testimonies of contemporary witnesses and police interrogations contradict this. Romel and Speidel warned against a second invasion in the Pas de Calais until the very end in order to be able to justify the reserve position of the two army divisions to the OKW, whereby the co-conspirator Colonel Roenne of the Army Division Foreign Armies West provided the most effective help by deliberately misleading the OKW.

If there had been no surrender plans at all and no influence from the conspiracy, Rommel would logically have thrown the strong 116th Army Armoured Division under his command, equipped with 350 tanks, which was only about 100 kilometers (air line) away from the defensive front and the 2nd Army Armoured Division, which was a little further away, into the defensive battle at the latest on the second day of the invasion, i.e. while the enemy was still weak. They would have thrown the more distant 2nd Army Armoured Division into the defensive battle on the 2nd day of the invasion at the latest, i.e. while the enemy was still weak, instead of waiting for the Wäffen- SS-Division "LAH", which as an OKW reserve was based in Beverloo (Belgium), at a distance of approx. 300 kilometers (airline) from the Normandy front.

From a strategic-tactical point of view, this would have made logical sense, while the futility of the actual operations in the decisive first days of the invasion and also later can only be explained by Rommel's own plans and the influences of the conspiracy.

Irving makes no mention of the report by contemporary witness Wilhelm v. Schramm, then a senior war correspondent in Rommel's staff, according to which the field marshal wanted to arrest Hider and bring him before a German court, although he must know his report "Der 20. Juli in Paris", as it is listed in the list of sources of his Rommel biography. Schweppenbuig, published in the Irish magazine "An Consantoi" on January 1, 1950, in which Rommel was heavily incriminated for holding back the two army tank divisions from the invasion battle and which Karl Balzer analyzed for the first time in his documentary "Sabotage against Germany" (1974)

Irving was probably not interested in such publications because they stood in the way of his plan to end Rommel.

Rommel also had to be very careful in his almost daily letters to his wife and, from his African campaign to the end, never forgot to write in

to repeatedly express his loyalty and devotion to Hitler.

His son, the current Lord Mayor of Stuttgart, confirmed this view in an article in "Der Spiegel" on August 28, 1978:

"David Irving has written an interesting book: But he is too faithful to documents. Documents are not a fountain from which the honest truth flows, especially not in a dictatorship. Neither my father nor Dr. Speidel entrusted their most secret thoughts and plans to paper for obvious reasons. Despite being seriously wounded on June 17, 1944, my father even made an effort in August or September to destroy papers that seemed incriminating to anyone. He had various documents burned in our garden in Herrlingen.

As every expert knows, even in a peaceful democracy it is extremely difficult to reconstruct political events, including the underlying considerations, from files and letters. All this applies a thousand times more to the reconstruction of events at my father's headquarters in the

Spring and summer 1944.

The letters to my mother are also not documents that reflect his attitude. They are written with extreme caution. He had to expect his correspondence to be monitored. Quite apart from the fact that my father's letters were repeatedly even officially opened by the censors: It would have been extremely unwise of him to write anything out of line to my mother. In those days, every letter that was out of line meant a risk for the cause and a burden for the addressee and those involved.

Hitler certainly had a deeper insight into the circumstances than David Irving or any other historian has today. How he judged my father's behavior is clear from the fact that he had him killed. After he was wounded, my father always expected such an end and accepted it as a consequence of his actions without rebelling against it.

Irving rightly describes my father as a loyal man. If my father had not become desperate in the face of the crimes that Hitler had committed, he would never have taken part in actions against Hitler. I am firmly convinced that the role of General Dr. Speidel is misrepresented in David Irving's book. My father was firmly convinced of Dr. Speidel's loyalty until his death, and my mother and I never had any reason to doubt this.

It is true that my father succumbed to Hitler's fascination from 1938 onwards. No one has claimed otherwise. Otherwise his unreserved commitment in the French campaign of 1940 and in the African war would be incomprehensible. It's just that my father had the wrong idea about Hitler . . .

My father certainly didn't consider himself a member of the Berlin resistance movement. He probably didn't even believe that a revolt could come from this resistance movement. My father didn't know about Stauffenberg's attack on Hitler beforehand. This is not new either."

Rommel's son needs to be corrected or clarified here. His father

did not belong to the Berlin Front, but made himself available to it as the new commander-in-chief of the Wehrmacht or as interim head of state in the event of the revolt succeeding. Rommel was not involved in the attack on Hitler because - as was known - he wanted to arrest him with the help of the army's armored divisions in order to bring him before a German court.

"My father," continued Rommel's son, "probably believed that the responsibility lay solely with him. If he didn't act, nothing would happen. It is certain that my father spoke to various members of the resistance from the beginning of 1944. It is also certain that my father wanted to end the war in France in the summer of 1944 after the invasion in order to allow the English, American and French troops to advance as far east as possible. But he was determined to end the war in France on his own if necessary . . .

My father did not imply that the Allies would wage war against the Soviet Union. He was, of course, suggesting a conflict with the Soviet Union.

war; he even risked having to sacrifice his family. He didn't think about his own fate."

It is well known that Rommel's son left the troops as an anti-aircraft gunner without permission in the last months of the war and has been a zealous representative of our evil zeitgeist for years.

Nevertheless, no one will want to doubt the credibility of his statements about his father, with whom he was together for many weeks until the end of the war. In his article, Rommel's son has reproduced what his father told him when he was already reckoning with his end. But what a father confides to his son in such a situation is the pure truth and therefore the most convincing argument against Irving's thesis that Rommel never took part in actions against Hitler and knew nothing of a conspiracy against him with the aim of overthrowing him. Irving is also clearly refuted by the letter that Mrs. Rommel wrote to the

The letter was written by Karl Strölin, a member of the resistance and mayor at the time, in which it says: "After difficult battles that no one can fathom who has not faced an equally difficult decision - because as a soldier he felt bound by his oath of allegiance - he clearly and unequivocally took your side in order to save what could be saved for the people and the fatherland." (Karl Strölin, "Traitors or Patriots", p. 35.)

This letter from Rommel's wife does not contradict her statement to Irving (p. 595 £): "I would like to state that my husband was not involved in the preparations or the execution of July 20, 1944, since as a soldier he refused to take this path . . ." This statement by Mrs. Rommel certainly corresponds to the truth, because it is known that her husband did not want the coup to be initiated by an assassination attempt on Hitler, but by his arrest with the help of his military means of power, which were made available to him within his army group by the division commander of the 116th Army Armored Division, Lt. Gen.

v. Schwerin, who was in favor of the conspiracy, had been offered the job.

According to Irving's biography of Rommel, the testimonies of contemporary witnesses and the research results of all the serious in and foreign authors that Rommel was increasingly in contact with the Paris Front from the spring of 1944 and was also in close contact with the Berlin resistance group shortly before July 20, 1944.

Irving's assertion that Rommel first learned of the conspiracy against Hider on July 21, 1944, as can be read on page 128 of the magazine "Nation Europa" in "Verrat und Widerstand im Dritten Reich", published in 1978, is completely absurd. With this statement, he clearly contradicts his own statements in his 1975 publication "Hider und seine Feldherren" (page 651), where he writes: "The evidence against him from the period before the

July 20 were available in full. Before his execution, Lieutenant Colonel Hofacker had testified in writing that Rommel had assured Goerdeler that

that they could rely on him if the coup succeeded."

In his biography of Rommel (p. 590), Irving says the same thing:

"In his death cell, the doomed lieutenant colonel described how Stülpnagel had sent him to Rommel with a series of proposals and how the latter had agreed to them 'after some thought'. Hofacker even claims that Rommel called out to him as he left La Roche-Guyon Castle: 'Tell the gentlemen in Berlin that they can count on me when the time comes.'

According to Irving (p. 590), Rommel admitted his guilt to General Burgdorf on October 14, 1944 shortly before his death by poison with the words: "Yes, yes. I will take the consequences. I have forgotten myself."

WERE THE CONSPIRATORS REALLY THE ROLE MODELS
THAT LEGEND HAS IT
IS TRYING TO PUT THEM DOWN TODAY?

For me, then as now, an attempted coup, especially from the ranks of the army, in the midst of a war for the survival of our nation, in which its very existence was being fought for on all fronts, was an inconceivable event. Most of the conspirators were the same people who had condemned the naval mutiny and the armaments strikes at the end of the First World War and recognized them as treasonous. Now they were committing treason themselves. They in theory, I in practice, knew the selfless service and the unwavering comradeship at the front, which grew out of the toughest battles, in which it was often a question of being or not being. Today's re-educated generation has no idea of this at all. They have only learned to turn up their noses when they are presented with reports which, for example, portray the murderous partisan battles solely as German crimes and conceal the murderousness of the other side. But every thinking soldier knew from his experiences on the Eastern Front what would happen to us if we lost this war.

The German soldiers were deeply convinced of the necessity of this battle in the interests of the survival of our continent. We had not attacked Russia purely out of a desire for conquest, but were forced to act because the Soviets had deployed superior forces of over 256 divisions to invade Europe at a suitable hour. They expected us to attack England. We were not unconditional "yes-men" and dreamy idealistic enthusiasts. We knew the seriousness of the situation from our own experience. Many a curse and nasty criticism

crossed our lips. However, all this was never done out of negating and self-destructive motives, but solely out of concern and necessity to prevent or remedy obvious mistakes and omissions. We wished and hoped that our dissatisfaction and harsh criticism would penetrate to the highest leadership, where it would be heard and respected. Unfortunately, we all too often had the unfortunate feeling that civil courage was not everyone's cup of tea, especially in the military sector, so that some criticism, combined with sensible suggestions, trickled away through official channels or did not reach the very top as it would have been desirable. In the Third Reich, no one was ever prevented from voicing reasonable criticism.

There was no lack of efforts of this kind. The opportunity certainly existed. I remember very clearly a personal discussion with the Führer in the fall of 1943 at headquarters in East Prussia, when I was ordered there alone to receive the Oak Leaves of the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross. At that time, I was in command of the I Battalion of the Grenadier Regiment of the "Greater Germany" Armored Division. I knew that I was to be received by the Führer in private. When I started my journey, I was advised by many commanders of my division as well as by my close comrades to open my mouth and tell the Führer unvarnishedly about the worries and hardships of the front. I was astonished, but at the same time delighted, to hear the same encouragement from many senior officers close to Hitler.

My first conversation with the Führer - I had many more later - was open-minded and cordial. I was certainly impressed, but by no means hypnotized, and I never hung wordlessly on his lips, as legend likes to portray meetings with Hitler, but I had the feeling that I was talking to a knowledgeable senior officer with a heart, who was not unfamiliar with the problems I was presenting and who had already dealt with them extensively⁵. While I was sitting at the round table with the Führer, his pretty German shepherd Blondi came to me. The Führer was surprised that he let me stroke him so easily. Hitler opened the conversation by making a very informed reference to the

Above left: Pastor Dietrich Bonhoeffer was the same German pastor who, at a secret Geneva church meeting in 1941, believed he had to pray for the defeat of his people, which they deserved because of their crimes against Europe and the whole world.

Top right: After consultations with Goerdeler, Beck and Popitz, Ambassador von Hassell drafted a program of resistance for the new government after the successful overthrow and conspired unsuccessfully with the British Foreign Minister Halifax.

Bottom left: Consul Dr. Schmidhuber was an eager helper of the resistance, but was to be liquidated by the Canaris-Oster group because he wanted to go abroad and knew too much.

Bottom right: Colonel of the General Staff Freiherr v. Gersdorff belonged to the active group of conspirators around Major General von Tresckow in the central section of the Eastern Front and claimed to have attempted to assassinate Hitler in 1943 after the Heroes' Memorial Ceremony in the Berlin Zeughaus.

Ewald von Kleist-Schmenzin, a Pomeranian landowner, was regarded by the leading English politicians and statesmen as a serious emissary of the hard core of the conspiracy, who was also warmly received by Sir Robert Van Sittart and Winston Churchill. He was one of the most zealous traitors to the country, who contributed significantly to the hardening of the situation.

Dr. Otto John, after the war president of the German Office for the Protection of the Constitution and declared friend of the Hohenzol ern Prince Louis Ferdinand, who during the war betrayed the Peenemünde V-weapons test facility and the status of the development of a German atomic bomb to the British. In 1954, he defected to East Berlin, then returned via Moscow and was convicted. Dr. Otto John (center) in East Berlin with the President of the Communist National Council, Prof. Dr. Correns (left), and Dr. Girnus from the Communist Committee for German Unity (right).

Dr. Erich Kordt, Legation Councillor of the Foreign Office, who began sabotaging German foreign policy as early as the mid-1930s through treasonous conspiracies with British politicians. He and his brother Theo played a leading role in the poisoning of German-British relations.

Dr. Erich Kordt in the Ribbentrop delegation in London in 1936. Kordt third from the right.

Ernst Freiherr v. Weizsäcker, State Secretary of the Foreign Office under Foreign Minister v. Ribbentrop, who could claim to have the largest group of resisters in his office behind him. Nevertheless, after 1945 he was sentenced to five years in prison by the Americans as a Ribbentrop collaborator.

Above: State Secretary v. Weizsäcker in office. 1941 at the signing of the German-Turkish friendship treaty.

Below: 1950 on his early release from prison in Landsberg.

^^^◆◆◆.◆◆◆f

I asked him why I had received the high war decoration. I told him that I owed it mainly to my brave men, who formed a close and reliable fighting unit with me and my officers. We then had a very open-minded conversation lasting about an hour, in which the Führer spent at most a quarter of the time. He didn't interrupt me once and only replied when I had finished a thought. Essentially, it was about maintaining the fighting strength of traditional, proven units that were able and willing to fight. Because they alone are capable of fighting a successful battle in a blood-saving manner due to their experience. Newly formed divisions without front-line experience, led by former staff officers of the Reichswehr, who had previously mostly been employed in higher staffs, in the adjutant's office, in administrative and supply units, usually needed long start-up times to get used to and master the constantly advancing development of weapons and their appropriate use, as well as modern technical and tactical combat procedures.

The consequence is that such new formations are quickly worn out and thus do not bring success in the long run. For this reason, battle-hardened divisions with a long tradition that have been in continuous contact with the enemy for months should not be completely bled dry so that they lose their marrow, but should be pulled out in good time as a reserve force and fully refreshed in terms of personnel and equipment. They would then be in a position to perform twice or three times as well as inexperienced and newly formed divisions without tradition. The Führer took up this topic with excitement: "I know that, and it has been my wish for a long time, but I always encounter the greatest difficulties with the army groups and army leaderships, which prevent the detachment of such units on the grounds of the tense situation."

We then talked about the fact that, even with a strength ratio of 1:10 and more, we felt we were a match for the Russians, but that the front was so weak, often only in the form of support points.

occupied, that the Russians would infiltrate our front without a fight, especially at night, through the gaps that could not be filled, and march through because there was no

sufficient mobile combat units are available. This was true on both a small and large scale. The aim must therefore be to have at least two operationally usable armored armies at our disposal, which can bring Russian offensives to a standstill and destroy them through counterattacks in the depths of space. It is essential that this is the only way to regain the law of action. Only through locally combined large-scale offensive operations can one encircle and destroy massed enemy forces that have broken through and thus create tangible end-strengths for a defensive front.

Here, too, I realized that the Führer had been thinking along the same lines. He spoke of his intention to create two such armies from the Grossdeutschland units and the Leibstandarte. But after Stalingrad there had been such a great need to catch up that his plans could not yet be realized, but should be implemented as soon as possible. I pointed out that this would only make sense if these units were to be deployed under their own direction, i.e. if they were never to be split up and torn apart.

All the other points were exclusively about finding ways and means of achieving success and victory despite all the difficulties. I often had to think about this conversation in connection with July 20th. I asked myself whether any of these conspirators had ever sought such a conversation with the Führer and recorded possibilities and ways that could have contributed to an improvement in the war situation. On the contrary, in their blind hatred and lack of understanding, they only sabotaged and worked destructively.

Throughout history, there have been many examples of conspiracies and overthrows aimed at removing the government of a state. This is undoubtedly a politically legitimate right, especially when subversives are not pursuing their own interests but believe, out of clean motives, that the government is acting against the vital interests of the people. Those who act in this way are regarded as

High traitors, are recognized and often achieve high honours if such a coup is successful. However, if such a coup fails, those responsible are called to account and, insofar as they are responsible for their

Those who used the country's own forces and means to overthrow the government were sentenced as high traitors and usually punished with a non-dishonorable prison sentence. It remains to be seen to what extent such a procedure is still valid in today's democracies.

However, such a coup, whether successful or not, is to be judged much differently if it is directed against the vital interests of a people or even endangers the existence of a nation. This will always be the case, especially in a war, if sabotage is carried out against one's own warfare or if conspirators, in their blind hatred of the alleged tyrant, degrade themselves to such a state of mental confusion by professing to serve the fatherland by establishing contact with the enemy and betraying military secrets. By betraying their country in this way, they uselessly sacrifice their own comrades and are also detested as traitors by the enemy, who had previously gratefully taken advantage of their treachery. Even more reprehensible, however, is such an act of treason against an enemy who has set himself the destruction of the German Reich, which has become too strong, and of the German people as a war aim and has proclaimed this loudly.

The illogicality of the present day, however, lies in the fact that, despite the fact that the conspirators' treasonous activities, some of which were considerable, have become known, almost the same paragraphs have been created in the Federal Republic as existed in the Third Reich, but that, on the other hand, attempts are being made to trivialize treason during the Second World War, by trying, as in the infamous Braunschweig trial against me, to invalidate the accusation of treason by claiming that the Third Reich was an unjust state whose laws on treason could not have been binding on the conspirators. Such rabulistic interpretations are nothing other than a

Commitment to anarchy. My reply that my marriage in the Third Reich would also be invalid and I would therefore have three illegitimate children remained unanswered. Such judgments do not contribute to the establishment of a constitutional state. After the capitulation, I had to think of my cellmate, the geophysicist Professor Haushofer, who told me

said: "History is a whore. It always proves the one who writes it right."

With regard to the paragraphs on treason, the Federal Republic of Germany today reads similarly to the Third Reich under paragraph 99:(1)

"State secrets within the meaning of this section are facts, objects or knowledge, in particular writings, drawings, models or formulae, or information about them, the secrecy of which from a foreign government is necessary for the welfare of the Federal Republic of Germany or one of its states."

(2) "Any person who intentionally discloses a state secret to an unauthorized person or makes it public and thereby endangers the welfare of the Federal Republic of Germany or one of its Länder shall be guilty of treason within the meaning of this section."

100 (1) "Anyone who betrays a state secret shall be punished with imprisonment for treason."

During the war, as in all other belligerent countries, treason was punishable by death. Nobody should be upset about that today.

To describe the Third Reich as an unjust state is a dangerous thing in terms of constitutional law. What would one say today if one were to describe the Federal Republic of Germany as an unjust state? It would not be difficult for an expert in international law to construe this with the same rabulism. After all, the German Reich continued to exist under international law after the surrender of the Wehrmacht. There is no act of the victorious nations that declared the end of the Reich under international law. We were occupied and divided into zones, governed and administered by the victors. A serious change only occurred when we Germans were asked to cooperate. We could have declared, yes, we are prepared to cooperate within the framework of an administrative status within the zones you have formed. But as long as we are occupied, sovereignty and responsibility for the German Reich will necessarily remain in your hands.

Instead, however, the Federal Republic was founded through the preparatory work of the Parliamentary Council, and in the first election, with the help of the parties licensed by the victors, this was achieved by the unsuspecting citizen.

confirmed. Historically and in terms of international law, this process meant that it was we West Germans ourselves - by no means the victors - who carried out the division by breaking up the German Reich, a unique event in German history. The response was naturally the founding of the German Democratic Republic. The consequences of this event still shape the political landscape today. Instead of trying to reduce the tensions between the two world giants, we have allowed ourselves to be incorporated into the respective fortress areas of powers from outside the region and their interests.

The Soviet Union and America have created a division of the world into two parts, a dualism that harbors all the dangers of disaster, as it manifests itself almost daily. As history teaches us, dualism always means war in the final phase. The current political power constellation is, metaphorically speaking, a set of scales with two weighing pans, which cannot function without the connecting centerpiece, the weighing beam. Only by installing this weighing beam as a third force of balance will it be possible for the scales to function. The Socialist Reichspartei, of which I was once the second chairman, advocated this idea at the time and was banned, in particular because we considered it wrong and dangerous to be aligned with the respective power blocs on a military level.

As forced citizens of the Federal Republic, we had to accept the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court and give up our resistance to the partition policy, as this could only have been continued underground. This raises the question of whether we would not have had the moral right at the time to regard the Federal Republic as an unjust state on the basis of its history, with the same right that the conspirators of July 20th still claim for themselves today in relation to the Third Reich? We did not. For us, the conspirators were not role models.

At the end of September 1944, when I took up my duties as combat commander of the headquarters and was thus responsible for the security of the

Hitler drew my attention to the pathetic behavior of the conspirators who had been caught and sentenced so far. His words: "What kind of men are these who presumed to want to save Germany but then did not stand by their deed when it failed! It is the lack of manliness of these officers that makes me despise them." When I then asked the Führer, horrified, on the basis of what facts he had come to this harsh judgment, he told me that General Burgdorf had 42 farewell letters that had been written and left behind by the traitors in the face of death. I then read them all. In fact, not a single one confessed to his deed. They all acknowledged their culpable involvement and thus the justifiable death sentence.

It said: "The request is for death, and it cannot be otherwise. It is just." Others wrote that they had acted dishonorably. Their names should be removed from the family chronicles. General Stieff spoke of the failure of the assassination attempt as a judgment of God to which he had to submit without grumbling. General Thiele admitted that he had acted wrongly in the crucial hour and acknowledged the death penalty deserved according to the law. Others confessed that, as accomplices, they had been guilty of disloyalty by failing to report to their superiors and therefore had to accept the sentence. Count Helldorf: "In my interrogation I admitted my guilt, which consists of disloyalty to the Führer and the movement. The consequences of my actions are clear to me and I must bear them."

Colonel Hansen: "After Canaris, I inherited a bad legacy that I didn't have the strength to put in order. So the ruin came, should I have said of the bad things I heard? Yes, today I know." Leonrod: "I have not been worthy of being a Leonrod. I hope I won't be included in the family history, because I'm a stain on it." Knaak: "Forget me, I am unworthy." Colonel Jäger: "A coincidence led me to Berlin, which made me complicit. Unfortunately, I can no longer change that." Smend writes: "I have become an accomplice. So I am also complicit and must die. If I am not one of the conspirators, I nevertheless had a certain inaccurate knowledge and had not

the courage,
to report them to Mr. Generaloberst. I was too cowardly and broke my loyalty to the Generaloberst. I must die for that. So I leave this life as a dishonorable man and have gambled away everything, but also everything."

Goerdeler had made astonishingly extensive statements and handed over a myriad of conspirators. He even went so far as to call for new allegiance to Adolf Hitler in writing from prison:

"If we place the Fatherland above all else, which is our faith, then we must respect July 20 as a final judgment of God. The Führer is saved from almost certain death. God did not want Germany's existence, for the sake of which I participated, to be bought with an act of blood. He has also entrusted the Führer with this task anew. That is the old German view.

Every German in the ranks of the revolutionary movement is now obliged to stand behind the leader saved by God and to give him the resources that should be made available to a new government without reservation; he decides whether he wants to use them or considers them useful." This certainly included the many troop units and their equipment that had been deployed at home but held back for the overthrow. Certainly also the armored divisions that were withheld from the decisive battle in Normandy in France, as they were also held back for the time after the coup.

After the events of July 20, I myself, as commander of the guard regiment involved, received a ticket to attend one of the first trials of the People's Court under Freisler. I have to say that the number of spectators was extremely limited. I therefore had the impression that only those spectators were admitted of whom one had to assume that they were politically aligned with the Third Reich, i.e. were considered reliable and loyal to the constitution. This must also have applied to the then Lieutenant Schmidt and current Federal Chancellor. My main concern was to form my own impression of the spirit and motives of the accused. For me, a coup d'état was an external threat

of the Reich was simply incomprehensible. This trial was about sentencing

Field Marshal von Witzleben, Colonel General Hoepner and General von Hase, who had expelled me from the Wehrmacht and from whom I had received my orders during the decisive hours.

As far as the conduct and course of the trial were concerned, I was not at all impressed by Freisler's conduct of the proceedings, but much less so by the behavior of the defendants themselves, which downright shocked me. I had hoped to find men there who would stand by their deeds, as soldiers of high rank and name would have done, who would take their stand and defend themselves honorably and fearlessly. But nothing of the sort happened.

"I am an ass," one of the generals replied to Freisler's request. The image of these men with their old names was so pathetic to me that I refrained from attending a second trial. I left no doubt about my displeasure at the behavior of the court and the defendants and expressed it clearly. I was therefore personally invited by Goebbels to attend the screening and viewing of the film made during the trial for the newsreel. The film camera was mounted on the wall behind Freisler. The lens looked through the center of the swastika in the flag hanging on the wall. I saw footage there, some of which is shown on television today, except that Freisler's language was even more distorted.

I complained openly about this type of recording and said that, on the one hand, it was unacceptable to listen to Mr. Freisler's hysterical screaming, and that, on the other hand, it was simply impossible to present the unworthy behavior of former German generals to the public in this form: "We are in the midst of a superhuman struggle against an overpowering enemy who has set the destruction of Germany as its goal. I therefore consider it inappropriate and extremely dangerous to show such defeatist images to the German Wehrmacht and the German people who worked so hard for the war. These defendants

are not German generals and do not represent the German army. Such images violate the honor of the German soldier and are therefore dangerous, because it now depends on the coming together of all forces in this existential struggle.

fight matters. But this film does the opposite and has a corrosive effect."

They agreed with me and explained the terrible distortion of the film with technical inadequacies. The different sound levels of Freisler and the defendants were due to the fact that the former had a microphone directly in front of him, hidden in an inkwell, while the defendants' microphones were placed under the prosecution table, so that their voices sounded very quiet and indistinct compared to Freisler's microphone, which was in full effect. Hence the unbearable discrepancy. In any case, my opinion was respected. The newsreel only showed a defensible documentary, which was far less depressing than the so-called documentary film that is shown today, which is also completely out of line with the usual newsreels.

The behavior of the accused was so incomprehensible and depressing for a soldier because no one stood by their actions and tried to shirk all responsibility. What can one say in the case of v. Witzleben when he, as an old conspirator and as a responsible co-actor in a series of planned coups, simply denies his involvement? During the planning of the coup in the summer of 1943, he had signed the orders for the imposition of a state of siege after the planned removal of Hitler "without hesitation". With his consent, he was designated as commander-in-chief of the army. This signature was not forged, as had been done by Stauffenberg in the case of Colonel General Fromm. This highly reprehensible method of misusing his name cost Fromm his life. How pitiful are v. Witzleben's words in court when he states:

"Colonel General Beck received me and told me that I had probably heard about the assassination attempt and that he had therefore decided to

to take command. I replied that I was shaken by this terrible assassination. I could see no reason to usurp the supreme command or the government. Colonel General Beck denied this to me in lengthy explanations and claimed again and again that the Führer was dead. Then Colonel Graf Stauffenberg came to show me an order that had been issued earlier. I saw

I was horrified to see that my name was on it, and I vigorously objected to the fact that this order had been issued without my knowledge and approval. I demanded the immediate withdrawal or invalidation of the order."

The untruthful telex HOKW 02165 was sent out under his name: "The Führer Adolf Hitler is dead. Taking advantage of this situation, a certain clique of politicians from outside the front has attempted to stab the front in the back and seize power for their own selfish ends. In this hour of greatest danger, the Reich government has declared a military state of emergency to maintain law and order and at the same time transferred executive power to me along with supreme command of the Wehrmacht." From this mendacious account it is clear that the conspirators were not sure of their cause and must have feared that the Wehrmacht would not take part in an uprising against Hitler, which was what it was really about. So this coup d'état was not carried out against Hitler, but virtually in Hitler's name against an unscrupulous clique!

Colonel General Hoepner had issued a series of Standrechtsverordnungen in his capacity as commander-in-chief in the home area. (Appendix 4-8) Even he, who had been a member of the resistance since 1938, did not admit to his crime and tried to shirk his responsibility by making excuses.

So it should come as no surprise that this contemptible behavior was acknowledged accordingly by the younger accused co-conspirators. Lieutenant-Colonel Bernardis and Captain Klausing, who were merely executive organs, declared in view of the behavior of their superiors: "If we had known what kind of men were at the top

of the conspiracy and were to be entrusted with leading positions, we would have come to the conclusion from the outset that nothing could ever come of a coup."

Churchill derisively assesses July 20 in his House of Commons speech on August 2, 1944, when he says: "Not only are the once proud armies being driven back on all fronts, but tremendous events have also taken place at home which have undermined the confidence of the people.

and the loyalty of the troops must be shaken to its foundations. The highest personalities in the German Reich are murdering each other or attempting to do so, while the armies of the Allies, filled with revenge, are closing their ring ever tighter. These events in Germany are manifestations of an inner illness. Decisive as they may be, we must put our trust not in them, but in our own strong arm and the justice of our cause." Sefton Delmer, head of English propaganda against Germany, writes cynically in his memoirs: "When I spoke to Otto John in September 1944, the only survivor of the General Conspiracy who had managed to escape abroad, I learned from him that the conspirators had indeed heard our broadcasts (on the enemy's Calais station, the author) and had interpreted them exactly as I had hoped. I am sorry that the generals had to lose their lives on Hitler's meat hook. But I could not say that I felt any remorse because I had raised false hopes in them. For these men and their ilk had been the first patrons and promoters of Hitler's movement. They were the beneficiaries of his Third Reich. And they only rose up against him when it became clear that his war of conquest was doomed to failure." The Scottish clergyman Peter H. Nicoll writes in "England's War against Germany": "On the other side meant a tremendous challenge for Germany to realize that, while it was literally fighting for its existence to the last breath, numerous subversive forces were at work to destroy it from within. The extreme severity with which these

the way the revolutionaries were treated. Nor can anyone doubt that they would have fared just as badly in England if we had had to deal with them under similar extreme conditions."

WHO WAS TO BLAME THE FALL OF THE 6TH ARMY AT STALINGRAD?

The decision in the West was brought about by the successful Allied invasion. Decisive omissions and treacherous manipulations on the German side were the causes. The lost battle of Stalingrad is still referred to today as the turning point in the German war against the Soviet Union. That may be correct. But the popular narrative that Hitler caused this catastrophe through his stubbornness is undoubtedly incorrect.

The facts known today prove the opposite. Hitler undeniably had to fight not only against the external enemy, but to a far more frightening extent against the internal enemy. This only became fully known after July 20th and has been deliberately withheld from the people to this day. This was done in particular in order to prevent a new stab-in-the-back legend from arising in the first place. The treasonous circles around Goerdeler and Beck within the German Wehrmacht knew that as long as Hitler continued to win, no overthrow was possible. So they waited restlessly for lost battles, which they then of course blamed on Hitler. Beyond that, however, they themselves caused military setbacks through their treachery and permanent sabotage and did not even shy away from accepting the final defeat of their nation.

Hitler had ordered the advance on Stalingrad and thus on the Russian life and supply base on the Volga with the simultaneous conquest of the Caucasus in order to cut off Allied supplies via Persia and to make use of the vital sources of oil in this region. He was aware of his endangered northern flank from the outset. In addition, at his headquarters at the time

in Vinnitsa by chance a yellowed general staff map from the archives of the

Red Army from 1919, which showed how the Red Army under Stalin's leadership had broken out across the Don between Stalingrad and Rostov and destroyed the "White Guards" of Tsar General Denekin.

Hitler studied every detail of the Russian map with a large magnifying glass and realized that he was in a similar position to Denekin. That was on August 16, 1942, a quarter of a year before the Battle of Stalingrad. Studying the Russian fighting at that time reinforced Hitler's concern about his endangered left flank of the 6th Army fighting around Stalingrad, all the more so as inadequately equipped Hungarian, Romanian and Italian units with insufficient fighting morale were deployed there. Hitler was undoubtedly one of the few who recognized the dangers coming from there in good time. He repeatedly drew the army command's attention to this and took preventive measures, which were, however, only very inadequately followed.

The war diary of the Wehrmacht command staff of September 9, 1942 contains the following information: "In Army Group B, the Don front is to be expanded and mined as much as possible; furthermore, reserves are to be drawn from the Stalingrad area behind the Don front and army artillery is also to be deployed there, as the Führer is expecting strong enemy attacks against the front of the Italian 8th Army in the coming winter to push through in the direction of Rostov."

On September 16, it says: "In view of the enemy attacks expected by him (Hitler) against the section of the Italian 8th Army, the Führer orders that the 22nd Panzer Division and the 113th Infantry Division of the 6th Army be moved immediately behind the Italian section." (Helmut Greiner, "Die oberste Wehr- machtführung", page 409 f.)

On October 26 it says: "The Führer expresses his concern once again about a Russian large-scale attack, perhaps a

allied armies Air Force field divisions are to be deployed as "corset bars". This would free up the divisions deployed at the front and, together with other units supplied, could be made available as a reserve behind the allied front." (Helmuth Greiner, "Die oberste Wehrmachtfuehrung", page 415.)

The results of reconnaissance by the reconnaissance services are always a prerequisite for victory or defeat in a battle. They should provide the commander with an unvarnished picture of the enemy, from which the enemy's intentions and strength ratios can then be recognized, so that appropriate and sensible decisions can be made for his actions. As already mentioned in the chapter

But what did the work of "Foreign Armies East" under its supposedly legendary General von Gehlen look like in the East? Was he, like Roenne, an obvious traitor during the invasion in the West, who deliberately deceived the top leadership, or was he merely incapable of correctly recognizing or assessing the changes in the enemy's image? It is still difficult to answer this question unequivocally at present, but it is justified to raise it, if only because Gehlen also expressly declared his support for the resistance after the war. Not least for this reason, immediately after the

In the Second World War, he entered "Amt Gehlen" arm in arm with the victors, when others, including myself, were still prisoners of war. Karl Balzer writes in "Conspiracy against Germany" on page 329: "Whether Gehlen was really 'terribly mistaken on every single point', as Irving comments, is not certain, because it is impossible to see inside people. As a conspirator, Gehlen can at least be counted among the confidants in the command centers of the "Eastern Front", of which Colonel General (ret.) Beck spoke to the co-conspirator Leuschner. There were undoubtedly many opportunities to regulate the war 'until the collapse of the regime' with the help of these 'confidants'."

What was the assessment of the enemy situation before Stalingrad by "Foreign Armies East"? To recapitulate the facts, I will say that the battle for Stalingrad began on November 19, 1942, exactly where Hitler had been the only one to predict it for a quarter of a year. Within three days the German 6th Army was surrounded. The plan came from Marshal Zhukov, the Supreme Commander of the Southern Front, in collaboration with the Soviet Chief of Staff Marshal Vasilevsky. Stalin expressly approved this proposed double pincer movement, which was to lead to the encirclement of the 6th Army in Stalingrad. From the beginning of October, therefore, all available Soviet forces were assembled for this decisive operation, which was to turn into the greatest Soviet victory. Zhukov himself gave the strength of his troops as no less than eleven armies with 900 tanks, 13,500 guns and 1,414 aircraft, an immense concentration of troops for one of the largest Soviet offensives known to date.

As in the case of the invasion, this was not an invented ghost army. It was a bitter reality, but in this case it remained hidden for "Foreign Armies East" under Gehlen's responsibility, indeed it did not exist. Even Zhukov must testify that this inadequate reconnaissance by Gehlen allowed him to triumph over the unsuspecting in

and the German troops fighting for Stalingrad. The English historian David Irving has also stated the same. Likewise, two German experts, Lieutenant Colonel Manfred Kehrigh in his book "Stalingrad" and Lieutenant Hans Heinrich Wilhelm in his study "Die Prognosen der Abteilung 'Fremde Heere Ost' 1942-1945", described the forecasts made by Gehlen's "Fremde Heere Ost" department with regard to the reconnaissance results as false and misleading.

Despite this fact, Hitler was man enough to declare after the lost battle: "I alone bear the responsibility for Stalingrad." He felt strong enough at the time to stand up to the German people in front of his responsible Field Marshal von Manstein, who expressly described this gesture as "soldierly decency". But it was no reason for Gehlen to later write untruthfully in his memoirs that ten days before the Soviet counter-offensive in the Stalingrad area he had "predicted exactly where the blow would fall and which of our armies would be affected". Indecently incriminating Hitler, as is generally the case nowadays and is almost considered good form, he then concludes in his favor: "What use are the best secret reports if their warnings are not heeded?" This is the purest mockery that will be used against Gehlen for his deliberate lies.

Exactly the opposite is the historical truth. It was not Gehlen and other German generals who warned of the flank threat posed by the 6th Army fighting around Stalingrad, but Hitler. "One of the few", according to contemporary historian Philipp W Fabry,

"who foresaw a major Russian offensive in the arc of the Don with the aim of closing in the 6th Army, was Adolf Hitler." The misanalyses of the "FHO" (Foreign Armies East) also influenced the Chief of the General Staff, Franz Haider, who was slow to act on Hitler's clear instructions because he apparently considered them to be wrong or premature. As early as mid-August, Hitler had ordered the Chief of the Army General Staff: "Have German heavy artillery and Paks move up immediately behind the Hungarian security section." But Haider led

only carried out this order weeks later and with insufficient forces. According to Kehrig, "Foreign Armies East" (FHO) had decided on an expected Russian offensive: "Since the beginning of October, the focus of the Soviet autumn and winter operations was now clearly ahead of Army Group Center due to the distribution of forces." Oberleutnant Wilhelm adds: "In a War Academy lecture in September, however, Gehlen said that the course of the operations justified the hope that the area around Stalingrad and the oil regions in the Caucasus - still several hundred kilometers away - would be firmly in German hands before the onset of winter. Neither of these predictions was confirmed.

In mid-October 1942, the Foreign Armies East Division expected a major Soviet attack, but anticipated it - from the beginning of November - between Toropez and Ssuchinichi, i.e. in the area of Army Group Center. The attack would probably target the Baltic region with insufficient forces . . .

At the beginning of November, the division still assumed that no major enemy attacks were to be expected on the Don front. In front of the Army Group Center takes place the enemy a and a success there would be particularly desirable for him because it would make the feared German offensive against Moscow in 1943 more difficult. Smolensk represented a worthwhile and not too distant objective; the fact that the entire Army Group North could later be cut off must at least appear conceivable to the other side . . . Only on December 9, three weeks after the start of the pincer operation against Stalingrad, did the Foreign Armies East Division at least consider it possible that the enemy could 'possibly' shift the focus of its force deployment from Army Group Center - more to the southern part of the front. However, further Soviet preparations for the attack on the Don could no longer be overlooked . . . Two days after this forecast came the major Soviet attack on the Italian section of the front and on the Chir Front for the 6th Army in Stalingrad, the beginning of the end. The thrust and its consequences probably came as such a surprise because the German side believed that the Soviets had their hands full trying to stop the

attempt to fend off the German attempt to unseat Stalingrad. However, the attacking units under the command of Colonel General Hoth were far too weak to seriously disrupt the Russian plans, even if they were able to record considerable initial successes. By mid-January, the majority of the German troops found themselves thrown back behind the Donets section. Hoth's elite units, which finally had to evade behind the Manych, now had the longest route back. In Stalingrad itself, however, the hopeless desperate battle raged on for another two weeks." (Hans Heinrich Wilhelm, "Die Prognosen der Abteilung 'Fremde Heere Ost' 1942- 1945", page 47 ff.)

Irving confirms Gehlen's misleading assessment of the situation on page 429 f. in "Hitler and His Generals": "Until early November, Gehlen's Foreign Armies East Division persistently predicted the opening of the Russian offensive not in the south, but against Smolensk or even Velikiye Luki, 1300 km north of Stalingrad . . . Hitler ordered the first three Luftwaffe field divisions and parts of the

11th Army to Velikiye Luki - and that was tantamount to abandoning Leningrad. But a Russian attack on Smolensk was even more probable in his opinion (due to Gehlen's false, misleading assessment of the situation, the author); therefore he had the 7th Aviation Division and also the 20th Armored Division brought into the Smolensk area. These were fatal and fatal mistakes.

However, Hitler did not accept Gehlen's judgment without reluctance. On October 26, he was visibly worried by concrete evidence of Russian plans to cross the Don at the very point where the Axis front was weakest - the section held only by reluctant Italians and Romanians. Army Group B interpreted the dense night traffic in the direction of Serafimovich as insignificant replacement transports; but when the enemy began building heavy bridges across the Don, Hitler knew better, he had built bridges over rivers himself and knew what this portended. He ordered more Luftwaffe field divisions to be deployed 'as a corset bar' in the endangered Italian and Romanian sections. He was convinced that Stalin was planning an advance

west towards Rostov - and that he would also strike before the end of 1942.

The Army General Staff was of a completely different opinion. On November 6, Gehlen assured them that there were no signs of an imminent Soviet offensive in the south; far more likely was an offensive against Smolensk, followed by an advance to the Baltic Sea with the aim of cutting off the entire Army Group North. In this way, the Russians would eliminate the danger for Moscow and achieve a relatively easy prestige success; in the south, the traffic situation was far too unfavorable for them. Also, the Russian offensive, explained

Gehlen, not before the ground frost began. It was to turn out that he was terribly mistaken on every single point." In contrast to Gehlen, German Intelligence 1 had gained completely different impressions of enemy activities by November 11. First and foremost, it had identified and reported the movement of the well-known Russian 5th Panzer Army from Orel to the Bolshoi bridgehead on the Don. Gehlen and his strategists, however, considered all these alarm signals to be preparations for minor attacks, but later condemned Hitler's stubbornness, who, unlike them, had correctly assessed the situation.

It was this 5th Russian Panzer Army that rolled down the weak Romanian-Hungarian defensive belt on November 19 and thus marked the beginning of the end of the Battle of Stalingrad. Gehlen's assessment of the situation, reported merely as an "increase in enemy activity", turned out to be not only a misjudgement, but also the beginning of a self-inflicted catastrophe, the effects of which were as irreparable as the botched invasion battle later in the West. Hitler's first major defeat, so eagerly awaited by the conspirators, had thus become a reality. While the entire German people were shocked to hear of this defeat and mourned their fallen and captured sons, the forces of resistance secretly celebrated their first miserable victory. They could point out that Hitler was not invincible.

As with the invasion, not only had the reconnaissance failed, but there were other omissions and betrayals that provided the Soviets with invaluable services for their victory.

The 48th Panzer Corps, ordered by Hitler, was still ready to push into the flank of the Russian attack wedge, stop the Soviet attack and gain time for missed regroupings. The armored corps, led by Lieutenant General Ferdinand Heim, was ordered to move closer in a north-easterly direction to the bridgeheads formed by the Soviets. It also proceeded as ordered. But after a few kilometers it turned out that the bulk of the tanks had caught fire. The investigation very quickly revealed that field mice had eaten the insulation of the cables. I have to say that it is a sad sign for the leadership of the troops if rest days are not used to maintain weapons and equipment in order to prevent such a failure from happening in the first place. I myself spent three years in Russia and served the 9th Armored Division and the Armored Division

belonged to "Greater Germany". I have never heard of a similar incident and am therefore skeptical. The suspicion of deliberate sabotage seems obvious. In any case, the leadership, right down to the tank commander, is severely reproached for having acted carelessly and thus recklessly. But recklessness in such a situation is sabotage and a crime worthy of death. The consequences were appalling.

It was only after days of delay that the corps slowly began to move and finally advanced as far as Blinow. Only thirty-two of the 22nd Armored Division's one hundred and four tanks were ready for action. Combat contact with the Soviets did not materialize. The Romanian General Lascar waited in vain for help. Parts of his units were still fighting doggedly in some pockets of resistance. It was not possible to establish contact as ordered. Instead of attacking, Heim retreated south towards Zschieber. Lieutenant General Heim was arrested by the field police on Hitler's orders and court-martialed in Germany. He was expelled from the Wehrmacht. The good-natured Keitel saved his life. The question seriously arises, were such people now also part of the

celebrated resistance?

Hand in hand with Heim's failure was the arbitrary behavior of the Commanding General of the 51st Army Corps v. Seydlitz. He was in command of the Paulus Army in Stalingrad. He, too, sabotaged his superior Paulus' order to halt and presented the army command with a fait accompli by arbitrarily evacuating the strong position of his 94th Infantry Division, which was not attacked. He did not even inform his neighboring units about this evacuation, which was contrary to orders. One can only understand such unbelievable behavior in retrospect if one knows that Seydlitz proved to be little worthy of his great ancestor under Frederick the Great and that in Russian captivity the Soviets made him the leader of the traitor group "Bund deutscher Offiziere" and a stooge for Soviet interests.

This was the first place where re-education was carried out. The activity of these gentlemen consisted not only of inciting people against Hitler and National Socialism in writings, radio and loudspeaker propaganda broadcasts at the front, but also of allowing themselves to be smuggled through German lines in German uniform in order to create confusion within the German troops and to carry out sabotage against their fighting brothers.

They directed German troops in the wrong direction, engaged in espionage behind the German front and demanded that German troop units that were temporarily encircled surrender. To compare such treacherous, shameless behavior towards the German fighting front with the historical behavior of Prussian officers in the forced fight under Napoleon against Russia is downright perverse and speaks for the criminal mindset of these resisters à la Seydlitz. Here, in contrast to the Napoleonic era, the German soldier was engaged in a life-and-death struggle with communism threatening Europe, which is by no means over today. If Mr. v. Seydlitz had understood this and acted consistently after his premature release from Soviet captivity, his place would not have been the Federal Republic with a high pension,

but a job in the GDR, where he would have had to prove himself in the development of the People's Army.

The Prussian officers who concluded the Tauroggen Convention with the Russians against the will of their king, thus proving that even then there was no cadaverous obedience, were nationalists, German freedom fighters who placed the welfare of their nation above the enforced loyalty to French interests. Normally, Seydlitz would have had to face a German court, which would certainly have been in dire straits given his broken relationship with treason. However, the extent to which such concepts and sentiments are blurred and evaluated differently today can be seen in the case of v. Puttkammer, who also belonged to this treason committee and was nevertheless appointed German ambassador to Israel following Wehner's intercession.

was able to advance. However, given his previous life, the fact that he only held this position for a short time can probably be attributed more to the patriotically-minded Israelis. In the eyes of right-thinking people all over the world, betrayal is appreciated when it serves one's own interests, but traitors have never been held in high esteem by friend or foe. Traitors are subject to contempt.

However, as far as the Soviet operation and its victory around Stalingrad were concerned, its best accomplices were German conspirators and traitors who, before, during and after the battle, promptly provided the Soviets with all the information they needed to ensure the success of this enterprise. There is no doubt that just a few months after the outbreak of hostilities with the Soviet Union, the German leadership had evidence of extensive treachery that could only have come from within its own ranks. Thus, to the greatest astonishment, two complete attack plans of the OKW had already been found in August during the capture of the command post of the 16th Soviet Army east of Smolensk and a copy of a recently issued order to give preference to the second plan over the first. A plan by Haider was also found at Briansk, which had only been presented to Hitler two days earlier but had not yet been decided. Such

Short-term acts of treachery could only have reached the enemy from Hitler's closest environment. Furthermore, the German Abwehr under Canaris and Oster knew that in the summer of 1942 a Soviet secret transmitter had been discovered near Warsaw, which had transmitted several thousand radio messages directly to Moscow. The decoding of all these reports, which were available in copies, also revealed a shocking picture of the extremely effective espionage activities of German backers. This realization alone and many other pieces of evidence should have been enough to force an investigation into the treason and espionage activities of German traitors. Today we should not be surprised that this did not succeed, indeed could not happen at all, because there were traitors and saboteurs in the key positions of the German Abwehr, the intelligence services and the radio and telephone system who covered up for themselves and prevented any factual exposure.

This only became fully clear to me when Hitler

I was able to disclose some treasonous offenses under the seal of secrecy in my position as combat commander of the headquarters. Through the vigilance of a sergeant, it had been discovered that a special double circuit in the intelligence command bunker at headquarters made it possible to listen in on important officers' telephone conversations regarding operational and tactical orders and directives. The eavesdropping took place in Berlin. There was also a direct switching connection to Switzerland. The Führer did not go into further details. I could tell that such a shameful betrayal from officers in his immediate environment was extremely distressing and incomprehensible to him. He was visibly suffering from it. That the existence of a "reactionary coterie" within the senior officer corps was an established fact for him, which he had always taken into account, was evident from his many remarks. But the fact that the betrayal had gone so far as to report decisive and vital strategic measures directly to the enemy before they could be implemented by the Germans hurt and offended him beyond measure. I, too, was so shocked by this information that I did not want to ask any further questions in view of the Führer's oppression.

I heard further details later from Brigadeführer Rattenhuber, who was responsible for internal security, but who was subordinate to me in my capacity as combat commander. I had expressly made this a condition of my appointment, as otherwise the responsibility for the security of the Führer and the headquarters seemed unacceptable to me. From Rattenhuber I then learned the details of these most shameful betrayals. It was not just the arrest and execution of the head of the intelligence unit, General Fellgiebel. Even his closest colleagues were not only co-conspirators, but also the most shameful traitors to the country, who made common cause with our enemies. Despite renewed assurances of unwavering loyalty to the Führer personally, Fellgiebel's successor, Lieutenant General Fritz Thiele, was caught red-handed and also executed. Along with him, as accomplices and participants in the

Colonel Hahn, Chief of Staff, and Colonel Hassel, Chief of the Intelligence Section of the Commander of the Reserve Army, who was in charge of the parallel operation in Berlin, were executed. They are being honored today in Plötzensee along with others.

This betrayal of military defensive measures and planning played a decisive role in the Battle of Stalingrad. This enemy information was all the more successful and all the less dangerous for the traitors because it was not transmitted by radio but by telephone. All these crucial messages were sent to supposedly neutral Switzerland, from where they were radioed to Moscow. It allowed the espionage activities it promoted to serve Stalin's interests. There is no doubt that all this was done with the knowledge and support of the Swiss intelligence services. After the elimination of the "Red Chapel" before the Battle of Stalingrad, the Soviet colonel general responsible for espionage, Fyodor Kuznetsov, who always operated under the code name "Director", switched over to another radio station in Geneva called "Rado", so that there were practically no delays in the transmission of messages.

Under "Rado", a group of three hid under the cover name "Dora". This included the former communist from Hungary

Alexander Rado, the German writer Rudolf Karl Rößler with the code name "Lucy" and the Swiss Xavier Schnieper. They were known as the "Red Three" and were able to continue their espionage activities almost undisturbed until the spring of 1944. They sent out around two hundred and fifty radio messages every month and, thanks to their close contact with the German Army High Command, reported in detail all the strategic and tactical measures taken by the German leadership in the struggle for Stalingrad, which was of inestimable value to the Soviet leadership. If little is published about this by the Soviets today, it is because they do not want to tarnish the success of the battle for Stalingrad by admitting that they received all the information for their own operations in good time and with regard to the enemy picture.

The fact that German officers, who today are counted and honored as part of the July 20th circle, were predominantly involved in this is one of the darkest chapters of German history. After the war, I was once punished with three months in prison for a much less comprehensive statement in this regard, which I now know was completely unjustified. In the meantime, the connections between the acts of treason have been clearly proven by foreign historians on the basis of better sources of information. A new trial would certainly be a monster trial and would shake some of the legends that have been carefully cultivated up to now. This would require, among other things, a witness like the Englishman David

J. Dallin, who writes in his book "Soviet Espionage": "As the starting point of intelligence operations against Germany, the Soviet intelligence apparatus in Switzerland rendered greater service to Soviet strategy than any apparatus in any other country, and its contribution to the Soviet victory can hardly be overestimated in its importance." The information came from the highest echelons of the German General Staff (OKW and OKH), namely from a group of conspirators with the code name "Werther". On November 9, 1942, i.e. before the start of the offensive around Stalingrad, the following question was asked: "Where are rear defensive positions of the

Germans on the line southwest of Stalingrad and along the Don? Where are the 11th and 25th Mot. Division, which were previously deployed in the Briansk front section?" After the encirclement of Stalingrad, it was said:

"Send details of concrete measures which the OKW intends to take in connection with the Red Army's advance near Stalingrad." On December 2, the request read: "To Rado. The most important task for the near future is the precise identification of all German reserves in the rear. Director." On December 7, Moscow wants to know: "Which units are currently going from the West and Norway to the Eastern Front and which from the Eastern Front to the West and the Balkans. Give numbers! What plans does OKW have on the Eastern Front in connection with the Red Army offensive? Will the Wehrmacht only fight defensive battles or is OKW planning counterattacks on any section of the Eastern Front?

If so, where, when and with what forces? Important task! Director." One could cite any number of other examples. From the questions asked and the answers given, it was clear that the informants must have been in key positions in high places.

Even the wording of Hoth's relief attack on Stalingrad on December 11 was known to the Russian High Command: "Begin an offensive tomorrow to free you. Führer's order. Expect to spend Christmas with you." The Soviet request after the battle may be seen as proof, but also as pure mockery, when a radio message then read: "Very important. Take immediate measures to determine through 'Lucy' what plans and concrete intentions exist, which divisions are to be sent to the eastern front and are already on their way. Thank you for the latest information from 'Werther' about the Caucasian front." Or: "How does the OKW intend to parry and neutralize the attacks of the Red Army? What is the OKW's assessment of the situation and of the necessary measures and plans? Give this order to all the people of Group 'Lucy', and if possible, Long should try to get information about this through Wirth Group. Best regards, Director." At the Wirth

group was the former Reich Chancellor Josef Wirth, who turned out to be an informant for the Soviets.

The fateful turning point in the East was initiated by the German defeat around Stalingrad. The losses in personnel and equipment were severe and could hardly be made up. From this time onwards, we were always at least six months late with all our efforts, especially in the field of armaments, especially with the completion of the latest decisive weapons. This meant that there were no real opportunities to turn our fortunes around through major successes or to achieve a tolerable negotiated peace through limited successes. The loss of Stalingrad set in motion a desperate struggle in all its severity that can only be understood by those who took part in it.

The deeper causes of the defeat in the battle for Stalingrad were the false forecasts regarding the reconnaissance of "Foreign Armies East"

under Gehlen, the delays in the reinforcements ordered by Hitler behind the Don front and the disgusting military treachery of German generals at the highest level. It was the treacherous spirit of treacherous forces who hoped for nothing more for their overthrow than a decisive military defeat of Hitler and who did everything to bring it about. History will one day clearly pass judgment on this. Unfortunately, even the later executions of Generals Fellgiebel, Thiele, Stieff and Wagner could not undo such a decisive battle. The only sad thing is that many tens of thousands of brave German soldiers lost their lives in the battle or later perished in Russian captivity.

THE MOMENTOUS BETRAYAL BY DR.
RICHARD SORGE

Even before Stalingrad, the German army had felt the consequences of one of the most serious treasonous crimes of the Second World War. In addition to the "Red Chapel" and the "Red Three" led by the Catholic emigrant Rudolf Roessler, there was also the "Millet" group. It was based at the German embassy in Tokyo (Japan). The head of this espionage center was the Soviet agent Dr. Richard Sorge, press attaché at the German embassy in Tokyo, who was in constant radio contact with Soviet General Beldin in Moscow. As the German press attaché, he was aware of all the diplomatic instructions from the Reich Foreign Ministry, which were constantly transmitted to the Soviets. He received his probably decisive report from a Japanese source in the second half of October 1941, when German troops were deep in Russia and the collapse of the Soviet front was only a matter of time.

His message to Moscow stated that the Japanese General Staff had had finally abandoned the plan requested by the Germans to attack the Soviet Union from the east in the interests of planning attacks against the British in Singapore and the Americans in the Pacific. As a result, the Soviets were able to throw over two million soldiers from the Far East Army onto the shattered Russian western front in express transports at a critical hour. These well-rested and well-equipped troops appeared on the European front just at the time when, after months of extensive and successful offensive operations, the exhausted German troops were making their final assault on Leningrad against the already crumbling front lines,

Moscow and Rostov. This final effort was intended to create the conditions for an undisturbed overwintering and refreshing of the German combat units. With the enormous reinforcements arriving just at this stage of the battle, the Soviets were able to overcome their shock at the time and thus prevent their military collapse. In practice, the German traitor Dr. Richard Sorge had already decided the blitzkrieg in 1941. The war of movement, which was to be won, became a war of position with ever longer fronts.

Dr. Richard Sorge was not only an eager press attaché at the German Embassy in Tokyo, but soon also an intimate friend of Ambassador General Ott, whose friends in turn were the conspirators State Secretary von Weizsäcker in the Foreign Office and Erich Kordt. Time and again, such treasonous acts of such dimensions reveal a disastrous personnel policy on the part of the Foreign Office. Who was ultimately the ambassador responsible, Major General Eugen Ott? He was recalled from his post in 1942. He owed his qualification as ambassador to the fact that he had had difficulties with the Gestapo because of anti-government statements. Although his original mission was that of a military attaché, his anti-Nazi stance was a sufficient guarantee in the eyes of men like v. Weizsäcker and Kordt that he could also fill the post of ambassador. In addition, he was a former colleague of the "red general" v. Hammerstein and v. Schleicher. Even before the seizure of power in 1932, he had had to work out the plans for the suppression of an unplanned National Socialist coup d'état and belonged to the clique of officers who had always advocated cooperation with Communist Russia.

Ott had known his press attaché Sorge since 1934. The two were friends and even used to have breakfast together at the embassy. In both his and Sorge's case, no checks had been made on the personal details and backgrounds of these men, as is customary in the diplomatic service. Because

otherwise it would have been easy to find out that Sorge was born in Russia.

and his mother was a native Russian. His father was a German engineer. In 1923, Sorge took part in a communist coup in Hamburg. After completing his studies, he moved to Hamburg and married there. Illegal agents of the Soviets repeatedly found shelter here. For this reason, and on suspicion of having provided espionage services for Moscow in Scandinavia, he was already being followed by the Weimar government's state police. But all these machinations were only discovered when the child had fallen into the well. The only important thing for the allegedly far-sighted conspiratorial clique of the Foreign Office was the fact that he was one of the opponents of National Socialism.

The diplomat Kordt reports that he had no suspicions about Sorge and had not noticed anything special. But he contradicts himself when he writes: "Apart from his bizarre quirks, there was nothing suspicious about him. I had noticed that the outbreak of war with the Soviet Union seemed to have moved the mocker and cynic Sorge more than any other event. He told me that he felt particular sympathy for the Russian people because he was born in Russia and his mother was Russian. The first reports of German victory caused him great excitement, and once when a lady spoke joyfully about the expulsion of the Soviets from Riga, he interrupted her rather rudely and forbade such statements. I believed, however, that I could explain this statement by his general anti-national socialist views and never for a moment suspected that Sorge was in Soviet service. I was only very displeased that in the following months he increasingly turned to alcohol." (Karl Balzer, "Der 20. Juli und der Landesverrat", 1st edition, page 219)

Only a conspirator like Erich Kordt could not have prevented the complete inappropriateness of a man like Sorge in the diplomatic service, especially in wartime in such an important post, is evident. Kordt, however, only characterizes the mindset and conditions of the Foreign Office at the time, which always prided itself on having only a few

The company was also accused of having members of the Nazi party among its staff and even warned new arrivals against people who professed the ideas of the Third Reich.

I first heard about the scandal of Sorge's betrayal from the Japanese ambassador Oshima in Berlin before July 20, when he was our guest in the guard regiment's mess. We felt a sense of comradeship with this upright man and friend of Germany, especially as he was a soldier. He knew all the Wehrmacht reports and called us when he heard something about the achievements of the "Großdeutschland" division. He was a sincere admirer of our traditional association. For this reason, at the request of the Japanese ambassador, our marching band was alerted one night after a cheerful officers' evening with guests. It played a few Prussian marches in the casino hall to the accompaniment of a mighty roar, which moved the good Oshima to tears. After such a warm evening, I always had the feeling that the Berlin-Tokyo axis could be considered absolutely secure for the next few years. This betrayal by a member of the German embassy was all the more painful for us.

Sorge was one of the German embassy's most eager and tireless employees. All doors were open to him there. He was already in the embassy building at six o'clock in the morning and followed all incoming radio messages and other reports from Berlin. He knew the Havas representative Youkelisch and the Japanese Miyagi Yotoku and Osaki. Both were cleverly disguised communists. The latter was secretary and confidant of the Japanese head of government Konoye. Miyagi Yotoku was secretary to the Japanese Foreign Minister, General Ugaki, and provided all the information from the Japanese army. Equipped with this kind of information, Sorge was naturally an interesting breakfast guest for Ott, and he was able to discuss the most secret matters with him openly without disguise. In addition, he was commissioned by the German ambassador to compile the "German Service". The only difference was that these messages contained information other than that which was radioed to Moscow every day.

Sorge was an agent financed by Moscow and received his funding from his radio operator Klausen, also a German communist who had been trained in Moscow. Klausen's radio play took place from a sailing boat with constantly changing sea locations. From the

Japanese surveillance, over thirty thousand coded word groups were recorded.

but unfortunately could not be deciphered. On May 20, 1941, long before the start of the German pre-emptive war against the Soviet Union, Sorge radioed the Fourth Bureau of the Red Army in Moscow that a German attack was imminent. However, the decisive war message, according to which Japan did not intend to attack the Soviet Union from Manchuria, was transmitted on October 15, 1941. This was the last, but probably the most important message.

Just three days later, on October 19, the Japanese defense struck and arrested Sorge and Klausen along with his spy network. Sorge made a full confession and was executed by the Japanese in October 1944. The German ambassador was recalled to Berlin. Only the cover provided by the Foreign Office saved him from his deserved fate, as he too should have been held responsible for the betrayal of one of his embassy staff members due to a lack of official supervision.

After all, the radio message, which was vital for the Soviets, meant that they no longer needed to include a probable two-front war in their decisions. Over two million well-equipped Siberian soldiers, prepared for a winter campaign, rolled onto the European theater of war in express transports and prevented the complete collapse of their desperate fronts in front of Leningrad, Moscow and Rostov.

These troops were rested, equipped with

These troops were rested, equipped with snowshoes and encountered emaciated German troops still wearing summer clothing, who at this point were suffering twice as many casualties from frostbite as from battle. Just as Sorge betrayed Germany, so did German saboteurs with regard to the timely supply of the fighting troops. By neglecting their supply duties, the saboteurs in key supply positions caused the death and loss of more than a hundred thousand German soldiers. This responsibility also weighs heavily and cannot be justified by anything. The Quartermaster General

Wagner, one of the main resisters, committed an insidious act by failing to replenish the supplies.

Crime. The same guilt applies to the head of the organizational department in the OKH, Major General Stieff, who was also executed as the main co-conspirator after July 20. Hitler was given the excuse of supply difficulties. The situation only improved when the Führer took over supreme command of the army during this emergency.

Hundreds of locomotives were at a standstill because no precautions had been taken for the extreme cold. One hundred and fifty thousand railroad cars clogged the tracks and could not be transported back. In this emergency situation, General Gehrke, head of transportation at the OKW, could think of nothing better than to suggest tipping over the wagons with their loads and sending the locomotives back home in convoy. In Germany alone, seventy thousand wagons were needed every day for the coal supply if the armaments industry was not to come to a standstill. Hitler himself had to intervene. He instructed Speer, the energetic General Milch and Dr. Ganzenmüller to remedy this situation by dictatorial means. "This war must not be lost over transportation issues. They must be solved immediately." In a few weeks, this problem was also solved. Milch was able to say over the heads of the general staff officers: "So far, we have been arguing about 400 wagons, yesterday we ordered 50,000 wagons."

The same problems occurred with our tanks in the prevailing cold.

-up. The vehicle engines would not start. The oil first had to be made liquid with blowtorches. As early as 1939, a demonstration had taken place in Rechlin in the presence of the Führer, where the cold-start procedure was shown. It was a simple procedure, namely diluting the oil with a little gasoline. This procedure had been expressly approved by the OKW and OKH. Only at the crucial moment the troops knew nothing about it. Although the top leadership had pointed out this procedure twice, the troops were not informed in good time. Milch ordered an investigation and found that the leaflet for the operation of motor vehicles in winter had only been published by the Quartermaster General on October 10, 1941. This had

This had disastrous consequences. In the cold winter months, up to 80 percent of the vehicles were at a standstill, so that the losses due to such sabotage were high.

In this situation, triggered by Sorge's betrayal, winterized, well-trained Soviet divisions arrived at the front on snowshoes and clashed with severely decimated German divisions, which had been losing their strength and most of their equipment in the victorious advance without interruption since June, with only weak reinforcements. When the front nevertheless stood firm after minor setbacks, it was not only the bravery of the soldiers but also Hitler's iron will that called for the utmost effort and was successful.

In its issue of September 4, 1964, "Pravda", the party organ of the Soviet Communist Party, revealed the secret of this master spy for the first time in Russia and admitted that, thanks to his close relations with the German ambassador in allied Japan, Dr. Sorge had provided exact information in good time about the date of the attack on Poland and about preparations and dates for the attack on the Soviet Union. However, Sorge's espionage activities were of decisive importance when he was able to inform his clients that Japan would by no means enter the war against the Soviet Union, but would instead concentrate its military forces in the Pacific Ocean against the United States, information that allowed Stalin to withdraw the majority of his elite divisions in the Far East and throw them into the decisive battle for Moscow. As is well known, the evacuation of Moscow began at that time. Only Stalin held his nerve.

At the same time, the Americans were in Moscow to conclude British-American aid supply contracts.

THE BETRAYAL UNDER THE CHIEF OF DEFENSE ADMIRAL CANARIS

As we know today, there was hardly any military planning or operation that was not betrayed with the involvement of military circles. Never in German history has such a planned and extensive betrayal been committed. Here it was shown that in the

In contrast to the French Revolution, the German Revolution of 1933 was the least bloody. No heads rolled. Hitler wanted to unite his people and convince all classes and estates of his idea. The unbelievable betrayals throughout the war prove that he was wrong. For the most part, it was reactionary officers who invoked their Prussian tradition, but in reality betrayed it. They contributed significantly to the fact that today Prussia, rich in tradition, has disappeared from the map, but also that they have lost their great estates in the East. Today they have to watch their beloved Prussia being represented only by the communist GDR.

Mr. v. Schlabrendorff's opinion in his book "Officers against Hitler" on page 47 in connection with the preparation of the planned invasion of England may be indicative of the mindset of these conspirators: "We were convinced that a successful invasion would have meant Hitler's domination of Europe. Our most urgent task was to prevent Hitler's success under all circumstances and by all means, even at the cost of a heavy defeat of the Third Reich." This was the wording of this sentence in the first edition. Although the second part of this sentence was deleted in later editions, just as the commemorative plaque of those executed on July 20 contained the names of the traitors of the "Red Orchestra" and was omitted in the next edition, this was not the case.

surely only a necessary correction to prevent the true reasons for the betrayal from becoming too obvious.

This betrayal began even before the start of the Polish campaign. It was Major Ewald v. Kleist-Schmenzin who, together with other resistance fighters, had close relations with the German War Ministry. He gave the British military attaché in Berlin the following information verbally before the outbreak of hostilities, which was immediately passed on to the British Foreign Secretary Halifax in a telegram sent by the British ambassador Henderson:

"Hitler forced the General Staff to change the plan drawn up against Poland, according to which Warsaw was to be attacked from East Prussia in a north-south direction on a broad front, in

In conjunction with the advance of their main troops from Bohemia-Moravia and western Slovakia in a north-easterly direction towards Krakow.

The new plan consists of a direct offensive from Pomerania and the Border March against Warsaw . . . Brauchitsch declared that a war on two fronts was out of the question because Poland's resistance was considerable and the new plan could not bring a quick decision. The West Wall is only strong in places, as tests have shown. Weak points include Freiburg, Saarbrücken and Aachen. The General Staff fears that a breakthrough through the Siegfried Line is possible . . . Hitler suffered a nervous breakdown after my Henderson book (nonsense; the author). . . The General Staff wants to take advantage of Hitler's nervous state to make a military coup possible, but it must first be sure that England will not give in.... If the General Staff knew that an attack on the West Wall was certain, it would strengthen its position... The mood in the German air force was good, but not in the army, and it was the army that would ultimately decide events.... . . Generals Hammerstein, Beck and Rundstedt had been given independent high command posts, and these were the men in whom the General Staff had confidence ... The German concentrations would take place in the Landsberg-Schneidemühl-Schlochau areas... If the General Staff were finally convinced that Ribbentrop's reports about England are false, this would favor the position of dissident (paraphrase: treasonous) elements (DBFP = Documents on British Foreign Policy VII, No. 546)." This secret report was accompanied by additional remarks from Kirkpatrick, First Secretary at the British Embassy in Berlin, and everything was presented to the British Prime Minister on the morning of August 31, 1939. Kirkpatrick's comments stated: "This information confirms the Aufmarsch order, which Dahlerus (a Swede who was to mediate between the German and British governments on Göring's recommendation; the author) has also seen. We have independent information on this, according to which Haider also made difficulties. I am sure that the Germans would have attacked the Siegfried Line.

but our position is not strong enough for us to exert pressure on the French to expose themselves to such risks and losses . . . From the description I cannot identify this officer, but I believe he is a departed officer connected with the reactionary elements of the General Staff. He gave us a lot of fairly concrete information last September when he was trying to get us to resist Hitler." This was a classic case of treason of the worst kind, committed by a landowner in Pomerania, a traditional bearer of the Prussian name. The hanging and the loss of his estate were his end. Quite rightly so. And a state that encourages such people to be honored is digging its own grave.

Apart from the fact that this Kleist-Schmenzin information had already been passed on from Berlin to Warsaw, Chamberlain had this treacherous secret information passed on directly to the Polish Foreign Minister, certainly not for reasons of necessary defensive measures - the fate of Poland was highly indifferent to the British - but to strengthen his resistance to the German will to negotiate. Negotiations would have meant peace. For the British warmongers, however, this was tantamount to political and military defeat. Annelies v. Ribbentrop and Karl Balzer, on the basis of British secret reports in their writings, have already proved that the conspirators were partly responsible for the outbreak of war over Poland. For England was allowed to believe in an easy victory over Germany, since German traitors were her allies, who ensured that the state would be overthrown from within without her intervention.

The twenty-seven-day Polish campaign, which was actually only a punitive expedition and ended without a declaration of war, was basically only intended to serve the political settlement of German-Polish relations. Immediately afterwards, Hitler made a comprehensive peace offer, which is worth reading. As is well known, this was rejected, as England was less interested in preserving Poland.

than in the destruction of Germany. The resisters would also have had to say this to themselves if they had not been so blindly stubborn and short-sighted in their hatred of Hitler, who did not have the "von" in front of his name and had only remained a private in the First World War. A later statement by the President of the Bundestag, Eugen Gerstenmaier, who also counted himself among the conspirators and lost his high office because he was accused of selfish actions, proves that people of insight were concerned with this question. They subsequently realized that all contacts with our opponents of the war were merely wishful thinking based on illusions. It could not remain hidden from them that the British leadership distrusted the German conservative conspiring generals no less than Hitler. England was exclusively concerned with the destruction of Germany as the most powerful organizing factor in Europe.

For this reason, all the acts of military treachery to be described in detail could only produce a negative result and certainly not any binding commitments, as had been assumed time and again in vain. All these treacherous contacts basically only strengthened the position of our opponents, resulted in losses on our side that were difficult to justify and deprived us of the fruits of a possible victory. Moreover, as time went on, the conspirators were no longer taken seriously by our opponents, as all forecasts proved to be wrong and any

There were no successes on their part. They were not considered credible in the eyes of our enemies either, quite apart from the fact that the betrayal was appreciated at the time as an improvement of one's own position, but the traitor was basically despised. Even monuments and commemorations erected afterwards cannot hide this fact.

Actually, the conspirators should have said to themselves, if the mighty Adolf Hitler was unsuccessful with his peace efforts, why should we of all people achieve this honor. What is the point of eliminating Hitler and his revolutionary idea?

if no binding promises could be obtained from the other side. They had to say to themselves, if they thought hard enough, that the elimination of Hitler could only be a free gift for the enemy, without any guarantee for the continued existence of the German Reich. But their so-called general staff thinking did not go that far. Blind hatred, their own hubris and pious wishful thinking about the attitude of our enemies prevented them from analyzing the situation rationally.

The next serious military betrayal was initiated on two fronts by the German defense. Under the pretext of avoiding further acts of war in order to reach a negotiated peace, contacts were sought with England under the promise of eliminating Hitler. The Vatican was considered to be the appropriate liaison office for this. So in the autumn of 1939, on the recommendation of Lieutenant Colonel Teschenmacher, the lawyer Dr. Josef Müller was ordered from the Munich Abwehr Office to the Abwehr Central Office in Berlin under Lieutenant Colonel Brasser. All that was known about Müller - also known as Ochsensteppe - was that he had good relations with the Vatican. He declared his willingness to work within the German Abwehr and to go to Rome on the condition that he could fall back on the good relations of Dr. Wilhelm Schmidhuber as an active collaborator.

Schmidhuber was drafted in August 1939 and served as a situation officer in Luftgau 3 under General Sperrle in Nuremberg-Roth. He was the Portuguese honorary consul and an experienced businessman. Dr. Müller, who came from an old family of officers, knew the Belgian Abbot General of the Premonstratensians, H. Noots, and Monsignor Krieg, who was chief chaplain of the Swiss Guard. Dr. Müller knew Monsignor Schönhöffer, who had married him, and the very important Father Leiber, an influential man from the Pope's immediate circle, as well as Monsignor Prelate Kaas. Incidentally, the prelate was one of those who, like our

former Federal President Heuss enthusiastically approved the Enabling Act, Kaas on behalf of the Center.

After both gentlemen had agreed to cooperate, they were instructed by the Abwehr to conduct exploratory talks with a view to ending the war on a negotiated basis before further hostilities broke out in the West. There would certainly have been no objection to such an order if it had been given in agreement with the head of state, Hitler. On the other hand, it was a high-handed action by the German Abwehr, which was not intended to serve the interests of the German Reich government, but to prepare a coup while securing the desired promises of our main British enemy. Thus, according to legal terms, this action was from the outset a clear case of treason, which revealed to the enemy the obvious weaknesses of the German side. This treason was committed by the conspirators Canaris, Colonel Oster and Reichsgerichtsrat v. Dohnany, who was a major and special leader in the central defense department. Dr. Lenz, who later served as State Secretary in the Federal Chancellery under Adenauer, was also in the same department. He knew Dr. Müller well and belonged to the group of resistance fighters mentioned above.

The second unauthorized contact with the English was successful.

The two groups knew nothing about each other when the then German Ambassador Ulrich Hassell visited Rome. Hassell in Rome. It was not the Vatican that was used, but the mediation of his Italian son-in-law Detalmo Pirzio Biroli, who was married to v. Hassell's daughter Fey. The latter had met the English agent Lonsdale Bryans in the Swiss restaurant "Albrecht" in Rome, who, allegedly on his own initiative but with the knowledge of the

Lord Halifax, the British Foreign Secretary, had set himself the task of making contact with leading circles of the German resistance in order to explore possibilities for peace. Detalmo let it be known that he was an anti-fascist and that his father-in-law was one of an important group of German patriots who had set themselves the task of liberating Germany from National Socialism and working together with England and France.

to make peace. He also explained that he had been instructed by his father-in-law to find a trustworthy person who would be prepared to present this to Halifax.

Without meeting v. Hassell in person, Bryans traveled to London, informed Lord Halifax of this conversation, and added "that v. Hassell was intended as the future foreign minister of a free Germany". After his return, he met Detalmo again in Rome and reported "that no one was more eager to preserve peace than Halifax". His son-in-law now arranged a meeting between Bryahs and v. Hassell in Arosa, Switzerland, as his son, Wolf-Ulrich v. Hassell, was staying there at the time due to severe bronchitis. To be on the safe side, Bryans was given a photograph of v. Hassell. It had been agreed that Bryans would stay at the "Isla" hotel, while the v. Hassell family stayed at the "Eden". This meeting took place in February 1940. Hassell had traveled by train from Chur in Switzerland for Tamung reasons.

The aim of the contact groups, which operated independently of each other, was to explore the possibilities for peace after the Polish campaign before the war threatened to spread to the West. Both groups presupposed an internal German coup d'état, which not only had all the characteristics of high treason, but was also nothing less than sabotage of the German war effort and the foreign policy of the Reich, and therefore also treason, due to the contact established with neutral and enemy agencies. For British diplomacy, a credible overthrow plan must have meant a highly welcome weakening of the enemy's position, which was to be encouraged, but still did not allow any promises of peace negotiations, even after a successful overthrow.

This was also clearly expressed when the English envoy to the Vatican, Sir Osborne, reported to Monsignor Schönhöffer on the basis of the Vatican contacts made by Dr. Müller and Dr. Schmidhuber that "there was a possibility of settling the war by negotiation as long as there was no fighting in the West". This was a non-committal answer without any

concrete determination. This became all the more apparent when Osborne stated during his second visit to Pope Pius XII on February 19, 1940: "I merely said that if they wanted to overthrow the government, they should do so. I added: But if there was a change of government, I still did not see how peace could be made as long as the German military machine remained intact." During Dr. Müller's personal conversation with Sir Francis Osborne, which was mediated by Father Leiber, the German opposition was to undertake to overthrow Hitler before the start of hostilities in the West. A binding commitment was also to be given by the leadership of the opposition that they were in a position to prevent an offensive in the West.

Now the resistance fighters had been passed the buck. Colonel Oster therefore conferred with v. Dohnanni, Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Gisevius. Canaris and Beck were also informed. Not Canaris, who welcomed all peace efforts but always remained in the background, but Oster made the following statement:

"We are in a position to bring about a revolution at home and prevent the forthcoming western offensive, provided that the English peace terms are acceptable." (Karl Bartz, "The Tragedy of the German Defense", page 32).

This explanation was nothing more than wishful thinking and overestimated the real possibilities. It also contributed to making the conspirators less and less credible, as similar promises had been made several times before without being fulfilled.

In the conversation between v. Hassell and Bryans, the ambassador was primarily concerned with a promise of the British willingness to negotiate with a new German government, which was to be formed immediately after the overthrow. This assurance before the overthrow was therefore

necessary in order to better assert himself among his still hesitant peers. When Bryans then replied with joyful excitement that Halifax had given him the positive assurance that he would use all his personal influence in this desired direction, Bryans recognized that he would be able to use his personal influence in this desired direction.

The German diplomat immediately said that although these were very fine words, they were not usable evidence. He needed written documents which he could present in Berlin and which would convince his friends. When Bryans then pointed out to him the difficulties of such written statements, v. Hassell replied: "There will be a European catastrophe, we must prevent it! Think what a signature from Lord Halifax would mean for my friends! It would be something solid, something tangible. It would be an unparalleled impetus. It would be the great moral justification for our beginning; it would carry away those who are still hesitating, and it would thoroughly destroy the widespread opinion in Germany that England is much more concerned with the destruction of Germany than with the downfall of Hitler. - I even maintain that the success or failure of a coup d'état depends entirely on a written declaration by Lord Halifax." (Karl Bartz, "The Tragedy of the German Defense", page 39).

After all, v. Hassell's justified concern that England was not really concerned with the destruction of Hitler, but with the destruction of a German Reich that had become too strong, was also addressed here. Hasseil promised Lonsdale Bryans to prepare an exposé for Lord Halifax the next day, containing his thoughts for a lasting peace. It read:

1. It is extremely important to end this senseless war as quickly as possible.
2. This necessity exists because the danger is growing that Europe will be completely destroyed and, above all, Bolshevized.
3. For us, Europe is not a battlefield or a power base, but has the value of a fatherland, in the context of which a healthy, viable Germany is an indispensable factor, especially with regard to Bolshevik Russia.
4. The aim of a peace treaty must be a lasting pacification and recovery of Europe on a firm basis and security against the early resurgence of armed conflicts.

5. The condition for this is that the unification of Austria and the Sudetenland with the Reich is not part of the discussions. Similarly, a reopening of border issues in western Germany is out of the question, while the German-Polish border must coincide with the German Reich border of 1914.
6. The peace agreement must be based on certain, above all recognized principles."

This was followed by a series of principles: Restoration of an independent Poland and an independent Czecho-Slovakia, reduction of armaments, justice and law as the basis of public life, control of state power by the people, freedom of thought, conscience and intellectual work. (Karl Bartz, "The Tragedy of the German Defense", page 41).

Apart from the fact that this expose during the war with our opponent, who had also declared war on us, was outright treason, especially since the implementation of this program presupposed a coup, this offer differs in terms of foreign policy in almost nothing from Hitler's view, which he addressed to the Western powers on 6 October 1939 immediately after the conclusion of the Polish campaign before the Reichstag and thus before the world public with his constructive and comprehensive peace program to prevent a military clash with the Western powers. He said:

"Two problems are under discussion today:

1. The settlement of the issues arising from the break-up of Poland and the
2. The problem of resolving those international concerns that make life politically and economically difficult for the people.

What are the aims of the Reich government with regard to the organization of conditions in the area west of the German-Soviet demarcation line, which is recognized as the German zone of influence?

1. the creation of an imperial border which - as already emphasized - corresponds to the historical, ethnographic and economic conditions,
2. The organization of the entire living space according to nationalities, i.e.

a solution to those minority issues that not only affect this region, but also almost all southern and south-eastern European states,

3. In this context, the attempt to organize and regulate the Jewish problem,
4. Reconstruction of transportation and economic life for the benefit of all people living in this area,
5. The guarantee of the security of this entire area and
6. The creation of a Polish state which, in its structure and leadership, offers a guarantee that neither a new source of fire against the German Reich will arise nor a center of intrigue against Germany and Russia will be formed.

In addition, immediate efforts must be made to eliminate the effects of the war or at least to mitigate them, i.e. to alleviate the existing excessive suffering through practical relief work.

The second, and in my view by far the most important, task is to establish not only the conviction, but also the feeling of European security. This requires that

1. unconditional clarity about the foreign policy objectives of the European states. As far as Germany is concerned, the Reich Government is prepared to give complete and full clarity about its foreign policy intentions. It places at the head of this declaration the statement that the Treaty of Versailles is regarded by it as no longer existing, and that the German Reich Government, and with it the entire German people, see no cause or reason for any further revision other than the demand for colonial possessions due and corresponding to the Reich, which relates primarily to the return of the colonies.

This demand for colonies is rooted not only in the historical claim to rights, but above all in the elementary legal claim to a share in the earth's sources of raw materials. This demand is not an ultimate one, and it is not one behind which the force stands behind, but one such of political justice and economic common sense.

2. The demand for a real flourishing of the international economy in connection with the increase of trade and transport presupposes the reorganization of the domestic economies or production within the individual states. In order to facilitate the exchange of these productions, however, a reorganization of the markets and a definitive regulation of currencies must be achieved in order to gradually remove the obstacles to free trade.
3. The most important prerequisite for a real flourishing of the European and non-European economy is the establishment of an absolutely guaranteed peace and a feeling of security among the individual peoples. This security is not made possible by the final sanctioning of the European status, but above all by the reduction of armaments to a reasonable and economically viable level. This necessary feeling of security includes above all the clarification of the applicability and scope of use of certain modern weapons which are capable of penetrating the heart of each individual nation at any time and which will thus leave behind a permanent feeling of insecurity. I have already made proposals in this direction in my earlier speeches in the Reichstag. They were rejected at the time - probably because they originated with me. However, I believe that the feeling of national security in Europe will only return when there is a comprehensive definition of the concept of permitted and unauthorized use of weapons in this area through clear international and valid obligations.

Just as the Geneva Convention once succeeded, at least among civilized states, in prohibiting the killing of the wounded, the ill-treatment of prisoners, fighting against non-combatants, etc., and just as this prohibition has in the course of time become a general prohibition, so too has it become a general prohibition.

respect, it must also be possible to define the use of the air force, the use of gas, etc., the submarine, but also the concepts of counter-attack in such a way that the war of the terrible

The perhorresis of certain procedures will lead to the elimination of weapons that have become superfluous. The perhorization of certain procedures will lead to the elimination of weapons that have become superfluous. In this war with Poland, I have endeavored to have the Luftwaffe appear only when active resistance was being put up in one place.

However, it must also be possible to find a fundamental, generally applicable international regulation based on the Red Cross. Only under such conditions will peace be able to return, especially in our densely populated continent, which, freed from mistrust and fear, can then provide the basis for a real flourishing of economic life. I believe that there is no responsible European statesman who does not wish in the depths of his heart for the prosperity of his people. However, the realization of this wish is only conceivable within the framework of general cooperation between the nations of the continent. Ensuring this cooperation can therefore only be the goal of every single man who is genuinely concerned about the future of his own people.

In order to achieve this great goal, the great nations of this continent will have to meet one day in order to work out, adopt and guarantee a statute in a comprehensive settlement which will give them all a feeling of security, tranquillity and thus peace. It is impossible for such a conference to convene without thorough preparatory work, i.e. without clarification of the individual points and, above all, without prepared work. But it is equally impossible that such a conference, which is to determine the fate of this very continent for decades to come, should operate under the roar of guns or even under the pressure of mobilized armies. But if sooner or later this problem does have to be solved, then it would be more sensible to approach this solution before millions of people bleed to death to no purpose and billions in assets are destroyed."

If one compares these ingenious peace proposals by Hitler, which touched on the real problems, with those of a man acting from the underground.

v. Hassell, one recognizes the handwriting of a talented architect and master builder who strives for global, future-oriented solutions and for whom the imposed war could only mean a highly undesirable interruption of his construction plans. Hassell's proposals, on the other hand, which first of all presupposed an overthrow and thus the destruction of existing orders with which the German people were more than satisfied, are far less constructive. So if the more comprehensive and sensible proposals of Hitler, who was a powerful man to be taken seriously at the time, were not accepted, how could a far more meagre peace proposal from a man without power and responsibility be successful? Moreover, proposals from a man who, in the eyes of an Englishman, could only be regarded as a traitor to his country.

While Dr. Müller and Dr. Schmidhuber had made contact with the Vatican and Sir Francis Osborne and had received certain vague and coded replies from Halifax, von Hasseil travelled to Berlin without English confirmation, where he had a meeting on March 19, 1940 at Beck's house in the presence of Colonel Oster and Major von Dohnanyi. Here he learned for the first time about the contacts with the Vatican, in which Halifax is said to have urged a change of regime, a decentralization of Germany and a referendum in Austria. Dohnanyi had drawn up a so-called X-report on the outcome of these contacts on Oster's behalf, without disclosing the names of the two agents.

This report was to be presented by v. Hassell to the then commander-in-chief of the army, Brauchitsch. Both Beck and Brauchitsch were pessimistic about the prospects for a western campaign. Hassell's originally planned meeting with Brauchitsch's Chief of Staff, Haider, was not held, as Haider informed the mediator Goerdeler "that England and France had declared war on Germany and that it now had to be 'fought through'. A compromise peace was pointless. Only in extreme necessity should

Claus Graf Schenk v. Stauffenberg and
Albrecht Ritter Mertz v. Quirnheim.

Top left: Field Marshal Günther v. Kluge, Commander-in-Chief of Army Group Center on the Eastern Front, then Commander-in-Chief West, was positive about the conspiracy, but did not allow an assassination attempt on Hitler in the area of his army group. During the invasion, he unsuccessfully sought contact with the Americans in order to surrender. He was relieved of his supreme command by Hitler and ordered to take responsibility. He then chose suicide by poison. Top right: General Carl Heinrich v. Stülpnagel, military commander in France and leader of the conspiratorial group in Paris, sent co-conspirator Dr. Hans Buwert to Madrid and Lisbon at the beginning of 1943 with the task of establishing, via informants, how the Western Allies had received the conspiracy's peace fugitives. Below left: General Erich Fellgiebel, Chief of Intelligence of the German Wehrmacht, who had secret telephone lines laid all the way to Switzerland to enable acts of betrayal by the conspiracy in favor of the enemy powers. He was certainly one of the most dangerous conspirators. Bottom right: Lieutenant General Hans Speidel, leading general of the German army and NATO after the war, belonged to the strong group of conspirators in Paris under the leadership of Gen. v. Stülpnagel.

Left: Caesar v. Hofacker, the soul of the military resistance movement in Paris. Right: General Henning v. Tresckow, leading conspirator in the central section of the Eastern Front. Below: Tresckow at the map table during a briefing with the staff of Army Group Center (Tresckow leaning with both hands). To his left, also leaning on him, his co-conspirator Colonel Schultze-Büttger, on the far right v. Schlabrendorff. In the command of one of the most decisive sections of the Eastern Front were fanatical conspirators who wanted to prevent a German success at all costs.

one should act as he, Goerdeler, wanted". Nevertheless, Haider received the report and passed it on to Brauchitsch. The bearer was General Thomas. The very next morning, the commander-in-chief indignantly returned the report to Haider: "You shouldn't have presented this to me. What is happening here is outright treason. This is out of the question for us under any circumstances. We are at war; we can talk about establishing relations with a foreign power in peace, but in war it is impossible for a soldier to do so. Incidentally, this is not a battle between governments, but a clash of world views. The elimination of Hitler would therefore be of no use."

Brauchitsch then demanded that the bearer of this letter be arrested and that the paper be forwarded through official channels to the OKW or SD, where it belonged. Only Haider's reply: "If someone is to be arrested, then please arrest me", made Brauchitsch refrain from any further action.

The X-Report, for which Oster and Dohnanyi were responsible, was found by the secret state police in Oster's armored locker in Zossen after July 20, 1944. This fact alone was sufficient for a death sentence, as provided for by the law in wartime. Such blatant cases of treason are punished in the same way by all nations.

The decisive factor, however, was that the conspirators had counted on the help of Brauchitsch and Haider. This fact must have been a great disappointment to the contact men such as Dr. Müller and Schmidhuber on the one hand and v. Hassell on the other, as they had campaigned hard for the coup and were now forced to realize that they had been talking too much during their negotiations. On the other hand, this must have made the British authorities suspicious and mistrustful. They began to take the negotiations no longer seriously or even to regard them as a waste of time.

This justified mistrust on the part of the British also came to the fore in mid-April 1940, at the time of the Norway venture, at the second meeting v.

Hassells with the Englishman Lonsdale Bryans in Arosa. With what feelings might v. Hasseil have traveled there, after he on the one hand knew of Brauchitsch's rejection of any attempt to overthrow the government, but on the other hand was aware of Oster's careless promise of such an attempt? It should therefore come as no surprise that Bryans had to reply evasively to v. Hassell's question about a written statement from Halifax: "Halifax thanked me very much for your message. He values it very highly. He is very much in agreement with the principles, but he cannot give a written assurance."

How must this meagre information have made v. Hassell feel? Moreover, the promise to prevent all Western acts of war was belied by the Norway undertaking. The conversation became even more embarrassing when Bryans referred to Halifax's answer about the Vatican's line and that this was another reason why he had refrained from committing himself in writing. During this conversation, v. Hasseil revealed his knowledge of the official channels via the Vatican, which he had only learned about during his recent visit to Berlin. The disappointed ambassador then wanted to know whether England could still be expected to negotiate a peace after the Norway venture. Bryans answered in the affirmative, but at the same time pointed out that Halifax had doubts about an announced change of system. He then concluded the conversation:

"Your statement is safe in the Foreign Office safe deposit box." He also promised to do his best to provide a written statement after all.

At this time, no one in England seriously believed in a German coup, especially since Dr. Müller, when questioned several times, let the English know that von Brauchitsch had refused to take part. Indeed, the skepticism of the English went so far that they considered these treacherous connections to be concerted, playful deceptive maneuvers.

THE MILITARY BETRAYAL OF ATTACK DATES

After Hitler's peace offers to the British and French remained unanswered, Hitler pressed for the earliest possible date for an attack against France in order to reach peace with England after France had been eliminated. However, the dates set for the attack were postponed for weather reasons and because the German army was not yet ready. On December 16, 1939, the German General Dr. Waldemar Erfürth, as Chief Quartermaster V in the Army High Command, considered it appropriate to inform General Marras, the Italian military attaché in Berlin at the time, that the German army was certain of success if it had the strategic operational area against France at its disposal. Belgium and Holland were needed for this. "We hope that the French will come to the aid of the Belgians with part of their forces. In this case, they would be cut off from the bulk of their army and a decisive battle could take place in Flanders."

One can only marvel at the frivolous chattiness

German generals, if one does not want to suspect more behind it. In any case, this confidential information was passed on by Marras to the Belgian ambassador Viscount Davignon in Berlin just two days later (Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, Issue II 1955).

Mussolini, who had already stabbed Hitler in the back with an indiscreet message to the British before the Polish campaign, instructed his Foreign Minister Count Ciano to inform the Belgian and Dutch diplomatic missions after receiving this information. Ciano did so on January 2, 1940 to the Belgian ambassador A. de Kerchove with the following words: "Belgium is in

great danger. Be prepared for any eventuality, because it sometimes happens that an attacker abandons his plan if he notices a serious obstacle in his path.

The Belgian princess Marie-Jose, the wife of the Italian crown prince, had already been informed of the German plan for the campaign against France.

On January 10, 1940, two German aviation officers were accidentally

landed on Belgian territory. Allegedly they had gotten lost. They were carrying attack plans that could not be destroyed, so that these also fell into Belgian hands.

On the same day, the Apostolic Nuncio in Brussels, Monsignor Micara, warned the Belgian Foreign Ministry. It is not known whether Dr. Schmidhuber and Dr. Müller were the informants here, but it can be assumed.

In any case, Dr. Müller, who was in Berlin at the beginning of May, received the order from Colonel Oster, who owed his knowledge to his boss Canaris, to forward the date of the western offensive, "May 10, 1940, four o'clock", to the English envoy in Rome via the Vatican. He sent the date of the attack with a confidant, written on a piece of paper, to Father Leiber, who ensured that it was passed on immediately. As fate would have it, the radio message sent by the Belgian envoy to the Vatican, de l'Escaille, to his government in Brussels was intercepted by the SD. It read: "A German who has just arrived from Berlin has informed me that the attack will begin next week, via Belgium and Holland." The reply was also intercepted. "Have you checked the reliability of the German?" To which de l'Escaille radioed back: "The German is known to me. He is reliable and was introduced by a fellow countryman."

Both the SD and the Abwehr were tasked with investigating the espionage case. Colonel Rohleder, head of Group IIF, which was responsible for foreign espionage and infiltrating enemy counterintelligence services, sent the informer Ascher to Rome. His research soon led to the suspicion that only Dr. Müller could have been the informant. According to statements by Senior Government Councillor Huppenkothen of the Secret State Police, the report was received by Col.

Rohleder, who passed it on to Colonel Bentivegni. He in turn informed Canaris, who in turn referred the case to Oster. Dr. Müller had to comment on the accusations made against him. The handling of this case speaks volumes. Canaris and Oster, at least, as the main parties involved, knew very well that they themselves had accused Dr. Müller

with the announcement of the attack date. So it was hardly possible to put Dr. Müller up against the wall and have him shot. As honorable men, they should have requested the same for themselves, because Colonel General Beck had always taken the view that in the event of an unannounced attack, the Allies would no longer make a distinction between so-called decent Germany and the Hitler regime. As if the British had ever done that! So naturally the investigation had to end like the Hornberg shooting. Dr. Müller was not shot, but the V-man Ascher was sent to Sweden for retirement. An unbelievable case.

A similar incident was reported to me after July 20. A cavalry captain I knew from Pomerania, Rittmeister Teschenmacher, asked me by telephone to visit him in a Berlin military hospital. He had been seriously wounded in Poland, had an artificial stomach outlet and was in constant treatment in military hospitals with a few interruptions. On the occasion of an officers' meeting of his old troop, he was approached with very defeatist remarks and subversive talk from some of the participants. He was horrified. While he was bedridden again, this unusual event kept bothering him so that he felt a kind of remorse. He was so depressed by what he had heard that he discussed it with a visitor, a senior officer he knew, who encouraged him to report it to the authorities.

The result was a court martial against the accused officers. Teschenmacher presented what he had heard at the time and stood by his statement. As the defendants denied everything, the trial was adjourned. They wanted to call other witnesses. Teschenmacher went back to his hospital. The next evening, an ambulance pulled up outside the hospital. Without being informed of the purpose of his transfer and without the

Without the possibility of informing his relatives, he was then driven to a mental hospital at night, subjected to an examination and labeled mentally incompetent with paragraph 51 by a doctor he did not know. As it **t u r n e d o u t** later, the whole thing was a court martial.

The conspirators' action was coordinated in order to acquit the defendants. The conspirators were not exactly squeamish when it came to endangering their own skins. They resorted to methods that differed little from those still practiced in the Soviet Union today.

Teschenmacher survived, but Colonel General Dietl, probably one of the most popular generals in Greater Germany, had to die because traitors who had tried in vain to win the hero of Narvik over to the cause of the resistance believed that he could become a deadly danger to a certain group of people. He was the victim of an act of sabotage after his plane had taken off. Lieutenant Colonel Konrad Knabe writes in his book "The Eye of Dietl" on page 236: "After the state ceremony for Dietl on the Obersalzberg, in which Hitler also took part, the mortal remains of the Colonel General were buried in a small circle in Munich.

It was also attended by the man who wanted to win Dietl over to the resistance. While condoling, he told one of Dietl's daughters that her father could still be alive if he had not been so hostile at the time.

Incidentally, the Dietl-Ju was not guarded by a member of the aircraft crew in Graz on the night of June 23, 1944, as was usually the case."

On April 3, 1940, 5 p.m., the Dutch military attaché Sas was invited in civilian clothes to Colonel Oster's private apartment in Berlin. The two had been friends for a long time. It was here that Sas learned from Oster the exact date of the attack against Denmark and Norway. "Exactly on April 9th. The operation is called Weserübung." Sas was initially incredulous and thought of an operation against his own country, which Oster had already advised him of for November 12, 1939, but had then been postponed by Hitler. Further on

In the course of this conversation, Sas also learned that the Wehrmacht leadership under Keitel and Jodl, and not the army high command, had been charged with preparing this operation. This had been ordered by Hitler for reasons of secrecy, as he did not want the

General Staff, which always expressed reservations. In this case, too, Canaris, who was subordinate to the OKW, had his dirty hands in the game by inserting Captain Liedig into this special staff as a representative of the Abwehr.

In response to Sas's remark that this undertaking was more than risky, especially as the German government did not have sufficient naval forces at its disposal, Oster said: "With a delusional man, anything is possible, although one would have to concede to this private that the possibility of an English landing could not be dismissed out of hand. But where will he get his ores if Narvik is occupied by the Allies?" This reasoning made sense to Sas and made him believe in the boldness of such an undertaking. To underline his credibility, Oster pointed to the many mountain troops in Berlin who could be recognized by the edelweiss on their caps and who were needed for the mountain battle for Narvik.

Sas immediately informed the Danish naval attaché Kjolson and the Norwegian envoy Stang, so that the Danes and Norwegians were also warned. Canaris himself, according to later statements by Criminal Commissioner Sonderegger, informed the chamberlain of the Danish envoy in Berlin, who passed this report on to the government, which in turn informed the British. Thus this daring venture was also betrayed to the enemy. In addition, as we have already mentioned, Oster once again used his agent Dr. Josef Müller to alert the British via his connections with the Vatican.

The result was that the British and Norwegians were prepared for this lightning raid and were able to inflict heavy losses on the German naval and land forces. The advantage of the element of surprise was thus lost to the German forces. Both the British and the Norwegians had retrieved their vacationers and hurriedly prepared their units for battle. If the German operation nevertheless proceeded meticulously as planned and led to great success, it was thanks to the boldness, bravery and sacrifice of German officers and soldiers.

The British submarines were waiting ready for battle in the Great Belt and the Kattegat, as well as at the entrance to the Oslo Fjord. The flanking fortress islands of Rauøy and Bolärne were occupied and blocked the fairway with a light barrage. The fearlessly entering German fleet was fired on from both sides with 28 cm and 15 cm shells. It had to pass through the bottleneck. The modern cruiser "Blücher" was hit hard and sunk by two torpedoes. Thanks to Oster and other traitors, the crew had to swim four hundred meters ashore through ice-cold water, unless they had fallen. Previously, two German steamers had been sunk in the entrance to the Oslo Fjord. The cruiser "Lützow" had narrowly escaped a torpedo from the British submarine "Trident" under its lieutenant Seale, which had previously sunk the German 8000-ton tanker "Posidania".

In Bergen, the cruiser "Königsberg" is damaged by the Norwegian coastal batteries, then attacked and sunk by British dive bombers. The "Karlsruhe" is also torpedoed by a British submarine on its return journey from Kristiansand South. After a three-hour death struggle, it sinks into the cold waters. In Narvik, in the early hours of April 10, the

"Wilhelm Heitkamp" under the command of Commodore Bonte is torpedoed by a surprise torpedo attack by an English destroyer flotilla, as is the destroyer "Anton Schmitt". Both ships sink, along with Commodore Bonte, Corvette Captain Heyke, Frigate Captain Maywald and Lieutenant Cruchmann. The destroyers "Roeder" and "Lüdemann" are damaged by British shells.

Due to the betrayal of Oster and others, the German navy lost twelve destroyers in addition to a number of merchant ships, tankers and transports, leaving only ten remaining.

I do not know how German soldiers, who had to give their lives in the faithful fulfillment of their duty, would have felt if they had suspected this wretched betrayal by their own so-called comrades at home. There can and must be no retrospective whitewashing here. It is incontrovertible that the British and Norwegian

forces had been put on high alert due to German treachery and countless brave, innocent German soldiers had lost their lives as a result. In the face of vastly superior British naval power, they had nullified Hitler's directive of March 1, 1940: "Our numerical weakness must be compensated for by bold action and surprising execution." This betrayal is so reprehensible not only because of our own heavy losses, but also because the alert provoked the sacrificial resistance of the Norwegian navy, thereby destroying the intended "peaceful occupation" of Norway.

And yet, despite his treason, Oster did not cause this daring enterprise to fail. Accordingly, he failed to achieve the strategic goal of the resistance, which was to make this foolhardy undertaking a failure, to bring about the total downfall of the navy and thus to burden Hitler with an irreparable defeat, as later in Stalingrad. Throughout the war, in view of the overpowering British fleet and air force, the chances of a total failure were never as great as in this operation, given the long approach routes running parallel to the British coast. But here too, Oster was a few sizes too small to initiate this as a capable and sophisticated agent. He was simply not the man after God's own heart, as the lawyer v. Schlabrendorff believed he could theologically classify Oster.

Here too, Oster misjudged the credibility of his incredible betrayal. In view of the incredible foolhardiness of the British, such a report was bound to arouse mistrust, and even be perceived as a deliberate deception to lure the fleet and air force there, because something more important was planned elsewhere. Hitler had scheduled this so-called "Weser exercise" for April 9 at 5:30 a.m. on April 2, 1940 in the greatest secrecy. Oster's betrayal was reported on April 3 in the evening, without him being able to provide convincing evidence.

This was all the more necessary because he himself and others have experienced repeated false alarms.

and thus made the enemy suspicious. So he still had enough time to convincingly put his betrayal into action. To do so, he or another authorized confidant would have had to go abroad with watertight evidence in order to provide further concrete details about the planned operation. Credible evidence would have included: detailed information on the names and staging areas of the intended landing troops, exact targets of attack, supply documents, staging ports for the transport ships and naval units, operational plans for the submarines, establishment of German airfields and reassignment of combat units, deployment plan and names of the divisions deployed against Denmark and much more. It would then have been necessary to agree on the departure times to be reported and the respective strengths of the outgoing units from the various ports in the Baltic and North Sea. After all, the ships needed two days to get to Narvik or Drontheim. Time enough to launch a devastating attack. This was the only way to convince the British of the credibility of this action and the seriousness of the situation and to achieve the total destruction of an army and almost the entire German navy. However, this would have meant that it was not us, but the British, as they hoped, who were in Norway. The crucial ore supplies from the Narvik area would have failed to materialize and Hitler would have suffered the irreparable defeat desired by the resistance and a great loss of prestige. The entire strategic situation would have changed before the French campaign to such an extent that it might even have failed to materialize.

But thinking that far and acting accordingly was not enough.

Osters' format. What he did, thank God, he only did halfway. He was not characterized by cool deliberation and energetic action, but by blind hatred of Hitler and his regime. He had the least reason to do so, as he had been reactivated for the rebuilding of the Wehrmacht after being forced to leave the Reichswehr. He had relationships with a married woman

of a regimental comrade, which was certainly not a fine trait in a gentleman, which he wanted to be.

Oster neither fulfilled his task as a defense expert conscientiously nor did he master his business as an enemy agent. But a man who, driven by blind hatred, was prepared to sacrifice forty thousand good German soldiers, which, according to research by some authors, he himself had expected, can only deserve the contempt of posterity.

But what do such saboteurs, defeatists, draft dodgers and traitors to the country care about such points of view when we know the point of view of Mr. Oster today? It is perfectly clear that people like Beck, Canaris, Oster, Dr. Müller and others wanted nothing more than for this operation to fail in order to humiliate and incriminate Hitler and create the conditions for a coup. What does it matter with such an attitude if thousands of comrades are sacrificed. At my trial in Braunschweig in 1952, which was supposedly about insulting resistance fighters, I experienced the same attitude from the witness and conspirator Fabian v. Schlabrendorff, whom I considered to be the classic witness for proven treason. When my lawyer asked him: "Were you not aware, when you passed on attack dates to the Allies during the war, that this cost the lives of thousands of soldiers?", he replied unequivocally: "It is less important that some soldiers lost their lives as a result, however regrettable that may be, than that we showed through such an announcement that there was another Germany."

This attitude becomes all the more alarming when one considers the true attitude of our opponents at the time. The British, who had only hoped for a quicker collapse of Germany by overthrowing the conspirators, had meanwhile been disappointed several times by their promises. The many promises had not been followed by action. The Vatican also felt abused for the same reasons and became skeptical. But far more important for the English was the question of what they were actually getting themselves into with such an overthrow. They knew that the main protagonists of the

The conspirators came from the reactionary aristocracy and regressive German Junker circles. They were right to say to themselves that the dreaded German army would thus exert an increased influence on future political events.

Just remember the measures taken by the British against Prussianism, militarism and Junkerism after the collapse. They took far stricter action against this group than against the evil National Socialists. In the event of a possible change of power, the English would have been less concerned about the associated social regression. But they were not unaware of the attitude of this caste with regard to their traditional pro-Russian stance, which corresponded to Seeckt's line. They knew that banned weapons, airplanes and tanks had already been tested in Russia during the Weimar Republic. The attitude of the "red General von Hammerstein", a co-conspirator, was known. His daughters were known to be ideologically Communist. It was to be feared that these people would continue their friendly relations with Russia to an even greater extent. The danger of a military caste with backing in Moscow was a nightmare for the British.

The successful Norway venture had considerably dampened the hopes of the conspirators that Hitler would soon be overthrown, and quite a few of their supporters began to resign.

But Colonel Oster was not to be deterred. Together with the defeatists of the Army High Command, he hoped that the western campaign, which was now certain to lead to defeat, would create the possibility of a coup. It should therefore come as no surprise that he had no inhibitions whatsoever about committing another serious act of treason. On May 3, 1940, Oster again personally informed the Dutch military attaché Sas about the upcoming invasion of Holland and Belgium. Both agreed to delay passing on the information until the exact date had been explicitly confirmed. In this way, they wanted to avoid causing uncertainty among the responsible politicians and military officers concerned by another false alarm.

and thus an unbelievable

would be caused by the conspirators. However, the Dutch government must have already received such a message through official channels via the Vatican. The very next day, Sas received a telegram from his Foreign Office in The Hague asking whether he could confirm the warning he had received as a decided invasion against Holland. The Dutch envoy replied that he had received an identical message from his military attaché. The invasion was expected to take place in the middle of next week.

In this case, too, Oster took a two-pronged approach. Once again, he had instructed his confidant Josef Müller to alert his friends, so that the Vatican's diplomatic apparatus went into action as early as May 3. The Cardinal Secretary of State Maglione informed the nuncios in Belgium and Holland by telegraph, with the express instruction that this terrible news should be communicated to the respective governments. On May 6, Pope Pius XII informed the Italian Crown Prince Umberto, whose wife was known to be Belgian. A day later, Pro-Secretary of State Montini, who later became Pope Paul VI, informed the diplomatic representatives of England and France. Osborne then wrote to the Foreign Office: "The Vatican expects a German offensive in the West to begin this week."

As we know today, this information triggered skepticism due to the many false alarms caused by Oster. It is worth noting the statement by the Belgian envoy Nieuwenhuys, which the now celebrated conspirators should put behind their ears after he heard who the information came from: "No German would do such a thing!" Truly, a punch in the face for a man like Oster! But despite the reprehensibility of his betrayal, he went one step further when he met with Sas again on the eve of the western offensive.

In order not to risk another cancellation of the offensive, both agreed to wait until the critical time of 9.30 p.m. to make sure that no counter-order was given. Sas himself reports

1948 before a Dutch committee of inquiry about all the details of that day. Both gentlemen stayed the whole afternoon and evening and ate together. Sas speaks of a funeral meal. One is only surprised that at such a time the second man of the Abwehr could allow himself to take this time! The two then went together to the Wehrmacht High Command. Sas waited outside in the dark for Oster to return. After about twenty minutes, Oster returned with the simple words: "My friend, the time has really come. No counter-orders have been given. The 'pig' has left for the western front. Hopefully we'll meet again after the war."

According to Heinz Höhne in "Canaris-Patriot im Zwielflicht", page 392, Oster's last words were: "Sas, blow up the Meuse bridges for me." As we know, the Meuse bridges were blown up. But this reveals the character and spirit of a traitor and high traitor who is probably without precedent in German history and who, no matter how much whitewashing he does, cannot change the perfidy of his actions. As long as the resistance is not willing to distance itself from such behavior, a decent German cannot visit resistance memorials! According to Peter Bor, even a shady man like the Chief of the General Staff Haider made the following statement in his book "Conversations with Haider": "What a deplorable state of mental confusion must have prevailed that German men, in their hatred of the tyrant, could persuade themselves that they were serving the fatherland by joining forces with the enemy, by betraying military secrets! In their zeal and blindness they overlooked the fact that the enemy took advantage of the betrayal, but still despised the traitor. Why should the contempt of their own countrymen who were betrayed not be incomparably greater?"

You have to think about that when you hear how the

Sometimes, after a catastrophe, someone boasts of having passed military intelligence to the enemy. The transmission of an attack date to the enemy, for example, is of no use, needless to say. Because the attack will be carried out according to plan . . . However, if the enemy

and is thus prepared to make thousands of its own soldiers, who leave their positions and proceed on orders, pay with their lives for this lack of conscience."

What did the Dutch military attaché Sas do after receiving this extremely important information for his country? He himself reported: "I then ran to my legation, where I had in the meantime summoned the Belgian military attaché. He was expecting me there and after I had told him this, he in turn ran to his legation to pass on the news. I picked up the phone myself and asked for the War Ministry in The Hague. These are, of course, moments that you never forget, because in the twenty minutes that we waited for the call to get through, we were sweating blood and water. Twenty minutes later, the call came through and I got an officer on the phone who I was lucky enough to know, Lieutenant 1st Class Post Uitweer, now Captain at sea, with whom I had the following conversation: 'Post, you know my voice, don't you? I am Sas in Berlin. I have only one thing to say to you. Tomorrow morning at dawn, ears stiff, you understand me, don't you? Would you like to repeat it?' He repeated it and said at the end: 'So letter 210 received. That was a coded agreement that we had made at the last moment. Letter 210 meant invasion, and the last two numbers were to indicate the day of the invasion. So in this case: 'Letter 210' received."

He then continues: "About an hour and a half later, Colonel van de Plasche called me and told me with more or less doubt in his tone: 'I have such bad news from you about your wife's operation. How sorry I am. Have you consulted all the doctors? Whereupon I, who had now exposed myself for the second time on the open line, became angry and said, among other things: 'Yes, I don't understand why you are still bothering me under these circumstances. I have spoken to all the doctors. It will take place tomorrow morning at dawn. Then I threw the phone on the hook.' And further: "That was the end of my role

as military attaché. At half past five the following morning, the envoy knocked on my door and said: 'Now the time has really come. - I have to see von Ribbentrop. - He then went to Ribbentrop and we turned on the radio. That's when we heard that the invasion was under way!'"

One must admire the courage of this military attaché to expose himself so obviously to the danger of espionage through this telephone conversation. The day before, Oster had spoken to him about the fact that an investigation had been launched into the Denmark-Norway affair after the attack date had been passed on in order to establish the existing leak. Suspicion had been cast on the Belgian military officer, as he was allegedly connected to Catholic circles in the Wehrmacht's High Command. "So," said Oster, "we've shuffled our cards well. So far, they haven't found out how the matter really lies."

That was an extremely embarrassing discovery. Both men agreed that Oster must not be compromised under any circumstances. As already mentioned, there was the so-called "Research Office", which had been set up after Göring came to power. It had a highly qualified and well-coordinated apparatus that was able to decipher radio and cable messages with great success. Above all, the diplomats' communications were monitored and registered and passed on to the Abwehr for analysis. The telephone conversation between The Hague and Berlin mentioned above was also recorded, handed over to the Foreign Counterintelligence Office for analysis and brought to the attention of both Admiral Bürkner and Colonel Piepenbrock. The Abwehr was well aware of the good friendly relations between Oster and Sas. But in this case, too, Canaris managed to prevent any clarification by pretending that the news of the western offensive had been passed on as

to have launched the "fault report" itself. In this way, the

The whole matter was dealt with within the Abwehr and was not pursued further. It can truly be said that the German Abwehr was the best ally of our enemies during the war.

These and other incidents contributed to the fact that the days of

Canaris were counted. It is interesting to note the opinion of the American Arthur R. Butz: "At about the time Heydrich was appointed Deputy Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, he seems to have seen through Canaris' game. All recent investigations indicate that Canaris apparently sensed this.

and London must have been informed of this. For it is striking that it was precisely at this point in his career that the British - allegedly by chance - had him eliminated by parachuting two assassins into Bohemia-Moravia. In keeping with the all-too-common script for political assassinations (e.g. Abraham Lincoln and John E Kennedy), the alleged killers are said to have been eliminated before they would have gotten a chance to spill the beans." (A.R. Butz, "The Deception of the Century", page 35)

After the victory over France, the entire Atlantic coast from Narvik to the Bay of Biscay was in German hands. This created the conditions for securing Europe against attacks from the west by building a massive western wall. The southern flank of the continent was still at risk, with England dominating the Mediterranean. The Italian fleet proved to be too weak to seriously stand up to the English. Germany had other tasks, to here the Italians decisively help to the Italians. A key position for dominating the Mediterranean, in addition to the heavily fortified Malta, was the Strait of Gibraltar, which, much to Franco's chagrin, was a thorn in his own flesh that hurt the pride of the Spaniards and, heavily fortified, militarily dominated the entrance to the Mediterranean.

What could be more obvious for Hitler than to come to an understanding with Franco, who was in his debt for supporting his fight for freedom with German aid, in order to avert the English danger from the Mediterranean? This was all the more obvious as Franco seemed to be in a hurry after the Western campaign to get to the German victory celebrations and the distribution of the spoils. He sent Major General Vigon a personal letter to Hitler in which he expressed his respect for the Führer's successes and his grief at no longer being at his service.

to be able to do so. He let it be known that Spain was ready to enter the war. Shortly before, as the fighting in France was drawing to a close, the booty-hungry Mussolini had done the same, much to Hitler's displeasure.

Hitler was no doubt thinking of breaking the proud British fortress out of England's crown in a night and fog operation. After the French campaign, the "Großdeutschland" regiment practised the capture of Gibraltar with special equipment such as rope ladders in the Montabauer area, a tempting task that the young grenadiers were eager to take on. But here, too, Canaris played a treacherous role. He was to prepare a meeting between Franco and the Führer on the basis of his supposedly good relations with Franco's Spain. It was clear to Canaris that as long as England was not conquered and occupied, Spain was still considered to be under threat from England.

Naturally, Franco was also concerned with this idea. Canaris clearly misused his commission against the interests of the Reich by declaring that the war had not yet been won, that the Führer was reluctant to attack England and that the Spanish position could become difficult if England was not eliminated. He even went so far as to recommend that Franco make such extensive economic demands of Hitler that the latter would have to refuse. This would at least postpone Spain's entry into the war.

Colvin also reports in this context on the help that Josef Müller had already provided in Rome to hold Spain back from war. The useful Josef Müller had appeared before Suner (Spanish Foreign Minister) and had already told the astonished Spaniard on Canaris' orders in the summer: "The Admiral asks you to tell Franco to keep Spain out of this game at all costs. At the moment it may seem to you that our position is the stronger one. In truth, it is desperate, and we have little hope of winning this war. Franco can rest assured that Hitler will not invade Spain by force of arms." (Jan Colvin, "Admiral Canaris, Chief of Intelligence", page 163)

It should therefore come as no surprise that, due to Canaris' sabotage

on October 23, 1940, Hitler's meeting with Franco in Hendaye on the Spanish-French border was not under a good star. Canaris' direction became apparent. Franco made unexpectedly unfulfillable demands. In addition to arms deliveries and the securing of Spanish food supplies in the event of war, it was above all the demand for Italian and French territorial cessions that forced Hitler's hand.

deeply outraged. Hitler simply stood up after two hours and left the further negotiations to Ribbentrop.

In Canaris, the British really had their best agent, who contributed significantly to Germany losing the war.

Another example may be typical of this. Hitler was extremely impressed by a personal meeting with Marshal Petain and considered him to be a man with whom a lasting friendship between Germany and France could be achieved. He planned to meet Petain a second time in Paris. But Canaris had also gotten wind of this. He let the English know. As the British could not be interested in a sensible reorganization of Europe that excluded English interests, they put their agents on Petain to talk him out of such a meeting on the grounds that Hitler intended to arrest him on this occasion. The Franco-German friendship that Hitler had intended was thus frozen and could only become a reality years later, when Europe was a heap of rubble and Germany only had a third of its territory left. It was not Hitler but Adenauer who became the founder of the Franco-German friendship. Petain had to give way to de Gaulle, to whom "vive la France" seemed more important than "vive l'Europe".

It would go too far to list all the intrigues and treacheries of Canaris, the German chief of defense, here. It would fill a book. He did not correctly predict a single Allied landing operation; on the contrary, he knew how to masterfully falsify correct forecasts in order to deceive the German leadership. Although he was aware of the Badoglio coup d'état, he denied it. When he realized that his star was sinking, he went to Hitler and asked for

At the beginning of the Russian campaign, Hitler reluctantly agreed to the introduction of the Jewish star. His justification for this measure, which today we chalk up to inhumanity, was that he could not guarantee the prevention of sabotage on the scale of the war if the main enemy was not marked. All these acts of sabotage must be remembered when the name Canaris is mentioned today when honoring the resisters. Or did he introduce the Jewish star to leave his fatherland at the mercy of character assassination after a lost war? It almost looks that way.

His deserved end was not a glorious one for him. Right up to the end, Canaris denied everything and talked his way out of it: "I was head of the Abwehr, it was my job to take part in plots against the Führer in order to uncover them later." He didn't uncover, he was uncovered! He also denied knowing anything about July 20. He was therefore confronted by his chief of staff, Oster, which was dramatic. Oster: "What the admiral says is not true!" Canaris then turned to his closest colleague: "Oster, I only did everything for appearances!" Oster responded very angrily: "No, that's not true. I'm not a scoundrel! I stand by what I did! It was as I say." The interrogating judge then intervened and asked Canaris whether he wanted to claim that Oster was lying? But Canaris stuck to his excuses and denied everything. His only words when he was asked again if he had anything else to say were: "I ask for a parole."

Oster, on the other hand, made greater concessions: "The connection with the enemy was necessary because only then did a coup make sense. I admit this connection, but I broke off the whole thing because I no longer recognized any possibility of success. I can't deny my involvement. I wouldn't do it again. I ask to be assigned to a front commando as a simple soldier."

Both were executed on the morning of April 9, 1945, one month before the surrender, thus atoning for the crimes they had committed as traitors to the fatherland.

Jan Colvin, of whom Churchill says in his memoirs that he took particular care with the truth about Canaris, says in ^Admiral Canaris", page 275: "Particularly striking are the deceptions and misleadings of his own military leadership, through which he caused immeasurable damage to the German war effort.

His omissions in secret reporting helped the Allies to strike surprising blows and brought them even closer to victory in a beneficial way. In 1938, he warned Great Britain of the imminent mobilization against Czechoslovakia

and recommended taking strong measures, which might have prevented the war altogether. He helped prevent the war from spreading to Spain and Portugal and remained silent at the crucial moment when Italy switched sides. His office warned England about the V-weapons and thus gave Great Britain the opportunity to reduce their destructive effect."

THE TREASON OF THE CONSPIRATORS IN THE FOREIGN OFFICE

As we know today, the political goals of the Anglo-Saxons and the German conspirators in the Foreign Office were not identical. The conspirators were concerned with the elimination of Hitler, while the Anglo-Americans wanted nothing less than the destruction of the political and economic power of the German people, regardless of whether they were governed by a monarchist, democratic or National Socialist regime. Because this was the case, they basically talked past each other and met each other with increasing distrust, without our short-sighted conspirators realizing or wanting to admit it. This fact alone caused the diplomatic betrayal to fail from the outset due to the hopelessness of any success.

Neither the conclusion of the German-Polish non-aggression pact between Hitler and Marshal Pilsudski nor the German-English naval agreement was welcomed or even approved of by the opposition members of the Foreign Office. The only reason for such a rejection was that these treaties had been concluded by Hitler. The then State Secretary von Bülow dismissed these treaties, which were in themselves beneficial, as a sham. The same view was held by Erich Kordt, the then Legation Councillor, whom we already know from the "Sorge affair" and who accompanied the later Foreign Minister v. Ribbentrop to London at the time. He used this trip for conspiratorial discussions with the Englishman Philipp Conwell Evans, who knew the then Prime Minister Macdonald well. Even here he took the view "that Germany could only be brought to the negotiating table with the necessary insistence if they did not want

take what you like".

The betrayal took on a firmer form when, in April 1938, the State Secretary v. Weizsäcker took office as Bülow's successor, who, according to his own statements, professed to want to create a broad front to bring about a revolt against Hitler. Goerdeler had already warned his English friends in London in 1937 and 1938 in close consultation with v. Weizsäcker and encouraged them to resist Hitler resolutely. In August 1938, v. Weizsäcker sent the Prime Minister Chamberlain and his Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax information about the existence of a secret opposition to Hitler and a

"Alliance of Friends of Peace". To this end, after consultation with retired Colonel General Beck, Erich Kordt's cousin was sent to his brother Theo Kordt, then chargé d'affaires in London, with a memorized message for security reasons. This was to secretly contact Sir Horace Wilson, Chamberlain's next advisor.

This took place on September 7, 1938 at 10 Downing Street through the back entrance. Here the absolute necessity of a clear statement by the British government against Hitler's alleged war policy was demanded. This was the only way to slow down and humiliate Hitler. This, however, was the prerequisite for the army being able to take up arms against Hitler's policy. Chamberlain and Churchill were informed of this conversation with the Foreign Secretary, which was of course to be kept confidential. Erich Kordt reports on this conversation in "Not from the Files", page 279, on the basis of a detailed report by his brother. According to a meeting that had taken place with Sir Horace Wilson, a letter from Chamberlain to Hitler was planned, for which Theo Kordt had allegedly agreed to provide the draft.

But Chamberlain decided otherwise. He flew personally to Berchtesgaden to meet with Hitler as agreed. So there was no need for a request from Mr. Theo Kordt and his backers. Chamberlain's biographer, Feiling, reports how Hitler really thought in a letter that Chamberlain wrote to his sister on September 19: "Hitler was completely committed to

and asked if Mrs. Chamberlain would not come too. Later I heard from Hitler, as was confirmed to me by others who were with him, that he had exclaimed in amazement, 'I cannot possibly let a man of his age make the long journey; I must go to London myself'. After some consideration he realized, of course, that this would not do, and it would have been very inconvenient for me indeed; for it would have taken away much of the dramatic impact of my coup. But it showed a side of Hitler that would astonish many people in this country."

So Hitler was by no means averse to a peaceful settlement, as his opponents always insinuated. Nor did he need any coaxing from the resistance forces to resolve the tensions caused by the Czechs. There is no historical evidence that Hitler wanted to solve the Sudeten question by war, as the conspirators simply insinuated. Chamberlain's attitude was certainly also determined by the fact that the current political and military rearmament of the Empire was not yet complete. The misjudgment of our conspirators, however, was that England's struggle was not against National Socialism, but against the containment of Germany's European supremacy. Chamberlain always saw Fascism and National Socialism as "a revolt against humiliation", against the Versailles alliance system and Eastern Bolshevism. For him, the insistence on the German people's right to self-determination was merely an "insidious weapon of Hitler's Germany". (Keith Feiling, "The Life of Neville Chamberlain", p. 399).

Theo Kordt, however, believed he could justify his private mission to Halifax by explaining: "Extraordinary times require extraordinary means. Today I come to you not in my capacity as German chargé d'affaires, but as a spokesman for political and military circles in Berlin who want to prevent a war by all means." Hitler wanted that too, but not the British! They, the conspirators, were therefore addressing the wrong people and also let it be known that they were not carrying out their overthrow under their own steam, but with the help of forces and means hostile to the country

which meant that they extended their high treason to treason.

In August 1938, behind the back of the Reich government, v. Weizsäcker again asked Professor Carl J. Burckhardt, the last High Commissioner of the League of Nations of the Free City of Danzig, to suggest to the British that instead of Lord Runciman as an honest broker in Czecho-Slovakia, an English general with a riding stick should be sent to Hitler, since Hitler would only understand such unambiguous language. At the same time, v. Weizsäcker arranged a meeting with Canaris, about whom Burckhardt innocuously reported that he was one of the few people with whom one could speak openly.

In the summer of 1938, the former Reich Minister and Reichsbank President Dr. Hjalmar Schacht also considered it appropriate to suggest via his friend Montagu Norman, Governor of the Bank of England, that British policy should be more active in maintaining peace, as it had so far given the impression of granting Hitler a free hand in foreign policy! Four weeks later, Chamberlain's shameful reply was received: "Who is Schacht? I have to deal with Hitler." (Who is Schacht? I have to deal with Hitler.) He later received the same rebuff from Roosevelt before the French campaign, whom he also tried to persuade to make a just peace. Of course, no positive answer here either, as Roosevelt did not want to mediate, but was willing to use America's decisive power to destroy the Reich.

The diplomatic conspiracy aimed at overthrowing Hitler began to falter when Chamberlain negotiated with Hitler instead of threatening him. The planned military coup led by v. Witzleben, which was to lead to Hitler's arrest, did not take place. The British had stabbed our conspirators in the back.

At the Nuremberg trial, Gisevius, when questioned by Dr. Schacht's counsel, brought up the astonishing fact that Schacht had negotiated with the American president of the BIS, Mr. McKittrick, in his presence in the spring of 1941. The purpose of this meeting had been to induce Roosevelt to negotiate peace with Germany in view of the impending Russian campaign. Here, too, one recognizes the naivety of the conspirators, who did not realize that America under Roosevelt was not even thinking about negotiations, but rather

must have been delighted to see the war expand in order to increase the chances of intervention. They dreamed of a better Germany and overlooked the fact that their warnings had exactly the opposite effect and thus only weakened the German political situation. The nascent negotiations with the Soviets in the summer of 1939 were also betrayed to the British at Weizsäcker's instigation, when they still believed that together with the Soviets they could successfully conclude the policy of encirclement against Germany. This political secret, which from Hitler's point of view was supposed to serve the preservation of peace, was revealed to the British by the Kordt brothers without hesitation. This was done on the express instructions of Weizsäcker after detailed discussions and with the agreement of Beck, Canaris and Oster. The two Kordt men, shielded by detectives, met with the German-hater Lord Vansittart in the private apartment of their friend Conwell Evans. They pointed out that, for reasons of secrecy, leading members of the resistance could not come from Germany in person and that they were therefore instructed to explain that, in view of the forthcoming treaty with the Soviets, the German opposition would only see a chance of peace if "the friends of peace in Germany and Great Britain planned and worked closely together". Although they were firmly convinced that Britain would not pursue any aggressive aims, they considered the British guarantee policy in the east and south-east to be wrong, as this policy of encirclement would only provoke Hitler and the German people, rightly or wrongly, and give the impression that a war was being prepared against Germany.

This correct statement did not require contact with the conspirators. Hitler had already publicly declared this. But it was the British guarantee policy that revealed Britain's will to go to war. The conspirators were also correct in pointing out that the "Soviet Union had been made 'acceptable again' in Europe by the antichambering of the Western powers". In any case, they argued, Hitler would not be deterred from sitting down at a table with the Soviets in view of this situation, despite all the insults among themselves.

to bring about a conclusion.

The further opinions expressed are then wrong and questionable, "if you do not bring about your 'heterogeneous coalition' and Hitler comes to an agreement with Stalin instead, this will mean war... In the present situation we must prefer even the risk of a temporary encirclement of National Socialist Germany to the certainty of a second world war, which could mean the end of Western civilization". (Erich Kordt, "Nicht aus den Akten", page 313 ff.) It really doesn't get any more naïve than that. One touches one's head when one hears such logic. After all, it remains to be said that our resisters affirmed the encirclement policy of our potential opponents and irresponsibly conjured up the danger of war in the process. Encirclement is always a preparatory step towards war. How Vansittart judged and honored these talks with the Kordts can be seen in Appendix 10, which was presented in Nuremberg.

When war broke out after all, because Poland had become megalomaniacal and relied on the dubious British guarantee instead of sitting down at the negotiating table with Germany to reach a peaceful agreement on the basis of Hitler's moderate demands, Theo Kordt agreed with the German-hater Lord Vansittart on the eve of the British declaration of war to maintain contacts even during the war. To this end, it was agreed that he would be transferred abroad in order to contact Vansittart, Evans or Miss Dogherty, Vansittart's secretary, by postcard with a "Horace verse". Vansittart would then immediately resume contact. This obviously treasonous agreement did not stop there.

From the point of view of the British, one can understand these agreements if one knows that Chamberlain wrote in his diary on September 10, 1939, one week after the British declaration of war:

"What I hope for is not military victory - I doubt very much whether it is possible - but a collapse of the German internal front!" This statement by the British Prime Minister clearly shows that the grave decision to declare war on Germany was largely influenced by the hope of avoiding a life-threatening conflict.

The idea of avoiding a settlement with Germany by creating the highly desired and believed prerequisite for a revolution in Germany.

This explains the monstrosity that the conspirators tricked the enemy England into a cheap victory over Germany by overthrowing Hitler and thus contributed in no small measure to the outbreak of war. But as if that were not enough, Hitler also had to lose the war because he could only be overthrown by his military defeat. Franz Ludwig Schenk v. Stauffenberg, the son of the assassin, saw this quite correctly when he asserted in the Zurich "Weltwoche" of July 15, 1966: "July 20 - unfortunately - proved that even a very carefully prepared attempt to overthrow Hitler from within was impossible. I can only conclude from this fact that responsible German men who wanted to make an active contribution to eliminating the injustice that was happening in Central Europe could only achieve this by defeating the regime militarily."

It is therefore not surprising that after the outbreak of war, the Foreign Office under its State Secretary v. Weizsäcker was not a responsible foreign ministry to help win the war within the scope of its possibilities. It did not place itself at the service of the German fight for freedom, but instead engaged in obstructionism, as they called it, and also betrayal of Europe, as history will one day establish. At the outbreak of war, the conspirator v. Weizsäcker systematically reshuffled co-conspirators in key positions. He himself maintained direct contact with the core of the conspiratorial group around Beck, Goerdeler, Canaris and Oster. Envoy Otto Kiep was transferred to the counterintelligence department and Mr. Spitzzy, a former employee of Erich Kordt, to the central department of Oster's office. Dr. Hasso v. Etdorf was appointed liaison officer between the Foreign Office and the OKH in Zossen.

This meant that important key positions were held by members of the resistance who were prepared to pass on the information they had received to the outside world without hesitation. As agreed with Vansittart, Theo Kordt was given an ambassadorial post in Bern. In Brussels, the ambassador Bülow-

After the Polish campaign, Goerdeler initiated an offer of mediation by the Belgian king and the Dutch queen, which was unsuccessful.

The foreign counterintelligence team in the OKW included the Legation Councillors v. der Heyden-Rynsch and Gottfried Nostiz, who constantly exchanged the enemy situation with Canaris and Oster, which they used as the basis for their fight against the regime. Alongside the Kordts, Adam v. Trott zu Solz was one of the most active conspirators, who sought contact with the American government in vain during a trip to America in October 1939. However, there was not only active and direct contact with the Western powers, but also with the Soviets. The most important man was Rudolf v. Scheliha, Legation Councillor First Class in the Information Department of the Foreign Office. He took part in the office's daily directors' meetings and was therefore an expert on all German diplomatic activities. His colleague was Ilse Stoebe, who had already been in direct contact with the Attache of the Soviet Embassy before the Russian campaign. In the trial against the "Red Orchestra", which began in December 1942, both were convicted of proven Soviet espionage, sentenced to death and executed.

A memorandum dated May 16, 1944, from the American Brigadier General Magruder, who was deputy head of the American secret service, reveals the extent of the treason committed by the July 20th conspirators. The report read:

"1 Since the beginning of 1944, two emissaries of a German group planning an attempt to overthrow the Nazi regime have periodically approached the representative of the Office of Strategy Service in Bern. The group included Leuschner, a leading socialist and former Minister of the Interior of Hesse; Oster, a general who was formerly Canaris' right-hand man, arrested by the Gestapo in 1943, kept under guard after his release and recently dismissed from official functions by Keitel; the former mayor of Leipzig, Goerdeler; and General Beck. The latter two were described by the OSS representative as leaders of the group. Of them, the two emissaries

negotiation proposals.

2. In early April, the envoys spoke with the OSS representative in Bern and suggested an agreement between this German opposition group and the Western Allies. The group expressed their willingness and readiness to attempt to eliminate Hitler and the Nazis. They stated their belief that the time in which a successful operation could be carried out was rapidly shortening. They said they were the only group in a position to benefit from personal contacts with Hitler and other Nazi leaders, and the only one with enough weapons and enough influence in the Wehrmacht to accomplish the goal of overthrowing the Nazis. The group determined that the German generals now in command in the West, especially Rundstedt and Falkenhausen, would be willing to give up resistance and support the Allied land operations once the Nazis had been exposed. They further argued that similar arrangements could be worked out for the reception of Allied airborne troops at strategic points in Germany. While the group agreed to attempt a coup d'état, they could not guarantee success.
3. The condition under which the group agreed to act was that they wanted to negotiate directly with the Western allies alone after the Nazi regime was overpowered. As a precedent for excluding the Soviets from all negotiations, they cited the recent example of Finland, which they said had negotiated exclusively with Moscow. This condition was justified by the group with the conservative character of its members and supporters. However, the group declared its willingness to negotiate with all left-wing elements except the Communists. In February they had described Leuschner as an acceptable man to head an interim government, assuming that neither the military nor the Communists would dominate during the transition period. The group feared that Bolshevism would swamp Central Europe politically and ideologically, with Nazi totalitarianism merely a substitute for

a totalitarianism of the left, accompanied by the

The German government would be exchanged for the demise of democracy and Christian culture. They declared that if the capitulation had to be undertaken mainly towards the Soviet Union, it would have to be carried out by another group in Germany.

4. The OSS representative expressed his conviction to the envoys that the United States and Great Britain would not take action against Germany without the agreement of Russia. In commenting on the opposition group's proposal, he expressed skepticism as to their export possibilities, since Beck and Goerdeler had been so prominently mentioned as possible leaders that the Gestapo must be aware of the situation and only waiting to strike if the plans went forward, or waiting because they might wish to keep an anchor to the west.
5. In May 1944, about a month after the emissaries' April visit to the OSS representative, they received a verbal message from the opposition group by courier. Now Haider, Zeitzier, Heusinger, Olbricht, Falkenhausen and Rundstedt were also mentioned as members. It was reported that the group was prepared to support Allied units in invading Germany if the Allies agreed that the Wehrmacht should continue to hold the eastern front. In detail, they proposed
 1. Three Allied airborne divisions were to land in the Berlin area with the support of the local army commanders.
 2. Larger amphibious landings should be undertaken at or near Bremen and Hamburg.
 3. Landing operations in France were to follow, although Rommel could not be counted on for cooperation.
 4. Reliable German units in the Munich area would isolate Hitler and other senior Nazis on the Obersalzberg. It is reported that the opposition group believes that Germany has lost the war and that the only chance of avoiding communism in Germany is to keep the

Occupation of as large a part of Europe as possible by the American \ and British forces before the Eastern Front collapses.

6. The envoys who had remained in Switzerland replied to the courier that there would be no point in discussing the plan because of the clause concerning the Soviet Union. Later the group sent them a telegram advising no further action for 'the present time'. Nevertheless, the envoys think that the question is still open. They have described the Group's precondition as unrealistic and regard as the essence of the proposal only the plan that the American and British forces should establish themselves in Germany before the Russians arrive. They pointed out that it was an entirely military matter if some of the German generals supported the Allied invasion and wanted the Nazi regime to take over. The OSS representative again emphasized to the envoys that Britain and the United States would honor their commitments to Russia. In reply to the objection that the first point of the group's plan might be regarded by the Allies as a trap, they stated that as non-military men they could only say that sufficient opportunity for the necessary precautions could be provided in the form of direct prior contact with German military authorities. The emissaries said that Zeitzier (Chief of the General Staff, who was replaced by Guderian after July 20; the author) had been won over by Heusinger and Olbricht. They added that although he was prejudiced against the military problems on the Eastern Front, he would cooperate in any plan that would bring about a systematic liquidation of that front in order to avoid the blame for a military catastrophe there, which he very much feared.
7. One of the envoys of the opposition group gave his lack of confidence in the political courage of the German generals based on previous experience and said that the Allies could

would do well to ignore their proposals if they were sure of an early victory and a quick occupation of Germany. The OSS representative in Berne is convinced of the sincerity of this intermediary on the basis of research and previous experience. The representative is of the opinion that there are some German generals who would like to liquidate their responsibility for the war by collaborating in the construction of an Anglo-American bulwark against Soviet pressure in Europe. He is convinced that the two envoys are in contact with such a group. It is doubtful whether the group would have the determination to act effectively at the appropriate time, and knowing the problem of relations with the Soviet Union in the accomplishment of any plan in which the group might be involved, he believes that the group's activity might nevertheless be useful in undermining the morale of the top echelons of the Wehrmacht." (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, December 15, 1966).

ESPIONAGE UNDER THE CLOAK OF RESISTANCE

The term resistance, or conspiracy as it is often used here, implies a legitimate right of the citizen or a multitude of citizens to rebel against the authority of the state when the social community is oppressed. According to the laws of the French Revolution, revolt is the most sacred of all rights and the most indispensable of all duties for the people and for every part of the people when a government violates the rights of the people.

In contrast, the United Nations Human Rights and Civil Liberties are silent on the right to resist. They certainly knew why they did so. For the consistent application of this right of resistance of the French Revolution would grant every minority in the state, however small, including the anarchist, the right to resist and revolt against the state. Every democratic government relies on the majority of its citizens and is obliged to guarantee peace, order in the country and the security of its subjects if it does not want to allow itself to become the bearer of injustice and violence. This was also the case in the Third Reich. However, in order for the right of resistance to be truly lawful and to be perceived as such, its aims must not violate the natural rights of the people of the state and its aims must not be aimed at creating new injustice. So basically the question is what is injustice, to what extent was there oppression, was this war just a whim of Hitler or was it forced upon us, and was it not a question of the very existence of our Greater German Reich, a first achieved by peaceful means since the beginning of the war.

dream that the Führer has been longing to realize for centuries.

leave. Were there not also values to defend that were in the interests of both Germany and Europe? Certainly there were a lot of inconsistencies in the Third Reich, which was built in just over six years, which were quite natural in this enormous development and expansion in all areas, starting from nothing - a bankrupt Weimar Republic with seven million unemployed, groaning under the burden of the Treaty of Versailles.

These inconsistencies, undesirable developments and shortcomings would certainly have been remedied and corrected after the war had been won. The returning front-line soldier would have taken care of this, after the defeat of the external enemy had given us the time and opportunity to do so. After all, back then Germany was a large, strong and powerful empire, well suited to guaranteeing Europe security and peace for a long time to come. Today, this mighty empire is divided into three parts: west-oriented West Germany, pro-communist Central Germany and neutral Austria. In addition, large parts of German territory have been handed over to the Russians, the Poles and the Czechs in defiance of international law and the right to self-determination. Even after the cessation of hostilities, over two million Germans lost their lives.

There is certainly no reason to break out in jubilation over this. The fact that, in contrast to 1918, all this is accepted today as no other nation in the world would do, can only be attributed to the re-education of our people since the end of the war and the negative coping with our past. Added to this was the total exhaustion of the affected generation, which closed its eyes and only took the time to create something out of nothing to make life seem worth living again. In an incredibly short space of time, we West Germans have become a first-rate prosperous state with the second strongest economy in the Western world. The same applies to our East German brothers in different degrees,

which are also at the number two economic level in the Eastern bloc. Our Austrian brothers have also caught up with the European standard to a significant degree. All of this is certainly astonishing and praiseworthy.

But it all happened to the same people who once followed Hitler, who had experienced the cruelty of war. After all, that was eighty to ninety percent of the German population.

Three German states have certainly found their way, depending on the circumstances imposed on them. But is there a sense of rejoicing or even complacency? To ask the question is to deny it. There is no doubt that the so-called economic miracle has spread a certain complacency here in the West German state, a remarkable complacency among the established parties and those in power, but growing dissatisfaction and increasing insecurity among broad sections of the population. This is all the more astonishing as it is most evident in the one of the three German states that is doing best and is the most satisfied. It is becoming increasingly clear that politics is no longer about whether you are on the right, left or in the middle, whether as a politician or an ordinary citizen, but whether you are at the top or the bottom. The dividing lines are no longer drawn vertically, but horizontally. It looks as if the established are above the line and only those who submit to the established and required standards in all areas can join them. Below the horizontal line, on the other hand, an ever-increasing mass of uninvolved citizens are taking their stand, even turning away from these policies. The strange thing is that this is happening precisely in the so-called freest of all democracies, which displays almost anarchistic traits. It is striking that a large proportion of young people, of all people, who in contrast to the older generation, who have worked hard to achieve this standard of living, can lie down in a well-made bed and still turn their backs on this state. But adults and the well-heeled are also increasingly leaving the country and investing enormous assets in the

abroad because they feel their retirement is too insecure here. I don't want to go into these ideas any further here. I just want to point out the fact that today far more citizens are far removed from this supposedly ideal state than was the case in the Third Reich despite the self-sacrificing war. Although this is denied today for propaganda reasons, I believe that once a incorruptible historiography will establish this. Up to now, this subject has always been treated by contemporary historians, the mass media and re-educated teachers in a way that is not objective and does not correspond to the historical truth. Why else has it always been necessary to de-Nazify, ban and destroy books, create laws with retroactive effect in order to condemn, defame the Third Reich to the hilt, enact muzzle laws and seek courts to punish free opinion and testimony? Is the state standing on such feet of clay that it simply wants to ban any factual engagement with a crucial period of history altogether?

I am by no means hostile towards this federal state, I am merely taking a wait-and-see approach. However, I see the resistance to this state growing every day. The current squats and protests by anti-nuclear or anti-war activists and other rebellions seem to me to be the beginning of a disastrous path that is reviving the problem of active resistance in the form of conspiracies against the state. The fruits of a resistance that has been glorified since the collapse are beginning to make themselves felt here, especially as the number of those who are disenchanted with the state is far greater than the former minority of the disenchanted. The danger of such a development of resistance is particularly great for the state with extremely liberal democratic constitutional forms, because it has rid itself of the means available to a tightly managed authoritarian state. This threat to a legal system was bound to occur because in the post-war period there was a deliberate failure to educate young citizens that they do not only have rights,

but also has duties towards the people as a whole. It seems to me that the adulation of the resistance in all its glory has caused many values to be forgotten and forgotten, which will perhaps be sorely needed when times become more threatening. I fear that in such a case we will have an unimagined army of resistance fighters and so-called conspirators who are more willing to serve foreign interests than those of their own country.

THE "RED CHAPEL" AND THE RESISTANCE

The traitor group "Red Orchestra" was a spy network of Moscow spread all over Europe, which already existed on a small scale many years before the beginning of the Second World War and was expanded at the outbreak of the Russian campaign to an instrument that continuously supplied the Red Army with information about almost all strategically and tactically important plans of the German Wehrmacht through about three hundred and fifty illegal radio stations.

The following events show that this group was exclusively in Moscow's service: after the Munich Agreement of 1938, a treaty was concluded between the Frenchman Daladier as Prime Minister and Hitler as leader of National Socialist Germany to introduce a policy of reconciliation, whereby the Reich renounced Alsace-Lorraine for all future. Nevertheless, the French Communists - the German Communists had to remain silent because their leaders had either fled or been sent to concentration camps - began to use the wildest propaganda and provocations to incite openly to war against Germany. But when Hitler and Stalin reached the German-Russian agreement on August 23, 1939, the whole agitation was abruptly stopped. From one day to the next, the smear campaign was directed against capitalist France and England. Acts of sabotage in the aircraft industry and munitions factories became more frequent. When it came to the French declaration of war against Germany the communist leader Maurice

Thorez deserted and fled to his superiors in Moscow, just like

Pieck, Grotewohl and the communist member of the state parliament Herbert Wehner, among others, had already done before. After the occupation of France, the communist propaganda of the French was fiercely directed against the calls of General de Gaulle from London, who had called for national resistance. It was only when the German-Soviet war began that they declared their support for national resistance and founded the FTP "Franc-tireurs et Partisans". Now their hatred was suddenly directed against Germany again, and the capitalists in England were highly valued allies.

Even more dangerous and serious for France was the behavior of the communist partisans after their liberation. They posed as patriots with their armed units. After the war, France lost over a hundred thousand massacred men, women and children as a result of this resistance movement, while many more disappeared into prisons and concentration camps. These were by no means just collaborators who had worked with Germany, but Frenchmen who had at some point distinguished themselves through some kind of activity against Moscow's policies.

Nevertheless, as in West Germany, the Communists lost the final battle for power in the state after the end of the war. Only in the Russian sphere of influence did they succeed in eliminating all democratic forms of government. It is from this perspective that the behaviour of communist organizations must be assessed and evaluated in the future if we do not want to run the risk of having to listen to the music of a myriad of bands in Western Europe in times of tension.

While Red radio communication remained within unexceptional limits until the beginning of the Russian campaign, similar to the AM apparatus that had already existed in the Weimar Republic and was limited to the transmission of information within the framework of the Comintern or Cominform

of industrial espionage, sabotage and propaganda, an extremely lively radio traffic from Germany, the occupied and neutral countries suddenly began from that day onwards, which increased continuously. This was only possible after many years of carefully camouflaged preparation. Hundreds, even thousands of radio messages were sent and received from everywhere.

men. Our ever-growing listening and counterintelligence service was fully occupied with intercepting and decoding the requests and messages. You can get a rough idea of the radio war being waged in this form for the first time in this war if you look at the agents captured at the end of December 1942

On December 5, 1942, the trial against arrested agents of the "Red Orchestra" began at the Reich Court in Lietzensee. The number of those arrested up to this point amounted to one hundred and forty-six, of whom around ninety were convicted of high treason and treason against the country. Forty-five were sentenced to death and executed for proven Soviet espionage. Among them were Harro Schulze-Boysen, Dr. Arvid Harnack, Rudolf von Scheliha, Dr. Adam Kuckhoff, Coppi, Graudenz, Heilmann, Schulze, Schumacher, Gollnow, Gerharts, Schaefer, Himpel, Husemann, Küchenmeister, Dr. Rittmeister, Guddorf, Fellendorf, Hössler, Barth. The women sentenced to death were Libertas Schulze-Boysen, Erika Gräfin Brockdorff, Ilse Stoebe, Dr. Mildred Harnack, Elisabeth Schumacher, Oda Schottmüller, Anna Krause, Marie Terwiel, Erna Eifler, Clara Schabbel and Greta Kuckhoff. The death sentence of the latter was commuted to ten years in prison. Over five hundred radio messages were decrypted.

In the booklet published by the WN-BdA (Bund der Antifaschisten) The brochure "Resistance in the Third Reich" states: "The group increasingly began to assign new special tasks to individual members. John Rittmeister, for example, had the task of listening to foreign radio stations. These messages were used at courses, in leaflets and in the magazine 'Die innere Front'. The war on the airwaves played a major role in the last war. The Schulze-Boysen-Harnack resistance group also tried to convince the German people of the hopelessness of the war and of the need to fight.

crimes of the war. They wanted to prove to the democratically-minded people of other nations that the voice of freedom, human dignity and human respect had not been silenced among the German people despite Hitler's terror and persecution. So they fought a heroic battle in the interests of Germany."

This is how the German people were taken for fools right after the war.

The bourgeois press also adopted such nonsense and dumbed down the German reader. Since when have alleged freedom broadcasts been sent in encrypted form and why were reports on operational and tactical planning, armaments figures and troop deployments able to change the German people's attitude?

The weekly newspaper "Christ und Welt" also took the same line when, among others, H.G. von Studnitz wrote: "Mr. von Scheliha was guilty of an offence which, in the worst case, could be interpreted as an incorrect interpretation of his official duty. He could have been subjected to disciplinary proceedings for this offense and, in the worst case, could have been dismissed." It is significant that Studnitz names Ambassador Dr. Albrecht as a key witness. Dr. Albrecht was under indictment in Nuremberg, but was then suddenly transferred to the witness wing of the court to the notorious prosecuting attorney Professor Kempner. Why do you think Mr. Albrecht was transferred there? Robert Max Wasilij Kempner, born on October 17, 1899 in Freiburg i. Br. and after 1928 employed in the Prussian Ministry of the Interior in the police department, later emigrated, was one of the lawyers in the prosecution team of Jackson, the chief prosecutor of the USA in Nuremberg.

After people had become aware of the dubiousness and danger of such arguments, which was also connected with the emergence of the Iron Curtain, they began to distance themselves from the so-called communist resistance. As I discovered at the Braunschweig trial, the thesis was that the resistance of July 20th was to be completely separated from the communist resistance and that the attempt to treat and evaluate the two groups as a whole was considered a defamation of July 20th.

had to be made. It was believed that this view could be enforced by quickly summoning witnesses, but the mistake was made of summoning not only the conspirator v. Schlabrendorff, but also the July 20 resister Dr. Otto John, who is known to have been a member of the "Red Orchestra".

Why don't they distance themselves from the writer Günthei Weisenborn, who was a member of the "Red Orchestra", but who gave it to the

German resistance. In his first edition of the book, Schlabrendorff also included the names of the executed Communist resistance fighters on the honorary list of executed resistance fighters. There was no disagreement when Ricarda Huch mentioned Colonel Count Stauffenberg and Colonel General Beck in the same breath as the executed Soviet spies Harro Schulze-Boysen, Adam Kuckhoff and Mr. and Mrs. Harnack in her "Aufbruch". Significantly, Mrs. Greta Kuckhoff was chairwoman of the Democratic Women's Association and president of the East Zone Bank at the time.

The later head of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, Dr. Otto John, proved his mindset once again when he moved to East Berlin to join his friends and was later punished for treason. I was in Egypt when I heard about this and immediately went to Oldenburg to serve the rest of my sentence for insulting resistance fighters. I thought this was so delicate because John had played the honorable resistance fighter of July 20th as a witness in my trial and was now proving his renewed treason by defecting to the East, while I felt innocently convicted at the time. After I had arranged for a television crew and a reporter who promised not to turn me in prematurely, I knocked on the prison gate in Oldenburg early in the morning and politely asked to be allowed to serve the remainder of my sentence. I made it clear that it was now important to me that this sentence should be carried out, as John's defection had once again proved my theory of treason. Naturally there was great excitement in the prison. The poor prison warden had his hands full trying to clarify the legal situation in talks with Bonn and Hanover. Meanwhile, I slept in my cell.

Only the television crew did not budge despite repeated requests. After an hour and a half I was told that I had received instructions from above that I was under amnesty and could go home. Yes, that's the way it is. When something becomes embarrassing, they even manage to give the troubled right a chance! But I was still denied my pension. I only hope that this verdict will one day find its way into a well-known joke magazine! Incidentally, I was told that when the verdict was reached, the two judges voted for acquittal, but the three assessors voted for conviction.

Today, Otto John is fighting for a revision of his verdict. I myself have so far refrained from doing so, as I know that there are double standards in political matters. The following incident may serve as a typical example. When Rudolf Hess's son refused to do military service in view of his father's treatment, he was called to account in court. When my eldest son, at the same time, was found fit for military service after the usual examination, he was asked what branch of the armed forces he wanted to be drafted into. His simple answer was: "None!" To the astonished question: "Why not?" came the reply: "As long as my father, Major General Remer, is deprived of his pension, I see no reason to serve!" What happened? Nothing at first. Later, he was examined again and classified as unfit for service. You can get out of an affair so inconspicuously!

But even Dr. Adolf Grimme, former Minister of Culture in Lower Saxony, whose name is still used today to award the cultural "Adolf Grimme Prize", cannot deny that he demanded the "Red Chapel". Two thousand Reichsmark, which he said he had received from Dr. Arvid Harnack, were found hidden over a beam in his house. The money came from the Soviet spy chief Alexander Erdberg in Berlin, from the time before the outbreak of the German-Soviet war.

It would be time for the Swiss intelligence service to open its archives in the interest of historical truth.

In this case, it was Dr. J. C. Meyer, now deceased, who, under the code name "Q, N.", as an agent leader of the Swiss intelligence service, together with Rössler, made Swiss espionage material f r o m German sources available to the Soviets. It would be desirable if his Swiss superior at the time, the still living Major Dr. Max Waibel, who maintained direct espionage contacts with the highest military command authorities, would name his informants. Who, for example, was the Berlin industrialist who had such first-class contact with Keitel, who was the general without command, who was the embassy councillor in the intelligence department of the Foreign Office, who was the supply colonel in the army high command, who was the best-informed German journalist and Ribbentrop's confidant?

On page 269/270 Karl Balzer writes in "Der 20. Juli und der Landesverrat" in connection with the successful Soviet agent Rössler: "Just as little as his ten companions did this man, Rudolf Rössler, originally have the disposition to be a conspirator. The others - Helmut S..., Hermann F..., RudolfG..., Fritz T... and GeorgT will ultimately be generals, O . . . Colonel and K . . . Major. The last three - S . . . , A . . . and O . . . - will only make it to captain."

Walter Görlitz commented on the publications by Accoce and Quet in the "Welt", Hamburg, of March 15, 1966, and suspected that behind Helmut S . . . was Major General Stieff, head of the organizational division of the army, behind RudolfG.... the General of Infantry Rudolf Gehrcke, Chief of Wehrmacht Transportation, and behind Georg T ... the General Georg Thomas, Chief of the Wehrwirtschafts- und Rüstungsamt.

Dr. Wilhelm Ritter v. Schramm, lecturer at the University of Political Science in Munich, goes even further and sees behind Fritz T... Lieutenant General Fritz Thiele, head of Wehrmacht intelligence, and behind Hermann F . . was General Hermann Foertsch, head of the press in the Reichswehr Ministry from 1932 to 1936 and commander-in-chief of the 1st Army at the end of the war. Further, behind O . . . Oberst could be assumed to be Colonel and later Major General Oster. Of those named, General Stieff, Lieutenant General Thiele and Major General Oster were executed after July 20 for taking part in the conspiracy, while General Thomas was only suspected and was executed.

was temporarily arrested.

According to a series of articles in the Zurich "Weltwoche" of May 20, 1966, it is certain that Rössler passed on the information he received from the so-called July 20 conspirators in Berlin to the Western powers and the Soviet Union and thus had an invaluable influence on their fortunes in the war.

Rössler continued his espionage activities after the war. In 1953, he was arrested by the Swiss federal police and sentenced to nine months in prison in Lucerne on November 5 of the same year. Together with his friend Dr. Schnieper, he had delivered NATO military secrets in West Germany to Prague and thus to Moscow.

Dr. L. Weißloch reports on this in the Kaufbeurer Geschichtsblätter of October 1980 on page 307: "Another interesting fact: One of the Rössler informants was the former SPD member of the Bundestag and former Sudeten German Alfred Frenzei, who was sentenced to 15 years in prison for treason by the Federal Court in Karlsruhe in 1961, although the judges in Karlsruhe did not know this at the time. (Alfred Frenzei also visited the Kaufbeuren airbase as a member of the Bundestag's defense committee).

Rössler served his sentence in 1953/54, returned to Lucerne and died in 1958. Six months before his death, he had told the 18-year-old son of his friend Dr. Schnieper the names of his German confederates from the Second World War. During a game of chess, he told him: "When you are a mature man and all those involved are dead, you may mention their names publicly. A year and a half later, Schnieper junior was killed in a car accident. There has been wild speculation ever since about what secret Rudolf Rössler and Schnieper Jr. took with them to their graves."

The best-informed journalist and confidant of Ribbentrop mentioned above was undoubtedly the later Federal Minister Ernst Lemmer. He was listed by "Rado", the head of the Geneva headquarters, with the source name "Agnes". A radio message to Moscow reads: "Von Lemmer, member of the Ribbentrop office . . . I will call him Agnes in future." In any case, a series of espionage reports

from Lemmer to Moscow as: "Tanks of the propaganda companies are in Bryansk awaiting the entry into Moscow, which was planned for October 14, then 20 . . . Heavy coastal and naval artillery on the way from Königsberg and Breslau to the Moscow front for days." On September 16, 1943: "From Agnes. For the first time, official Berlin circles admit the possibility of a collapse on the Eastern Front. Reserves are exhausted." And so it goes on.

There is no question that Lemmer's information was passed on to the Soviets to the detriment of Germany, thus proving that the informants were not careful in the selection of their alleged friends and were thus practically in contact with the "Red Orchestra".

Gisevius reports in "Bis zum bitteren Ende" on page 241: "Consequently, the close-knit Stauffenberg circle sought an alliance with the extreme left, the Communists. The main initiator was government president Fritz Grafv. der Schulenburg, son of the well-known army commander from the First World War, who had already paid homage to communist ideas as a corps student in Göttingen. He then joined National Socialism via the intellectual socialists. Once again in the opposition from 1938, it was he who won over Stauffenberg and from then on was closest to him, certainly the most active in the inner circle, he took a sharp stance against the candidacy of the 'reactionary' Goerdeler. In his place, he nominated Dr. Julius Leber, the far-left former social-democratic Wehrmacht adviser in the Reichstag, as chancellor of the 'younger generation'. Since then, the opposition had been splintered. For it was neither about the person of Goerdeler nor about Leber, it was about two diametrically opposed wills... (this is also the reason why Goerdeler was not informed by Stauffenberg about the intended assassination attempt on July 20, so that Goerdeler was unaware and therefore could not be in the Bendlerblock at the decisive moment; the author).

The best thing to do is to ask the Social Democrat Emil Henk report: 'An unexpected event, as so often before, once again threw all plans overboard. At the end of June, members of the Kreisauer Kreis had meetings with the so-called ZK (Central Committee of the

KPD) began. This CC consisted of three men: Jakob Saefkow, Franz Jacob and my recollection Schwenk. From the socialist side, Dr. Leber and Professor Reichwein took part in the meetings.

took part. At a second meeting, to which Reichwein went alone, all those involved were arrested. It turned out that one of the three men from the Central Committee was a Gestapo informer.""

Here it is confirmed in black and white that the conspirators of the July 20 with the communists existed and should be further deepened. This is further proof that the July 20 people cannot be easily separated from the communists of the "Red Orchestra". So there was a connection. It is also clear that Stauffenberg was much more inclined to come to terms with Moscow than with the West. This is basically where the mistrust of today's Americans within NATO was sown, that Bonn's arrangement with Moscow could take precedence over a clear confrontation with the Eastern striving for power. The fact that German NATO soldiers live in Stauffenberg barracks is certainly not a good omen for the Americans, if they are intelligent enough to learn their lessons from history.

Just as today with the left-wingers in the SPD, the conspirators of July 20 were in close contact with the Reds who worked for Moscow. Examples of this include Rudolf v. Scheliha, leader of the "Aryan" group of the "Red Orchestra", as a first-class legation councillor in the Foreign Office, as well as First Lieutenant Werner Gollnow from the Canaris Office, who was in charge of the department for airborne troops and parachutists there and also belonged to the close-knit "Red Orchestra" group.

"Coro" belonged to them. But that's the way it is today. If you don't allow yourself to deal with our recent history, you can put forward theses that don't stand up to the search for historical truth.

It makes you sick to read the content of the entire treason report, which made it easy for the enemy to organize his war actions in such a way that seamless espionage provided him with the concrete documents for his enemy image. It would take a book of its own to give all the details. I will confine myself to giving a summary description of the organization of the "Red Orchestra" as described by the outstanding expert on the subject, Karl

Balzer, in "Der 20. Juli und der Landesverrat" on page 246/47:

"Practically everything that could be betrayed was betrayed. As early as November 1941, the General Staff of the Red Army knew that an offensive against the Caucasus had been planned for the summer of 1942. It was revealed that Leningrad would not be decisively attacked, but only destroyed. Likewise, the figures of our armaments industry, the production of our aircraft, ammunition, tanks, Tigers, all weapon renewals, the exact troop deployments and troop strengths, the names and dates of the outgoing submarines, the operational and tactical plans of the General Staff of the Army, Air Force, Navy and so on were betrayed to Moscow.

The 'Red Orchestra' consisted of the following groups in Berlin, whose main task was to obtain valuable news and information, which was immediately passed on to Moscow by a separate radio department:

Group 'Coro', headed by First Lieutenant Harro Schulze-Boysen, his wife Libertas, Colonel Gehrts (IC in the Reich Aviation Ministry), First Lieutenant Hermann Gollnow (Defense Department in the OKW), Trade Representative Johannes Graudenz, News Radio Operator Horst Heilmann, Heinrich Scheel, factory owner Leo Szczribczynski, Hans Gerhard Henning, construction inspector at the Ministry of Aviation Group 'Lips' was led by Mrs. Libertas Schulze-Boysen, whose colleagues Erika Gräfin v. Brockdorff, the shorthand typist Maria Terwiel and the journalist Ilse Stoebe.

The 'Dancer' group, led by the sculptor Oda Schottmüller, consisted of Dr. Philipp Schaefer, the library inspector Elly Lotte Schleif and the graphologist Anna Krause.

The 'female doctor' group, led by Dr. Elfriede Paul, had Dr. Rittmeister and writer Walter Küchenmeister as colleagues. The 'Engineer' group was led by engineer Paul Scholz, who was assisted by his wife Herta, director Thomfor, engineer Hans Henkel, engineer Karl Boehme and chief engineer Hans Hummerow.

The 'student group' was led by Horst Heilmann, whose

The employees were student Gussow, constable Alfred Traxl and student Helmut Himpel.

The "Arvid" group was led by Senior Government Councillor Dr. Arvid Harnack; the main collaborators or informants were: His wife Dr. Mildred Harnack, Dr. Adam Kuckhoff and his wife Greta Kuckhoff, the writers Ernst Niekisch and Günther Weisenborn, Dr. Adolf Grimme, the publisher Marcel Melliand, the pianist Helmut Roloff, the designer Karl Behrens, the university assistant Eva Buch and the shorthand typist Rose Schlösinger.

The "Aryan" group was led by Legation Councillor First Class Rudolf v. Scheliha, whose employee was Ilse Stoebe.

Harro Schulze-Boysen had already made contact with the Soviet embassy in Berlin in 1936 and was already working as an informant against Germany at that time. A number of intermediaries, informers and a group of experienced old party communists, agents and radio operators, some of whom were parachuted into Germany from Moscow, also worked with the main figures mentioned. Some of the members of the "Red Orchestra" were paid by the Soviets. Even before the outbreak of the German-Soviet war, the Soviet spy chief Alexander Erdberg in Berlin gave Dr. Arvid Harnack 12,000 RM, Dr. Kuckhoff 1,500 RM and a radio set. Harnack paid out RM 2000 to Dr. Grimme, RM 5000 to Behrens, RM 3000 to Szczribczynski and RM 1000 to Rose Schlösinger.

When the Soviet agent Heinz Könen was caught by the police during his parachute jump on October 23, 1942, he had 8,000 RM with him, which he was supposed to bring to Mr. v. Scheliha. Ilse Stoebe not only brought v. Scheliha the instructions of the Soviet agent Rudolf Herrnstadt, but also 30000 RM in February 1941. In February 1938, the Soviets had already transferred 6500 US dollars to v. Scheliha via the Lyon bank to v. Scheliha's bank account at Julius Bär & Co in Zurich." It seems important to me that the German resistance did not even realize that the "Red Orchestra" was not a German resistance movement, but exclusively a purely Soviet espionage organization. The Soviet instruction may be cited as proof that there was an explicit order from

Moscow stated that before new connections could be established by the agents, the head office in Moscow had to be informed. This was only possible after explicit authorization.

The goal of the Soviets has always been the revolutionary conquest of Europe. Before Hitler came to power, the German Communist Party was at least as powerful as the NSDAP. However, with the destruction of this party apparatus after 1933, the illegal BB apparatus (Betriebsberichter-Betriebsspionage-Apparat) was simultaneously eliminated, so that the Soviets were forced to relocate this espionage and sabotage organization to neighbouring countries. The result was that this organization was considerably strengthened in Belgium, Holland, France and Switzerland, in which the current risk factor Wehner also played a major role. He organized on behalf of Moscow from Sweden, was exposed and received a year in prison for this espionage. Today he is leader of the SPD parliamentary group and, together with his loyal followers Brandt, Bahr and Ehmke, who had all come to the attention of the Federal Intelligence Service because of the conspiratorial nature of their activities, initiated the new German Ostpolitik. Gehlen notes this in his book "Verschlußsache" published after his death on page 117/118 :

"Wehner's political activities in Germany can be interpreted as follows: First version:

1. Wehner broke away from communism and renounced its teachings (see Wehner's attempts at justification in the so-called 'Notes'). However, Wehner later partially revised his decisions and made this clear through his behavior and actions in decisive phases of German politics.
2. The Soviet leadership then took Wehner back as a 'prodigal son'. They accepted Wehner's efforts to 'rehabilitate' him and supported his dominant role in the opposition and government coalition. Since then, there has been no more talk of the 'traitor' and 'democrat'.

Second version:

3. Herbert Wehner is irrevocably committed to turning away from communism. His commitment to liberal democracy and his

Attacks against the communists inside the FRG are genuine. Its behavior towards the Soviet Union and its satellites, including the GDR, is determined solely by 'realpolitik'.

4. The Soviet leadership respects Wehner's attitude, right down to his distanced statements towards the communists of West Germany. In return, however, Moscow expects Wehner to continue to confirm his special good behavior and unreserved support for Soviet policy towards Germany and Europe."

This analysis is not unambiguous either. It only leaves room for conjecture and continues to puzzle, as it does for all those who at some point in their lives have engaged in conspiracy, resistance and treason. It is the quiet tones of conspiracy that still cause anxiety and uncertainty to this day, not his rumblings in the Bundestag.

It was also these quiet tones of conspiracy that allowed Moscow to quietly rebuild its intelligence service, which had been smashed in Germany, with an increased incorporation of Red Army officers from 1938 onwards. At the end of 1938, a Russian officer entered Ostend in Belgium with forged papers and a Uruguayan passport. His name was Vicente Sierra, in the organization he was called "Kent" or "Petit Chef". He was joined by two other Russian officers, Daniloﬀ and Makaroff. The latter came with 10,000 dollars and was given the name "Carlos Alomo". To avoid attracting attention, they only took up residence months later with a "Fritz" and a "Pierre", both members of the Soviet trade mission in Brussels.

Daniloﬀ was ordered on to Paris, where he went into hiding in the diplomatic service of the Soviet consulate and was given the French name "Desmets". At the start of the Western campaign, both were ordered to allow themselves to be overrun by the Germans, which they succeeded in doing. These planned radio groups, which were joined by a communist trained in Moscow, regularly sent their agent reports to Moscow under the code names "Kent" and "Hermann". A third radio station was set up by the Soviet captain Konstantin Jefrenoff, who had already registered in early 1939 under the name of a

The organization was set up by the Finnish student Jernström to gather intelligence in the field of warfare agent production. The connections extended as far as Switzerland and the Kassel area. The fourth radio group to be set up was intercepted at the beginning of July 1942 when the 63-year-old agent parachuted in from England. The biography of this man is more than interesting. He was the Dutch pastor Kruyt, who had worked for the Soviet trade mission in Berlin since 1935. From 1937 he lived in Russia, where he was prepared for his task.

Holland also had its own broadcasting group, which continuously reported troop movements, details from the Dutch arms industry and other military and political information to Moscow. This group had been set up by the Dutch communist Winterink before the outbreak of war. It was also under the command of the Soviet officer Jefrenoff and was supervised by the German Johann Wenzel, a former functionary of the German Communist Party. They maintained various radio stations in Amsterdam and Rotterdam with extensive contacts into the Reich and operated under the name of "Hilda" summarized.

In Paris, in keeping with the importance of this place, a senior Russian general staff officer under the name of Monsieur Gilbert was head of the import and export company "Simex", which was registered with the Chamber of Commerce in Paris. It had branches and subsidiaries in Rome, Prague, Oslo and Stockholm, as well as sister companies in the protectorate in Raudnitz on the Elbe and in Bucharest. The managing director of this company was Leo Großvogel, who, before joining the "company" in April 1939, had sold a textile goods business to the Russian agent Makaroff for

200,000 Belgian francs. It was, of course, a wonderful disguise. You could go in and out without arousing any suspicion.

The same company was also duly registered in Brussels. Here the agent "Kent" was registered under his passport name Senor Vincente Sierra with a number of Belgians, who were even ordinary merchants, as members of the board of directors. Soon the company "Simex" in Brussels with the German Wehrmacht administration and the organizati-

on Todt in order to supply the Wehrmacht. At first, nobody suspected that, in addition to profitable business, it was also doing good intelligence work for Moscow. In his espionage activities, Gilbert went by the cover name "Grand Chef" or simply "Otto". He was in charge of a number of other radio stations in France, consisting of members of the French Communist Party and emigrated Belarusians, who often carried the messages on two shoulders. The decoded radio messages in June/July 1941 alone contained reports on monthly German aircraft production, the fuel situation, the intended attack on Maikop, the location of the German headquarters, the extent of serial aircraft production with type designations, the concentration of chemical warfare agents in Germany, knowledge of a Russian radio key in Petsamo, losses of German paratroopers on Crete, the transfer of German air units from Crete to the east.

There were also instructions from Moscow that "Kent" was to contact Schulze-Boysen and Adam Kuckhoff in Berlin. Contact was also to be established with the consulates in Stockholm and Istanbul. Furthermore, preparations were to be made to be able to report in detail on American and British landings by stationing radio stations on the Atlantic Wall. It is clear at first glance that an almost worldwide espionage organization was set up here, the significance of which cannot be minimized.

As numerous as the radio stations may have been, they were repeatedly smashed by our listening and reconnaissance service. But time and again new radio stations were set up with the help of new Soviet agents and local communist organizations. In the spring of 1942, the German defense was faced with difficult, almost unsolvable problems. Well over a hundred transmitters had to be monitored and located in order to apprehend them. As in all other countries, they were singled out and arrested in the same way. They were carried out by the executive organs, either by the secret state police or the field police. The one-sided agitation against the

"Secret State Police" is therefore meaningless. They

fulfilled its task just like the defensive units in a clean and commendable performance of duty.

In the same way, the CIC and the military police or FBI were responsible for counter-espionage in the United States, for observing and investigating espionage traps, while the French used the Second Bureau and the Surete or military police for arrests. In each case, spies were tried and severely sentenced according to the law, as happened almost indiscriminately in other countries. It is simply perverse and criminal to want to glorify the kind of fighting that stabbed our fighting front in the back and cost much blood through treachery, and to trivialize it under the heading of "honourable resistance". One should think of the espionage organization that is already ready today to stab the Front in the back again in the future. This will be "many times" larger in Western Europe than in the last world war. In addition, there is an enormous partisan organization, which will be all the more effective if the Marxist leftists continue to be nurtured and allowed to flourish.

After all, under Hitler, Marxism belonged to the historical past. That was also the reason why the resistance from Marxist circles essentially came from bloodless intellectuals and was never a mass organization, because they lacked the workers. The people's community, which had been put into practice, had taken Marxism off the ground.

The "Red Orchestra", however, was not a resistance organization, but a spy network set up by the Soviets to overthrow the government, not to create a democratic Germany, but a Soviet soviet republic, as they have succeeded in doing today everywhere east of the Iron Curtain.

The documentary "Das Geheimnis der Roten Kapelle" (The Secret of the Red Orchestra), published in 1978 by Gert Sudholt at Druffel-Verlag, proved that the conspirators of July 20th also used the "Red Orchestra" to make their treason reports accessible to Moscow via the Soviet agents in Switzerland.

From an American report on the activities of the "Red Orchestra", which was published in 1976 from the secret archives of the American

Exterior

Ministry, it emerges "that at least three of Rössler's four main sources were men of the resistance against Hitler or key players of July 20: Hans Bernd Gisevius, the former mayor of Leipzig Goerdeler and General Oster". ("The Secret of the Red Orchestra", p. 11).

GERMAN TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENT FAR AHEAD OF THE WESTERN POWERS

It is always claimed that, contrary to the propaganda of the propaganda ministry, our technical development was only a simple invention of Goebbels. A report I have received from a member of the U-234 ordered to Japan speaks a different language. It reads in short form: "In the spring of 1945 I was assigned to 'U-234'. The boat was a type XB minelayer converted for special tasks with 1760 GRT, 4200 HP and a crew of 52. The commander was Kapitänleutnant Fehler. The boat sailed from Kiel to southern Norway on March 23, 1945. On April 15, 1945, it dived at Christiansand South for an underwater voyage, initially heading for a passage between Iceland and the Faroe Islands. The destination of the voyage was Japan. The mission was to take General der Flieger, Kessler, to Tokyo as air force attache with staff and technicians. The tenno had requested that the air defense of the Japanese islands be built up with the weapons developed in Germany. In addition to the general, two air force officers were on board, as well as a naval anti-aircraft specialist from the navy, a specialist in underwater weapons, a low-frequency specialist from Professor Küpfmüller's staff, two Messerschmitt engineers, specialists in the construction of the ME 262, and two Japanese frigate captains. One of them was Captain Tomonaga, who had been involved in the construction of our small combat boats as a specialist for one-man submarines.

The boat's cargo consisted of twelve steel cylinders fitted into the mine shafts, containing extensive microfilm material on the last

Status of German inventions in the field of offensive and defensive weapons

Our research results in the field of high and low frequency technology, especially for missile and missile defense technology, as well as our research results in the field of nuclear energy and nuclear technology, also made a decisive contribution to the development of nuclear energy and nuclear technology.

After crossing the Iceland Strait and twenty-eight days underwater at an average depth of eighty meters, we received the surrender order from Grand Admiral Dönitz on the night of May 12-13 while snorkeling over our snorkel dipole. At the time, we were in the mid-Atlantic on a position south-east of the Newfoundland Banks.

The order addressed the commander of 'U-234' in a very personal tone to hand over the boat without destroying it, together with its valuable cargo. After twelve hours of consultation and deliberation, Lieutenant Captain Fehler, in agreement with General Kessler and after informing the two Japanese frigate captains, decided to carry out Dönitz's order and surface for the handover. The two Japanese officers committed suicide before surfacing. Eight hours later, 'U-234' was picked up as a prize by the American destroyer 'Sutton' and transferred to the US naval port of Portland (Maine).

The American officers and officials who interrogated us afterwards were extremely dismayed by the contents of our submarine. They reproached us for the fact that none of us could obviously appreciate how valuable our cargo had been. At the end of July 1945, the head of the investigation team finally explained to me that the material in the micro-records and the statements of our technicians proved that we had been '100 years ahead' of the Western powers in decisive technical facilities and developments."

The adoption and utilization of advanced German inventions and their exploitation, as in the case of "U-234", was only a foretaste of what was systematically initiated by the victorious nations after the capitulation. The American aid of the so-called "Marshall Plan", which is so praised today, meant in the

In relation to the systematic plundering of German scientific and technological inventions, this was only a small compensation for the values stolen from the German nation. The quality and scope of these forward-looking developments show that Germany was in a unique leading position at the time and was by no means at the end of its tether or even completely bled dry.

Anton Zischka writes in "Was it a miracle?" on page 149 f: "As the New York magazine 'Life' stated on September 2, 1946, 'the real reparation gain of this war' was not in industrial equipment, but 'in the German brain and in German research results'. But even if the Americans were the initiators of the 'intellectual dismantling' of Germany, it was carried out by all the victors. When the Second World War came to an end, the experts of the French 'MIST', the Russian 'WN.Z.' and the British 'BIOS' were just as ready as those of the American 'OTS'. The London management of these 'British Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committees', for example, said openly: 'The manufacturing secrets we are taking from Germany are a harder blow than the loss of East Prussia. Even Australia's Prime Minister Chifley admitted in a radio address in September 1949 that 'the booty of 6,000 German industrial reports and 46 German scientists given to Australia' had a value that could not be calculated in gold and now put Australian producers in a position to take a prominent place in world industrial production'. . . So great was the booty that very soon the documents could no longer be counted, but their paper weight was given. The US Air Research Station in Wright Field, Ohio, thus obtained 'the undisputed largest collection of captured secret procedures in the world', weighing 1554 tons. An official of the 'OTS', the Office of Technical Services in Washington, called this office for the distribution of Germany's technical and scientific advances 'the first organization in the world for the exhibition of the inventive power of an entire nation'; they had over 3000 tons of files confiscated in Germany."

Udo Walendy comments on this in "The methods of re-education -Historical Fact No. 2", page 17: "But so that no-one can get away with-

and describes all this activity as 'illegal', as robbery and plundering, even as a crime, it is important to make sure that the principle of all Germans of that time were constantly defamed and treated as criminals, barbarians, "war criminals", "militarists", "fascists" (with the propagandistic accent of diabolical wickedness) and that none of such undesirable people who might hold such opinions could hold any position from which they could reach the public. Therefore Allied control officers at German universities, Allied writers or assistants to rewrite German history books, as many foreign lecturers in history and political science as possible at German universities."

And Anton Zischka continues on page 153/154 in "Was it a miracle":

"And if the Nazis, who were certainly not squeamish, removed a total of 1628 university teachers (and retired them), no fewer than 4289 professors and lecturers fell victim to the anti-Nazis in 1945, who did not receive any pensions. As "Christ und Welt" calculated in 1950: the Nazis removed 9.5 percent of university staff, the Allies 32.1 percent. Almost one in three German university lecturers in the West lost their teaching and research positions at the hands of the victors. And in Germany as a whole, it was one in two . . . By 1946, 1028 professors and lecturers from the eastern territories and central Germany had already arrived in what would later become the Federal Republic of Germany as refugees without a position, and later thousands more. But denazification had only just begun in 1946. According to Control Council Directive No. 24 of January 12, 1946, which stipulated the "immediate removal of former National Socialists from all offices and numerous professions", 37,376,762 people in the American zone alone had been found unsuitable for any public function or work in the economy other than as "manual laborers" by the end of 1946.

And there was a method to it: denazification served the purpose of intellectual dismantling and formed part of the Morgenthau plan."

I have never heard of resistance fighters objecting to this

would have risen. The vast majority of them were again on the side of the victors.

Udo Walendy continues on page 17: "But there were other Germans: those in leading positions in the private economy, at schools and universities. The Western Allied Operation 'Paper Clip', named after the riders on the search map for German scientists, had been running since 1944. They hunted for 'living knowledge' and also craved their patents and trade secrets. In the end, both were stolen. According to the US Department of Defense in February 1950, 24,000 German researchers and technicians were 'questioned in detail' and 523 of them were 'brought to the USA', 362 of whom were 'invited to take steps to naturalize in the USA', which they did. According to the rider of 'Operation Paperclip', these German scientists had already saved the USA at least 1000 million dollars in armament costs and at least ten years of development time by May 1949." So not only were German secrets and patents stolen, but German "accomplices" were also used to put these pioneering inventions into practice. This happened in both East and West. It would be interesting to find out how many of these scientists belonged to the German resistance or feel an inner connection to it today. In any case, they have intentionally or unintentionally contributed to the armament of both world giants, the victims of which we and Europe will hopefully not have to foot the bill for tomorrow.

THE COUNCIL AT THE PEENEMÜNDE RESEARCH INSTITUTE

While the saboteurs among the scientists had succeeded in preventing the construction of the atomic weapon, this was not the case with long-range weapons. During the war, our rocket researchers Wernher v. Braun and Dr. Dornberger were of a different calibre than their colleagues in nuclear physics. As responsible Germans, they served their country unreservedly because they knew what they owed it.

In the development and production of long-range weapons (V 1 and V 2), as with other types of weapons, there were repeated setbacks from the outset for various technical and personnel reasons. Of course, this was the same as with any translation of scientific research results into technical reality and practice. However, the development and production of the V-weapon was set back by betrayal and sabotage to such an extent that its timely and effective use at the front was no longer possible. The enemy was so fully informed about the production of our new weapon that it was easy for them to destroy our production facility with targeted bombing raids.

The enemy's informant was the conspirator Dr. Otto John, who betrayed the research and testing facility of our V-weapon, Peenemünde, to the British.

The treasonous activities of Dr. Otto John would hardly have become known if, after his defection to East Berlin, the English colonel Daniel Shapiro had had any reason to maintain the discretion he had exercised until then. It is important to know that this colonel, in collaboration with Sefton Delmer, who broadcast his smear programs to about 300 emigrants on the enemy radio station in Calais at the time.

against Germany

who was the guardian of the deserter Dr. Otto John. His report was first published in "Stern" on August 8, 1954. It read: "At first he (John) was introduced to me as Oskar Jürgens. I couldn't imagine anything about that. It was only when this Mr. Oskar Jürgens started talking about Peenemünde without any context that I pricked up my ears. . But I still didn't understand. I simply wasn't prepared to suddenly be sitting opposite the man who had given us Peenemünde and its mysterious testing station for wonder weapons. After all, it was a big deal, and up until then it was the biggest success of our intelligence service. I remember it very clearly: the report came from Berlin, from well-informed air force circles. It had come to us via Spain, whereupon the RAF first sent Mosquito reconnaissance planes to Peenemünde and soon afterwards 600 bombers. And the man we had to thank for all this was now sitting in my office with badly dyed hair.

That was the beginning of my acquaintance with Dr. Otto John, who had been given the code name 'Oskar Jürgens'. He remained in my care for the next week. I accommodated him in Knightbrigde in one of our so-called permanent houses. That was the rule, and no exception could be made for Dr. John, despite all the recognition of his merits. I hope, however, that he felt at home with us. The villa was comfortable, and outwardly there was nothing to distinguish it from the staid, bourgeois villas in the neighborhood. The staff were dressed in civilian clothes and carried out the surveillance unobtrusively and discreetly. There were certainly not many houses in the whole of London at that time where the cooking was better than here. And if we had kept a guest book, Otto John could have signed in under prominent names."

In this report, the significance of the betrayal is clearly emphasized and reference is made to the source of the Reich Aviation Ministry, where the "Red Orchestra" also had its field of activity. It is almost certain, that John had close contact with these circles . His

His defection to the East only confirms his mindset. That such a man could rise to become head of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution after the war, should give even the most simple-minded people food for thought. It would have been better for the welfare of this Federal Republic if the German parliament had not passed the unlawful abolition of the statute of limitations, but rather stricter penal provisions up to and including the death penalty for treason. That would have been a good and forward-looking thing that would have been widely applauded by the people. But contact with the people does not seem to be a matter for our rulers today. They are more subject to pressure from outside.

Otto John was also summoned to my trial in Braunschweig, which was about the question of treason and treason against the state. There he energetically distanced himself from any kind of treason and did not even blush when he told the court the untruth. In particular, he stated that the men under the term July 20, 1944, among whom he counted himself, had been idealists and responsible German men who had been far removed from treason. Unfortunately, I was not aware of John's despicable role at the time. I would have expressed my contempt for him in court.

Today we know that on June 19, 1944, John flew from Berlin to Madrid on Stauffenberg's orders to find out from General Eisenhower's American military attaché whether a "soldier-to-soldier" armistice negotiation, as Stauffenberg wanted, would be possible after a successful military coup. John was supposed to wait for the planned coup in Madrid, but contrary to this plan, he was called back prematurely by the Abwehr with a coded radio message from Colonel Hansen. John arrived in Tempelhof in Berlin on July 19, 1944, one day before the failed coup attempt. The next day he was called by the co-conspirator Major Haefliger, who informed him that everything was underway and that the executive power had been taken over. What John then went on to do is beyond my knowledge. He deliberately kept quiet about it, just as he never said a word about his traitorous

activity of the Peenemünde surrender. The only thing that is certain is that he was able to leave Berlin unchallenged on July 24, 1944 by plane, even though he had been recognized by Gestapo officers carrying out checks.

"Otto John was" - according to the book "End of a Legend" by Hans Frederick - "taken from Lisbon on December 12, 1944, accompanied by the embassy's commercial attaché there, Harold Middleward, on a special RAF plane to London. Taken over by members of the military counterintelligence service, he was subjected to another check there. This was merely a routine procedure that all foreigners who came to London under similar circumstances had to undergo during the war. But the routine vetting in John's case came to an end very quickly, as authoritative figures such as Winston Churchill, Lord Vansittart, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, the Bishop of Chichester were waiting for his reports.

In the wartime London to which John was flown, there were a large number of German political émigrés who had the same motto as Ottojohn: 'Against Hitler - for Germany'. However, they were far worse off. They were either interned or degraded to political passivity. Only a small circle managed to break out of this wall of 'enemy evaluation'. Political cooperation was only possible for those Germans who were willing to propagate the Allied doctrines of unconditional submission, collective guilt and the division of Germany. Ottojohn was one of the chosen few.

Early the next morning, John was taken to Kensington Palace Gardens by a military patrol. There John had to undergo a detailed interrogation by various special officers. The complex of questions by no means only covered the events of July 20th, as Otto John's special reports, which had been received from London from Madrid and Lisbon, had already reached a considerable level of intelligence content.

These interrogation protocols, supplemented by Johns in London again

written reports were interesting enough for Prime Minister Churchill to listen carefully to an oral report from John afterwards.

When the game began for Ottojohn in Madrid in March 1942, it was the recommendations of Prince Louis Ferdinand of Prussia that brought him to the attention of the British and American chargés d'affaires in Madrid.

Dr. Josef Müller, known as "Ochsensepp", acted as an accomplished conspirator for the Canaris-Oster conspiracy group's connection to the Western Allies' enemies thanks to his good relations with the Vatican. After the war, he was CSU Minister of Justice in Bavaria (top left).

The late Dr. Wilhelm Scheidt, who was to take on the role of the German traitor "Werther" in order to cover up the trail of the real traitors (top right).

Werner Heisenberg, nuclear physicist and Nobel Prize winner, was jointly responsible for sabotaging the development of a German atomic bomb during the war (bottom right).

**The American spy chief Allen Dulles
(top right).**

**Dulle's secretary Gero v. S. Gaevernitz
(top left).**

**Dr. Hans Bernd Gisevius, who provided
i n f o r m a t i o n for the American
secret service from the ranks of the
resistance (bottom right).**

Rudolf Rössler,
known as "Lucy",
the Soviet chief spy
in Switzerland,
who passed on a
great deal of
information from
the German
resistance to the
Soviets, with his
colleague Dr. Frans
Josef Xaver
Schnieper

Trial before the
People's Court.
Standing: Minister
President Dr. Eugen
Bolz, far right:
Fabian
v. Schlabrendorff.

Also in the dock of the
Berlin People's Court:
Ambassador
Ulrich v. Hasseil,
to his left Paul
Lejeune-Jung.
Both were to
b e l o n g to the
coup government.

Carl Goerdeler, the civilian head of the conspiracy, who poisoned the German-British relationship in the pre-war years through multiple treasonous conspiracies to such an extent that it made it easier for the British warmongers to declare war.

Above: Goerdeler, arrested while on the run, before the People's Court, where he was sentenced to death and later executed.

Below: Dr. Carl Goerdeler at the laying of the foundation stone of the Richard Wagner memorial in Leipzig in 1934. From left to right: Winifried Wagner, Adolf Hitler, Lord Mayor Goerdeler, Reich Governor Mutschmann and Dr. Goebbels.

about Juan Terrassa. His targeted information, which he had received directly from Beck, Hammerstein and Oster for this purpose, did not fail to have an effect

The fact that even a Hohenzollern prince allowed himself to be carried away to such actions is probably unique. He was unable to prevent the destruction of Prussia by the Allies.

"In November 1943, John turned up in Madrid again. The military attache at the American embassy there, Colonel Hohenthal, received him for a confidential interview. Hohenthal had previously worked as a military attaché at the American embassy in Berlin and was therefore no stranger to John. At the time, the contact had been established by the American journalist Louis Lochner.

The return journey took place on December 16. Otto John made a detailed report for Colonel Hansen and Stauffenberg about his talks with Beaulaue and Colonel Hohenthal.

His new interlocutor Otto John's outstanding knowledge in the field of military technology also caught his eye. He was very well informed about the state of development of nuclear research and nuclear weapons in Germany. He obtained his information from the first circles. Above all, facts from the so-called Uranium Association were of particular importance. This group of around a dozen scientists, chaired by Nobel Prize winner Heisenberg, was working on plans for an atomic bomb. In the fall of 1943, Otto John was able to report in Madrid that the production of an atomic bomb was ready on paper, but that it was not yet possible to manufacture it for technical reasons. At the same time, it was also possible to report on the status of the V-1 and V-2 weapon project in Peenemünde. .

Otto John's efforts were also aimed at obtaining real information from his contacts about the Allies' position on the issue of unconditional surrender. His sources in London and Washington gave him the following ideas: The Allies are not expected to make concessions in terms of unconditional surrender. It is expected that the collapse of the

Russians in Germany, and the English and the Americans will make no special effort to get to Berlin before the Russians do. It is felt that Germany deserves to be punished, and the Western Allies prefer to leave that to the Russians." (Hans Frederik, "The End of a Legend?", page 53).

It is astonishing what information a man like John could have at his disposal. This again proves the close contact that must have existed between the individual traitor groups. Here, too, men like Professor Carl-Friedrich v. Weizsäcker and people like Rosbaud and Dr. Wirtz must have played a sinister role. The fact that a Hohenzollern prince also acted as a go-between will certainly depress some monarchists.

In his book "Grenadiers", Panzermeyer provides us with a telling account of John's attitude and character on page 347: "At the end of April (1945), I was ordered to the camp commandant (this was prison camp no. 7 near Windermere in England; the author). The manner in which I was ordered and escorted could not mean anything good . . . To my astonishment, the commandant was not present, but instead a man in uniform shouted at me, who obviously had no idea how a soldier in uniform should behave in order not to become the laughing stock of those around him.

Dr. Otto John, later President of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, once a wanderer between two worlds, did himself the honor of performing his duties as England's beadle. He shouted to me in a slaving voice: 'Do not leave this camp without permission! If you ever try to escape, your body will be taken back to the camp. You won't see your family again anyway! If this wretched creature had suspected the contempt with which I listened to her hateful ranting, she would certainly not have strutted through the camp like a peacock flapping its wheels, but would have sunk into the ground in shame.'

This Mr. John, of all people, contributed as a witness for the prosecution,

that I was convicted for allegedly insulting the resistance fighters in the Brunswick trial!

The greatest perversity of our history, however, is the fact that after the war a top traitor of the greatest magnitude was able to become the head of the newly established Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, with the task of spying on decent and dutiful German front-line soldiers in the GPU manner. Otto John was not a soldier during the war, but an in-house lawyer at Lufthansa and was able to travel abroad unhindered during this time as he was in possession of a passport authorized by Admiral Canaris' Abwehr. His function as head of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution was ended in 1953 by another betrayal, namely his defection to the East. After his return, he was punished for treason. The old German proverb: "The cat never lets the mouse out" proved to be true once again. Otto John was, as has been proven by police questioning of his brother Hans, not only a member of the 20th July resistance, but also a member of the "Red Orchestra".

Today the world knows that in 1939 we were by no means the most heavily armed state in Europe, as is the case now. Since coming to power, the development of our economy has been of primary importance. Here, too, there was no armaments industry exclusively serving the war effort, as was the case in other countries. As late as 1939, Hitler had issued instructions to the Wehrmacht that no new weapons were to be expected. At that time, we were demonstrably not equipped for a two-front war or even a world war. The Wehrmacht at that time was just sufficient for a major punitive expedition. Only the Polish campaign forced upon us changed the situation.

As a statesman, Hitler was also a revolutionary in the military sector. The formation of independently operating armored units, which were able to penetrate deep into enemy territory through long advances, originated from his ideas and brought us astonishing military successes even against a superior opponent. Similarly, he had also recognized the importance of

ranged weapons. After the Polish campaign, when his peace efforts went unanswered, he pushed ahead with the new strategy with missile weapons. He had a large-scale test center built in Peenemünde under the leadership of

The project was under the control of the German Reich Aviation Ministry. This project was the responsibility of the German Reich Aviation Ministry. The construction and development of this test station progressed rapidly and produced surprisingly quick results. But this promising development was abruptly interrupted on August 17, 1943, when 600 British bombers destroyed this center of German long-range weapons. The entire facility, which had previously cost more than 500 million Reichsmarks, burned to the ground. Over 700 scientists, engineers, technicians and workers lay under the rubble. The large-scale offensive deployment of these weapons was therefore delayed in terms of both time and capacity. This was to have fatal consequences for the fight against the Allied invasion that began in June 1944. In his book "The Secret Weapons of the Third Reich", page 10, David Irving provides us with a statement by General Eisenhower that clearly shows the importance of these long-range weapons: "If the Germans had succeeded in completing these new weapons six months earlier, the invasion of the European continent would have been extremely difficult and perhaps impossible." At a briefing with Hitler on June 17, 1944 in the aforementioned Margival, eight kilometers north of Soisson, which Field Marshals v. Rundstedt and Rommel had urged, the problems of the invasion front were addressed. In particular, the failure of their own air force was pointed out. According to Speidel "Invasion 1944", page 117, Hitler is said to have replied "that he had been deceived by the Luftwaffe leadership and technicians. The most diverse types had been developed side by side without reaching a practical result in time." In the further course of this discussion, the possibility of using V-weapons was also mentioned. In order to clarify this question, the commanding general of the V-weapon, General of Artillery Heinemann, was called to the meeting, who explained that the dispersion range of the rockets was still about fifteen kilometers and would therefore endanger his own troops if they landed in a confined space. Today, however, we know that these rockets are already

were ready for series production in 1941, but their use was

The project had to be postponed again and again due to a considerable amount of sabotage and bureaucratic obstacles.

For example, technical inadequacies could be eliminated very quickly by consulting the experienced Professor Messer-Schmitt, after saboteurs from the Reich Aviation Ministry had long resisted the involvement and cooperation of relevant specialists in the work for V-1 and V-2. As we know, there were a large number of so-called resisters and traitors here who were initially able to carry out their disastrous sabotage unnoticed.

In this battle, a report by the Inspector General of the Luftwaffe, Field Marshal Milch, dated October 21, 1942, to his chiefs of staff is noteworthy. Along with Heydrich, he was one of the few who had seen through Canaris' treachery. David Irving writes about this report in "Tragedy of the German Air Force", page 246: "Screening only serves a purpose if it is carried out by the reliable Gestapo. It is pointless if it is done by the Abwehr. I would like to make this expressly known. I forbid any kind of screening by the Abwehr; any screening must only be carried out by the Gestapo, because otherwise we have no guarantee that it will be successful. I cannot tell you why. I have my own specific reasons and evidence."

He then spoke about the activities of the "Red Orchestra". "There is a circle of certain people involved in this matter, that is, in absolutely proven treason, which is five times as large as what is sitting around this table. Not a single worker is involved. But instead, gentlemen, half of the high nobility and their relatives are represented. People of whom one could assume that they would be fiercely reactionary and loyal to the emperor, whom one would never trust to cooperate with Communists, that they would betray their fatherland to the Communists."

Graduate engineer Gerhard Frank from Kierling in Austria, then commander of a V-1 launching pad, reports on his discoveries of sabotage on the missiles: "The thin pneumatic hoses for the compass and rudder adjustment were attached to

difficult to access

points. This led to early crashes of our shells, often into our own lines, to circling or even return fire, which sometimes caused heavy losses in our own territory. Losses not only in our own ranks, but also among the civilian population of the occupied territories. In such cases, the blame was naturally placed on the German soldiers, thus poisoning the atmosphere. I myself experienced such a concrete case during a circular run into a small Dutch town.

As far as we knew at the time, most of the V-1 shells were assembled by concentration camp prisoners. There is no question that there was sufficient desire and opportunity for sabotage. However, the acceptance controls in the production facilities were undoubtedly carried out by own officials were carried out. The extent to which acceptance inspections were carried out carelessly or sabotage was even carried out by political opponents among the inspectors can hardly be answered today. Unfortunately, given the catastrophic extent of betrayal and sabotage in the last war, the latter possibility cannot be dismissed out of hand." (Karl Balzer, "Verschwörung gegen Deutschland", 2nd edition, page 366). It was similar with the sabotage involving the so-called "barrel". This was an explosive winged missile that was mounted under an airplane and flown into the target area. The missile was released and then independently headed for the intended target. The technical remote control device, which was the most advanced at the time, was remarkable. At the head of this rocket was a television recorder with an optical system that was automatically replaced by one with a different focal length. This recorder transmitted the captured images to two television screens, one of which was installed in the carrier aircraft itself, while the other was located at the airport for monitoring purposes. A remote control system was also installed under the television screen, which could be operated by a gunner of the aircraft making the turn. This gunner then followed the flight of the released missile on his screen and was thus able to make directional corrections to the aircraft.

the intended target. He was therefore able to prevent the missile from breaking away and make targeted course corrections.

take. This was a huge step forward, which meant that every missile had to reach its target.

Here, too, progressive scientists and technicians had achieved a major feat that gave rise to hopes of decisive successes, primarily against naval units. The development work in Karlshagen, Jesan, NeuMecklenburg and Röchlin had been carried out with tremendous diligence and personal commitment. Everything was ready for production. After this special department had been transferred to the Sudetenland, a request was made in the spring of 1944 for the allocation of a combat squadron to test these operational rockets in combat. Inexplicably, here too everything was delayed due to difficulties in competence. When a squadron was finally made available for the deployment of this "ton" in the Adriatic in June, there was a new delay, which was typical of the deliberate sabotage. Special multi-plugs were needed to connect the cables in the machines. Thousands of these were stored in Berlin-Straußberg. When the required multi-plugs were requested under the highest degree of urgency and couriers were even sent to Berlin for this purpose, they returned without having achieved anything on the grounds that this depot was under the control of a high-ranking Wehrmacht officer who refused to hand them over. Instead, the visit of General Fellgiebel, Wehrmacht Intelligence Service, was announced, who was supposedly already on his way. It then says literally on page 374 f. in Karl Balzer "Verschwörung gegen Deutschland", 2nd edition: "We breathed a sigh of relief. Scientists and technicians, who had been working non-stop for weeks on the completion and testing and had only been able to keep themselves on their feet with chemical tonics, were filled with new hope: in the end everything would work out after all!

The arriving for the plant tour General of the
The situation is described to the intelligence troops. In view of the urgency, we ask him to personally arrange the release of the required plugs, as we only have three days until the

finally ordered deployment. The general remains extremely obliging, but does not commit himself. When he wants to leave the factory again after four hours of trivial discussions, I (a production manager on the staff of Fernseh GmbH; author's note), stand in front of him.

in the way and politely asks for the necessary signature. 'I have more important things to do now' is his laconic reply. I refer to the experimental missions of the 'Tonne', which give rise to the highest hopes, I refer to the imminent deployment, which is ordered by the Führer's headquarters, I refer to the insignificance of the formality of a single signature

.....Outside my office,

I do not issue signatures on principle. Come to my office in Berlin in eight days' time tomorrow. We will then see what can be done. Besides, the war will go on for a long time and you won't be too late! Leaves me standing there without a greeting and drives off in his car . . .

Shortly afterwards, the equipment was transported away - not to the Adriatic - to a storage room in Klein-Machnow. I found them there again in November 1945. The Russians had discovered them, mistaken them for radios, turned them - and when no music sounded, they simply doused them with gasoline and set them on fire. But General Erich Fellgiebel, a member of the intelligence unit, was executed on September 4, 1944 for his involvement in the July 20 assassination attempt."

As we know today, the so-called "ton" was used for the first time in the Korean War. This supposedly American invention was announced at the time with the comment that it was one of the most significant in the field of war technology in recent years and that its impact on the future could not yet be estimated.

BETRAYAL AND SABOTAGE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE GERMAN ATOMIC BOMB

In this chapter, too, I refer to the documentary works of the author Karl Balzer, who in "Conspiracy against Germany" shed light on the sabotage of the development of a German atomic bomb by examining the revelations of the English publicist David Irving in "The Dream of the German Atomic Bomb" and the book "My Life" by the discoverer of nuclear fission, Otto Hahn, which he analyzed exhaustively and commented on aptly.

Professor Otto Hahn discovered uranium fission at the end of 1938. During the war, he was director of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Chemistry. His closest colleague was Dr. Fritz Straßmann. On December 22, 1938, this discovery was published by the editor of the journal "Naturwissenschaften", Dr. Paul Rosbaud. He was the great traitor who, from the very beginning, exposed all the research and progress of the German nuclear physicists and the work at the Vermork sulphur water plant (southern Norway) to the British secret service, so that it was severely damaged by a British-Norwegian sabotage operation.

In 1938, after 30 years of collaboration, Otto Hahn had to part ways with the Austrian Dr. Lise Meitner because, as a Jew, she was too great a risk factor. Despite being banned from leaving the country, she was able to emigrate to Sweden with the help of Hahn and others. Here she spent Christmas with her nephew, Dr. Otto Frisch, also a nuclear researcher. Frisch was an employee of the world-famous scientist Niels Bohr in his Copenhagen laboratory. During these days, Lise Meitner received a letter from Dr. Hahn about his discovery, the significance of which was immediately clear to her and her nephew.

While Mrs. Meitner remained in Sweden, Frisch immediately went to Copenhagen to visit Niels Bohr, who was half-Jewish. David Irving reports in

"Dream of the German atomic bomb" on page 31: "He (Frisch) also explained to Bohr what conclusions he and his aunt had reached with regard to the amount of energy released. Shortly afterwards, Bohr traveled to the United States, where he stayed for several months. The secret traveled with him across the Atlantic."

On January 26, 1939, Niels Bohr reported on Hahn's discovery and the resulting release of enormous amounts of energy at the Conference on Theoretical Physics in Washington.

Just two days later, Hahn and Straßmann referred to the consequences of uranium fission in the journal "Naturwissenschaften" under the title "Nachweis weiterer Bruchstücke". They talk about the release of unimaginable amounts of energy due to the avalanche effect or chain reaction. During the war, Professor Werner Heisenberg was involved theoretically and experimentally with the use of nuclear energy. Carl Friedrich Freiherr v. Weizsäcker, a son of Ernst v. Weizsäcker, the state secretary and top conspirator in the Foreign Office, also belonged to this group.

Irving reports on a discussion between the German nuclear physicists gathered in Farm Hall in English captivity, which, in addition to Professors Hahn and Heisenberg, included Dr. Erich Bagge, Dr. Kurt Diebner, Dr. Horst Korsching, Professor Walter Gerlach, Professor Paul Harteck, Professor Max v. Laue, Professor Carl Friedrich v. Weizsäcker and Dr. Karl Wirtz, which took place on 6 August 1945 after the American bomb was dropped on Hiroshima.

"In the hours that followed the news broadcast, the discussion became increasingly acrimonious. Dr. Korsching said that the Americans had obviously cooperated to a considerable extent. Unfortunately, that would have been impossible in Germany. Everyone said that the other was insignificant/ - 'I think the reason why we didn't do it is that all physicists didn't want to do it, basically not', claimed v. Weizsäcker.

And he added: "If we had all wanted Germany to win the war, we could have succeeded."

Naturally, there was a heated debate about this treacherous statement, in which Professor Gerlach in particular, who had been Reich Marshal Göring's plenipotentiary for nuclear physics since the beginning of 1944, was most concerned about the German failure. Dr. Bagge stated after Irving (page 16 f.): "I think it is absurd for v. Weizsäcker to declare that he did not want the work to succeed: that may be true for his case, but not for all of us."

Professor Paul Harteck was also horrified; he and Dr. Wilhelm Groth had reported to the Reich War Ministry on April 24, 1939, "that the latest discoveries in nuclear physics would probably make it possible to produce an explosive that would be many orders of magnitude more powerful than all conventional explosives". The same report pointed out that the Americans and British placed great emphasis on nuclear research, whereas here in Germany it was very much neglected. It goes on to say: "The country that is the first to make use of it has an unassailable superiority over the others." The name Professor Harteck repeatedly appears as the driving force behind this far-sighted research, even during the war years. The result was that as early as September 1939, the Army Ordnance Office endeavored to create a central institute for the research group of all scientists involved in nuclear physics. The building of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Physics in Berlin-Dahlem was intended for this purpose. However, this project was delayed due to the obstinacy of almost all the researchers, who also saw the project of harnessing nuclear fission primarily as a welcome opportunity to avoid military service. According to Irving on page 51 of his book: "And as one of the young physicists concerned, v. Weizsäcker admits that he accepted the orders for military research in 1939 from the army office because his other research would not have exempted him from military service."

There has never been a lack of willingness on the part of the Reich government to help the

to provide every conceivable support for nuclear research. However, there was little sympathy on the other side. Although it was said that "German science was in the service of the war", the our leading scientists obviously acted contrary to these principles. Even under Gerlach's new rule, the efforts and payments were used for research areas that could have no influence on the outcome of the war. Irving writes ironically on page 238 f.: "As far as he (Gerlach) was concerned, the new slogan could have been: the war in the service of German science."

The publications by Professor Hahn and Dr. Fritz Straßmann as well as the forwarding of information received from Germany to the Americans by Professor Niels Bohr, the so-called "Pope" of theoretical physics, made the Americans prick up their ears even before the outbreak of war. Coming from abroad, five scientists had come together there who could be described as the actual initiators of the development of the atomic bomb. They were Enrico Fermi, Teller, Szilard, Weisskopf and Wigner, all of whom were Jewish apart from the first named. Fermi, however, had a Jewish wife.

As early as March 17, 1939, Fermi had a conversation with members of the Navy Ministry and tried to draw their attention to the danger of German nuclear weapons production. As these gentlemen did not recognize the significance of this communication, Fermi turned to Albert Einstein, who, as is well known, always became active when others had brought the scientific preliminary work to a certain level of maturity. It was also he who wrote to President Roosevelt on August 2, 1939 and March 7, 1940, warning of the imminent danger coming from Germany. His second letter stated: "Since the outbreak of the war, interest in uranium has increased in Germany. I have now learned that research there is being carried out in great secrecy and has been extended to another of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institutes, the Institute of Physics. The latter is run by the government and a group of physicists under

C. F. v. Weizsäcker, who is now working there on uranium in collaboration with the Institute of Chemistry. The former director was sent away on leave, apparently for the duration of the war."

The former director was none other than Dr. Debye, who was replaced and found it necessary to sound the alarm. If any further proof of his treasonous activities were needed, it was his own revelations, which he made public himself when he appeared in America at the end of April 1940. He not only spoke to journalists about the circumstances of his leaving his old position in Berlin-Dahlem, but also about the fact that this institute, which he had previously headed, served "other purposes". He had made discreet inquiries and learned that a large part of the institute was being used for uranium research. The result of his irresponsible gossip was that an extensive article appeared in the New York Times which, as we now know, reported in tones of highly disturbing exaggeration that every available physicist, chemist and engineer in Germany had been ordered to "leave all other work and devote himself exclusively to this work. All these researchers, it was learned, are feverishly carrying out their task in the laboratories of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Berlin." (Irving, page 67 ff.).

Unfortunately, as is now clear, this newspaper report did not correspond to the facts. If it had been true, Germany would probably have won the war and Europe today would be an indomitable bloc without the worries and hardships of total disorder after the war.

Unfortunately, however, the gentlemen at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute had different ideas about German warfare and the fighting commitment that was a matter of course for the front-line soldier. Once again, the English historian gives us an insight into the incomprehensible mentality of some of the scientists responsible. On page 57 of the book "The Dream of the German Atomic Bomb" it says:

"Dr. Karl Wirtz remarked to von Weizsäcker that they suddenly had 'Nazis' in the institute - what to do about it. Wirtz himself gave the answer to his question: Somehow, with the help of

Weizsäcker went to Diebner's office and suggested that Heisenberg be invited to join the institute as an advisor; Diebner, who had nothing to do with Heisenberg's work, was not interested.

Weizsäcker immediately went to his friend Wirtz and explained to him that Diebner had not aroused any suspicion and that Heisenberg could come. The famous professor would continue to live with his family in Leipzig and travel to Berlin once a week."

And so it happened. Initially, Heisenberg was only a scientific advisor. The next step was then logical. At the suggestion of the two traitors, Professor Heisenberg was to be appointed director of the Institute on October 1, 1942, in order to bring him completely under the influence of the sabotaging forces of Weizsäcker and Wirtz. As Irving reports, "he was now completely under the influence of the two politically aware physicists who had pulled off this coup". The other scientists who **w e r e** in on it, or at least not unaware of it, scoffed, referring to the abbreviation

"WHW" of the German Winter Relief Organization: H-Heisenberg sandwiched between W-Wirtz and W-Weizsäcker (Irving, page 57).

According to Professor Heisenberg, there had been a "clear road to the atomic bomb ahead of us" since September 1941. There is no doubt that we were far ahead of American research at that time. While the latter still had virtually no uranium metal at the end of 1942, the Reich was already able to produce one ton of pulverized uranium metal per month in 1940. Irving writes on page 84: "By the time Fermi's reactor in Chicago made history, Degussa in Frankfurt had produced over seven and a half tons of uranium metal, 99 percent of which was available to German scientists. It wasn't the industry that let Germany down, it was its scientists." Professor Heisenberg proudly admitted his sabotage of the German war effort in a Spiegel interview after the war (No. 24/52), stating: "We have never

tried to produce atomic bombs and are glad that we did not have to take on this responsibility."

On the other hand, during the war they were not afraid to give the impression that they were working intensively on the military use of uranium fission. A typical example of the lack of interest in this work, but also of the naivety of the responsible employees, is a

An incident that took place in June 1942 at a conference between the Minister of Armaments Speer, the participating Field Marshal Milch and some nuclear physicists. David Irving reports on this on page 303 f: "When Speer asked Heisenberg and v. Weizsäcker in June 1942 how he could best help them, the two complained that they were making no progress because they were not getting the necessary building material allocations; but when he asked how much money they needed, v. Weizsäcker hesitantly spoke of an amount of 40,000 RM. Field Marshal Milch remembers: 'It was such a ridiculous figure that Speer looked at me and we both shook our heads at the unworldliness and naivety of these people. Speer says today: 'I had already come up with a figure of 100 million Reichsmarks as suitable when von Weizsäcker's reply came. Dr. Vogler (then head of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society; the author) was terribly embarrassed by this faux pas; he left the conference together with Speer and had an extremely negative impression of the whole project. Speer told the scientists they could have any amount they asked for, but after that he didn't care much about the core project.

The scientists in question would now like to explain that this was their intention, that they had no desire to work on a uranium bomb. Heisenberg certainly succeeded in making it clear to his listeners that the production of such a weapon in Germany was almost impossible, but he admits that during the war he and his colleagues had overestimated the actual difficulties of producing the necessary fissile material. That is why they never made a serious effort to draw attention to the possibility of making atomic bombs."

It is certain that at this point the neutron multiplication had succeeded by about 13 percent. This is clear from the report that Heisenberg and Döpel had forwarded to the Army Weapons Office. It was only a matter of extending these process methods to a uranium burner from which energy of the same order of magnitude as atomic energy could be extracted. It had been calculated that a pile with a capacity of approx. 5 tons of heavy water and 10 tons of cast uranium metal could be created. Our scientists were thus able to build the world's first "self-excited" pile with a "chain reaction". The uranium burner LIV was still submerged in its water tank in Leipzig on June 4, 1942, when a secret meeting of all the scientists involved took place in Berlin with Speer, accompanied by Otto Saur, the head of the technical office of his armaments ministry, Professor Porsche, Colonel General Fromm as commander-in-chief of the replacement army, with the head of the army office General Leeb, Field Marshal Milch and Admiral General Witzei, who held the same position in the air force and navy as Leeb. Among the scientists present were Professors Heisenberg, Otto Hahn, Dr. Diebner, Professor Harteck, Dr. Wirtz and Professor Thiessen, who had written a letter to Göring three months earlier on his own initiative about the importance of splitting the atom. Also present was Dr. Albert Vogler, the president of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society

and Chairman of the Supervisory Board of the Vereinigte Stahlwerke, was also present.

In connection with the catastrophic area attacks by the Royal Air Force on Lübeck, Rostock and Cologne with over 1,000 bombers, Professor Heisenberg immediately mentioned the military application of nuclear fission and explained the production of an atomic bomb. The words caused a certain amount of consternation among a number of participants in nuclear physics, such as Dr. Telschow, the secretary of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society, as Heisenberg's research had previously only been associated with the so-called "uranium furnace".

In his lecture, Heisenberg explained that there were practically two nuclear explosives, namely uranium 235 and element 94 (plutonium). It was also known that protactonium could be fissioned by fast neutrons.

and can cause chain reactions, but it is not possible to produce this protein in sufficient quantities.

"The exchange of questions and answers that remained most deeply rooted in the memories of all those present came at the end of

Heisenberg's presentation. Field Marshal Milch asked how large a bomb would be that would be enough to destroy a large city.

Heisenberg replied that the explosive charge would be 'about the size of a pineapple', and he emphasized this answer by showing the size with his hands. This statement caused an uncomfortable stir among the non-physicists present. Heisenberg therefore hastened to dampen the enthusiasm, as he explained: even if the Americans could have a uranium pile very soon and a uranium bomb in two years at the earliest, if they worked single-mindedly towards such a goal, the production of such a bomb in Germany was currently an economic impossibility. Such a bomb could not be produced within a few months anyway . . .

Heisenberg, on the other hand, emphasized the importance of the uranium reactor, both for Germany's military plans and for post-war development. Otto Hahn's diary shows that Speer approved the construction plans, which included a large air-raid shelter with special equipment to house the first large German uranium reactor; it was to be built on the site of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Physics in Berlin-Dahlem." (Irving, page 122 ff.).

This created all the conditions for further work. The scientists now had it in their hands to make their appropriate contribution to the German victory and thus to the preservation of a strong, unassailable Europe. They did not seize this opportunity. Instead, under the pretense of serving science, they failed to provide their fatherland with the means to prevent the loss of this war and the misery it caused through concentrated work geared towards a single goal. On the contrary, they led our leadership to believe that they were working on the military use of uranium nuclear research without actually doing so. They had no scruples about giving the war economy all kinds of raw materials, money and

to deprive them of manpower. And this only happened so that they could pursue their quiet job in the service of science and in reality avoid military service. When Heisenberg, v. Laue and others were drafted into the Volkssturm in December 1944 following the relocation of the departments from Berlin to Hechingen, Haigerloch and Tailfingen, Professor Gerlach wrote to Reichsleiter Bormann on December 16 protesting against this request, pointing out that it would jeopardize work of the utmost importance to the war effort.

But Irving has this to say about Professor Gerlach: "Professor Walter Gerlach was a man whose ways were mysterious, and there were few in the German Uranium Association who fully understood his motives. Above all, many did not understand why he allowed two research groups to compete with each other for the material needed to build uranium burners. Was it to create a healthy spirit of rivalry? Or was it to ensure that neither group received sufficient quantities of the scarce materials? Or was it to spare the largest possible number of physicists from front-line service? .

As far as it was necessary to enforce his wishes, Gerlach also continued to make allusions to explosives¹. When he was forced to withdraw the last remaining high-voltage particle accelerator, which had been built for other purposes, from a Dresden factory, he considered himself justified in emphasizing at a meeting in Berlin in October that this 'high-voltage facility is needed for explosive physics experiments, for which purpose no other facility is available'." (Irving, page 270 f.)

Some of our responsible nuclear physicists had other ideas and concerns from the very beginning, but not the willingness and readiness to make their work available to the German people's struggle for existence. It is significant that Heisenberg traveled to Denmark at the end of October 1941 to visit Professor Niels Bohr, at a time when German troops were standing in front of Moscow and were giving their all in order to achieve a nuclear war before the onset of the first Russian winter.

to achieve a decisive victory. At this meeting, Mr. Heisenberg wanted to clear his conscience and persuade the "Pope" of nuclear physics to advocate that all the world's expert scientists should stop working on the production of the atomic bomb. This is about the same as if he were to join an anti-nuclear demonstration today and believe that the world would therefore stop a development that has long since begun.

Apart from the fact that one can only describe such behavior and requests from a full-grown professor as naïve and unworldly, it also fulfills the full extent of the crime of sabotage against one's own people. In this context, to speak of

Whether a physicist has the moral right to work on the production of an atomic bomb in wartime is all the more astonishing as such contacts in wartime with hostile foreigners and with the undisguised offer of sabotage reveal a maximum denial of moral values, for the sake of which he initiates such discussions. For Niels Bohr, at any rate, it was not so much the evaluation of a moral right that was at the forefront of this question, but the clarification of the reason for such a request. This question presupposed that the Germans were in possession of the key to the solution of such a project. Hence the prompt counter-question from the Danish researcher as to whether the use of nuclear fission in the military field was possible at all? Professor Heisenberg now felt compelled to admit this based on his latest findings.

This admission caused consternation on both sides, for Niels Bohr because he believed that the Germans were about to overtake the Americans in nuclear research, and for Heisenberg because the Danish physicist considered military research by physicists throughout the world to be inevitable and therefore correct. Never have foreign nuclear scientists, unlike German conspirators and saboteurs, so consciously put their scientific interests above the welfare of their people.

placed.

The conversation is all the more incomprehensible as Heisenberg must have known that the mentor of physics, Niels Bohr, was half-Jewish and for his part maintained very close relations with the Jews who had emigrated to America, who had declared war on us, and that all such information was passed on immediately. America entered the war against Germany in the same year, on December 12, 1941, having already continuously broken the neutrality rules. It was therefore inevitable that, as a result of Albert Einstein's influence, all non-military uranium research projects were immediately halted from the day America entered the war and only work on the atomic bomb was allowed to proceed with vigor. While our opponents were always informed about the progress of our work, the Germans knew next to nothing about the American state of development. The Americans knew what they owed their country and kept their mouths shut.

On the contrary, everything was done to cover up the sparse rumors about American atomic bomb projects coming via Stockholm. Nevertheless, when a short report of this kind appeared in a small physicist's journal, there was great concern that German leadership circles might find out about it. David Irving writes about it on page 248 f:

"Fortunately for Professor Schuman and the other military research directors, the publication does not seem to have caused much of a stir. Like Professor Esau, Schuman was terrified that his superiors might say something to Hitler about the atomic bomb and that the order would then come that such a bomb was to be built in six months. So it was better not to say a word."

Conversely, some of our scientists took no offense at publishing their research results during the war. On July 6, 1942, Hermann Göring felt compelled to make the following statement to the Reich Research Office in the Air Force Ministry about such lack of understanding: "The researcher has lived too long individually in this direction. One can hardly

when you read that a congress on this or that physical or chemical subject was held in New York or London, and you can see the urge with which a researcher, as if he could no longer hold it in his bubble, spread his results. It was all wonderful, everyone knew about it. Only those who would have been interested in making use of it usually didn't find out. First of all, they can't read the papers that the researchers published; at least I'm too stupid to do so. There are so many formulas swirling around that you can't find your way through them. As a result, those of us who were interested in these things usually learned nothing. On the other hand, our colleagues in England, France and America knew exactly what kind of egg our colleague in Germany had hatched."

An interview with Dr. Schröder shows how Professor Hahn felt about research results that had to be kept secret even after the war: "I published everything we did. During the war, I was once advised by official authorities to publish our

to keep my work secret, but I didn't bother." Any soldier would have lost his head for betraying a secret during the war. But apparently the lack of freedom and oppression repeatedly attributed to the Third Reich was not so great after all that our scientists could allow themselves to do such things with impunity. Despite Professor Hahn's claims to the contrary after the war, there were constant links with America through Professor Niels Bohr.

Nor is it true that we in Germany lacked the technical prerequisites for the production of an atomic bomb during the war, but we did lack the will of some leading scientists to do their utmost to develop such an atomic bomb, although the prerequisites were in place both on the part of the leadership and the industry. Sufficient uranium was available from the mines in Jáchymov in Bohemia-Moravia. Initially, not enough heavy water was produced in Vermork near Rjukan, but the electrolysis plant was quite ready.

in a position to increase production to 1.5 tons per year. There was also the possibility - as Professor Harteck had strongly recommended - of building a second plant in Saheim in Norway. I.G.-Farben in Leuna had also agreed to build a large heavy water plant in Germany at its own expense using the Harteck-Sueß process. According to Heisenberg's calculations, the priority was to have about 5 tons of heavy water available to achieve a chain reaction in the uranium reactor.

Professor Harteck had already written to Heisenberg on January 15, 1940, informing him that the time needed to produce heavy water (D₂O) could be reduced to a fraction with the cooperation of major German industry. But it was not until April 30, 1942 that Professor Esau, who had been appointed by the Ministry of Education as the new head of the atomic energy project, reached an agreement with the director H. Bütetisch of I.G. Farben and the relevant staff of the Army Weapons Office on the production of heavy water in Leuna, after the problems of energy production had been discussed in detail. This all happened rather late. Until then, the company had been content to increase the production of Vermork.

Precisely because Leuna was of crucial importance for nuclear research, one would assume that this plant enjoyed special German military protection. Even the first unsuccessful sabotage attempt on a plant in 1942 should have made those responsible sit up and take notice and resulted in increased protection. But nothing of the sort happened. The result was a second sabotage attack on the night of February 27-28, 1943, which, according to British nuclear researchers, set German research back by two years.

Today we know that this catastrophe was not only due to the gossipiness and communicativeness of some of our nuclear researchers, but that a planned betrayal was the cause of this event. The Berlin scientist Dr. Paul Rosbaud, a "close friend of Professor Hahn", knew how to maintain the trust of his German colleagues throughout the war without arousing suspicion, and was thus the best person in the world to do so.

taught as an agent for the British secret service. Even before the war, it was he who had reported to the English professor R. S. Hutton from Cambridge about the secret nuclear research conference of April 29, 1939. On the basis of this information, Hutton immediately came to Berlin and shortly afterwards passed on all the information he had received to Dr. J. D. Cockcroft in England.

The British Abwehr had been following German nuclear research closely for years and had also received news of the ongoing heavy water deliveries to Germany in 1941. Irving writes on page 137: "The reliable reports still came via Scandinavia and reached the desk of Corvette Captain Welsh, from whom they were passed on to Michael Perrin in the London office of 'Tube Alloys'; some of the best reports came from a Berlin scientist whose name we have already encountered in this book."

But a German patriot must be even more ashamed when Irving says: "As the Soviet armies advanced further west in January 1945, Gerlach had to decide to stop work on the heavy water pile in Berlin-Dahlem

and to move the rest of the institute to Hechingen in southern Germany. The professor asked his good friend Dr. Rosbaud to join him and told him on the morning of 29 January 1945 that he wanted to leave Berlin in the next day or two and take the 'heavy stuff' with him. Rosbaud asked if he meant that he wanted to take the heavy water to Heisenberg, who was already in southern Germany, and Gerlach did not deny this. When Rosbaud pressed him to say what Heisenberg wanted with the liquid, he only replied: "Perhaps business* . . .

Gerlach and Rosbaud discussed at length the danger that the heavy water could be destroyed. That same evening, Gerlach called Gauleiter Sauckel and told him about the planned transfer to Stadtilm. He arranged with Sauckel to visit him two days later.

In the late afternoon of January 31, Professor Gerlach, Dr. Diebner in his army uniform and Dr. Wirtz left the Harnack House in a

Wagons. Several trucks loaded with heavy water, uranium and other equipment followed shortly afterwards. . . . Despite all his efforts, Rosbaud could not find out their final destination; he stayed behind in Berlin and tried to inform the Englishmen Professor Blackett and Dr. Cockcroft (English secret service; the author) via his secret Norwegian intermediaries that the uranium and the heavy water had been taken out of Berlin; this message was followed by a request to Blackett to come as quickly as possible after the capitulation and bring these precious materials to safety." (Irving, p. 274 f.)

But in 1945 it was too late. The Russians were on the Oder, the Ardennes offensive had failed. Our nuclear physicists had not understood their hour of destiny and had missed it. They had the chance to earn the laurels of victory. But, as the above lines prove, they only thought of making their findings available to the enemy. Irving is right when he writes: "When Göring appointed a physicist to head the German project, it was clear that the project would remain without result. Gerlach had seen his appointment as a golden opportunity to regain German supremacy in the field of pure science, even in the midst of war.

An earlier analysis of German military research by the Allies stated as early as 1945: "German science was not without guile and took advantage of the lack of understanding of science among its leaders to engage in interesting research under the guise of war work that could not possibly help the war effort. In short, the behavior of the German scientific leaders proved that science could not be left to the scientists during the war In Germany, Heisenberg was the undisputed doyen of physicists, and Heisenberg was a theorist. He would probably have resigned in wartime and left the experimental physicists to take a greater share of the leadership of the project if the physicists around him had not advised him against it - especially v. Weizsäcker and Wirtz, who despised the achievements of all scientists who were not like them

(Wirtz had worked on the main patent for the uranium machine). But theoretical physicists were the furthest removed from industrial engineering and technology; this regrettable gap between science and industry had deprived German science of major industrial achievements such as the cyclotron (as a preliminary stage for the uranium pile; author's note) in 1940.

As a result of the hegemony of theoretical science in Germany, there was no immediate urgency for the uranium pile to become critical (i.e., to lead to the chain reaction as a prerequisite for an atomic bomb; author's note). Heisenberg's group was more interested in building up the solid theoretical foundations step by step and comparing them with the practical results they then obtained. Academically, this is a very satisfying approach, but it doesn't win a war . . .

Only when the German scientists heard the news of the atomic bomb on August 6, 1945, did they realize that they had also lost the war of physics . . .

Gerlach himself, in particular, was reproached for abandoning Germany in its hour of need: he could have forced the scientists to produce an atomic bomb, but he didn't. . .

The Americans, on the other hand, had thrown themselves wholeheartedly into the project even before Fermi's pile in Chicago became critical in December 1942, and had invested a thousand times more effort in their 'Manhattan project'. From mid-1942, Germany stood still until the end of the war. In these three years, insights were gained that could have been achieved in just as many months if the will had been there." (David Irving, "The Dream of the German Atomic Bomb", page 306 ff.)

In order to be recognized and treated as "internationally qualified scientists", these shameless saboteurs were prepared to deny their Germanness and become loyal servants of the enemy. This became apparent when the so-called Jagdkommandos, whose most urgent task was to win over scientists for their interests, followed immediately behind the victoriously invading Americans, British and Russians. Their sincerity and good will went so far that they retrieved the most secret documents from even the most hidden hiding places for the victors. Irving writes on page 293: "When the group was already about to leave Hechingen, v. Weizsäcker suddenly blurted out that the remaining reports of the German research program in

hanging in a sealed canister in the privy pit of his apartment. The hiding place was tracked down and the unsavory task of investigating the find was entrusted to Dr. Goudsmit (head of the Mission of the Allied Defense and Intelligence Services in liberated Europe; the author). Now the picture of German uranium research was complete, for the Abwehr mission now possessed the complete set of secret research reports, and with Gerlach's files they provided the history of the entire project." What had been withheld from the German Reich as a possible victory was now made available to the victors without hesitation. There can hardly be any doubt today that a nuclear bomb in the hands of the German military would not have led to the total capitulation and destruction of Europe with all the devastating consequences that are still visible today. A German atomic bomb would have been a means of forcing our enemies into a compromise peace. We Germans and Europeans would not be powerless today to resist the two atomic bombs. America and Soviet Russia on mercy and compassion.

I don't know how our nuclear physicists and nuclear chemists will cope with the shame of their betrayal and sabotage. Their moral guilt weighs very heavily. Or do our German scientists believe that they can allow themselves a different conscience than their colleagues on the enemy side? They never had such scruples. That was reserved for the German scientists alone.

While millions of Germans were starving in Allied prison and internment camps after the capitulation, millions of German women, children and old people were homeless, dying on country roads and perishing simply because they were German, our core researchers preferred to spend this critical period not as "Germans" but as "internationally recognized scientists" with all the advantages of such a status, until they placed their knowledge and skills at the disposal of our so-called liberators.

I have already mentioned the names of the nuclear scientists collected by the Western Allies at the beginning of this chapter, when the dispute arose among them after the American atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, as the Englishman Irving tells us. But the nuclear scientists captured by the Soviets also played their part in Russia becoming a nuclear power and getting its hands on the weapon that the same team had previously withheld from the German Reich government. Even if, as a result of abundant propaganda in the post-war period, people got into the habit of accusing the Third Reich of lacking freedom, which some nuclear scientists were unwilling to serve, they still had to pay their tribute to a far greater lack of freedom by working very diligently on the development of the Soviet atomic bomb.

Today's nuclear standoff between the two world powers is preventing Europe's freedom and independence. This cooperation would only be understandable and perhaps morally justified if they had done it as convinced Marxists and communists. Since this was certainly not the case, the serious question arises

The question of a double standard, which should have been unacceptable for so-called men of honor and educated people.

have to. I am thinking of the German scientist Professor Niikollaus Riehl, who has now found his home again at the Technical University in Munich. Irving says on page 299: "In 1949 he was still in the USSR. He received the Stalin Prize First Class, the Order of Lenin and was named a 'Hero of Socialist Labor' for work he did in Russia. For the next three years, he was the scientific director of a Soviet institute that conducted secret research into the chemistry of radioactive fission products and sought antidotes to radiation damage." Other well-known German collaborators in Soviet nuclear energy research were Manfred v. Ardenne, Gustav Hertz and Professor K. Pose. From 1953, the aforementioned gentlemen worked together with Professor Niikollaus Riehl on non-secret projects in Sukhumi. With the exception of Riehl, the other scientists returned to Sukhumi in 1955. Central Germany.

In Otto Hahn's memoirs "My Life" it says: "Colonel Pash (leader of the American hunting detachment; the author) informed us that our future had not yet been decided. But it depended on our sincerity and good will whether we *would be* treated 'as internationally recognized scientists' or as Germans'."

Otto Hahn received the Nobel Prize on December 10, 1945, a fact that was bound to astonish any thinking person. In his acceptance speech he declared: "The collection of monographs currently being prepared for publication in Germany at the suggestion of the Allies will probably show that German science by no means came to a standstill during the war, even if the work was often carried out under the motto 'important for the war' or even 'decisive for the war'. Thousands of young Germans have thus been saved for the new era . . . In reality, we also carried out our work during the war and brought it to publication. We are glad about that. But not everyone was able to do this. Not many people outside of Germany realize the pressure under which most of them have lived during the last ten or twelve years; and may I say once again how many of my German colleagues have made an effort despite all the external obstacles.

to continue pure scientific research during the war, as far as it was somehow possible."

What must a German front-line soldier think when he reads such statements? I am sure that later generations, who have not been educated by re-education, will view such statements about scientific work during the war with great skepticism. All this happened at a time when Germany seemed too strong politically and economically to our enemies and should therefore be destroyed. Can such men really say with their heads held high that they stood up for the vital rights of their people and thus earned the respect of their fellow citizens?

have? I think this will be difficult, and I believe that scientists of this kind, who presume to live in a different world, should in future be placed under supervision and control in critical situations, just like soldiers, so that they are forced to do their national duty. I cannot see that scientists should be given different rights and duties from those of an ordinary front-line soldier, who is simply required to sacrifice his life, whereas these gentlemen, while talking about war-critical work, sabotaged it and kept away from military service.

There were undoubtedly exceptions here too, such as the president of the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft, Dr. Albert Vogler, for whom military sabotage would have been inconceivable and who is also described by Irving as an outstanding chair actor. The same applies to Professor Paul Harteck, who, according to Irving, "could certainly have built an atomic bomb for Germany if he had been given the money, the manpower and the material and if he alone had been the decisive leader of the entire uranium project". We could no longer have been burdened with history, as we have been and will be for a long time to come.

But there was no powerful and ruthless coordinator who could have asserted himself in a dictatorial manner. There were too many traitors around him who were contaminated and infected. The physicist Weizsäcker was the son of Ernst v. Weizsäcker, who as State Secretary of the Foreign Office held a top position in the resistance group. The

Max Planck's son was also involved in the events of July 20. He was convicted and executed.

We learn from Otto Hahn that he and his friends were deeply shocked by the fate of the Bonhoeffer family, who were also connected with July 20. At a secret church meeting in 1941, Dietrich Bonhoeffer had declared "that he had to pray for the defeat of his people, because only through a defeat could the German people atone for the crimes they had committed against Europe and the whole world". The physicist and chemist Karl Friedrich Bonhoeffer was present when, at the beginning of 1940, Heisenberg and Dr. Karl Wirtz discussed the production of heavy water in the office of Dr. Döbner's office. His brother Claus was shot as a co-conspirator after July 20.

As is well known, on July 28, 1944, the I. G. Farben hydrogenation plant was destroyed by a bombing raid to such an extent that heavy water production at the Leuna plant came to a complete standstill. Directors Bütefisch and Herold were convinced that this heavy water plant had become known through betrayal and that the bombing had therefore been aimed specifically at this plant. So far, the "gentleman's agreement" not to attack the hydrogenation plants had been adhered to, as the Allied countries had made considerable investments in them. Since then, Leuna-Werke had refused to further expand a heavy water plant. Professor Harteck was astonished and annoyed by this. After the failure of the poorly secured Norsk hydro plant in Vemork, the destruction of this German plant practically meant the end of any hope of producing a German atomic bomb in the foreseeable future.

still be able to produce.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

After July 20, my name was all over the press and radio. The portrayal at the time made me appear as a model of German loyalty and fulfillment of duty. In captivity after the end of the war, I had no trouble or difficulties of any kind because of my role on July 20. It was rightly regarded as an internal German matter and my behavior as a soldier was respected, especially as it was noted that I came from the Bündische Jugend and had never belonged to the party. At that time, the victors did not appreciate resisters who felt and behaved like co-victors. They wanted to have won alone.

After my release from captivity as a prisoner of war, I was often called a bloodhound, a mass murderer and a Nazi general by the mass media and party people. But when I was denazified, I was classified in Group V and, following my complaint, as "not affected by the law". Then it was said for a while that I had done nothing at all on July 20 and was just making propaganda out of my behavior. Finally, I had to defend myself in court, claiming that I had originally been a co-conspirator and had then fallen over. Like everything else, this too was false.

I have the following to say about the claim that I gained personal advantages through my behavior on July 20, 1944. Goebbels had nominated me for the highest award in the war. At my express request, Adolf Hitler refrained from the intended conferral of this award. I considered the "Brillanten" to be an award for bravery of the highest degree and therefore did not want to receive it for a home campaign in which I and my troops had not done a single thing.

Only one shot had to be fired. I personally communicated this opinion to the Führer, who fully respected it. For the rest, I considered the uprising of July 20, which in truth was only an insignificant revolt, to be a stain on the badge of honor of the German officer corps, which I did not want to be remembered by an award.

Similarly, I declined the dotting of an estate in Mecklenburg, my homeland, with the remark that I was a soldier and hoped to remain one in the future. Apart from that, it seemed inappropriate to me to be rewarded with material goods for a fulfilled duty.

I was asked to accept the golden HJ pin. I agreed and received the golden youth pin personally from the Reichsjugendführer, Baldur v. Schirach, who, incidentally, had been in my old battalion "Großdeutschland" on the French campaign, because I was a model of bravery, loyalty and fulfillment of duty for the growing youth. I accepted this honor gratefully and out of conviction.

My promotion to colonel was due to the fact that, as was the case at the time

my promotion to lieutenant colonel was already available before July 20.

Just four weeks after July 20, I asked to return to the front. My request was granted. I was to take over the "Großdeutschland" fusilier regiment, which was fighting in M emel. But on the way there I was stopped by the Führer and personally ordered by him to take over the main regiment in Rastenburg as combat commander. For this purpose, I was to set up one of the most modern units, the Führer's escort brigade. As the Führer told me, a reliable and experienced front-line officer was needed in the Lötzen fortress area, especially since, according to agent reports, two enemy parachute divisions had to be expected to jump off. In addition, the Russians had advanced to the border of East Prussia and the Führer was determined to stay close to the front. I was later promoted to major general by Hitler himself in the Reich Chancellery on January 30, 1945, when I, together with my brigade, reported on the successful deployment during the Battle of the Bulge.

The troops, which in the meantime had been increased to an armored division, the Führer-Begleit-Division, were deployed as firefighters in the East.

If in the past the *rumor* was often spread that it was only through my intervention that a promising undertaking failed on July 20 and that I was therefore responsible for everything that happened from those days until the end of the war, then I am certainly being given too much credit. Personally, I am much more modest and only claim the merit of having so effectively dampened a putsch that had already failed from the outset that there was no more fratricidal struggle and the world was spared the miserable spectacle of an outbreak of the old familiar German discord in the greatest common distress. For in the camp of the Western and Eastern "victors", the fighters of the inner resistance may be officially celebrated and turned into compulsory exercises, but in their hearts they are despised, as I learned often enough during our captivity from the mouths of Allied officers. Even the Bundeswehr can only superficially come to terms with this issue.

The uprising - or rather the revolt - of July 20, 1944 did not fail because of my intervention, but because of the internal lack of purpose and conception of its heterogeneous organizers, visibly only a privileged aristocratic class that had been overcome, which was probably united in its rejection of Hitler, but completely divided on all other issues. The coup failed because it was started with unclear ideas, prepared with inadequate means and carried out with an almost shocking helplessness. It was also known that no relief had been promised in terms of foreign policy and that only unconditional capitulation remained open as an outcome.

But the cause of this technical and human failure lies - unfortunately it cannot be concealed - in the lack of personal courage shown by all those involved. Even a man like Colonel Stauffenberg, who was at the front for a short time, lacked any personal commitment in this matter, which would have been necessary for the success of such an undertaking, at least on the part of the assassin himself. No less a personage than Stauffenberg himself

His behavior - as already mentioned - put his conspirators and himself at risk. Instead of at least waiting for his bomb to explode near the counseling room and personally witness its effect, he preferred to leave the scene of the crime as soon as possible and, after his arrival in Berlin, to make a report to his co-conspirators and superiors, which he had not personally convinced himself was correct and which - as it later turned out - was a false report. _

What would have happened to a staff officer under completely normal circumstances who would have been guilty of such negligence in such an important matter, with incalculably serious consequences, is easy to assess. His end would probably not have been significantly different from that of Colonel Stauffenberg. For it was only as a result of his fatal report that the co-conspirators in Berlin and elsewhere were prompted to emerge from their previous disguise and take up their governmental activities, which they would probably have wisely refrained from doing if they had known about the actual outcome of the assassination. At the very least, if they believed they had already been discovered, they would have taken completely different measures. There was still the possibility of immediately replacing the failed assassination attempt with a new one, taking advantage of the general confusion. All this could have happened if Colonel von Stauffenberg had remained at the scene of the crime until the bomb was detonated and had convinced himself of the success of his undertaking.

But there was also another possibility. The inspector of the intelligence troops, General Fellgiebel, who was present in the Führer's headquarters, had received instructions from the conspirators to blow up the intelligence center immediately after the assassination attempt in order to initially cut off the entire headquarters from the outside world and prevent any personalities from the Führer's entourage from entering. In contrast to Stauffenberg, Fellgiebel initially waited to see the outcome of the operation. However, when he saw that the assassination attempt had failed and Hitler was alive, he did not - taking advantage of the confusion - grab his weapon to shoot down the dictator he hated so much, but instead hurried to the site of the catastrophe.

He came to congratulate the Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht on saving his life.

It will be remembered that the original plan of the conspirators was to place the bomb, which incidentally came from England, in the assault baggage of a lance corporal who was to demonstrate new field equipment to the Führer and who would inevitably have been blown to pieces if this plan had been carried out. Only the postponement of the planned demonstration saved the life of the completely unsuspecting man and his four companions. The plan here was the outright murder of innocent front-line soldiers, a monstrous act intended by stage warriors!

At this point, however, the decisive problem of July 20, 1944 becomes visible. Since the memory of mankind, officers and soldiers of the armed forces have been placed under a special obligation. The bearer of arms requires a firmer bond than the civilian citizen, not least for the protection of the non-combatant population. For it is all too easy for the soldier as

A troop without the binding force of discipline, which is ultimately tied to the oath of allegiance, becomes a marauder, a robber who dares to defy his own authorities. World history is full of examples of what happens to a force that no longer has the binding power of the oath. The Bundeswehr and the Federal Border Guard will not be able to do without the oath either. The only question that arises is how seriously it will be taken if the opinion is still held that the German soldier's loyalty to the oath in the Second World War was stupidity, if not worse, while oath-breaking deserves all praise.

The disruptions and riots by anarchists at the recent swearing-in ceremonies, as well as the reaction of those responsible, are the consequences of this mental confusion. Either we have an army with proven principles, or we abolish it. But if it is deemed necessary for the protection of the fatherland, there should be no discussion about formalities of military service. If I had been the commander in charge during such unworthy riots, I would have interrupted the swearing-in ceremony without asking the politicians responsible and

I would have used all the means at my disposal to drive the ruffians off the pitch with the recruits in such a way that they would have been taught a lesson for all time. The defense would have been all the more convincing and lasting afterwards.

An oath is an oath, it is hard to argue with that. Whoever shakes the oath is shaking the foundations of the world, and he must be aware that he is touching the last ties to which a person is able to cling in confused times. Certainly, there has been no lack of determined personalities in history who have dared to take a decisive step out of ultimate responsibility. But they only possessed the moral right to act if they were prepared to stand up for their cause with their whole person and, if necessary, to sacrifice themselves. The organizers of July 20, however, totally lacked this willingness, and they are also guilty of it. This is the reason why Colonel Teske was able to state in the "Rheinischer Merkur" on July 20, 1951: "The deed of July 20, 1944 and its promoters are unpopular in wide circles today." Little has changed to this day. "The public already has a hard enough time seeing July 20 as a hero's day." This is how Dr. Arthur Radtke (CDU) on July 15, 1966 in the Zurich newspaper "Weltwoche".

What's more, the main actors were all officers. It cannot be assumed that their plans were to keep Germany defenceless forever, in accordance with the victors' intentions. A renewed officer corps was to emerge from their actions. But how could this officer corps and the renewed Wehrmacht exist if the outcome of their existence was a breach of oath? Wouldn't this breach of oath also have to poison the minds of subsequent generations of soldiers and thus turn the army into the plaything of ambitious usurpers in the image of the late Roman legions? In any case, after Nuremberg, Landsberg and Tokyo, the future will be confronted with this problem often enough.

An officer who undertakes to take up arms against the bearer of the oath, to whom he himself, like the youngest recruit, has sworn an oath of loyalty and obedience before God, may not be able to protect himself and his

comrades, but above all the future generations of soldiers only

from the inevitable consequences of his deed by putting an end to his own life and thus taking the stain of his breach of oath with him to his grave.

These may be hard principles, but an armed force will hardly ever be able to dispense with such principles, for there are more serious matters at stake here than the brain of a newspaper writer or television commentator is able to grasp in a hurry; matters on which the security of human existence ultimately depends. Because none of the conspirators had the courage to carry out the assassination attempt with their own hands and then sacrifice themselves in the name of all, July 20th remained a revolt, a mere act of negation without a trace of a positive conception, a failed Köpenickiade as far as the external image was concerned. Until July 20, 1944, any visitor could appear at Hitler's with a pistol strapped around his waist, so it really wasn't difficult to draw a pistol.

I was left with the thankless task of completely extinguishing the dying flames. That this could be done without the use of force and that it was above all the army itself, without calling in other parts of the armed forces, that carried out the necessary clean-up at that hour fills me with pride even today. I *would* do the same thing again today in the same situation. I have no regrets.

Before and after July 20, 1944, 114 people were executed for treason, sabotage and subversion of military power, 28 were shot, 14 committed suicide and 4 died (see Appendix 9).

When loud complaints are now made about the severity of the sentence against the conspirators of July 20th, people deliberately do not want to remember that up to now in all belligerent states high : v erreaders *have been* treated as traitors to their country, that for example His Majesty's government in England during the First World War had Sir Roger Casement shot in the Tower because as an Irish freedom fighter he had made alliances with the Central Powers, while England was in a war with Germany in which Ireland was only forced to take part. It is also *deliberately* not remembered that the

French Prime Minister Clemenceau ordered indiscriminate mass shootings among the mutinous front divisions in the spring of 1917, as it seemed pointless to continue the war after the failure of the Nivelle offensive. One of the most inhumane acts after the war was carried out by the Americans under the responsibility of General Eisenhower and the British, when they ruthlessly handed over the Vlasov army and the Cossacks fighting under General von Pannwitz, i.e. anti-communist citizens of the Soviet Union who had fought on the side of Germany against Bolshevism, to their merciless Soviet executioners. They thus regarded Ukrainian, Cossack and Caucasian war volunteers who fought for their freedom on the German side as national perpetrators.

All the more reason to think about the justification of a harsh punishment, as there is no such thing as

conspirators of July 20th who were demonstrably prepared to betray their front comrades to the enemy, to sacrifice their lives, not only to accept the military defeat, but, like Fabian v. Schlabrendorff, who wrote in his book "Officers against Hitler" on page 38: "Our most urgent task was to prevent Hitler's success under all circumstances and by all means, even at the cost of a serious defeat for the Third Reich."

HOW little the conspirators had considered the course of events in the event of the success of their revolt can be seen unmistakably from the complete lack of a foreign policy concept. The putschists, like the responsible German leadership, were aware of the Casablanca resolutions. They were aware of our opponents' intentions of annihilation and, despite contacting the Western powers, they had no binding assurances that Germany would be treated with respect if their plans for a coup succeeded. In their own assessment of the situation, they must have been aware that this war was not being waged against Adolf Hitler's regime, but against the German people as a whole, and they nevertheless undertook to evoke a German fratricidal struggle, regardless of the consequences.

Above all, they knew that the West was determined not only to destroy German industry, but also to leave well over half of the German Reich's territory at the free disposal of its fiercest enemies, the Bolsheviks. Their decision to revolt was determined far less by love for the German nation than by blind hatred of Hitler. But no positive achievement has ever been born of blind hatred. If any proof of their indifference to the fate of the German nation had been needed, it was clearly provided to the German nation by the silence of the survivors in the face of the violent acts of the "victors".

There is no need to ask what would have happened if the July 20th operation had been successful. The German Eastern Front, which was engaged in the most difficult defensive battles, would undoubtedly have collapsed as a result of the civil war that necessarily broke out and the associated interruption of supplies. I myself received over 10,000 letters from German front-line fighters and from the Hei m at area, telling me that they would have turned their weapons against the HeimaSt warriors if even the suspicion of a rebellion had arisen in the area of the reserve army. Again and again the evil word of the stab in the back of the fighting front appeared. A collapse of the Eastern Front, however, would not only have meant the transportation of millions more German soldiers to the death camps of Russian captivity, but would also have prevented the evacuation of countless women and children who were resident in the eastern territories of the Reich or had been evacuated there as a result of the Western Allied air terror.

When Colonel General Jodl was asked by the Nuremberg judges why he had advocated the continuation of the war, he replied that this was the only way to keep millions of German women and children and the masses of the Eastern Army out of the hands of the Russians. The same

Grand Admiral Dönitz also held this view in Nuremberg, which only stupidity and malice can refute. Dönitz proved this historically through his actions. He deserves the unreserved gratitude of our people.

The further consequences of the collapse of the German eastern front can only be guessed at. What is certain is that the intention of the Soviet leadership was to create a fait accompli before the arrival of the Western Allies in Europe, i.e. to continue the advance to the Rhine in order to gain access to a premeditated pro-Soviet France. For the historiography of the decades to come will probably have to concede that only the dogged resistance of tattered German front divisions with their many volunteers from all European countries before Vienna, Prague, Wrocław and Szczecin in the May days of 1945 saved the rest of Europe from the final inundation by Bolshevism. The German problem has not only been a European one since today. From this point of view, too, this campaign was justified, and July 20 should also be viewed from this perspective. That is why history will one day prove right those who, then as now, recognized the unconditional fight for the preservation of the Reich and thus of Europe as the first of all tasks and who were prepared to consider their own blood and lives to be of little consequence. More than 150 years ago, when Prussian Germany collapsed before the storm of Napoleon and the freedom of Europe seemed lost, General Clausewitz declared that in an honorable downfall lies the promise of the future. It seems to me that it was we, the loyalists, who on July 20, 1944, chose the path of Unit I ergang in honor, and that we thereby created the conditions for a future ascent that will one day bring order and peace to the tormented continent, which the Allied victory seems to have pushed into the unattainable distance for the time being.